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By
Andrey A. Meleshevich

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For Alla Meleshevich

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List of Abbreviations

Estonia

CPE	Communist Party of Estonia
EKe (ECP)	Eesti Keskerakond (Estonian Center Party)
ERSP (ENIP)	Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei (Estonian National Independence Party)
KMÜ	Koonderakond ja Maarahva Ühendus (Estonian Coalition Party and Rural Union)
ER (PFE)	Eestimaa Rahvarinne (Popular Front of Estonia)

Latvia

CPLat	Communist Party of Latvia
LKDS	Latvijas Kristīgo Demokrātu Savienība (Latvian Christian Democratic Union)
LNNK	Latvijas Nacionālā Neatkarības Kustība (Latvian National Independence Movement)
LSP	Latvijas Sociālistiskā Partija (Latvian Socialist Party)
LTF (LPF)	Latvijas Tautas Fronte (Latvian Popular Front)
LZP	Latvijas Zaļā Partija (Latvian Green Party)
LZS	Latvijas Zemnieku Savienība (Latvian Farmers Union)
TB	Tēvzemei un Brīvībai (Fatherland and Freedom)
ZZS	Zaļo un Zemnieku Savienība (Union of Greens and Farmers)

Lithuania

CPLit	Communist Party of Lithuania
LCS	Lietuvos Centro Sajunga (Lithuanian Center Union)

LDDP	Lietuvos Demokratine Darbo Partija (Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party)
LKDP	Lietuvos Krikscioniu Democratu Partija (Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party)
LSDP	Lietuvos Socialdemokratu Partija (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party)
TS/LK	Tėvynės Sajunga/Lietuvos Konservatoriai (Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives)

Russian Federation

CPRF	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
KRO	Kongress Russkikh Obshchin (Congress of Russian Communities)
LDPR	Liberal'no-Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia)
NDR	Nash Dom - Rossiya (Our Home Is Russia)
NPSR	Narodno-Patrioticheskiy Soyuz Rosii (Popular Patriotic Bloc of Russia)
ORV	Otechestvo - Vsya Rossiya (Fatherland-All Russia)
PRES	Partiya Rossiyskogo Edinstva i Soglasiya (Party of Russian Unity and Accord)
SPS	Soyuz Pravykh Sil (Union of Rightist Forces)

Ukraine

CPU	Communist Party of Ukraine
NDP	Narodno-Demokratychna Partiya (Popular Democratic Party)
SPU	Sotsialistychna Partiya Ukrainy (Socialist Party of Ukraine)
SDPU (U)	Sotsial-Demokratychna Partiya Ukrainy (Ob"ednana) (Social Democratic Party of Ukraine - United)
UNA	Ukrains'ka Natsional'na Asambleya (Ukrainian National Assembly)
UNSO	Ukrains'ka Natsional'na Samooborona (Ukrainian Self-Defense Force)

USSR

CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union

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Introduction

Few events in modern history can rival the political, economic, and international transformations caused by the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, which concluded an unsuccessful and brutal social experiment that started in 1917. These epochal changes brought significant confusion and turmoil into the academic field once known as Sovietology. Suddenly, researchers faced not one relatively well-studied and stable country, but 15 increasingly unpredictable, largely unknown entities. Robert Campbell, former director of the Russian and Eastern European Studies Center at Indiana University, described the state of the field in the early 1990s: "Our wealth was in a knowledge of systems that don't exist any more. . . . That was a society that despite changes taking place was characterized by stasis. Once that ends, we have all these problems with transitions. That's something nobody knows how to study very well" (Barringer, 1993, B8).

Following the initial confusion among academics about how to deal with rapidly changing post-Soviet nations, most Western Sovietologists focused on the Russian Federation, overlooking the other former Soviet republics. As a result, the field of post-Soviet studies is dominated by Russia. In his article, "The First Decade of Post-Communist Elections and Voting," Joshua A. Tucker (2002) analyzes academic publications on the topic of post-Communist elections that appeared in 16 leading political science journals between 1990 and 2000. His findings are striking. Russian elections are exclusively examined in a major portion of research on post-Communist elections. The Russian Federation is the sole subject of almost 85 percent of all single-country studies of elections in the post-Soviet region. Tucker argues,

> *A similar pattern is present in book publication.* . . . [I]t should raise some red flags. If the field continues to develop in this direction, then there is a realistic danger that much of what we learn about elections and voting in the post-communist context will be based on our understanding of only one country, and one that is hardly representative of the lot. (2002, 278, emphasis added)

Tucker's analysis also demonstrates that post-Soviet studies are not only overshadowed by one country, but, in fact, lack a comparative perspective: "[T]he

field of political science seems to have collectively shied away from the opportunity to pursue comparative research" (ibid., 280). The author finds that of the 65 articles in his study devoted to the republics of the former Soviet Union, only 6, or 9 percent, compare two or more countries. All other investigations have a single-country focus.

The few studies that do attempt to understand and investigate cross-national comparisons among the former Soviet republics represent, as a rule, multiauthored collections. These books have all the advantages and disadvantages of a collaborative effort of multiple experts. On one hand, individual authors are very knowledgeable regarding their particular topics of interest. On the other hand, these studies lack a unified approach and comparisons across the case studies are hardly drawn. The multiauthored volume, *The Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova*, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (1997), serves as an example. Scholars who contributed to the project were given research guidelines for case studies. For example, they were asked to assess the strength of the countries' political parties and party systems. Although individual authors had attempted to address this question, the book lacks a consistent approach and cross-national comparisons. All scholars who contributed to the study underlined the weakness and fragility of political parties and party systems in the four countries. However, the investigation as a whole fails to address whether there are any differences in levels of political institutionalization of party systems in the countries that emerged after the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and, if so, what factors have caused relatively different degrees of party-system institutionalization in these countries.

In sum, the academic field of post-Soviet studies in political science currently suffers from several significant limitations: (1) it is dominated by one country; (2) it lacks a comparative perspective; and (3) it lacks a unified approach for consistent cross-national comparisons of the former Soviet republics. Our knowledge of post-Communist transitional societies would be greatly enhanced if social scientists pay more attention to all nations that achieved their independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

* * *

PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND OUTLINE

This book attempts to close some of the gaps left by previous post-Soviet studies. It conducts a systematic multiple-country and multiple-election examination of political institutions in the five former Soviet republics: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. The study starts with the

assumption that the strength or weakness of a party system serves as an important determinant of whether democracy has a potential for survival: "[T]he historical evidence . . . suggests that the crucial consideration for democracy is . . . the degree of party institutionalization. All of our cases call attention to the institutional strength or weakness of parties as a determinant of success or failure with democracy, and each of them grapples with the problem of institutionalization" (Diamond and Linz, 1989, 21). The two central questions of this project are as follows: Are there differences in the levels and dynamics of institutionalization of party systems in the former republics of the Soviet Union? What factors determine the different degrees of political institutionalization in these countries?

The book has two parts. Part 1 consists of six chapters and measures party-system institutionalization in the five post-Soviet countries. Chapter 1 presents a critical analysis of different approaches to political institutionalization discussed in the literature. It also develops a detailed set of conceptual criteria and operational indicators suitable for cross-country longitudinal empirical analysis of levels and dynamics of party-system institutionalization. In the analysis of the institutionalization of a party system, two broad criteria are concerned: *autonomy* and *stability*. *Autonomy* requires that the institutionalized organization should have an independent status and value of its own vis-à-vis its external environment. Three indicators are employed for measuring *autonomy*: (1) the role of political parties in the recruitment into the legislative branch of government; (2) the role of political parties in the formation of the executive branch; and (3) the strength of the party and the uniformity of this strength in different regions across the country. The second dimension, *stability*, suggests that the system should demonstrate regular patterns of interaction between its elements, and this is measured by the percentage of the vote share in a legislative election taken by the parties that participated in any previous electoral contest and by Pedersen's index of electoral volatility. Chapter 1 serves as a theoretical framework for the next five chapters that examine and assess the degree of party-system *autonomy* and *stability* in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine.

Chapter 2 investigates patterns of legislative recruitment in the five nations. One of the principal, distinctive functions of a party system in a democracy is to recruit politicians into legislative bodies. If a national parliament consists largely of members with previous careers within political parties, then a party system is likely to have a high level of *autonomy*. Conversely, if the system includes numerous parties whose representatives in the legislature have not had prior party careers, then its degree of *autonomy* is bound to be low. In countries that employ a proportional representation system, it is useful to assess electoral lists of political parties participating in elections. In countries that use a majoritarian formula, a percentage of seats held by

independents in a national parliament is employed as an indicator of *autonomy*. Chapter 3 extends the analysis by investigating patterns in the formation of the cabinet. The second indicator of *autonomy* deals with another important function of a party system: recruitment of politicians into the executive branch of government. It assesses the relationship between the party system and the Cabinet of Ministers. In an institutionalized party system, a cabinet must be formed by a winning party or a coalition of parties. The party system displays low *autonomy* if the top executive officers in a country are not affiliated with political parties, especially those parties that occupy a significant percentage of seats in the legislature.

Chapter 4 deals with the regional pattern of party strength and uses the coefficient of variability to measure the electoral support for major national parties across the entire territory of the country. A party system consisting of organizations that are distinctly divided according to territorial lines, merely expressing the interests of certain regions, and not having significant support in others lacks *autonomy* and institutionalization across the nation. In an institutionalized party system, as a rule, political parties should have a relatively even electoral support in different parts of the country. *Stability* of a party system as the second dimension of institutionalization is assessed in chapter 5. It is measured by two statistical indexes ("old" parties' volatility index and Pedersen's index of electoral volatility), which address different aspects of electoral volatility of the party system. Chapter 6 concludes the first part of the book project and summarizes the findings of the previous four chapters. The main conclusion is that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine reveal strikingly different patterns of institutionalization of their party systems.

Part 2 attempts to explain different dynamics and levels of political institutionalization in the five nations. Chapter 7 explores the role of the old Communist elites in the late 1980s and the early 1990s during the genetic stage of party-system formation in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine. By combining the comparative historical sociological perspective with organizational theory, it examines how the behavior and policies of the individual or the group decision makers were able to articulate institutional objectives, establish an organization's foundation, and define its framework in the process of post-Communist institution building.

Chapter 8 makes a contribution to the current presidents versus parliaments debate. It focuses on a somewhat narrow issue concerning the relationship between the type of government and the formation of the party system in the post-Soviet countries. The chapter provides new evidence to support the mainstream argument that the presidential form of government is less conducive to the development of a meaningful multiparty system and democratic consolidation in general. However, the book also shows that not

all accusations made in the literature against presidentialism in transitional countries are supported by empirical evidence drawn from the five post-Soviet states. Chapter 9 assesses the importance of different electoral arrangements in the development of the post-Soviet party systems. It examines which electoral rules and procedures are more favorable for the creation of strong parties and the establishment of a meaningful competitive party system. It also shows that similar electoral arrangements tend to produce different political consequences in transitional post-Soviet countries as compared to advanced Western democracies. Chapter 10 explores the post-Communist phenomenon of parties of power and their effect on the overall development of the party systems in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine. For the most part, these short-lived and nonideological political formations, which comprise central and regional representatives of political and industrial elites, harm institutionalization of political parties and contribute to high levels of electoral volatility.

* * *

Country Selection

From the methodological point of view, Tucker's finding about a lack of cross-national comparative studies of the post-Soviet nations is surprising. The countries emerging after the disintegration of the Soviet Union present the researcher a unique and exciting opportunity—one of those rare examples in political science when history creates "near-experimental" conditions. Neil J. Smelter states, "The more similar two or more [cases] are with respect to crucial variables . . . the better able is the investigator to isolate and analyze the influence of other variables that might account for the differences he wishes to explain" (as cited in Lijphart, 1994, 78). Indeed, a comparative study of post-Soviet nations allows the researcher to neutralize certain factors shared by all of these countries in the recent past and still common to them. At the same time, the "most-similar-system" design, undoubtedly relevant to post-Soviet nations, allows the researcher to focus on the influence of those interactive variables he/she wishes to study. For these reasons, one would expect a greater number of comparative political investigations of the post-Soviet region.

Five countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine—have been selected for this study based on three criteria: (1) the availability of electoral data sufficient for the purposes of the longitudinal analysis; (2) reasonably free and fair parliamentary elections; and (3) the sovereignty of the nation over its territory. For example, a lack of comparable voting statistics with constituency breakdown for the 1994 and 1998 elections to the Moldovan national legislature and breakaway Transnistria Region prevented

the inclusion of this country in my investigation. Belarus and most other former Soviet republics were excluded from the study as these countries do not correspond to the second criterion.

On the one hand, the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine used to be a part of the same state, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, which disintegrated in 1991. They had similar economic (highly centralized central-planned economy and public ownership on the means of production), political (one-party rule, lack of a competitive party system, meaningful election, and civil society), and social conditions (active role of the state in the redistribution of income and a relatively high level of social protection of the population). The five nations represent the same geographical region, the European part of the former Soviet Union. All of them declared as their goal the establishment and consolidation of a free market economy and democratic political regime.

On the other hand, during the process of democratic transition these nations have developed distinct institutional frameworks, including different types of electoral formulas and governmental systems. For example, Estonia and Latvia combine the proportional representation model and a parliamentary republic. Both Lithuania and Russia adopted a mixed PR/majority electoral formula. Ukraine used the majority run-off elections in single-member districts for its founding elections and then switched to the mixed formula. The institution of the presidency is an extremely powerful, predominant force in the Russian political system. Until 2006, a strong president shared power with two other bodies of government: the parliament and the cabinet in Ukraine. The Lithuanian system, which combines a directly elected president and a prime minister who depends on parliamentary support, is leaning toward parliamentarism in practice. During the formative stage of their national party systems, political elites in the five nations conducted distinctly different policies toward emerging non-Communist political organizations. The Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine also developed different models with different roles for *nomenklatura* (i.e., a list of senior positions in the Communist countries and appointees to these offices that required a prior approval by the Communist Party) and parties of power in their political systems. These four variables (the role of political elites, type of government, electoral system, and the place of parties of power) serve as explanatory factors of different levels of political institutionalization in the five nations.

Although the empirical material in the present study covers a 15-year period from the late 1980s to mid-2004, the author has also attempted to incorporate the most recent academic literature available after the data collection stage of the research was concluded.

PART I

Measuring Political Institutionalization in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine

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CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND OPERATIONAL INDICATORS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION

TWO WAVES OF THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION RESEARCH

USING SOMEWHAT TRITE "WAVE" TERMINOLOGY ONE MAY STATE that the concept of political institutionalization research is currently experiencing its second wave. The first wave rose and then receded as a part of the political modernization approach in the 1960s and 1970s. The theory of political institutions was introduced by Samuel P. Huntington in his pioneering article in 1965 titled "Political Development and Political Decay." For the first time in political science, in this work, as well as in his seminal *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Huntington explicitly emphasized the importance of political institutions for a modern society: "[T]he achievement or maintenance of a high level of community becomes increasingly dependent upon . . . the strength and scope of its political institutions" (1968, 10).[1] Huntington approached a study of institutionalization in a broad manner arguing that his theory may be used to explore diverse social organizations and procedures. Influenced by Huntington's analysis, numerous scholars applied his model to a variety of institutions: a national legislature (Polsby, 1968), an international decision-making body (Keohane, 1969), political participation (Brass, 1969), a new independent country (Perlmutter, 1970), political roles in a

society (Hopkins, 1971), an individual political party (Farr, 1973), party systems in general (Janda, 1970, 1980; Welfling, 1973), political elites (Robins, 1976), and local communities (Kjellberg, 1975).

After the decline of the developmental approach and the establishment of the undisputed dominance of the behavioral paradigm in political science, which portrayed formally organized social institutions "simply as arenas within which political behavior, driven by more fundamental factors, occurs," (March and Olsen, 1984, 734) studies of political institutionalization virtually disappeared from many major journals in this academic field. The renewed interest for institutions has developed "in reaction to the excesses of the behavioral revolution" (Scott, 1995, 7). Two influential volumes by Douglass North and Angelo Panebianco, as well as the rich empirical foundation provided by democratic transitions in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and other parts of the world have contributed to the emergence of the second wave of the political institutionalization research and the rebirth of the institutional analysis of political parties in the early 1990s.

The publication of *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* in 1990 by Douglass North, who three years later was awarded the Nobel Prize for economics, brought institutional analysis back to the mainstream research agenda in social sciences. North is often credited as the father of the "new" institutional theory, which emphasizes a more autonomous role for institutions "without denying the importance of both the social context of politics and the motives of individual actors" (March and Olsen, 1984, 738). In addition to economics, several variations of the "new institutionalist" theoretical approaches received recognition in political science, sociology, and organizational theory.[2]

About the same time Douglass North produced his influential volume, the institutional approach to the study of parties received an additional boost after the publication of Angelo Panebianco's *Political Parties: Organization and Power* in 1988, which became an instant classic in the political parties literature soon after its release. In his own words, Panebianco attempted to "adapt the theory of institutionalization to the case of political parties . . . in order to permit a dynamic analysis of the organizational development of parties" (1988, xvii). In fact, this "outstanding contemporary work" (Ware, 1996, 94) became an indispensable reference source for most of the published research on political parties conducted in the institutional perspective.

The global movement to democracy at the end of the twentieth century has also contributed to the second wave of the political institutionalization research, changing its scope and creating a more focused theory of institutionalization. Unlike the first wave, when researchers applied the theory of political institutionalization to a variety of organizations and procedures, political

parties and party systems have become the primary focus of the contemporary institutional analysis (e.g., Dix, 1992; Lewis, 1994; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Filippov and Shvetsova, 1995; Jin, 1995; McGuire, 1997; Morlino, 1998; Levitsky, 1998; Mainwaring, 1999; Moser, 2001a; Bielasiak, 2002; Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Gunter and Hopkin, 2002; and van Biezen, 2003).[3] This heightened academic interest in political parties is not surprising. A rare consensus among the overwhelming majority of scholars holds that an institutionalized party system is a necessary, though not sufficient, factor of a successful democratic transition and consolidation. Huntington states, "[A] primary criterion for democracy is equitable and open competition for votes between political parties without government harassment or restriction of opposition groups" (1996, 17). The underlying premise of the academic research in this genre is to develop theoretical models for the study of political institutionalization, understand the reasons for diverse levels of party and party system strength achieved by different nations, contribute to the exploration of the institution-building process, and perhaps predict the success or failure of a democratic experiment in individual transitional countries.

* * *

Approaches to Political Institutionalization

Huntington's Criteria of Institutionalization

Some of the most important questions that attracted the attention of scholars focus on the nature and process of political institutionalization, its defining criteria, as well as the ways of its operationalization and measurement (see table 1.1). This critical overview of different approaches to political institutionalization begins with Samuel Huntington and his two early works on the subject. Huntington defines institutionalization as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (1968, 12) and proposes *adaptability/rigidity, complexity/simplicity, autonomy/subordination*, and *coherence/disunity* as its four dimensions. He argues that *adaptability*, which is "a function of environmental challenge and age," can be measured in three ways: (1) chronological age: "the longer an organization has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization" (ibid., 13); (2) generational age: the more often an organization has experienced a peaceful succession of one set of leaders by another, the more highly institutionalized it is; and (3) functional terms: an organization that has survived one or more changes in its principal functions is more highly institutionalized than one that has not. The indicators of the second criterion of political institutionalization—*complexity/simplicity*—are multiplication and differentiation of organizational subunits and functions, as well as the significance of personalism. In the latter

Table 1.1 Criteria of Political Institutionalization Proposed by Selected Scholars

Author(s)/ Subject of Study	Dimensions of Political Institutionalization														
	Adaptability	Complexity	Autonomy	Coherence	Boundary	Universalistic Practices	Differentiation	Durability	Stability	Scope	Systemness	Stable Roots in Society	Legitimacy	Party Organization	Value Infusion	Reification
Huntington (1965,1968) Political institutions	√	√	√	√												
Polsby (1968) U.S. House of representatives		√			√	√										
Keohane (1969) UN General Assembly			√				√	√								
Welfling (1973) African party systems	√				√				√	√						
Panebianco (1988) European political parties			√								√					
Mainwaring and Scully (1996) Latin American party systems									√			√	√	√		
Randall and Svåsand (2002) Parties and party systems			√								√				√	√

case, the least stable and institutionalized political organization is that "which depends on one individual" (ibid., 18).

The discussion of *autonomy/subordination* seems to be the most comprehensive among Huntington's four criteria. For him, *autonomy* is "the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior" (ibid., 20). The author suggests that *autonomy* can be measured by the "distinctiveness of the norms and values of organization compared with those of other groups, by the personnel controls (in terms of coaptation, penetration and purging) existing between the organization and other groups" (Huntington, 1965, 405). He also argues that a political organization that serves as "the instrument of a social group—family, clan, class—lacks *autonomy* and institutionalization" (1968, 20). For example, a political party that reflects the interests of only one group in society is less autonomous than one that expresses the interests of several social groups. Another indicator of an institutionalized political system is the availability of mechanisms that restrict the entry of new groups and individuals into politics "without becoming identified with the established political organizations" (ibid., 21). In an institutionalized political system the recruitment of leadership occurs from within the organization.

Perhaps Huntington's least elaborated element of political institutionalization is *coherence/disunity*. In fact, he has neither defined this dimension nor proposed any precise indicators for its operationalization. Although in his original article he stated that "coherence can be measured by the ratio of contested successions to total successions, by the cumulation of cleavages among leaders and members, by the incidence of overt alienation and dissent within the organization, and, conceivably, by opinion surveys of the loyalties and preferences of organization members," (1965, 405) he has never explained or developed these vague measures. Not surprisingly, his *Political Order in Changing Societies*, which includes the almost complete version of the original article, "Political Development and Political Decay," omits the passage where Huntington attempts to propose how this criterion of institutionalization can be measured.

* * *

CRITIQUES OF HUNTINGTON'S CRITERIA

Although scholars in political science recognize Huntington's contribution to the study of political institutions, his criteria and indicators of institutionalization have been criticized. Some authors argue that Huntington's dimensions of institutionalization "don't seem very useful in empirical analysis" (Panebianco, 1988, 286) and "require a more rigorous operationalization" (Morlino, 1998, 23).

No doubt that the proposed conceptual framework would be strengthened if accompanied by a set of precise indicators that allow the criteria of institutionalization to be measured. Unfortunately, most of Huntington's measures (e.g., *complexity*: number and variety of subunits of organization; *autonomy*: distinctiveness of norms and values of the organization and dependence on one social group or class lack this precision, and one of his dimensions (*coherence*) is not accompanied by any indicators in *Political Order in Changing Societies*.

Another important critique of the conceptual scheme offered by Huntington questions his dimensions of political institutionalization themselves. For example, it is argued that *complexity* and *adaptability* may serve as partial indicators of broader concepts and should not "be placed at the same level of analysis as *autonomy* and *durability*" (Keohane, 1969, 863). Other authors reject some of Huntington's criteria as unnecessary for determining levels of institutionalization. For example, Mary B. Welfling rejects *complexity* as part of institutionalization because "systems with different levels of complexity could be institutionalized, and thus complexity does not appear to be a defining characteristic of institutionalization" (1973, 13). Still other scholars criticize Huntington's four-dimensional model for "conflating causes and effects . . . leading to charges that the model is tautological" (Randall and Svåsand, 2002, 12).

* * *

Alternative Approaches to Political Institutionalization

Scholars who study political institutions have tried to take into account the weaknesses of Huntington's dimensions and indicators of institutionalization. Essentially, this has been done in two ways. Some authors have employed the original conceptual framework and further elaborated with a set of operational indicators (Robins, 1976; Dix, 1992). For example, Robert Dix applies Huntington's criteria of institutionalization and employs a variety of both the original and more feasible new measures to explore political party systems in Latin American countries. He uses empirical, chronological age, generational age, change in functional roles from opposition to government (*adaptability*), Rae's index of fractionalization (*coherence*), as well as more judgmental indicators, personality-dependent parties, multiplication of organizational subunits (*complexity*), and presence of "catch-all" parties (*autonomy*), to compare the degree of institutionalization of party systems in the Latin American region in the 1960s and the 1980s.

Other authors have either modified Huntington's original dimensions or created their own framework of political institutionalization. A well-known work in this genre is Nelson Polsby's (1968) study of the U.S. House of

Representatives in which he provides a research framework for investigation of institutionalization of a legislative body. Polsby employs three criteria: *boundary*, *complexity*, and *universalistic rules of decision making*. The first dimension of institutionalization, *boundary*, means that an organization "is relatively well-bounded, that is to say, differentiated from its environment, its members are easily identifiable . . . its leaders are recruited principally from within the organization" (ibid., 145).[4] The second element, which deals with multiplication of the number and variety of organizational subunits, is similar to Huntington's criteria of *complexity*. The final measure of institutionalization is *universalistic patterns of behavior*, meaning that "the organization tends to use universalistic rather than particularistic criteria, and automatic rather than discretionary methods for conducting its internal business," precedents and rules are followed, and merit systems replace favoritism (ibid., 145).

Following Polsby's article, Robert Keohane also attempted to apply the concept of institutionalization to a collective decision-making body. In his study of the UN General Assembly he developed a new set of criteria of political institutionalization: *autonomy*, *differentiation*, and *durability*. According to Keohane, all of his three chief dimensions deal with relationships between the organization and its environment: *differentiation* refers to "organizational distinctiveness from its environment," "whereas *durability* and *autonomy* reflect interactions between organizational capabilities and environmental pressures" (1969, 862). The author believes that *autonomy*, which indicates the ability of the organization to withstand environmental pressures and make decisions independently, is "the most important and complex of the three variables" that he has identified as components of institutionalization (ibid., 866). Keohane seconded several of Huntington's indicators of *autonomy*, and added one more (the last entry in the following list): (1) distinctiveness of organizational norms and values; (2) personnel control; (3) control of material resources; and (4) impact of organizational norms on political process.

Taking into account the argument that components of institutionalization have to be accompanied by some distinct operational indicators in order to have some value for empirical research, Keohane's criterion of *differentiation* seems unnecessary. As a matter of fact, both its indicators—"experience of personnel" and "promotion takes place within the organization"—are completely identical to *autonomy* indicators of personnel controls: "the analysis of experience" and "promotion patterns."

Keohane considers *durability*, which refers to "the tendency of an organization to persist over time" (ibid., 862), as the third ingredient of institutionalization. He proposes to measure this dimension by (1) the level of acceptance: number of members, the willingness of the government to support the organization, etc.; (2) simple adaptability: Huntington's chronological age, generational age,

and change in principle functions; and (3) system *stability*: no precise indicators are offered.

* * *

STUDIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

Any scholar who studies institutionalization of political parties and party systems faces the problem of the unit of analysis. Should the main emphasis of a study be on individual political parties, party systems, or both? Are there any differences between institutionalization of single parties and party systems? The mainstream literature on the subject does not, in fact, differentiate between institutionalization of these two units. Beginning with the seminal works by Samuel Huntington, most publications approach institutionalization of individual parties and party systems interchangeably: "the implication being that the institutionalization of single parties must contribute to the overall institutionalization of the party system" (Randall and Sväsand, 2002, 6). I support the preceding argument. Although the thesis of the *unevenness* of political institutionalization (i.e., a party system might consist of individual parties at drastically different levels of institutionalization) is certainly valid in the post-Communist setting, the institutionalization of the party system directly depends on that of individual parties.[5] Since individual political parties constitute integral parts of the whole party system, institutionalization of separate parties as well as institutionalization of interaction patterns among the elements of the party system contribute to the overall institutionalization of the party system.

Although a number of scholars employed the concept of institutionalization in their studies of political parties during the first wave, these institutions have become the primary focus of the political institutionalization research in the past two decades. This discussion will be focused on the selected works by Mary B. Welfling, Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, and Angelo Panebianco, which are the most useful for my conceptual framework. The first two volumes constitute comparative analyses of political party systems in African and Latin American countries respectively. Although the authors of these two studies arrived at somewhat different sets of institutionalization criteria, their theoretical frameworks contain several identical dimensions and indicators of the concept. For example, they name *stability* in the rules and the nature of interparty competition as an essential element of institutionalization. Moreover, both analyses employ a somewhat similar indicator to operationalize this dimension. Welfling developed the index of "legislative instability," which measures "the yearly changes in the percentage of seats held for each party" (1973, 20). Mainwaring and Scully use Pedersen's index of electoral

volatility to measure the criteria of *stability*. This index will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter and in chapter 5.

Among Welfling's other components of institutionalization are (1) *boundary*, or differentiation of the system from its environment, as measured by the percentage of seats in a legislature held by independent members; (2) *scope*, which means that "an institutionalized system has an impact of some significance on its environment" (ibid., 22), indicated by geographical patterns of voting and electoral turnout; and (3) *adaptability*, which is operationalized by the indicators of "electoral discrimination," "arrests," "registration refusals," and "single legal party."

Unlike Welfling, who did not differentiate between democratic, authoritarian, or tribal political rule, Mainwaring and Scully focus their discussion on democratic party systems. Along with *stability*, they specify three other major characteristics for an institutionalized party system: *stable roots in society, legitimacy*, and *party organization*.[6] The second dimension (i.e., in an institutionalized system parties must develop *stable roots in society*) closely relates to the criterion of *stability*. According to the authors, these two components are nevertheless separable: "Whereas the first dimension looks at stable overall patterns in interparty competition, this one addresses linkages between parties, citizens, and organized interests" (1995, 9).[7] The second criterion of institutionalization is measured by (1) the difference between presidential and legislative voting; (2) linkages between organized interests and parties; and (3) the percentage of the vote in a legislative election captured by older parties.[8]

The last two dimensions of institutionalization are *legitimacy*, that is, parties and elections should be perceived as "the means of determining who governs," and *party organization*, which "must be relatively solid in countries with institutionalized party systems," (ibid., 14, 15–16) lack a clear means of operationalization. The reader has to rely on the opinion of the authors to determine the level of institutionalization relative to these criteria. In fact, except for Mainwaring and Scully's first dimension (*stability*), all of their other criteria of political institutionalization are not accompanied by precise indicators. As I show in the discussion of the operationalization problem later in this chapter, on several occasions it is not clear why the levels of institutionalization of the analyzed countries were ranked as they were.

In his detailed and insightful study of several European parties, Angelo Panebianco suggests that institutionalization, or "the way the organization solidifies" and "becomes valuable in and of itself" (1988, 49, 53), is crucial for the survival of a political party. He argues that institutionalization "can be measured on two scales: (1) that of the organization's degree of autonomy *vis-á-vis* its environment, and (2) that of its degree of systemness, i.e., the degree of interdependence of its different internal sectors" (ibid., 55). The degree of *autonomy* of an organization is closely associated with the degree of

differentiation of its boundaries: "the more autonomous the organization, the more defined its boundaries" (ibid., 56). The author suggests that a party with a high degree of *autonomy* "directly controls its financial resources (through membership), dominates its collateral associations, . . . possesses a developed central administrative apparatus, chooses leaders from within, its public assembly representatives are controlled by the party leaders, . . . its electoral lists [do not] include candidates sponsored by interest groups who have never had previous careers within the party" (ibid., 56–57).

Another of Panebianco's elements of institutionalization, the degree of *systemness*, deals with the level of centralization of the organization and control over organizational subgroups. More stringent control over subunits by a central apparatus leads to a homogeneous and, hence, more institutionalized organization. On the contrary, a lack of centralized control results in varied subgroups, heterogeneous organization, and a low degree of *systemness*.

As follows from this discussion, there is a great deal of disagreement among scholars concerning the ways of conceptualizing the criteria of political institutionalization, their operationalization and measurement. Some authors analyze essentially the same elements of institutionalization under different names. Thus, Huntington's *complexity* and Mainwaring and Scully's *party organization* address the same issue. Others use the same labels to study somewhat different phenomena: for example, Huntington and Welfling use the same term, *adaptability*, but define it differently. To confuse things even more, there are other political scientists who employ similar indicators to study and measure different dimensions of political institutionalization. For instance, if Panebianco studies party discipline as one of the indicators of the degree of *autonomy*, Mainwaring and Scully employ the same indicator to explore their dimension of *party organization*.

* * *

Using Institutionalization to Study Political Parties

Although no scholars have arrived at the same set of dimensions of political institutionalization, two broad areas of consensus concerning the elements of this concept seem to emerge from our analysis: the study of institutionalization of a political organization or procedure calls for a discussion of its *autonomy* and *stability*.

Autonomy

Autonomy as a dimension of political institutionalization was originally suggested by Samuel Huntington (1965, 1968) and developed by other scholars

(Keohane, 1969; Panebianco, 1988; and Randall and Svåsand, 2002). It requires that the institutionalized organization should have an independent status and value of its own *vis-à-vis* its external environment.[9]

Political parties and party systems play a number of vital roles in a democracy. Parties share some of these functions with other social institutions. For example, parties besides serving as agents of political socialization also serve as a linkage between individuals and the political system. However, in a democracy with a healthy civil society, many other groups fulfill similar tasks. In addition to the shared functions, parties also have a number of social niches unique to this type of political organization. Among the most important functions of a party in a democratic setting are its participation in elections and the recruitment of political leaders into the legislative arena. These features differentiate a political party from an interest pressure group, which is not supposed to nominate candidates to compete in elections for public office. Another distinctive function of the party system is the recruitment of politicians into the executive branch of government. Mainwaring and Scully argue that "in an institutionalized party system, parties are key actors in determining access to power, open elections must be the real process in determining who governs, and main actors must see them as such" (1995, 5). These two functional niches, electoral participation and cabinet formation, belong to the "exclusive domain" of parties (Katz, 1987, 5) and make them structurally distinct from other political institutions and social groups. The higher the degree to which a party system fulfills its unique missions and acts autonomously from other social institutions, the more highly institutionalized it is.

I agree with Huntington that an institutionalized and highly autonomous political party should not simply express the interests of a particular social group. A party that serves as the instrument of a specific class or clan lacks *autonomy* (Huntington, 1968, 20). It would also demonstrate a low level of political institutionalization if it is distinctly split along territorial lines, draws its exclusive support from a certain geographical region, and does not express interests of other regions.

Some scholars conceive institutionalization in terms of the organization's boundaries, that is, the level of differentiation of the system from its environment. Although Huntington never mentions the term boundary, he implicitly discusses it as a part of his *autonomy* dimension: "[W]here the political system lacks autonomy, [new] groups gain entry into politics without becoming identified with the established political organizations or acquiescing in the established political procedures" (ibid., 21). In fact, the line between these two concepts, *autonomy* and boundary, is so fine that some authors use them interchangeably and do not differentiate between them at all (Opello, 1986; Hibbing, 1988). Panebianco is correct when he argues that an autonomous organization has clearly defined boundaries: "A very dependent organization,

on the other hand, is one whose boundaries are undefined: many groups and/or associations formally outside the organization are really part of it . . . and 'cross' its formal boundaries in a more or less concealed faction" (1988, 56).

Although most scholars recognize that *autonomy* is an essential element of political institutionalization, a few disagree. For example, Kenneth Janda argues, "[A] party can be highly institutionalized and yet lack independence of other groups (Huntington's autonomy)—as the Labour Party in Great Britain" (1980, 19). However, recent developments in British party politics contradict Janda's argument. As a result of social changes in British society in the past several decades, that is, the movement of the electorate toward the political center and growth of the middle class, the Labour Party was unable to successfully compete with the Conservatives for four electoral cycles. This was partially a result of its excessive dependence on the Trade Unions. Tony Blair's "Third Way" ideology, a textbook example of the Downsian spatial model of party competition, enhanced the *autonomy* of the Labour Party by decreasing trade union influence within the party and appealing to a broader stratum of British society.

STABILITY

The second broad dimension of political institutionalization, *stability*, suggests that the system should demonstrate regular patterns of interaction between its elements. Thus, for many social scientists, institutionalization primarily connotes stability and persistence over time (Stinchcombe, 1968; Scott, 1995). Huntington defines institutions as "stable . . . patterns of behavior," and institutionalization as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire . . . stability" (Huntington, 1968, 12). Proponents of systems analysis in political science emphasize *stability* in interactions among subunits as an important attribute of a political system (Almond, 1956). I agree with these authors; by definition, *stability* of a political organization is a necessary characteristic of its institutionalization: the more stable the system, the more highly institutionalized it is.

Although the model of political institutionalization presented here designates *autonomy* and *stability* as two dimensions of a single concept, they address its two different aspects. *Autonomy* is related to the external aspect of party-system institutionalization. It examines the interaction of the party system with its environment and state structures, its "external relations with other parts of the polity, . . . with the society in which it is embedded" (Randall and Svåsand, 2002, 7, 12). *Stability* deals mostly with the internal aspects of institutionalization, referring to the patterns of interaction between individual parties as elements of the party system.[10]

External *autonomy* and internal *stability* of a party system may partially overlap; for example, higher *autonomy* may lead to higher *stability* and vice versa. In a consolidated democratic regime, *stability* and *autonomy* of a party system are likely to accompany one another. Usually, in such states two or more political parties are well known to the population, serve as vehicles for political recruitment, and have relatively solid electoral support spread more or less evenly across the country. Regular entry into politics of influential new groups is rare and is caused, as a rule, by extraordinary circumstances. However, in new democracies *autonomy* and *stability* are not necessarily going in the same direction. Contrary to consolidated democracies, transitional countries might demonstrate different patterns of interaction within their political party systems. Their highly fragmented party systems might lack *autonomy* and either manifest some regularity of party competition patterns or be unstable. Party systems in other transitional countries may move toward greater *autonomy*, but, at the same time, demonstrate higher levels of instability due to the changing configuration of political forces—emergence or disappearance from the political arena of some groups, merger or enlargement of others, etc. The comparative analysis of the five case studies in this work will provide examples of such scenarios.

* * *

FINDING OPERATIONAL INDICATORS

PROBLEM OF OPERATIONALIZATION

It is always a challenge for a researcher to find reliable and precise operational indicators for an empirical assessment of a conceptual scheme. If the conceptual framework is not accompanied by adequate measures which allow its dimensions to be operationalized with an appropriate level of validity and precision, it does not have much value. "These indicators should be as precise as possible; where quantitative techniques are relevant, they should be used" (Keohane, 1969, 864). However, starting with Huntington's "Political Development and Political Decoy" (1965) the concept of political institutionalization suffers from a problem of operationalization. Most inquiries on the subject endure one or several serious flaws:

1. Some of the proposed measures of institutionalization are vague and hardly useful for a comparative empirical analysis. Indeed it is not clear how to operationalize "the cumulation of cleavages among leaders and members, the incidence of overt alienation and dissent within the organization" (Huntington, 1965, 405) or "the control over the zones of uncertainty" (Panebianco, 1988, 57).

2. Similarly to many other areas of social science research, students of political institutionalization often encounter problems of feasibility and reliability of the relevant data. Much of the data which would be helpful for a cross national study of party-system institutionalization, particularly in transitional countries, may simply not exist. For example, a lack of comparable data on electoral geography prevented Mainwaring and Scully from measuring the strength of party identification to assess the degree of institutionalization of the Latin American party systems (1995, 11). In other cases, it may not be completely dependable. If a scholar chooses to use such questionable information for his or her research, it would most certainly affect the credibility of findings. For example, Mary B. Welfling recognizes that because of the limited documentation and statistics, she encountered difficulties in developing valid indicators, and that "the resulting set of indicators is offered . . . as the best feasible" (1973, 26) measures of institutionalization of African party systems. She extensively utilizes electoral statistics to assess the level of institutionalization in the countries under analysis. However, in some of the African nations included in her study, voter turnout was as low as 3 percent nationwide. Some of her other indicators, for example, a legal single-party regime, arrests, etc., demonstrate nothing more than governmental interference in the political system of a particular country and manipulation of its electoral and party systems by the repressive state. It is highly problematic to compare political party systems and to draw reliable conclusions about their institutionalization on the basis of such questionable measures.

3. A lack of reliable data for a cross-national comparison leads to the several other problems. Many measures of political institutionalization used in the literature are subjective and the reader is advised to rely on knowledge and expertise of the author sometimes without proper explanation, which may produce confusing results. For example, in their study of the Latin American party systems, Mainwaring and Scully evaluate their third dimension of institutionalization, *legitimacy*, only on the basis of their subjective "rough estimates." They have divided Latin American countries into three groups according to their level of *legitimacy*. For example, Colombia belongs to the first group, where "parties have been and are crucial in determining who governs" (1995, 14). Argentina and Bolivia are included in the second group of countries, where "parties have become increasingly accepted as the main route to governing" (ibid., 14). However, in Table 1.6 of Mainwaring and Scully's book, which presents a ranking of the dimensions of party-system institutionalization by country, Colombia and Argentina have the same score, but Argentina and Bolivia are ranked differently. Countries that belong to the same groups according to Mainwaring and Scully's fourth criterion of institutionalization, *party organization*, also have different rankings (ibid., 17).

Certainly, it may not always be possible to avoid subjective measurements and personal judgments of experts in the social science research. However, the author should explain his or her methodology and how he or she has arrived at the final outcomes of the study.

4. Because of the problems mentioned above some scholars develop their theories of institutionalization without providing any means to operationalize them and compare the strength of party systems and individual parties. For example, Randall and Svåsand recognize that "the elements we have identified cannot be directly measured; this would require the further step of funding appropriate indicators . . . We are not . . . in a position to somehow compute and aggregate scores for parties on these different aspects of institutionalization in order to arrive at a cumulative and comparative measure" (2002, 15). Needless to say that an appropriate set of measures would significantly strengthen their thoughtful theoretical model of party institutionalization.

One of the priorities in this project is to develop a set of indicators suitable for a cross-national empirical analysis of political parties. I attempt to minimize subjective judgments and opinions as indicators of the identified elements of political institutionalization by using relevant quantitative measures whenever possible.

AUTONOMY

Three types of operational indicators are identified to measure the *autonomy* of a party system. First, to determine whether a party system is an autonomous institution, it is necessary to explore patterns of the channeling of career opportunities. One of the principal distinctive functions of a party system in a democracy is to recruit politicians into legislative bodies. If a national parliament consists largely of members with previous careers within the political parties, then the party system is more likely to have a high level of *autonomy*. Conversely, if the system includes numerous parties whose representatives in the legislature have not had prior party careers, its degree of *autonomy* is low. In countries that employ a majoritarian electoral formula, the percentage of seats held by independents in the national legislature is a useful indicator for political *autonomy*. The lower the fraction of independent members of parliament, the more institutionalized is the party system. In countries with a proportional representation model, I study electoral lists of parties participating in elections. A system with a low level of political institutionalization features numerous candidates on party lists who had no previous careers within the parties (e.g., representatives of interest groups, movie stars, decorated military figures, other famous personalities, etc.). Once electoral results become public, many of these "outsiders" turn down their

parliamentary seats to professional politicians whose names follow celebrities on the electoral list.

The second indicator of *autonomy* uses the same logic as the first one and deals with another important function of a party system: recruitment of politicians into the executive branch of government. It assesses the relationship between the party system and the Cabinet of Ministers. In an institutionalized party system, a composition of the cabinet depends on the outcome of parliamentary elections and is formed by a winning party or a coalition of parties. The party system lacks a high level of *autonomy* if elections are not the primary means that determine the access to power, and the top executive officers in a country are not affiliated with political parties, especially those parties that occupy a significant percentage of seats in the legislature.

The final measure of external *autonomy* looks at geographical patterns of voting, the strength of party identification in different regions across the country. Kenneth Janda, who originally developed the indicator of national orientation of individual political parties, argues: "[A] regional party that boycotts national elections or otherwise chooses not to compete in national politics would rate low in [national orientation] status. At the high end . . . is a party that competes with others across the country and enjoys rather uniform success across regions" (1970, 91). For party systems, this point can be modified as follows. If political parties in a particular country are distinctly divided according to territorial lines, or, in other words, merely express the interests of certain regions and do not have significant support in others, the party system in this nation can be characterized by a low degree of *autonomy*. In an institutionalized party system, political parties should have a relatively even electoral support across the country. To measure variations in geographical distributions, the present study employs the coefficient of variability (*CV*), which is explained in detail in chapter 4.

STABILITY

The second broad dimension of institutionalization looks at the *stability* of a party system. The degree of *stability* can be operationalized in several ways. First, it can be judged by the extent of variance in party strength over time, or, in other words the extent to which "old" political parties are able to maintain their support among voters from one national election to the next. By this reasoning, a party system has a low level of institutionalization if new parties can regularly enter into politics and become an influential political force in a short period of time. A developed party system "is protected by mechanisms that restrict and moderate the impact of new groups" (Huntington, 1968, 21). In this project I employ an indicator which calculates a total percentage of votes in a parliamentary election taken by political

parties that have also participated in the previous electoral cycles. This indicator takes into account Huntington's "chronological age" of political institutions and the vote shares of "old" political parties in national elections. Mainwaring and Scully, who employ a similar indicator to measure their dimension of institutionalization, "stable roots of political parties in society," argue: "[T]he ability of parties to survive a long time provides one possible indication that they have captured the long-term loyalties of some social groups" (1995, 13). The larger the percentage of the vote captured by "old" political parties, the higher degree of *stability* a party system is likely to have.

A final indicator of the *stability* of a party system is Pedersen's index of electoral volatility, which refers to "a net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers" (Pedersen, 1990, 198). This indicator is widely used in political science to study party system strength. For example, Adam Przeworski based his investigation of political institutionalization exclusively on Pedersen's volatility index. He argues that such a measure of a net change of aggregate voting distribution in two consecutive elections can be used "as indicative of the stability of patterns of behavior within a party system" (1975, 52). Both indexes of political stability are discussed in chapter 5.

* * *

"FACES" OF PARTIES

In his classic book *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, V. O. Key, Jr., developed an analytical approach, which later would become known as the "three faces" of the party framework (Key, 1958). V. O. Key, Jr., differentiated between a party in the electorate, a party in office, and the party organization. Following this prominent scholar, many students of both comparative and U.S. political parties organize their studies along the same lines (Baer and Bositis, 1988; Beck and Sorauf, 1992; Katz and Mair, 1993; Ishiyama, 2001). It is generally understood that the party in the electorate, or the party on the ground, refers to "the men and women who affiliate casually with it, show some degree of loyalty . . . and vote habitually for it, even though they do not participate in the party organization or interact with its leaders and activists" (Beck and Sorauf, 1992, 12). The party in office "is understood as the representatives of the party in parliament and/or government" (Ishiyama, 2001, 849). Among the leading attributes of a party organization "which determine the capacity of parties to operate in the electoral arena are: budget, professional staff, party officers . . . and institutional support and candidate directed programs" (Cotter et al., 1989, 5). Ideally, an exploration of these three elements allows for a deeper and more comprehensive investigation of political parties.

The elements of the "three faces" approach do not necessarily contribute to the study of political parties in equal shares, since "parties include mixed, varied, and even contradictory and conflicting components" (Beck and Sorauf, 1992, 13). For example, many researchers describe "counterorganizational tendencies" at the current stage of the party development in Western countries. They argue that the growing reliance on the mass media and dependence on big donations as opposed to mass membership dues lessen the importance of party organizations (Gallagher et al., 1995, 263). Political parties in the post-Communist countries, which had been ruled by a single totalitarian organization for many years, demonstrate additional reasons for a neglect of the party infrastructure. Ingrid van Biezen writes that parties in new democracies "devote most of their attention to activities in the parliamentary and governmental arena and primarily concentrate their activities around the party in public office at the expense of attention for the development of the extra-parliamentary organization" (2003, 35). Examples like Unity, which was created literally from scratch several months before the 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia and obtained almost a quarter of the national vote, prove that the party organization is not always necessary for an electoral success.

Although the significance of party organization seems to be underestimated by political elite in post-Soviet nations in comparison to the other two "faces," a developed infrastructure is a sign of the institutionalized party. As I argue in the conclusion, a comparative cross-national and cross-time investigation of the party organization in post-Communist countries would be an important and welcome addition to the literature on political parties in transitional countries. This topic is, however, outside of the boundaries of the present book. My book focuses mainly on the two other aspects of post-Soviet political parties and party systems: parties in government and parties in the electorate.

* * *

Summary

The criteria and operational indicators of political institutionalization which will be employed in this study are summarized in table 1.2. In determining the degree and dynamics of institutionalization of a party system, I am concerned with two broad criteria: *external autonomy* and *internal stability*. Three indicators are useful for measuring *autonomy*: (1) the number of independent members of parliament (majoritarian systems) or the number of candidates in electoral lists who have not had previous careers within the political parties (proportional representation systems); (2) the role of political parties in the formation of the executive branch of government; and (3) the strength and uniformity of party identification in different regions across the country.

Table 1.2 Criteria and Operational Indicators of Political Institutionalization

Criteria of Institutionalization	Indicators of Institutionalization
Autonomy	Number of independents (majoritarian systems) or political outsiders on party lists (PR systems) Participation of parties in formation of a Cabinet of Ministers Geographical patterns of voting
Stability	Percentage of the vote taken by "old" parties Pedersen's index of electoral volatility

The criterion of *stability* is measured by the percentage of the vote share in a legislative election taken by the parties that participated in any previous electoral contest and Pedersen's index of electoral volatility.

The purpose of this project is to study the levels and dynamics of political institutionalization in the five post-Soviet countries. The devised indicators allow us to investigate the static levels as well as diachronic properties of institutionalization of party systems. In addition to clearly dynamic measures (i.e., the index of electoral volatility and the strength of support for "old" parties), a comparison of more static indicators of the same party system over time (i.e., geographical patterns of voting) provides useful empirical information for a diachronic analysis of party systems.

In the next five chapters I will apply the proposed operational indicators and compare the levels and dynamic trends of political institutionalization in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine.

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CHAPTER 2

AUTONOMY OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: RECRUITMENT INTO THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE

THE FIRST INDICATOR OF *AUTONOMY* AS A DIMENSION of political institutionalization is the recruitment pattern of political leaders into a national legislative body. In a country with a highly institutionalized party system, political parties play the central role in legislative recruitment. The growing body of literature on political recruitment in advanced democracies takes the statement that "parties are the principal 'gate-keepers' in the process of candidate selection" as an axiom requiring no further proof. In fact, there seems to be no major work in the area of recruitment studies challenging this thesis. "Outside the United States, where no primary elections are held, parties have complete control over eligibility and selection," argues Moshe Czudnowski (1975, 225). Even in the United States "parties monopolize national elections, and independents are rarely elected" (Erickson, 1997, 34). The great majority of members of congress previously held party positions at the national, state, or local level (Czudnowski, 1975, 224). In their analysis of Western European governments, Gallagher, Laver, and Mair confirm that both selectors and candidates are well aware that "outside the party there is no . . . political career prospect" since "European parties keep candidate selection firmly under their own control" (Gallagher et al., 1995, 258, 254). The centrality of parties is an important feature of democratic nations in other parts of the world: "In common with other advanced industrial democracies with strong party systems, [in Australia] legislative recruitment depends on a party label; without it, election to the federal parliament is all but impossible" (McAllister, 1997, 17).[1]

What seems obvious about the status of political parties for the students of legislative recruitment in advanced democracies does not necessarily hold true for those who study post-Communist transitional states. Rephrasing an overquoted Schattschneider's maxim—the nomination process in post-Soviet nations still has to become the crucial process of the party (Schattschneider, 1942, 64). Since political parties in many cases are far from exclusive agents of legislative recruitment in these countries, the research agenda of party scholars in post-Soviet studies must include an analysis of the role these organizations play in the candidate selection for the executive and legislative branches including the national assembly. Indeed, those few investigations of legislative recruitment in the post-Soviet nations (mainly in the Russian Federation) that appeared in the literature do analyze different aspects of how political parties perform their important function of candidate selection (Remington and Smith, 1995; Ishiyama, 1998, 1999a, 2000; Moser, 1999a). Two main conclusions may be drawn from these works: (1) "at present, the Russian parties are organizationally too weak" to fully "control the nomination procedure and act as political gatekeepers" (Ishiyama, 1999a, 42); and (2) many theories of legislative recruitment developed on the basis of empirical material collected in advanced democracies are not supported by the evidence from Russia.

The purpose of the present chapter is to evaluate the degree of control that parties exercise over their primary political niche in a democratic society—selection of candidates for the national legislature and participation in parliamentary elections. The extent of party control over legislative recruitment indicates the degree of *autonomy* and independence of the party system from its environment. In a country with an amorphous, undifferentiated system of political parties, entry of parliamentarians to a legislature from outside of the party system is quite common; a parliament comprises either numerous independent members or individuals who have not had prior careers within parties. At this stage of party-system development power seekers do not recognize the significance of political parties and the value of party membership as a successful vehicle to power. The existence of effective nonparty, alternative ways of political recruitment for the legislative branch of government indicates a low level of party-system institutionalization. As political parties are becoming more institutionalized, the entry of legislators not affiliated with these organizations is more difficult; the number of independent members of parliament decreases and recruitment to a parliament is more likely to occur from within the party system. If individual parties exercise tight control over candidate selection and a parliament consists largely of politicians who have had extensive prior party careers, then the party system can be characterized by higher degrees of *autonomy* and institutionalization. At this stage, parties become deeply entrenched in the political system, oust alternative ways of

legislative recruitment, and ambitious politicians unquestionably acknowledge their significance as the exclusive springboard to power.

Since all five nations under study employ vastly different electoral models,[2] finding appropriate and uniform operational indicators to empirically evaluate *autonomy* of the party system in the process of legislative recruitment poses a serious challenge. What follows below is an attempt to present a set of comparable measures which allow conducting a multinational analysis based on the available data. The author does recognize that a lack of consistent and precise indicators suitable to compare diverse electoral models across nations introduces an element of subjectivity in the present analysis.

In countries that use a majoritarian electoral system, a percentage of seats held by independents in a national parliament is a useful indicator of *autonomy*. Mary Welfling, who proposed a similar indicator in her study of African party systems, argues, "[O]ne can document the activity of nonparty personnel in the party system and the extent to which they participate in it. When individuals run in elections and attempt to link constituents to the government (i.e., the primary party system goal) without identifying with components of the party system," the degree of political *autonomy* tends to be low (1973, 19). The larger the percentage of independents, the less institutionalized the party system is.

In countries that employ a proportional representation system, an assessment of electoral lists of political parties participating in elections is a useful way to evaluate the level of political autonomy. In a system with a low degree of institutionalization, parties tend to include in their lists many candidates "who had never had previous careers within the parti[es]" (Panebianco, 1988, 56). This is done for a variety of reasons. For example, such nominees might be sponsored by interest groups affiliated with the party. Sometimes among the nominees are famous movie stars, writers, athletes, military figures, and other Chekhov's "wedding generals" who could boost the chances of parties during elections. Since many of these candidates are not interested in a political career, they often give up their seats in a legislature to professional politicians as soon as the final electoral results are made public. Therefore, a large proportion of (1) nonaffiliated candidates on lists of major parties; and (2) newly elected members of parliament who refuse to take their seats in the national legislature would indicate a low level of political institutionalization.

* * *

LITHUANIA

The first competitive elections in postwar Lithuania took place in 1990. Unlike Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine (see below), no major anti-independence force was competing in this race. The rump All-Union Communist Party

supported by the pro-Moscow *Yedinstvo* movement nominated 91 candidates, but only five were elected. The main issue in the campaign was the pace of obtaining state sovereignty. The independent Lithuanian Communist Party supported a more gradual pace than Sajudis. Although the contest for power was essentially between these two political organizations, "the result however was not quite so clear, because [many] of the 'Sajudis deputies' were also Communist Party members" (Lieven, 1993, 235). The elections, held between 24 February and March 10, produced 136 deputies, including 99 supported by Sajudis (12 of them were also Communist Party members) and 25 pro-independence Communists (ibid.).

There was another significant difference between the 1990 electoral campaign for republican Soviets in Lithuania and the same year elections in the other four countries under analysis. Although at the time Lithuanian political parties were in their embryonic stage, they were allowed to contest elections under their names. Among others, nine representatives of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) and two from the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LKDP) became members of the legislature in 1990. For many years these two parties, along with two other participants in the 1990 elections: the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDDP), renamed independent Lithuanian Communist Party, and the Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives (TS/LK), which came out of Sajudis, have been the major political organizations in independent Lithuania.[3] For example, in the 1996 elections, these four parties gained 55.83 percent of the national vote and won 110 seats out of 137.

In the 1992 parliamentary elections contestants faced the following dilemma. On the one hand, they attempted to select loyal candidates who would support party decisions in the legislature. On the other hand, political parties remained weak and had to include on their ticket representatives of interest groups and prominent public figures in order to successfully compete in the race. Undoubtedly, parties in all five countries encountered this problem. In Lithuania, it was perhaps more critical than in other cases. By the time of the 1992 elections, the Sajudis deputies, most of whom did not formally belong to any party, had split on several factions which had frequently voted against one another and were occasionally involved in bitter conflicts between themselves. In the fall of 1992, Sajudis was still supported only by 42 members of the legislature (ibid., 267). Like Sajudis, the LDDP also split. Thus, in March 1922 the LDDP faction consisted of only ten members.[4] Shortly before the 1992 elections this faction lost several more of its deputies.

It is not surprising that, under these circumstances, parties tried to strengthen internal discipline and to include in their 1992 electoral lists loyal and reliable candidates. For example, the Sajudis leadership discussed the "importance of the question of the reliability" of its candidates. Their work in

government structures and political activity was "analyzed and their positions evaluated" before the electoral list was compiled.[5] Several other parties undertook more stringent measures. Candidates of the Lithuanian Democratic Party had to sign pledges: "[I]f the party should decide that this individual must resign, he has to obey."[6] After elections, similar measures were taken by the LDDP: the party conference in October 1995 adopted the resolution that "in all important issues, the decisions of the LDDP Council are binding for the members of the party's parliamentary faction."[7]

As a result of measures to strengthen party discipline, top candidates on the electoral lists of many contestants were loyal deputies from the composition of the previous legislature who consistently supported the policies of their parties. For example, 13 of the top 15 candidates on the list of the Sajudis coalition and nine of the top ten names on the Center Movement slate were members of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania.[8] At the same time, electoral contestants could not ignore the fact of their weakness and were forced to include outsiders in their party slates to improve their chances. The LDDP (42.6 percent of the vote, 73 seats) electoral list had a number of nonparty candidates, including several well-known writers and other prominent public figures, as well as five leaders of the Future of Lithuania Forum, an organization formed by former Sajudis members. The LDDP also helped to bring to the Seimas representatives of the Union of Agriculture Workers, an agricultural lobby comprising the collective and state farm directors (Girnius, 1992). Sajudis (20.3 percent of the vote, 30 seats), which did not have strict membership rules, formed an electoral coalition with the Citizens' Charter, the Union of Political Prisoners, and the Green Party. After elections these organizations merged into one political party, TS/LK. The list of the LSDP (5.9 percent of the vote, 8 seats) included along with the party activists representatives of trade unions, youth and women's organizations, and even two Christian Democrats.[9]

All postindependence elections in Lithuania were conducted according to the mixed PR/majoritarian electoral formula. Seventy-one members of the Seimas are elected from single-member districts. Electoral parties and movements were very successful in these constituencies. In 1992 only 1 independent candidate (or 1.4 percent of the total number elected in SMDs) managed to get elected to the national assembly (table 2.1). The number of independents in the consequent elections insignificantly increased to 4 in 1996 (5.6 percent) and 3 in 2000 (4.2 percent).

The 1996 Seimas elections witnessed an increased proportion of party members on the electoral lists of major contestants. First, several political organizations that took part in the previous race as broad movements or coalitions without strict rules of individual membership transformed themselves into political parties: the TS/LK (former Sajudis), the Center

Table 2.1 The Number and Percentage of Independent MPs Elected in Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine in Single-Member Districts, 1991–2003

	Year (and Month) of Election	Total Number of Elected MPs	Number of Independent MPs	Percentage of Independent MPs
Lithuania	1992	71	1	1.4
	1996	71	4	5.6
	2000	71	3	4.2
Russia	1993	219	84	38.7
	1995	225	77	34.2
	1999	224	105	48.6
	2003	225	67	29.8
Ukraine	1994 (March–April)	338	218	64.5
	1994 (July–August)	59	51	86.4
	1994 (November–December)	10	6	60.0
	1995 (December)	14	9	64.3
	1996 (April)	6	4	66.7
	1998	225	102	45.3
	2002	225	72	32.0

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania (www.vrk.lt); the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (www3.lrs.lt); the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation (www.cikrf.ru); Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (www.duma.ru); the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine (www.cvk.gov.ua); Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (www.rada.gov.ua); the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Archive of Ukrainian Elections: Full Elections Results, Elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1994; and the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, Department of Government, University of Essex (www.essex.ac.uk/elections).

Movement, the Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees, etc. Second, several leading political parties changed how they nominated candidates, decentralizing the whole process and greatly expanding their electorate. Drawing electoral lists based on the opinion of local organizations and rank-and-file party members effectively decreased the number of outsiders on the ballots of these contestants. For example, the LDDP (9.5 percent of the vote, 12 seats) asked its local organizations to recommend candidates. Then, delegates of the party congress rated every nominee to determine the order of candidates on the list. The top slots on the party ballot were Party Chairman Ceslovas Jursenas, Prime Minister Mindaugas Stankevicius, Agricultural Minister Vytautas Einoris, Parliamentary Committee Chairwoman Sigita Burbiene, Foreign Affairs Minister Povilas Gylys, and other well-known party members.[10] The ballot of the TS/LK (29.8 percent of the vote, 70 seats) was also composed on the basis of ratings by regional party organizations as well as results of polls taken among conservative voters. Prominent conservative

politicians Vytautas Landsbergis, Elvyra Kuneviciene, Gediminas Vagnorius, Andrius Kubilius, etc. were at the top of the party list.[11]

At the same time, the electoral lists of several left-of-center parties included quite a few nonparty candidates. For example, the ballot of the LSDP had "two trade union representatives for every ten candidates" some of whom were not formally affiliated with this party.[12] Perhaps the least coherent among all electoral contestants was the Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles. Its candidates represented 12 public organizations, 6 of which were Polish, 5 Russian, and 1 Byelorussian.[13]

The tendency to include on party lists mostly active party members persisted in the subsequent electoral cycles in Lithuania, as well as in the latest electoral contests in other Baltic states. In the 2000 race, Lithuanian political parties approached standards of the European party systems and became the principal "gatekeepers" in the process of legislative recruitment: almost all candidates included in the electoral ballots of parties that reached the electoral threshold were active members of these organizations. The exceptions can be counted in single digits. Five members of the Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees ran on the list of the TS/LK (8.6 percent, 9 seats). In January 2004, these two political organizations merged into one party. Two Modern Christian Democrats became parliament members on the slates of the New Union/Social Liberals (19.6 percent, 28 seats) and the Lithuanian Liberal Union (17.3 percent, 33 seats).[14] Two other politicians, nonparty Ronaldas Pavilionis and Egidijus Klumbys, the chairman of the marginal National Progress Party, were elected on the New Union/Social Liberals' list.[15]

* * *

ESTONIA AND LATVIA

Estonia became the only Soviet constituent republic that changed its voting system for elections to the republican legislature held in 1990 from an absolute majority formula to single transferable vote.[16] Although by this time several political parties and groups had emerged in Estonia, the party affiliation of candidates did not appear on the ballot "at the insistence of the Communist Party of Estonia leaders, whose personal name recognition surpasses the popularity of their party" (Taagepera, 1993, 176). The seats in the Supreme Soviet were contested by representatives of three main political formations: (1) the Estonian People's Front, an umbrella movement that included several emerging political organizations such as the Social Democrat, Liberal, and Rural Center Parties; (2) the reform Communists' Vaaba Eesti (Free Estonia) association; and (3) the anti-independence United Council of Labor Collectives in alliance with the International Movement,

and the War and Labor Veterans Council.[17] Party affiliation was not an essential criterion for the formation of these three broad electoral alliances which consisted of various political organizations and nonparty candidates. Members of the same parties were included in different electoral coalitions. For example, members of the CPE were dispersed among all the principal groups and won 55 out of 105 parliamentary seats.[18]

State independence was also the most prominent campaign issue in Latvia in 1990. Two main political forces competing in elections for Latvian Supreme Soviet were the Latvian Popular Front, supported by other pro-independence organizations and individual candidates, on the one hand, and the Equal Rights Coalition, backed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Interfront, and the Joint Council of Labor Collectives, on the other hand. The latter organizations favored Latvia within the USSR. Among 183 contenders elected in March–April 1990, 104 were Communist Party members who were split between these two broad and inclusive coalitions.[19]

In the first postindependence elections in Estonia in 1992, 17 electoral unions and political parties as well as a number of independent candidates contested the race competing for seats in the new 101-member parliament, the Riigikogu, using a proportional representation system. Essentially three types of contestants took part in the elections. The electoral lists of the first group (the Isamaa electoral coalition, the Left Opportunity alliance, and the ERSP) are characterized by relatively strong ties between the candidates and the political parties that nominated them. For example, on the electoral list of Isamaa (22 percent of the vote, 29 seats in the Riigikogu) there was only one nonparty candidate among the top 20 names. All other candidates belonged to one of the five parties that comprised this electoral coalition.[20] The party list of the ERSP (8.7 percent of the vote, 10 seats), which at the time was "really only one party in Estonian politics worthy of the name, . . . had the highest membership and the best network of local organizations of any Estonian political organization," (Titma, 1992) overwhelmingly included members of this party.

The electoral lists of the second type of contestants, including the Kindel Kodu (Secure Home), Moodukad (Moderates), and People's Front coalitions, consisted of members of organizations, which had formed these electoral alliances, along with representatives of interest groups that supported them, nonparty well-known public figures, and other independents. As a rule, party discipline and ties between these electoral blocs and their candidates were looser than in the previous group of competitors. For example, Secure Home (13.8 percent of the vote, 17 seats), which was formed by the Coalition Party and the Rural Union and made up of former government ministers and collective/state farm directors, allowed "its candidates to the new parliament to vote according to their conscience and the wishes of the voters rather than holding them to party discipline . . . because the group is an election coalition

rather than a party" (Kionka, 1992b). To boost the winning chances of the Moderates (9.7 percent of the vote, 12 seats), a prominent nonparty politician Andres Tarand, writer Jaan Kross, who "nearly won a Noble Prize for literature" (Tammerk and Lucas, 1992), as well as representatives of agricultural groups were included on its list.

The final group included independent candidates who ran either individually or formed an electoral coalition. Thus, the alliance Estonian Citizen (6.8 percent of the vote, 8 seats) had been formed with the purpose of providing contenders who did not belong to any political party "with the opportunity to run in the elections to the Riigikogu."[21] This bloc included independent candidates who "publicly admitted that they had no platform but were simply seeking enough votes to gain seats in the parliament" (Kionka, 1992c). The Estonian electoral legislation allows independent contenders to run in parliamentary elections, and a number of nonparty candidates used this opportunity. Together, all individual candidates won 4.8 percent of the overall vote.

The Royalist Party (7.1 percent of the vote, 8 seats) can also be placed in the third category. It was not an authentic political party in the classical sense, and was established before the elections by a group of popular comedians "to deride foolishness" in politics. In their electoral program, which consisted of several sentences, the Royalists wrote, "the party does not lean right or left, but hovers above this left-right bustle." Many people voted for the party as a joke, and, as a result, the Royalists surprisingly won 8 seats in the Riigikogu.[22]

Similarly to Estonia, the founding 1993 elections in Latvia were contested by numerous electoral formations, but only a few of them were de jure fully constituted political parties: the Farmers Union, the Christian Democratic Union, and the Democratic Center Party. Along with political parties, public movements and electoral alliances, which had no strict procedures of individual membership, were also permitted to nominate lists of candidates. The latter types of contestants did not have "the common attributes of a party, such as a comprehensive program, a developed organizational network, and a disciplined system of membership, but [were] simply groups wanting to be represented in the parliament" (Bungs, 1993a). Examples include the Latvia's Way electoral coalition (32.4 percent of the vote, 36 seats out of 100), a unique team of moderate Latvian émigrés in the West and pro-independence former members of the Communist establishment; the nationalist Latvian National Independence Movement (13.4 percent, 15 seats); the Harmony for Latvia/Revival for the Economy election association (12 percent, 13 seats), etc. As a matter of fact, even "real" political parties feature numerous nonparty candidates on their electoral tickets. Thus, the Democratic Center Party (4.8 percent) won 5 seats, but only 1 MP was a party member at the time of electoral contest.

A peculiar feature of the 1993 elections to the Latvian Saeima, which clearly tells about the low degree of party-system institutionalization, was an unusually large proportion of émigrés of Latvian descent taking part in voting. Among approximately 400 contestants, about 50 were residents of the United States, Germany, Canada, Sweden, and other foreign countries. Some of them arrived in Latvia literally days before the election. Eighteen émigrés were elected to the parliament, three of them on the slate of the Farmers Union, two on the ticket of the Christian Democratic Union, eight on the Latvia's Way electoral list, etc. In contrast, the number of deputies with dual citizenship elected to the Saeima in 1995 has fallen to three (Girnius, 1995).

In general, the second postindependence electoral cycle demonstrated a significant step toward greater political *autonomy* of party systems in Estonia and Latvia. Both contests witnessed an increasing number of political parties at the expense of vague electoral alliances without formal membership, a growing share of party members on the electoral lists, and overall strengthening of party discipline, on the one hand, and a complete fiasco of independent contenders and a "party joke," on the other hand. However, most of the party lists were not totally "pure" and comprised, along with party members, some interest group representatives and well-known nonparty candidates.

Shortly before the 1995 elections to the Latvian national assembly, the Saeima adopted a new election law. The provision in the old law that any 100 voters have the right to form a preelection association and nominate candidates was removed. According to the new legislation, only registered political parties or coalitions of parties could bring forward list of candidates to the Saeima elections. Simultaneously, the law on political organizations was amended. The introduced changes were directed against small parties.[23] As a result, many electoral coalitions and factions in the legislature transformed themselves into political parties with strict rules of individual membership.

Having a party affiliation had become also an important criterion for the selectorate. The majority of candidates on the electoral ballots of the centrist and center-right parties—Latvia's Way, the Fatherland and Freedom Union, the LNNK and Green Party coalition, the Democratic Party "Saimnieks"—belonged to these organizations. For example, on the list of Fatherland and Freedom (11.6 percent, 14 seats), only two candidates (Leopolds Ozolins and Oskars Griggs) out of 61 were not members.[24] The congress of the Farmers Union, which took place in February 1995, allowed only LZS members who have joined the party at least six months before the voting to be included on its electoral list. The congress also decentralized the selection process depriving the party's central board of the right to nominate candidates and giving this right only to regional organization of the Farmers Union.[25]

A composition of electoral lists submitted by the left-wing organizations was noticeably different. The ballots of the Latvian Socialist Party (5.6 percent,

5 seats) and the Labor and Justice coalition (4.6 percent of the vote) included party members as well as numerous representatives of public movements and interest groups. The LSP compiled its list of candidates together with the Equal Rights movement. The Labor and Justice alliance was formed by three registered parties and several labor organizations. For example, representatives of the trade unions ran in the first positions for the coalition in all five electoral districts in Latvia.

The 16 party and electoral coalition slates and 13 independents participated in the 1995 parliamentary elections in Estonia. Shortly before the election, the Isamaa-ERSP alliance (7.9 percent, 8 seats) disclosed the top dozen names on its election list. It included only active functionaries from both parties.[26] The Estonian Center Party (14.2 percent, 16 seats) tried to enforce party discipline among its candidates who had to sign an agreement that once elected to the Riigikogu, one can quit the party parliamentary faction only by giving up his or her seat in the legislature.[27] The electoral list of the Estonian Center Party (EKe), though, included quite a few candidates who did not have a previous career in this party. For example, former Royalists Priit Ailma and Toonu Koorda and the leader of the Estonian Entrepreneurs Party Tiit Made ran on the EKe ticket.

The electoral list of the Moderates union (6 percent, 6 seats), formed by the Social Democrats and Rural Center Party was again topped by the former prime minister Andres Tarand. Tarand, who did not belong to any party at the time, was rated the most popular politician in Estonia in 1994–1995. Another nonaffiliated leading member of this coalition was Raivo Paavo, the head of the Trade Union association. Quite a few nonparty interest group members ran also on the party slates of the Coalition Party-Rural Union alliance (32.2 percent, 47 seats), Estonian Reform Party-Liberals (16.2 percent, 19 seats), People's Party of Republicans and Conservatives (5 percent, 5 seats), etc.

Contestants who chose to run as independents obtained only 0.3 percent of the overall vote (in comparison with 4.8 percent three years earlier). The coalition of independent candidates Better Estonia-Estonian Citizens and untraditional Royalist Party lost their representation in the Riigikogu and managed to receive a meager 3.6 percent and 0.8 percent of the vote respectively.

The pattern of further gradual strengthening of political *autonomy* and institutionalization persisted in Estonia and Latvia in the two latest electoral cycles. These two countries are not far behind their third Baltic neighbor where party membership became the principal factor of legislative recruitment: a great majority of the Riigikogu and Saeima members have been active functionaries of political parties lately. However, a number of nonaffiliated candidates both on electoral lists of leading parties and in parliaments of the two nations are somewhat larger than in Lithuania. For example, among the 12 members of the Eighth Saeima in Latvia elected from the Union of Greens

and Farmers (9.5 percent) are two former prime ministers who did not belong to the ZZS: Vilis Kristopans and Andris Berzins. On the eve of elections, Kristopans, who was included in the ZZS electoral lists in all five Latvian electoral districts to increase party visibility, explicitly stated that he is not going to join this organization and would remain a nonaffiliated politician.

After the Estonian parliament passed a law in November of 1998 banning multiparty electoral blocs, many leaders of small political organizations run on electoral lists of major parties. Unable to form separate parliamentary factions of their own, many small parties were forced to merge with their senior coalitional partners in order to stay in big politics. Thus, in the 1999 elections, the Green Party merged into the Center Party list (23.4 percent, 28 seats), representatives of the Pensioner's and Families' Union run on the ballot of the Coalition Party (7.6 percent, 7 seats), the People's Party put its candidates into the ticket of the Moderates (7.0 percent, 6 seats), etc. In 2003, many leading parties continued featuring nonaffiliated candidates on their tickets. For instance, the electoral list of the People's Union (13 percent, 13 seats) included 11 nonparty politicians. Nonparty contestants were also on the tickets of Isamaa (7.3 percent, 7 seats), the Center Party, and the Moderates. Even in those cases when an electoral list was comprised entirely from party members, some of them joined this political organization shortly before the voting. Although Res Publika (24.6 percent, 28 seats) has been in existence as a political club since 1989 and transformed itself into a political party in January 2002, Juhan Parts, who led this organization to a stunning victory in the 2003 elections and later was appointed a prime minister, became both its member and leader only eight months before elections. These examples of nonparty parliamentarians, however, are not the rule; rather, they are exceptions from the rule: political parties in Estonia and Latvia are well on their way to exclusively claim their unique niche in a democratic society and establish firm control over selection of candidates to the national assembly.

* * *

Russia

At the time of the 1990 elections to the Russian Supreme Soviet, the Communist Party was the only legal political party in the republic. Articles 6 of the USSR and Russian Federation constitutions would be removed later that year (see chapter 7). However, the question of candidates' party affiliation was, in fact, of little significance for voters. Michael McFaul states that "the distinction between communists and non-communists was not very revealing, as some of the most radical candidates (Yeltsin, Popov, Sobchak) were still Communist Party members, while many conservatives ran as

noncommunists" (1992, 40). The competition was mainly between opponents and supporters of perestroika. Although members of the CPSU won 920 seats, or 86.7 percent of the total number of seats in the republican legislature, they were spread between diverse groups varying from the hard-line Marxist Platform to the radical wing of Democratic Russia.

During the 1993 elections, which employed the mixed PR/majoritarian electoral system, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and, to some extent, the Agrarian Party were the only genuine parties in Russia "with organizational networks and reserves of political experience." Richard Sakwa argues that the rest of the contestants "were not political parties at all but movements or coalitions representing particular groups of individuals . . . The whole notion of membership was barely applicable" to most of these organizations (1995, 195). Examples of such electoral associations were the Russia's Choice and Yabloko electoral blocs, Women of Russia, and the Russian Democratic Reforms Movement. For instance, Russia's Choice (15.5 percent, 70 seats) included the movement with the same name, the rump Democratic Russia movement, the Peasant Party, the Association of Peasant Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives representing emerging farmers, several other organizations, as well as individual candidates. Among 29 MPs elected on the Yabloko ballot (7.9 percent, 23 seats), 15, including the top ten, had no party affiliation.[28]

Although the elections were also contested by five registered political parties (the Communists, Agrarians, Liberal Democrats, Democrats, and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord), the large proportion of candidates on their slates did not belong to these organizations. For example, five of the top six candidates on the ballot of the Democratic Party of Russia (5.5 percent, 15 seats) were not party members. The list included a well-known movie maker, Stanislav Govorukhin, actress Tatiana Doronina, singer Iosif Kobzon, etc. In one of his preelection interviews, party leader Nikolay Travkin said that the candidates were selected according to two criteria: personal decency and professionalism.[29] Candidates' party affiliation was not mentioned. The LDPR took 22.9 percent of the vote and 59 Duma seats in the multimember district. However, 26 of them, or 44.1 percent, were either nonparty candidates or members of other parties (Lester, 1994). The only exception was the CPRF: the overwhelming majority of its deputies elected on the national list (29 out of 32) were party members.[30]

The political parties and electoral alliances competing in the 1993 elections had done poorly in the single-member constituencies. Only 84 out of 219 MPs, or 38.7 percent, elected in single-member districts represented political parties, movements, or electoral coalitions. The rest ran and won as independent candidates.

The significance of a party membership and party discipline have not essentially advanced throughout all consequent electoral cycles to the State

Duma. Numerous political movements and electoral coalitions without clearly defined rules of individual membership continued to compete in elections. Leading political parties not only have not strengthened a share of party members on their electoral slates, but, in fact, demonstrated a tendency to increase the number of nonaffiliated candidates and interest group representatives on their lists. The emergence and growth of pragmatic parties of power created a numerous group of influential government administrators who participate in elections without any intent to take a seat in the Duma even if they get elected.

In 1995, the progovernment Our Home Is Russia movement (10.1 percent, 55 seats) became the second largest party in the Russian national legislature. The first dozen candidates on its electoral list had been put together in the best traditions of Soviet representation, which had nothing to do with party membership: Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin represented the government; the winner of the 1994 Oscar for the Best Foreign Film, Nikita Mikhalkov—artistic intelligentsia; decorated General Lev Rokhlin—the military; Daniya Karimova—the ethnic minorities; Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences Zhores Alferov and Chairman of the State Committee on Higher Education Vladimir Kinelev—science and education; Chairman of the Association of Peasant Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives Vladimir Bashmachnikov—agriculture; Alexandr Martynov—the Cossacks, etc. Before elections, Deputy Chairman of Our Home Is Russia Sergey Belyayev noted that the list "corresponds to the principle of creation of professional parliament . . . [and] contains people who will professionally and permanently work in the parliament."[31] However, it was obviously not the case. Once the final election results were announced, Viktor Chernomyrdin (#1 on the list), Nikita Mikhalkov (#2), General Rokhlin (#3), Nikolay Travkin (#8), Vladimir Kinelev (#9) among others announced their resignation from the national assembly. Rokhlin and Travkin later changed their minds and remained Duma members. Altogether, seven candidates elected on the ticket of Our Home Is Russia turned down their parliamentary seats.[32]

Many other contestants were also either inclusive political movements or broad electoral coalitions consisting of various organizations and individuals: Yabloko, Women of Russia, Derzhava, Forward, Russia, Russia's Choice-United Democrats, Congress of Russian Communities, Power to the People, Bloc of Ivan Rybkin, etc. None of them had strict procedures of individual membership.

Party membership as a criterion for the inclusion on the electoral lists of many fully constituted political parties suffered a setback. In comparison to the previous electoral cycle, the CPRF (22.3 percent, 157 seats) decreased a proportion of party members on the national part of the list. The federal part of the ballot included nonparty candidates Aman Tuleev, chairman of the

Legislative Assembly of Kemerovo oblast, Aleksey Podberyozkin, a leader of the Spiritual Heritage movement, as well as several other representatives of this organization. Nearly half of the top 12 candidates on the Agrarian Party (3.8 percent, 20 seats) ticket were nonparty representatives of various agrarian interest groups.

The only political party that had strengthened positions of party members on its list was the LDPR (11.2 percent, 51 seats). Party chairman Vladimir Zhirinovsky proudly announced that the list of the LDPR nominees contained "no showman of figureheads." Indeed, the corps of the party federal list was made up of the leader's long time party comrades-in-arms.[33] In his comparative study of legislative recruitment of several Russian political parties in the 1993 and 1995 elections, John Ishiyama (1998, 307–309) found empirical evidence to illustrate a tendency of the LDPR to rely on its party activists at the expense of "independent political notability." The LDPR continued to be a national leader in legislative recruitment of party members in the consequent contests. Thus, the 2003 elections marked an event of at least symbolical significance for the party-system development when for the first time in Russian electoral history a major political party, the LDPR, had submitted a list which consisted of exclusively members of this organization.

In comparison with the 1993 legislative elections, the only evidence about the increasing importance of candidates' affiliation with political parties or electoral blocs came from the majoritarian districts. In December 1993, 135 candidates (or 61.6 percent) out of 219 elected in SMDs were independents who were not affiliated with any organization competing in the elections. In 1995, there were 77 independents out of 225 candidates, or 34.2 percent. This figure could be even lower because a number of party members contested elections as independent candidates. For example, a leader of the Democratic Russia Party, Galina Starovoitova, CPRF members Vladimir Zelenin, Oleg Kazarov, and others ran in single-member districts and won seats in the Duma as independents.[34]

The two latest cycles of legislative elections hardly advanced the degree of political *autonomy* of the national party system. Amorphous parties of power or electoral coalitions without any rules of individual membership dominate the Russian political scene. Creation of two electoral "coalitions of power," pro-Kremlin Unity and regional-oriented Fatherland-All Russia (ORV), which together gained almost 37 percent of the national vote in the 1999 elections and 45 percent of the Duma seats allocated according to proportional representation, is a telling example of extremely low *autonomy* of the Russian political party system. The phenomenon of Unity (23.32 percent, 73 seats) deserves a special comment. This organization, created only three months before the elections was "an electoral phantom . . . without biography, without a program, without the 'head' and 'body' " (Petrov, 2000). Three top spots

on the coalition's federal list were occupied by people who had rather remote relation to politics: the head of the Russian Emergencies Ministry and the Hero of Russia Sergey Shoigu; the Triple Olympic Champion, 9-time World Champion, and 12-time European Champion on Greco-Roman wrestling Alexander Karelin; and renowned anticorruption activist Aleksandr Gurov.

By the 2003 parliamentary elections Unity and OVR merged into United Russia and formally established itself as a political party. It took an unprecedented 37.57 percent of the national party vote and currently controls the absolute majority of seats in the Duma. The electoral list of this organization included numerous regional leaders: governors and republican presidents, representatives of top federal executive agencies, big business, power structures, etc. Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, who occupied #3 spot of the federal list, explicitly stated prior to the elections that neither him nor many other of these candidates had any intention to serve in the Duma should they get elected to the national legislature. Indeed, 37 candidates, or almost a third of all those elected on the United Russia party list, refused to take their Duma seats and instead kept their old positions.

An electoral success of the Rodina electoral alliance (9 percent), which was created shortly before the 2003 elections and became one of the four contestants overcoming the five percent threshold, demonstrated that the time of vague and inclusive coalitions in the Russian Federation has not passed. Thus, the federal part of the Rodina ticket that included 18 candidates gave party affiliation of only seven contenders who represented four marginal political organizations.

Many experts of Russian politics argue that political parties played a secondary role in the last two parliamentary electoral cycles. Indeed, ideological parties, which regularly participate in elections, seem to be losing ground to the "pragmatic" parties of power. Thus, in 1993 four major political formations, the CPRF, LDPR, Russia's Choice, and Yabloko, obtained 54.9 percent of the national vote. In the three subsequent elections their share of the vote declined to 44.3 percent, 44.7 percent, and 32.33 percent.[35] However, even these ideological parties do not avoid including nonaffiliated candidates in their electoral lists. In 2003, the Communist Party had "given about one fourth of the spots on [its] party list to business representatives," (Mereu, 2003a) some of whom have been elected to the Duma (Kondaurov, Muravlenko, Kvitsinsky).[36]

Political parties also seemed to lose some ground in the single-member electoral contests (table 2.1). In 1999, the share of independent candidates that were successful in majoritarian races increased to 48.6 percent. Although in 2003 the percentage of independents declined to 29.8 percent, this figure should be viewed critically because the party of power, United Russia, which won 104 single-member races, co-opted many successful contestants who otherwise would run as nonaffiliates. So far, the Russian Federation failed to

demonstrate a consistent and convincing trend toward the increasing importance of candidates' affiliation with political parties or electoral blocs.

* * *

UKRAINE

The first political organizations oppositional to the ruling Communist Party were registered in Ukraine in February 1990. It prevented the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika (Rukh), Zelenyi Svit, and other alternative groups from officially nominating their candidates and contesting the March 1990 elections to the republican Supreme Soviet under their names. During the elections the struggle was between the Democratic Bloc, a broad coalition of pro-reform candidates, and the hard-line CPU/CPSU, the only legal political party in the republic at the time. Originally, 108 (24 percent) out of 449 elected deputies belonged to the Democratic Bloc. In comparison, the opposition gained between 65 and 74 percent of the parliamentary seats in the Baltic nations and over 40 percent in Russia (Wilson, 1997a, 120). The 1990 elections in Ukraine also produced a very large proportion of the Communist Party members among newly elected deputies: 385 legislators (86 percent) were members of the CPU (ibid., 120). Just as in the case of the other four countries, many representatives of the political opposition were members of the ruling party.

The first free elections to the Verkhovna Rada in independent Ukraine were held in March–April 1994. A new electoral law adopted on November 18, 1993 did not alter the principal electoral formula used in the Soviet past: the absolute majority two-ballot system remained intact. The law maintained several tough provisions in order for elections to be valid in any given district: 50 percent plus 1 of the voters had to participate in voting, and a winner was required to obtain 50 percent of the votes plus 1. These regulations made elections "permanent and never-ending." Due to the passivity of the Ukrainian electorate and the high number of candidates in the majority of the constituencies, only 338 out of 450 seats in the Rada were filled in the first attempt. Repeat Elections took place in July–August, and November–December 1994, December 1995, and April 1996. About 20 seats remained vacant until the next electoral cycle in 1998.

Political parties were not popular among the voters who gave their preferences to independent candidates. Many of the nonaffiliates represented the party of power at its initial, informal stage of development: high- and middle-ranked government officials, managers of large industrial enterprises, and agricultural associations, etc.[37] Table 2.1 shows the number and percentage of the nonaffiliated candidates elected in several rounds of successive and

repeated elections in Ukraine held from 1994 to 1996. In March–April 1994, only about one-third of all newly elected parliamentarians were members of political parties. In subsequent repeat elections the significance of party identification has not improved. In fact, 51 (86.4 percent) of 59 MPs elected in July–August 1994 were independents, resulting in the overall decrease of the proportion of seats in the Rada held by party members. Sarah Birch writes, "[T]he most striking difference between the candidate corpuses of 1990 and 1994 was the overall decline in political identification. Compared to their counterparts in 1990, the candidates who contested the 1994 elections were far less likely to be party affiliated." However, she continues, "[Y]et it can be assumed that in 1994 party membership meant considerably more than it had four years earlier" because those who voted for representatives of political parties "took ideological precepts of their chosen organization[s] more seriously than had the CPU members in 1990" (Birch, 2000, 89).

The introduction of the mixed majority/proportional representation electoral system for the 1998 contest contributed to a growing significance of party identification in the single-member district races. Table 2.1 shows that the number of independent candidates has been gradually and consistently decreasing in the majoritarian constituencies since the founding elections. In comparison to the 1994 race, in 1998 and 2002 the share of nonaffiliated members of the parliament decreased from 64.5 percent to 45.3 percent and 32.0 percent respectively. Although independent members of the Rada still constitute a very sizable proportion of the people's deputies corpus, a near 33 percent drop in the number of independents in 2 electoral cycles is a healthy sign of a slow but steady institutionalization of the Ukrainian party system.

The first parliamentary elections based on the proportional representation model took place in Ukraine in 1998. It was the same year when Latvia, for example, held its third cycle of party-list elections. However, no matter how weakly institutionalized the Ukrainian party system was, it was able to drive out from the electoral scene vague and all-inclusive movements without formal rules of membership, which had been a widespread feature of the post-Soviet countries in the early and mid-1990s. The leading components of most major electoral contestants in the multimember district in the second and third postindependence elections to the Rada were established political parties. The coherence of electoral lists submitted by these organizations in comparison to the Baltic nations was far lower. Without a single exception, all Ukrainian parties that cleared the electoral threshold in 1998 and 2002 included nonparty candidates in their lists. In quite a few cases, the share of nonaffiliated contestants was rather substantial.

The composition of electoral lists submitted by most political parties for the 1998 and 2002 proportional representation race followed essentially a similar pattern. The most common scenario used by parties or electoral coalitions was

to compile the majority of its ticket from active party functionaries with some addition of nonparty candidates at the top of the ballot. These candidates were either well-known public figures or made a major financial contribution presumably to the party's electoral campaign or represented influential interest groups. The 2002 list of the Communist Party of Ukraine is typical in this regard. Seven candidates among the first hundred did not belong to the party: Ivan Gerasimov, the head of the Ukrainian veterans' organization (#3 on the list), Oleh Blokhin, the best footballer in Europe in 1975 (#10), Procurator General of Ukraine Mykhailo Potebenko (#20), etc. In addition to the CPU, three other political organizations (SPU, SDPU United, and the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc) that were able to overcome a 4 percent threshold submitted electoral lists that overwhelmingly consisted of the members of these organizations (in the latter case, members of the coalitional parties) and incorporated some nonparty candidates, who could boost their party's electoral chances, at the top of the ballot.

Electoral lists of two other coalitions, Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine and For United Ukraine, which also received proportional representation seats in the Rada, were less coherent. Among 50 top slots of Our Ukraine, an electoral alliance of 4 major and 6 marginal oppositional parties, 22 were occupied by nonparty candidates, many of whom represented the banking industry and/or were personal loyal friends of the leader of the bloc.[38] The electoral coalition For United Ukraine, which was composed of five regional parties of power, also included a significant number of prominent nonaffiliated figures: Head of the presidential administration Volodymyr Lytvyn, President of Kyiv University Viktor Skopenko, Railways Minister Heorhiy Kyrpa, and renowned vault jumper Serhiy Bubka. Overall, 12 of the top 50 candidates on the list of For United Ukraine were not members of the parties that formed this electoral alliance. Skopenko and Kyrpa were among 7 elected candidates (4 from For United Ukraine, 2 from the SDPU(U), and 1 from Our Ukraine) who declined to accept a mandate of the people's deputy.

* * *

Conclusion

In a country with an amorphous system of political parties, entry of parliamentarians into a legislature from outside of a party system is quite common; a national assembly comprises either numerous independent members or parliamentarians who have not had prior careers within parties. As a party system becomes more institutionalized, the entry of nonaffiliated legislators is more difficult, their number decreases, and legislative recruitment is more likely to occur from within a party system. If a parliament consists largely of

individuals who have had extensive prior party careers, then a party system can be characterized by higher degrees of *autonomy* and institutionalization. In most advanced democracies, party membership is a minimal requirement of legislative recruitment. As a general rule, only those candidates who have more or less long-standing party careers "taking responsibility for less attractive service positions in the party for longer periods" are rewarded by more attractive offices including parliamentary seats (Wessels, 1997, 88). Those rare cases when a leading political party in the West, as for instance, the Italian Communist Party, invites "prestigious independents not previously identified with the party" to run on its electoral ticket represent exceptions that are often cited in the works on the subject (Wertman, 1988, 154). The role of political parties in the process of legislative recruitment in the post-Soviet states in the decade and a half after independence has been vastly different.

The party affiliation of candidates was not a principal issue in the 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviets in all five republics of the former Soviet Union. As a rule, elections were contested by two loose coalitions that represented pro-reform, pro-independence, on the one hand, and antiperestroika, pro-center political forces, on the other hand. Members of the Communist Party and numerous independent candidates were among both reformist and conservative coalitions.

Within several years after the 1990 elections, both pro- and antireform coalitions had disintegrated in all five countries. Instead, different forms of political organizations emerged, most of which were associated with the names of popular politicians, lacked a coherent social base, comprehensive programs, strong organizational structure, and support among the electorate. The first postindependence elections were contested by political movements, broad electoral coalitions, and a few amorphous political parties. The first two types of electoral contestants, for example, Russia's Choice, Sajudis, Rukh, Secure Home, Latvia's Way did not have any strict rules of individual membership, and actually each candidate on their electoral lists was considered a member of a movement or coalition that nominated him or her. Electoral alliances were formed either by representatives of various political groups and individuals, or simply by candidates who were not affiliated with any political parties and used this opportunity to run in the elections for the parliament. Realizing their weakness, even "genuine" political parties such as the ERSP, the Latvian Democratic Center Party, LDDP, the Democratic Party of Russia attempted to attract more votes by including in the lists numerous well-known public figures and representatives of interest groups, who had no prior career within the party.

The situation in Lithuania was somewhat different that that of the other four countries. Already in 1990, political parties were legalized and allowed to participate directly in the elections, nominate their own candidates, and compete under their names. It gave Lithuanian political parties a "head start"

and contributed to their early institutionalization in comparison to the other four nations. In the 1992 elections to the Seimas, the majority of contestants undertook certain measures to strengthen party discipline and attempted to include in their lists loyal party activists. Lithuanian parties achieved great success in single-member constituencies winning 69 out of 70 seats.

By the time of the second cycle of elections two different scenarios had emerged in two groups of countries (see table 2.2). In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania political parties were taking on an increasingly important role as intermediaries between the electorate and the legislative branch of government. Groups of professional functionaries and the party bureaucracy developed and strengthened their position within political organizations. Their leaders understood that existing amorphous political formations could hardly serve as a reliable vehicle in the contest for power. Many political movements, electoral coalitions, and parliamentary factions transformed themselves into political parties with strict procedures for individual membership and strengthened intraparty discipline. Party lists submitted for the second round of postindependence elections included mostly active party members.

This tendency persisted in all consequent electoral cycles in the Baltic states. Again, Lithuania stands as the most prominent example. In the 2000 elections, almost all candidates included in the electoral lists of parties represented in the Seimas were active members of these organizations Although electoral tickets of the leading political parties in Estonia and Latvia were less "pure," these two nations closely followed the same pattern. Despite minor exceptions, party affiliation serves as the single most important criteria for recruitment into the national legislatures in the Baltic states.

On the contrary, in Russia and Ukraine the role of political parties as a means of candidate recruitment into the national legislature remains less significant. Broad and amorphous electoral alliances, which lack formal individual membership, and deideological parties of power, dominate the Russian political scene. Parties of power (Unity and Fatherland-All Russia in1999 and United Russia in 2003) included plentiful governors, presidents of autonomous republics, leaders of federal executive agencies, big business, power structures, who, as a rule, do not have any intent to take parliamentary seats after their election to the Duma. In 2002, almost a third of candidates on the United Russia ticket, or 37 MPs-elect, kept their old positions in government turning down their Duma seats. Russian ideological parties continued to feature on their electoral lists numerous nonaffiliated candidates who could boost party's electoral chances.

No leading Ukrainian party submitted a "pure" electoral ticket consisting exclusively of members of this organization in any postindependence electoral race. As a rule, party lists consist of the majority of candidates, who are active party members, with some addition of nonaffiliated prominent public

Table 2.2 Autonomy of the Party System: Recruitment into the National Assembly in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine, 1991–2004

	First Postindependence Election	Second Postindependence Election	Third Postindependence Election	Fourth Postindependence Election
Estonia (1992, 1995, 1999, 2003)	Medium-low	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high
Latvia (1993, 1995, 1998, 2002)	Low	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high
Lithuania (1992, 1996, 2000)	Medium	Medium-high	High	
Russia (1993, 1995, 1999, 2003)	Low	Medium-low	Low	Medium-low
Ukraine (1995, 1998, 2002)	Low	Medium-low	Medium	

Note: The rankings are based on comparison of the five countries. The scores are rough approximations. See the text for an explanation of the ranking criteria.

figures, financial contributors, and representatives of interest groups at the top of the ballot. Some electoral contestants feature a rather sizable proportion of nonparty candidates on their list.

The strongest evidence of the increasing role of the Ukrainian political parties in the process of legislative recruitment comes from the majoritarian constituencies. The share of independent candidates has been steadily decreasing in the SMDs since the 1994 elections to the national assembly. Although the third cycle of the post-1991 elections still produced a substantial number of nonaffiliated MPs, a 33 percent drop in the number of independents in comparison to the founding elections is a solid sign of a gradual institutionalization of the Ukrainian party system.

CHAPTER 3

AUTONOMY OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: RECRUITMENT INTO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS in the European countries is the parliamentary model of the executive-legislative relations. The common framework of parliamentary government, which unites European nations and differentiates them (with the exception of Switzerland) from other governmental systems, is based on the idea that the executive is linked to the legislature (Blondel, 1988, 1–2; Blondel and Thiébault, 1991a, 1–2). In the parliamentary system, the executive branch is formed by a political party or a coalition of parties represented in the national assembly and can be dismissed from office if the legislative majority withdraws its support for the cabinet. Parliamentary government is also party government that has the following defining characteristics: "decisions are made by elected party officials or by those under their control; policy is decided within parties which then act cohesively to enact it; officials are recruited and held accountable through party" (Katz, 1987, 7). The best examples of "perfected" party governments in terms of recruitment (Döring, 1987, 120) are the United Kingdom, Denmark, or Italy where the cabinet members are chosen almost exclusively from the ranks of the parliamentarians affiliated with political parties that form a ruling coalition.

Ideological party government is the antithesis of the pragmatic "government of experts," whose members are recruited outside parliaments and "are often viewed as technocrats with little feeling or attention for the party political dimensions of policy making" (de Winter, 1991, 44). Ideally, the technocratic government does not have any ideological orientation and includes

representatives of the civil service with extensive experience in their particular departments. The recruitment of executives into the "government of experts" does not depend on the outcomes of elections to the national legislature. The early years of the French Fifth Republic when President De Gaulle openly demonstrated his mistrust of parties and attempted to minimize their influence in national politics is a widely used example of the *technocratic government*. De Gaulle vigorously protected his constitutional presidential prerogative to form the cabinet "without any obligation to consult with parties . . . [and] was able to name ministers and even prime ministers from whatever background he thought appropriate. The result was the infusion of new people into government without prior parliamentary service. Indeed, many of these people lacked any political experience, since they were drawn into government from the civil service, private business, and elsewhere" (Wilson, 1982, 76–77). However, an apolitical profile of the French cabinet did not last long and in "one of the most fascinating paradoxes and ironies of recent French history" gradually developed into a textbook example of party government: "[T]oday, France has a system of party government as clearly and to the same extent as such prominent examples as . . . Germany or—classic case–Great Britain" (Reif, 1987, 28).[1] A similar tendency is evident in the Netherlands, a country with a traditionally high proportion of cabinet members with technical-specialized expertise (de Winter, 1991; Bakema and Secker, 1988). Overall, 12 percent of cabinet ministers in Western European countries in the 4 decades after the World War II were independent professionals recruited from outside the political sphere.[2]

Party government is a feature of a nation with a developed party system, where political organizations are principal players not only in recruiting leaders into the legislative bodies, but also in determining their access to another branch of government—the executive. Political parties serve as a tool of implementation of one of the key constitutional features of a democratic polity: political executive directly or indirectly "derives its mandate from, and is politically responsible to" the electorate (Laver and Shepsle, 1994, 3). As a party system becomes more institutionalized, a party affiliation becomes the main criterion of selecting and recruiting politicians for various leading executive posts, including the Cabinet of Ministers. If the cabinet is formed by the victorious party or parties on the basis of election results, then a party system is more likely to have a higher degree of institutionalization. In a country with a weak system of political parties, the regular entry of nonparty individuals into the cabinet and other top echelons of the executive branch of government without a prior approval by major parties is quite common. Colton and Skach argue that the "technocratization of the cabinet hinders the democratic principles of inclusion and contestation, distances the government even further from the legislature, and cramps parliamentary responsibility" (Colton and Skach, 2005, 117). As a rule, a government that consists of

nonparty "technocrats" or "professionals" is a sign of the low level of *autonomy* and institutionalization of a party system.

The outcomes of the postindependence elections and patterns of cabinet formation in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine demonstrate different approaches to the advancement of elites into the executive and put these countries in different places "on a continuum ranging from one extreme in which ministers are regarded primarily as representative politicians to the other in which ministers are . . . specialist managers in a particular field" (Blondel, 1991, 10).

* * *

BETWEEN THE LAST PREINDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS AND THE SOVIET COLLAPSE

In 1990, the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine held the last elections to the republican Supreme Soviets before the disintegration of the USSR. Although these elections did not fully meet democratic standards, they were the first and only competitive electoral contests for republican legislatures in Soviet history. The influence of nascent political parties and movements on the composition of governments, which existed between 1990 and the first postindependence elections in all five countries, was very insignificant. With an exception of Ukraine, the Cabinets of Ministers formed after the 1990 elections lacked a clear ideological orientation and coherence. As a rule, they consisted of more or less politically neutral pragmatists who represented diverse sectors of a society: old Communist *nomenklatura*, democratic opposition, experienced industrialists, foreign specialists, academics, etc. The main purpose of these primarily nonideological governments was to guarantee stability in dealing with the center and pursuing policies toward state independence and decentralization in political and economic spheres.

In the 1990 elections in the Baltic states, the candidates supported by Sajudis, the Latvian Popular Front, and the Estonian People's Front won between 70 and 75 percent of the seats in the republican Supreme Soviets. However, these political organizations were not the primary players in determining access to the government. Although the cabinets of Kazimiera Prunskiene, Edgar Savisaar, and Ivars Godmanis included some representatives of the victorious movements, they were overwhelmingly made up of the former Communist *nomenklatura* and "existing state officials, albeit from that part of the establishment which had swung over to give support, or at least lip-service, to independence and reform" (Lieven, 1993, 296). These governments of professionals with no clear ideological focus were supposed to ensure continuity and pragmatism in dealing with Moscow and pursuing

policies "in the direction of decreased effective dependence on the USSR and increased private enterprise" (Taagepera, 1993, 196). The composition of the Silaev cabinet in the Russian Federation was similar. It was a motley crew that included experienced administrators, academics, reformist members of the Soviet legislature, and individuals who were personally close to Boris Yeltsin.

Ukraine was the only country among my five case studies where the first competitive elections did not bring any changes in the government composition. Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers Vitaliy Masol, who was originally appointed to this post in 1987, was reappointed to lead the government in June 1990. Members of his cabinet had been beforehand approved to their offices by the Communist Party of Ukraine.

* * *

THE BALTIC STATES AND THE "POLITICAL CABINETS"

Post-1991 political developments in the Baltic states, Russia and Ukraine have put these countries in different places on a government of politicians—a government of technocrats continuum. Fifteen years after their independence, five nations demonstrate distinctly different models of determining access of political elites to the cabinet and the recruitment into the executive branch of government. The Baltic states, with their clear-cut party governments, are at the one end of the spectrum. As a result of the last two electoral cycles, the parliaments of these three countries approve cabinets that comprise leading members of political organizations that were victorious in the national elections. However, before the Baltic nations arrived at the current model of the "political government," the composition and nature of their cabinets went through a period of extensive transformation. The breakup of the Soviet Union brought the former Soviet republics to the state of severe political and economic crisis that the leadership of the newly established sovereign nations had to address without a delay. Similarly to the cabinets during the critical early years of the French Fifth Republic, first postindependent governments in the Baltic states could be called the teams of experienced managers with little party leaning rather than politicians. In February 1992, Riina Kionka argued, "Above all, most political parties and movements were convinced that only someone without a strong political orientation could rise above politics to lead Estonia out of its current political crisis" (1992a). This observation is valid in regards to two other Baltic nations.

Few attempts to create political governments in the early 1990s were unsuccessful and led to their downfall and the formation of successor caretaker cabinets of nonparty experts. For example, after the 1992 elections, the

Isamaa and Moderates electoral alliances and the ERSP formed a coalitional government. The cabinet included five ministers from political parties that comprised the Isamaa coalition, three ERSP members, four politicians who were affiliated with the Moderates alliance (one of them did not belong to any party), and two nonparty experts from Sweden and Canada. The leader of Isamaa and Prime Minister Laar called his cabinet "a government of politicians, not of specialists."[3] It was indeed mainly a government of politicians that included several nonparty professionals (see table 3.1).

After several months in power, the governing parties started losing public support. Among the main complaints leveled against the government was

Table 3.1 Brief Descriptions of Cabinets in Estonia, 1990–2004

Date of Appointment	Prime Minister	Brief Description of the Government
March 1990	Edgar Savisaar	Pragmatic, nonideological government,the majority of ministers affiliated with the ER that won legislative elections
January 1992	Tiit Vahi	Politically neutral technocratic government that included the Communist *nomenklatura*
September 1992	Mart Laar	Coalitional political government that included several nonparty experts
September 1994	Andres Tarand	Cabinet consisted of politicians and nonparty technocrats and led by a compromise nonparty PM, who kept "aloof from parties"
April 1995	Tiit Vahi	Coalitional cabinet that included both politicians and nonparty experts
October 1995	Tiit Vahi	Coalitional "political-technocratic" cabinet with an increased proportion of nonparty technocrats
March 1997	Mart Siimann	Coalitional cabinet that consisted of politicians and nonparty experts
March 1999	Mart Laar	Party government: cabinet members belonged to one of the parties of the ruling coalition
January 2002	Siim Kallas	Party government: cabinet members belonged to one of the parties of the ruling coalition
April 2003	Juhan Parts	Party government: cabinet members belonged to one of the parties of the ruling coalition

"that it consider[ed] party political loyalty to be the main criterion for eligibility for many posts."[4] In some cases it had led to the appointment of inexperienced leaders. At the beginning of 1993, one political commentator noted, "Cabinet ministers admit before parliament that they [knew] little about what [was] going on in their areas."[5] Laar was forced to reshuffle the government on several occasions. Most of the new appointees belonged to the parties of the ruling coalition, and the political character of the government had not significantly changed. In September 1994, the Laar cabinet was defeated in a no-confidence vote. The new leader of the Estonian government, Andres Tarand, was a compromise nonparty candidate. Although Tarand made few changes in the composition of the cabinet, he "tried to keep aloof from parties," emphasizing that his "government is not based on a parliamentary coalition in the classical sense."[6] Speaking on the formation of his cabinet, Tarand said that it "would not act directly in the interests of any party or faction, and intended to call upon all members of the future government to avoid acting only according to party positions."[7]

A "moderate technocrat," Tiit Vahi, was elected to lead the government after the 1995 elections.[8] The Vahi cabinet was formed on the basis of the Coalition Party and Rural Union electoral alliance (KMU) and the Center Party and consisted of both politicians and experts. The proportion of nonparty executives increased in the next composition of the Estonian government that was again headed by Tiit Vahi in October 1995 after the breakup of the ruling KMU-Center Party coalition. The government included six ministers from parties that were parts of the KMU alliance, four representatives of the Reform Party-Liberals, a new member of the ruling coalition, and five nonparty professionals (or 33 percent of the ministerial posts). The share of independent ministers again increased in the Siimann cabinet appointed in March 1997. The composition of this government was "half technical and half political" (Müller-Rommel and Sootla, 2001, 20). However, similarly to the previous Vahi cabinets, all nonaffiliated ministers had been nominated by one of the parties from the ruling coalition.

Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis was the only head of state in the five countries who had come to power as a result of the pro-reform vote in 1990 and was able to survive until the next elections to the national assembly held in 1993. However, his cabinet was not a model of stability; its composition was significantly changed during these years. Thus, a major reshuffle of the government took place in November 1991, when the Supreme Council had appointed eight new cabinet members, including key ministers of economic reform, industry, defense, internal affairs, etc. The nature of the government had not been altered though. New appointees were, as a rule, nonparty professionals replacing ministers "who were unable to carry out radical reform of the economy."[9] See table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Brief Descriptions of Cabinets in Latvia, 1990–2004

Date of Appointment	Prime Minister	Brief Description of the Government
April 1990	Ivars Godmanis	Cabinet consists mostly of experts from the old Communist *nomenklatura* and led by a leader of LTF that won elections.
July 1993	Valdis Birkavs	Government of politicians most of whom had extensive previous experience in their areas of responsibility.
August 1994	Maris Gailis	Despite an increased number of nonparty ministers, the political profile of the cabinet as a government of politicians who, at the same time, were experienced professionals, was preserved.
December 1995	Andris Skele	Cabinet is based on a broad coalition of politically diverse parties and led by a compromise nonparty PM. Each party is responsible for the work of ministries headed by their representatives.
February 1997	Andris Skele	Three-party coalitional cabinet is led by a compromise nonparty PM.
August 1997	Guntars Krasts	Party government: cabinet members belonged to one of the parties of the ruling coalition.
November 1998	Vilis Kristopans	Party government: cabinet members belonged to one of the parties of the ruling coalition.
July 1999	Andris Skele	Party government: cabinet members belonged to one of the parties of the ruling coalition.
May 2000	Andris Berzins	Party government: cabinet members belonged to one of the parties of the ruling coalition.
November 2002	Einars Repse	Coalitional political government which includes several nonparty professionals.
March 2004	Indulis Emsis	Party government: cabinet members belonged to one of the parties of the ruling coalition.

Gediminas Vagnorius, who was appointed to the office of Lithuanian prime minister after the resignation of Kazimiera Prunskiene, attempted to change the fundamental principle of the government formation (see table 3.3). The composition of his cabinet was significantly different from his predecessor:[10] "[T]he ministers of the new government were selected from among the majority coalition in the Supreme Council, consisting of the *Sajudis* faction and its allies, the Moderates and the Tautininkai" (Clark, 1993, 55). Soon after the new government assumed power, Sajudis became a minority in the legislature. During 1991–1992, Liberals, Social Democrats, Centrists, Moderates, and the National Progress party split from this movement, and some of the splinter groups opposed Sajudis. For example, Deputy Prime Minister Zigmas Vaisvila and Minister of Defense Audrius Butkevicius belonged to the National Progress faction, which was in the opposition to the government.

In July 1992, Vagnorius was replaced by Alexandras Abisala, who similarly to the caretaker governments of Tiit Vahi (1992) and Andres Tarand in Estonia, expanded the representation of nonparty technocrats in his cabinet. A Lithuanian political commentator argued that "judging by the way Prime Minister A. Abisala chose ministers, one could maintain that an attempt [was] being made to remove incompetence from the Government."[11]

In October 1992, the LDDP achieved a sweeping victory in the elections to the Seimas, winning 42.61 percent of the vote and 73 out of 141 parliamentary seats. The composition of the new 17-member government, though, did not reflect the LDDP success. Only three representatives of this political party became cabinet members: Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys, Agriculture Minister Rimantas Karazija, and Culture Minister Dainius Trinkunas.[12] Economics Minister Julius Veselka was elected to the Seimas on the LDDP list, but was not a member of this party, representing instead the Future of Lithuania Forum. Two other ministers belonged to the Moderates and the Centrists. Other cabinet members were experts in their particular areas of responsibility with no party affiliation. Eight of them had occupied top posts in their ministries in the previous governments.[13] This cabinet of professionals was chaired by Bronislovas Lubys, who belonged to no political party at the time and was a deputy prime minister in the former government and a general manager of one of Lithuania's largest industrial enterprises.[14]

After the February 1993 presidential elections, Adolfas Slezevicius, who was one of the leading members of LDDP, became a new prime minister. After his appointment, Slezevicius kept the profile of the government as a team of technocrats. However, during the three years of its existence, his cabinet had undergone several major reshuffles. By the end of 1995, the 17-member cabinet appointed in March 1992 included only 6 of its original members. New ministerial appointments reflected the ongoing debates within the LDDP concerning the character of the government: should it consist of politicians or

Table 3.3 Brief Descriptions of Cabinets in Lithuania, 1990–2004

Date of Appointment	Prime Minister	Brief Description of the Government
March 1990	Kazimiera Prunskiene	Cabinet consisted primarily of former Communist ministers and a few members of Sajudis that was the election winner.
January 1991	Gediminas Vagnorius	Ministers selected from among Sajudis and its allies. However, Sajudis did not have strict rules of individual membership.
July 1992	Alexandras Abisala	A number of politicians from the previous cabinet, including vice PM, were replaced with nonparty experts to "increase the competence" of the caretaker government.
December 1992	Bronislovas Lubys	Government of technocrats; the majority of ministers including PM belonged to no political party.
March 1993	Adolfas Slezevicius	Cabinet of nonparty technocrats was headed by a "pragmatic" member of the LDDP. During 1993–1995 the cabinet remained a government of technocrats with an increasing proportion of ministers affiliated with the ruling LDDP.
February 1996	Mindaugas Stankevicius	A nucleus of the cabinet consisted of the ministers from the former government. New appointments included both politicians and technocrats.
December 1996	Gediminas Vagnorius	Party government: cabinet members belonged to one of the parties of the ruling coalition.
June 1999	Ronaldas Paksas	Coalitional political government includes several nonparty technocrats.
November 1999	Andrius Kubilius	Coalitional political government includes several nonparty technocrats.
October 2000	Ronaldas Paksas	Coalitional political government includes several nonparty technocrats.
July 2001	Algirdas Brazauskas	Coalitional political government includes nine politicians and five nonparty technocrats.

professionals? First Deputy Chairman of the LDDP and Chairman of its parliamentary faction Gediminas Kirkilis argued that "the political government concept must be realized. [A] minister working for the LDDP government must carry out its program."[15] During the May 1994 session of the LDDP Council, its members expressed similar ideas that ministers should "be not only qualified specialists in their respective fields, but that they also [should] be politicians, who would know how, be able to, and would want to execute and defend the LDDP program in a responsible manner."[16] The opposite point of view was advocated by President Algirdas Brazauskas and Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius. Thus, in one of his interviews Brazauskas said about the government that "it does not matter what people [are] in power. The important thing is that the state must be run by professionals."[17]

New ministerial appointments demonstrated a balanced approach toward the formation of the government; it combined both politicians and experts. Although the majority of new appointees who replaced the members of the original Slezevicius cabinet were professionals with an extensive prior experience in their areas of expertise, the proportion of ministers who were either members of the LDDP or its supporters in the government increased. For example, in October 1993, nonaffiliated Minister of Defense Audrius Butkevicius and Social Welfare Minister Teodoras Medaiskis resigned. A Seimas deputy from the Democratic Labor faction Linas Linkevicius and a senior LDDP member Laurinas Mindaugas Stankevicius were appointed to lead these two ministries. Most of the six new ministers appointed in June 1994 were "either members or supporters of the ruling" LDDP.[18]

The results of the 1996 parliamentary elections put an end to the debate on the nature of the Lithuanian cabinet. The voters dissatisfied with the leftist-controlled government overwhelmingly supported the right-of-center political parties: the TS/LK and the Christian Democrats. These two organizations, together with the Centrist Union, had formed a new government. Conservative Board Chairman Gediminas Vagnorius said that before his appointment as prime minister "the cabinet of ministers will be one of politicians and not of so-called specialists. Only members of the ruling parties' coalition can hope to receive ministerial posts."[19] The cabinet included 12 ministers who were members of the TS/LK, 3 from the LKDP, 2 from the LCS, and 1 from the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists. Most of the ministers were recently elected Seimas members.

By the mid-1990s the political and economic crisis caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union was generally over; the three Baltic countries were successfully moving toward a greater consolidation of their democracies and closer to the European institutions. The era of the emergency caretaker governments by and large ended, and politics has taken a normal parliamentary course. Lithuania since 1996, Latvia since 1997,[20] and Estonia since 1999

have been governed by political parties, and the composition of their governments had reflected a composition of the national parliaments. Electoral outcomes have become the primary tool that determine the access of political elites to the governmental positions. The members of the Estonian (Kallas, Parts), Latvian (Kristopans, Skele, Emsis), and Lithuanian (Paksas) cabinets formed as a result of the two latest electoral cycles belonged to one of the parties that signed a coalition agreement to form a government.[21] Political parties fill the cabinet seats allotted to them by electing and dismissing ministers at party congresses.[22] By the late 1990s, parties strengthened their legitimacy in the society and have undisputedly claimed their distinct social niche as vehicles of the recruitment of political leaders into the top executive offices in all three Baltic states.[23]

The Russian Federation and the "Technocratic Government"

In an interview on the eve of the 1995 elections, former prime minister of the Russian Federation Viktor Chernomyrdin said about a cabinet formation: "I am in favor of a government that consists of professionals because a government is not a political body."[24] Although he did not elaborate the thesis about an apolitical nature of a government, the views of the longest-serving Premier in post-1991 Russia on the principles of the cabinet formation are clear: he favors the government of experts. On several occasions Chernomyrdin, as well as presidents Yeltsin, Putin, and other top Russian politicians, emphasized that the main criterion of an appointment into the Cabinet of Ministers should be the professional skills of a candidate.[25] In most cases since 1990, the professional and managerial experience of a candidate was indeed an important factor of his or her nomination into the Russian cabinet. At the same time, ministerial appointments were also made for other reasons such as adherence to a course of radical reforms, personal loyalty to the president, affiliation to industrial or agricultural lobbies, distribution of political forces in the parliament, and occasionally candidates' party membership.

In the fall of 1991, after the breakup of the Soviet Union and resignation of Ivan Silaev from the post of the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, the political profile of the Russian government was radically altered. Recently elected President Yeltsin decided to carry out duties of the cabinet leader himself. A cofounder of the Democratic Russia movement Gennadiy Burbulis and director of the Economic Policy Institute Egor Gaidar were appointed first deputy prime ministers in charge of overall government affairs and economic reforms respectively. All important ministerial slots were filled with radical reformers, many of whom had an academic background and were staffers from Gaidar's research institute (see table 3.4).[26] At the time of their

Table 3.4 Brief Descriptions of Cabinets in the Russian Federation, 1990–2004

Date of Appointment	Prime Minister	Brief Description of the Government
Summer 1990	Ivan Silaev	Cabinet represented a diverse team on the Communist *nomenklatura*, experienced administrators, academics, and reformist members of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
September 1991	Boris Yeltsin	Political profile of the cabinet is dramatically changed. All key ministers were filled with radical reformers.
May–June 1992	Egor Gaidar (Acting PM)	Cabinet was a coalition of radical reformers, experienced managers, and representatives of the military-industrial lobby.
November 1992–February 1993	Viktor Chernomyrdin	The industrial and agricultural lobbies, supported by the new PM, attained a number of key posts in the cabinet changing a balance between liberal and industrial wings in the cabinet in favor of technocrats.
January–March 1994	Viktor Chernomyrdin	The reformist element affiliated with Russia's Choice had almost disappeared from the cabinet. Government was dominated by the industrial and agricultural lobbies, most of whom were not affiliated with political parties.
December 1995	Viktor Chernomyrdin	Formation of the government of industrialists with no ideological constraints was completed.
February 1996	Viktor Chernomyrdin	Strengthened by their electoral victory the Communists succeeded in removing the last members of the Gaidar team from the cabinet. Almost all replacements are nonparty technocrats.
April 1998	Sergey Kirienko	Cabinet of technocrats who are not affiliated with political parties.
September 1998	Evgeniy Primakov	The most political and independent cabinet in post-1991 Russia. The government included representatives of all major party factions in the Duma, nonparty technocrats, and old Soviet *nomenklatura*.

Continued

Table 3.4 Continued

Date of Appointment	Prime Minister	Brief Description of the Government
May 1999	Sergey Stepashin	Most of the cabinet members are technocrats with no party affiliation.
August 1999	Vladimir Putin	Most of the cabinet members are technocrats with no party affiliation.
May 2000	Mikhail Kasyanov	Cabinet of technocrats who are not affiliated with political parties.
March 2004	Mikhail Fradkov	Close to the "ideal technocratic government" on "the government of politicians—the government of experts" continuum

appointment, most members of the new cabinet were affiliated with no political parties or movements. Although Yeltsin had discussed the formation of the government with representatives of Democratic Russia, this political movement had never become a "government party."[27]

A team of young reformers and academics who had no prior government or managerial experience was doomed from the beginning: "[T]he young government lacked authority from the outset and was practically boycotted by the major forces in the country: it had to start implementing market reforms in complete isolation and under heavy fire from all sides" (Rahl, 1992). After the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation in April 1992, President Yeltsin was forced to reshuffle the government and change its political profile. The first influx of the military-industrial lobby into the cabinet took place in May–June 1992 with the appointment of Vladimir Shumeyko, director of a plant in Krasnodar and president of the Confederation of the Union of Russian Businessmen; Viktor Chernomyrdin, former minister of the Gas Industry and chairman of the Gazprom concern; Georgii Khizha, a director of a large military enterprise in Leningrad; etc. At the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, the balance between industrial and liberal wings in the Cabinet of Ministers shifted in favor of the technocrats when Viktor Chernomyrdin replaced Egor Gaidar, and the industrial and agrarian lobbies, supported by the new premier, stepped up the pressure on Yeltsin attaining a number of key posts in the cabinet. Oleg Soskovets and Oleg Lobov[28] were appointed first deputy prime ministers; Aleksandr Zaveryukha, vice prime minister; and Yuriy Shafranik, Minister of Fuel and Energy.

The 1993 elections to the Duma led to the influx of political appointments to the cabinet. Five cabinet members, including deputy prime ministers Egor Gaidar[29], Anatoliy Chubais, and Boris Fedorov, Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, Minister of Social Welfare Ella Pamfilova, and leader of the presidential administration Sergey Filatov, ran for the Duma on the ticket of Russia's Choice. In addition, First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeyko, who was originally entered as #2 on the party list of this bloc, ran for the upper chamber of parliament—the Federation Council. The Moscow establishment had high hopes for the electoral success of Russia's Choice. Gaidar "who had been selected as a candidate for prime minister by Yeltsin in the autumn of that year should, according to the head of state, receive the majority of votes during approval in the State Duma" (Shatskoy, 2003). Two other vice prime ministers, Sergey Shakhray and Aleksandr Shokhin, as well as Minister of Justice Yuriy Kalmykov and Minister of Labor Gennadiy Melikyan, were on the ballot of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord. The participation of some cabinet members in the electoral campaign and their affiliation with political organizations signified an attempt to depart from a government of politically neutral professionals. It was a step toward party government that obtained its mandate from the electorate and asked the voter to pass a judgment on its record. The results of the 1993 elections provide further evidence in support of this argument albeit in a negative way.

Perhaps the greatest surprise of the elections was the relative failure of the Russia's Choice bloc, which received less than 16 percent of the overall vote. Voters rejected Gaidar's program of radical economic reforms. Soon after the elections, Gaidar, Fedorov, and Pamfilova resigned from the government. Shumeyko, another Russia's Choice cabinet member, was also released from the post of first deputy prime minister in connection with his election as chairman of the Federation Council. Shakhray and Shokhin, members of the PRES, which barely overcame the 5 percent barrier, were stripped of their status as deputy prime ministers.[30] As a result of the elections, the Cabinet of Ministers was dominated by representatives of the industrial and agrarian lobbies, most of whom had no party affiliation. The reformist element that was represented in elections by Russia's Choice and PRES almost disappeared from the executive branch.

The formation of a government of technocrats was completed in November–December 1994. The resignation of Aleksandr Shokhin and Yuriy Kalmykov, who were among few government members simultaneously engaged in party activity, as well as the appointment of deputy prime ministers Oleg Davydov, Aleksey Bolshakov, and Nikolay Yegorov, Economics Minister Yevgeniy Yasin, and Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov, meant the most thorough cabinet reshuffle since 1991. In the words of Boris Yeltsin, he "placed [his] stake on high-class professionals, not on politicians."[31] Representatives of the industrial

lobby with no ideological constraints gained an upper hand in the Cabinet of Ministers. The transformation of the ideological government of academics gathered around Gaidar in 1991 to a coalition of liberal reformers and experienced managers and then to a team of nonaffiliated industrialists was completed.

During the 1995 electoral campaign, like two years before, the government of the Russian Federation became more politicized. The ruling establishment had created a "centrist" party of power: Our Home Is Russia. Four cabinet members, including Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, appeared on the electoral list of this bloc. After the first election results were made public, President Yeltsin said about the postelection cabinet: "[T]he government composition should take account of the distribution of forces in the new Duma."[32] The electoral outcome did cause changes in the cabinet composition. However, it was once again in a negative way. Three out of four political parties that had passed the 5 percent barrier did not participate in the formation of the government. The CPRF (22.3 percent of the vote, 157 out of 450 seats in the Duma), the LDPR (11.2 percent of the vote, 51 seats), and Yabloko (6.89 percent of the vote, 45 seats) did not send their members to the postelection cabinet. Nevertheless, the Communists had succeeded in removing the last members of Gaidar's team from the government. First Deputy Prime Minister Chubais, Deputy Prime Minister Shakhray, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, and Head of the president's administration Filatov were forced to resign. State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev (CPRF) admitted that the government reshuffle had been carried out under pressure from the Communists because of their election victory.[33] Most replacements for the dismissed cabinet members were skilled professionals with no party affiliation.

After the defeat of the ideological government led by Egor Gaidar, the pattern of cabinet recruitment in Russia has been at the opposite pole from the Baltic states. Ruling circles in the Russian Federation put their stock in the governments of professionals. The current cabinet of Mikhail Fradkov is a good example to illustrate this point. On the one hand, the appointment of a little known, uncharismatic, and loyal technocrat with no independent status and political base of his own was a surprise for most experts of Russian politics. On the other hand, it is a logical move toward establishing a cabinet of obedient nonaffiliated professionals run as a department of the presidential administration and completely dependent on Putin.[34] When someone reviews composition and official biographical sketches of the Fradkov cabinet members, the following terms come to mind: the St. Petersburg group, *siloviki* (politicians who were formerly members of the security, police, or military services), economic liberals, personal loyalty, and technocrats. Party affiliation and political ideology are missing from this list. At the same time, some cabinet members are not strangers to party politics. Thus, Sergey Shoigu is a cochair of the largest political organization represented in the

Duma, United Russia; Aleksei Gordeev was involved in the development of the Agrarian Party program; Aleksandr Zhukov and Aleksei Kudrin have been included on party lists in several previous cycles of national elections. However, the official Web site of the Russian government does not contain any of this information emphasizing the nonideological nature of the Fradkov government.[35]

With the exception of one case in the post-Communist Russian Federation, parties had little, if any, political influence on the formation of the government. The most "political" cabinet was formed by Evgeniy Primakov (September 1998–May 1999) after the Duma for the first and only time in its history forced the president to withdraw his original nomination for prime minister and appoint a compromise candidate.[36] Since Primakov was "obliged to form the cabinet in a political vacuum, without any serious support from either authorities or society" (Frost, 1998), it is natural that the backing of the parliamentary majority was instrumental for the survival of his government. Primakov's desire not to alienate major Duma factions brought to his cabinet senior functionaries from the CPRF, Agrarians, Our Home Is Russia, Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party, a former Yabloko member, nonparty technocrats, and old Soviet *apparatchiks* (members of the apparatus of the Communist Party or the Soviet government). Experts consider the Primakov cabinet the most independent from the president of all Russian governments, a feature that eventually led to its demise in May 1999. After Primakov's resignation, Russia returned to the model of the government of the pragmatists and the technocrats, "which had been the basic element of stability of the presidential regime" in this nation (Shevtsova and Klyamkin, 1999, 36).

* * *

Ukraine and the Late and Slow Transition

Similarly to four other post-Soviet nations, the average life expectancy of the Ukrainian cabinets is short: slightly over one year. In 2002, Viktor Yanukovych became the eleventh chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. Since the fall of 1991, when the Communist Party of Ukraine was banned, until the appointment of Yushchenko cabinet in December 1999, a political profile of the Ukrainian cabinet as a government of nonparty professionals remained essentially without change. Those uncommon cases when members of political parties have been appointed to the Cabinet of Ministers did not alter the general picture: the Ukrainian government comprised predominantly technocrats who did not belong to political parties. However, the composition of the Yushchenko government and the Yanukovych cabinet

formed after the 2002 election demonstrates a slow but gradual advance of party affiliation significance in cabinet recruitment.

Unlike the Baltic states and Russia, the first competitive elections in Ukraine in early 1990 did not bring immediate changes in the government composition. Chairman of the Ukrainian cabinet Vitaliy Masol continued to lead the *nomenklatura* government whose members had been picked up by the CPU (see table 3.5). In the fall of 1990, Masol was forced to resign under pressure from the students' hunger strike. The biography of Vitold Fokin, who succeeded Masol, is similar to his predecessor's. Both headed large industrial enterprises, both chaired Ukraine's Gosplan, and both "were characterized by their lack of understanding of the market economy" (Zviglyanich, 1997). The profile of the Fokin government hardly changed: the overwhelming majority of ministers belonged to the old Communist *nomenklatura*. However, Fokin made several attempts to co-opt a number of prominent opposition representatives in the cabinet. A member of the pro-reform parliamentary group New Ukraine, Volodymyr Lanovyy, was appointed deputy prime minister; a leader of the Greens, Yurii Shcherbak, became environmental minister; and a Rukh supporter, Petro Talanchuk, was approved as education minister. Some of these appointments were short-lived. Thus, as soon as New Ukraine transformed itself from a parliamentary group into a political movement and formally announced its opposition to the government, President Leonid Kravchuk removed Lanovyy from his posts.[37] Whatever the reason for this dismissal, the Fokin government established a precedent of inviting to the cabinet politicians who had never belonged to Communist *nomenklatura*.

On October 1, 1992, Fokin and his government resigned, and two weeks later, the parliament approved a new prime minister—Leonid Kuchma, the manager of the world's largest missile production enterprise (Pivdenmash) during the cold war. The new premier made a number of new appointments, including all six deputy prime ministers. Ihor Yukhnovsky, the former head of the opposition in the parliament, became first vice premier. Five deputy prime ministers were reform-minded professors Viktor Pynzenyk and Mykola Zhulynsky, as well as representatives of industrial and agricultural lobbies Vasyl Yevtukhov, Volodymyr Demyanov, and Yulii Ioffe. The composition of the government, especially at its senior level, was extensively changed to "a mixture of professionals and representatives of the old democratic opposition" (Solchanyk, 1992). However, it should be emphasized that neither technocrats nor formerly oppositional leaders, who became a part of the Kuchma cabinet, officially belonged to Ukrainian political parties. Dmytro Tabachnyk, a close associate of Leonid Kuchma, gives the following characteristic of his government: "[I]t was neither brought to power by, nor does it draw on, the full support of any of the political parties of Ukraine,

Table 3.5 Brief Descriptions of Cabinets in Ukraine, 1990–2004

Date of Appointment	Prime Minister	Brief Description of the Government
June 1990	Vitaliy Masol	Cabinet consisted of old Communist *nomenklatura* members who were beforehand approved to their posts by the Communist Party.
November 1990	Vitold Fokin	The overwhelming majority of ministers were the old Communist *nomenklatura*. The cabinet also included several representatives of reformist forces.
October 1992	Leonid Kuchma	Cabinet, especially its senior members, was a mixture of professionals, representatives of the industrial lobby, and members of the democratic opposition.
September 1993	Yukhym Zvyahilsky (Acting PM)	Most of the reform-minded members of the former cabinet were replaced by representatives of the "Red directorate" and old Communist *nomenklatura*.
June 1994	Vitaliy Masol	Cabinet consisted of technocrats and the old Communist *nomenklatura* and is led by a nonparty PM who considers himself "a communist at heart."
July 1994–March 1995		Newly elected President Kuchma replaced a number of key ministers and deputy PMs with his supporters from the reformist forces, the industrial and agricultural lobbies.
May 1995	Yevhen Marchuk	Cabinet members are not oriented toward any specific political force.
May 1996	Pavlo Lazarenko	Government consists of experts, most of whom had no party affiliation. Some cabinet appointments demonstrated that Kuchma was increasingly relying on personal loyalists from his home city Dnipropetrovs'k.
July 1997	Valeriy Pustovoitenko	Cabinet consisted of the majority of nonparty professionals and was headed by the PM who

Continued

Table 3.5 Continued

Date of Appointment	Prime Minister	Brief Description of the Government
		was very close to the president. For the first time since 1991, the PM was a member of a political party, the NDP, which was the first party of power in Ukraine.
December 1999	Viktor Yushchenko	Cabinet consisted of the majority of nonparty technocrats and several leaders of the major factions in the Rada. The PM was dismissed by a coalition of parties in the legislature after he lost the parliamentary majority support.
April 2001	Anatoliy Kinakh	Cabinet consisted of the majority of nonparty technocrats and several leaders of the major parliamentary factions.
November 2002	Viktor Yanukovych	For the first time since independence, Ukraine had a coalitional party-based Government supported by a parliamentary pro-presidential majority. The ruling coalition consisted of five parties of power representing major clans in Ukrainian politics.

accordingly, it is not restricted to a certain party program. It may be called the government of the 'pragmatic party' which [includes] democratic politicians, the supreme officialdom, and influential representatives of the business community" (Tabachnyk, 1993).

In September 1993, Leonid Kuchma resigned, and the Ukrainian president appointed a representative of the industrial lobby, Yukhym Zvyahilsky, to the post of first deputy prime minister and Acting Premier. Zvyahilsky replaced several reform-minded members of the Ukrainian cabinet, including Yukhnovsky, Pynzenyk, Defense Minister Konstyantyn Morozov, by representatives of the informal party of power, "Red directorate," and old *nomenklatura*. The tendency to rely on old cadres manifested itself with the reappointment of Vitaliy Masol, the last head of the Ukrainian government under Communists, as prime minister in June 1994. At the time of his reappointment, Masol had no party affiliation, although he considered himself "a communist at heart."[38] Masol claimed that "his Cabinet would consist of professionals having no political sentiments" (Borodin, 1994). The new composition of the Ukrainian government mainly corresponded to this principle of forming the cabinet.

The resignation of the Masol cabinet following a no-confidence vote in the Rada in April 1995 meant that the top representatives of the old Communist Party *nomenklatura* were finally removed from the Ukrainian government. The informal party of power (see chapter 10) was firmly in power. In May 1995, President Kuchma asked first deputy prime minister in the former cabinet, Yevhen Marchuk, to form a new government. Asked by journalists on which principles the new cabinet would be formed, Marchuk said, "We would like to avoid politicization in the formation of the government. The most important task is to try and form a highly professional government." He also added that he was not going to form a coalition cabinet by sacrificing the level of professionalism just to satisfy all politicians.[39] The government composition was significantly renewed; more than 60 percent of cabinet members were appointed to their posts for the first time. Representatives of various political forces recognized a rather high level of professionalism of the cabinet members. One of the Rukh leaders, Les Tanyuk, "summarized the general opinion: 'we can see a certain professionalization in the government; the important point is that the communists and socialists in their pure form [are] not represented in it' " (Vishnevskyy, 1995).

The appointments of new Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko in May 1996 and somewhat later his First Deputy Serhiy Tyhipko clearly manifested another tendency in Kuchma's cadre policy. The president, who launched his career in the city of Dnipropetrovs'k as director of Pivdenmash, was increasingly relying on his personal loyalists and supporters from this town. Members of the so-called Dnipropetrovs'k clan included a former governor of this region, Lazarenko; a former head of one of Ukraine's top five banks, Privatbank, located in Dnipropetrovs'k, Tyhipko; Volodymyr Horbulin, secretary of the powerful National Security Council and Kuchma's colleague from Pivdenmash; Valeriy Pustovoitenko, minister of the Cabinet of Ministers and former mayor of Dnipropetrovs'k; Hryhoriy Vorsinov, Ukraine's procurator general and former Dnipropetrovs'k oblast prosecutor. During his several years of presidency Leonid Kuchma has appointed more than 200 top government officials from this region. Olexander Razumkov, a former director of Kyiv's Independent Center for Economic and Political Research, said that many Ukrainian appointments were based on personal loyalty to the president rather than on professional qualifications.[40] In July 1997, Pustovoitenko replaced Lazarenko as the Ukrainian prime minister. This appointment of another representative of the Dnipropetrovs'k clan seemed to provide another example that personal loyalty had become a principal factor of nomination to the top government offices: "Pustovoitenko has enough experience and organizational ability to hold onto the post of premier. But this is probably not his main attraction in Kuchma's eyes. Pustovoitenko is one of the longest-serving members of Kuchma's team and one of the closest to the president" (Zviglyanich, 1997).

At the same time, no matter whether professionalism, personal links, or any other reason was behind the selection of Prime Minister Pustovoitenko, this appointment had an important political implication: for the first time in post-1991 Ukraine, a member of a political party was chosen to head the central government. Pustovoitenko has been a senior member and later the head of the Popular Democratic Party (NDP) formed in February 1996. The NDP was the first attempt of the Ukrainian establishment to create a formal party of power and signified the emergence on the national political arena of a de facto pro-presidential political formation, which was supposed to accept responsibility for the course of political and economic reforms in the country. At its peak of popularity in 1999, the NDP had one of the two largest parliamentary groups in the Rada.

Although party identification was still an insignificant factor for the government formation in Ukraine, political parties have been playing a more prominent role after the Rada dismissed the Pustovoitenko government in December 1999. His successor, Viktor Yushchenko, who was given a free hand to select his ministers, has emphasized on numerous occasions that his government would "only work efficiently if backed by a center-right majority in the parliament."[41] The Yushchenko cabinet was "a compromise between reformists intentions and the demands of party politics." Although professional qualities came first, several cabinet posts were given to leaders of major factions in the Rada. In April 2001, when Yushchenko lost support of the parliamentary majority, his government was voted out of office by the national legislature.

After the 2002 elections, a pattern of the cabinet formation in Ukraine experienced a dramatic change. Viktor Yanukovych, who became a new prime minister, was one of four candidates nominated by pro-presidential parliamentary factions to this position. Moreover, for the first time in Ukrainian postindependence history, a new coalition government model was introduced, under which parliamentary caucuses that formed a pro-presidential majority in the Rada, nominated their representatives to the Yanukovych government. In addition to the prime minister, who was soon elected to lead the Party of Regions, all four of his original deputies, Mykola Azarov, Ivan Kyrylenko, Dmytro Tabachnyk, and Vitaliy Hayduk,[42] were senior members of the Party of Regions, Agrarian Party, Labor Ukraine, and SDPU (U) respectively. The leaders of the pro-presidential factions "themselves determined which caucuses would get what posts and then offered nominees, among which Mr. Kuchma chose his appointees" (Woronowycz, 2002). To a large extent the Yanukovych cabinet was dependent on parliamentary support. However, one should not overestimate the significance of this coalition government, which represents nothing more than an alliance of nonideological regional parties of powers representing the Donbas, Dnipropetrovs'k, and

Kyiv clans that agreed to set aside their quarrels in order to prevent an access to government by the largest political force in the nation at the time: Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine.

* * *

CONCLUSION

The topic of formation and functioning of cabinets in Western Europe attracted considerable attention of scholars and "has been more extensively studied than many other aspects of the political process" (Gallagher et al., 1995, 333). Scholarly research focused on important themes such as types of cabinet governments, their legitimacy, seat allocation, various facets of coalition building and power sharing, cabinet stability and survival, influences on governmental policies, and produced an abundant literature on the subject. At the same time, I agree with Jean Blondel (2001, 2) that the national executive in the Eastern European countries remains "almost wholly uncovered" so far. Those few studies of cabinet governments in the former Communist states tend to be modeled along the investigations of these institutions in Western Europe and almost automatically adopt a research agenda of Western European cabinet experts (see, e.g., Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 2001). Although such a research design helps to bring to light some similarities and essential differences between the executive branch of government in the two parts of Europe, it fails to uncover and address topics that are specifically peculiar to young post-Communist democracies.

One such topic is the role and influence of political parties in the process of government formation. Party monopoly of cabinet recruitment in Western European countries is taken for granted: the national executive is formed on the basis of legislative elections and cabinet portfolios are distributed "among government parties in strict proportion to the number of seats that each party contributes to the government's legislative majority" (Gallagher et al., 1995, 323). Even in those few cases when a nonaffiliated technician becomes a cabinet member, his or her selection and recruitment tends to remain "firmly in the hands of the various party organizations" (Pasquino, 1987, 206). The Western European scenario assumes a highly institutionalized system of political parties. Although party systems in some post-Soviet societies have made significant progress in the past 15 years, the overall levels of their institutionalization and impact on the cabinet formation is much weaker.

Table 3.6 summarizes the role of political parties in the formation of the cabinets in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine since the spring of 1990 until the fall of 2004. All five post-Soviet nations are characterized by the high level of government instability. Since the first competitive elections for

Table 3.6 Autonomy of the Party System: Recruitment into the Cabinet in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine, 1991–2004

	Before the First Election	After the First Election	After the Second Election	After the Third Election	After the Fourth Election
Estonia (1992, 1995, 1999, 2003)	Medium-low (Savisaar, Vahi)	Medium-high (Laar) Medium (Tarand)	Medium (Vahi) Medium (Siimann)	High (Laar, Kallas)	High (Parts)
Latvia (1993, 1995, 1998, 2002)	Medium-low (Godmanis)	High (Birkavs) Medium-high (Gailis)	Medium-high (Skele) High (Krasts)	High (Kristopans, Skele, Berzins)	High (Repse, Emsis)
Lithuania (1992, 1996, 2000)	Low (Prunskiene) Medium (Vagnorius) Medium-low (Abisala)	Medium-low (Lubys) Medium (Slezevicius, Stankevicius)	High (Vagnorius, Paksas, Kubilius)	High (Paksas) Medium-high (Brazauskas)	
Russia (1993, 1995, 1999, 2003)	Low (Silaev, Yeltsin, Gaidar, Chernomyrdin)	Low (Chernomyrdin)	Medium-low (Chernomyrdin) Low (Kirienko) Medium (Primakov) Low (Stepashin, Putin)	Low (Putin, Kasyanov, Fradkov)	Low (Fradkov)
Ukraine (1995, 1998, 2002)	Low (Masol, Fokin, Kuchma, Zvyahilsky, Masol)	Low (Marchuk Lazarenko) Medium-low (Pustovoitenko)	Medium-low (Pustovoitenko, Yushchenko, Kinakh)	Medium (Yanukovych)	

Note: The rankings are based on comparison of the five countries. The scores are rough approximations.
See the text for an explanation of the ranking criteria.

the republican legislatures in 1990 until the fall of 2004, these countries had between ten and twelve prime ministers and cabinets, which lasted at least a month. Although several prime ministers kept their posts for a relatively long time (e.g., Viktor Chernomyrdin, December 1992–March 1998; Adolfas Slezevicius, March 1993–February 1996; Ivars Godmanis, April 1990–July 1993), the composition of their cabinets, including vice premiers and key ministers, has repeatedly been reshuffled. In some cases, such changes in the governments were so thorough that it would be more appropriate to talk about the Chernomyrdin governments or the Slezevicius cabinets instead of the Chernomyrdin government or the Slezevicius cabinet.

A comparative analysis of the influence of postindependence electoral outcomes on the cabinet formation in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine demonstrated different approaches to the recruitment of political elite into the executive. In the Baltic nations, electoral results play an instrumental role in determining the composition of the government. The profile of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian top executive bodies gradually changed from a team of old Communist *nomenklatura* and technocrats in the early 1990s to a coalition of the nonparty experts and political appointees in the mid-1990s, and finally to purely political cabinets. Since the second postindependence elections in Lithuania and Latvia and the third electoral cycle in Estonia, political parties negotiate and distribute ministerial positions, nominate and approve candidates for government offices, including in some cases nonparty professionals, and provide parliamentary support for the cabinet. The role of parties in the creation of the executive branch has become more important over time. The level of external *autonomy* and institutionalization of the party systems in the Baltic nations advanced notably during this period.

Russia demonstrated a diametrically different approach to the formation of the cabinet. Apart from one atypical example of the Primakov government, which depended on the parliamentary majority, ruling circles in this country place their stakes on the government of technocrats. After Gaidar's ideological team of radical reformers with academic backgrounds was replaced by a government of politically neutral managers and representatives of the industrial and agricultural lobbies, Russian political parties had little, if any, political influence on the formation of the cabinet. Premier Mikhail Fradkov and his ministers, who lack an independent political base and derive their legitimacy mostly from President Putin, are extreme illustrations of the technocratic profile of the Russian government. The degree of external *autonomy* of the Russian party system remains low.

Until the last parliamentary elections, Ukraine was lagging behind the other four countries in terms of party influence on cabinet formation. Only in 1995 were members of the old Communist *nomenklatura* finally removed from the Ukrainian government. They were replaced by representatives of big

business, the industrial lobby, and the increasing number of politicians who were personally loyal to President Kuchma.

A member of a political party was chosen to head the Ukrainian government only in July 1997, or years later than in the other four case studies. Overall, however, party identification was not considered a somewhat significant factor for the government formation, and it hindered institutionalization of the Ukrainian party system. After the 2002 parliamentary elections, a pattern of the cabinet recruitment in Ukraine fundamentally changed. The Yanukovych government was set up by a coalition of regional parties of power that joined forces to prevent the opposition from coming to power. Most of the cabinet members, including the prime minister belonged to one of the parties of the ruling coalition.

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CHAPTER 4

AUTONOMY OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERNS OF PARTY SUPPORT

SCHOLARS CONDUCTING RESEARCH ON POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION have offered numerous ways to measure the degree of *autonomy* of individual political parties and party systems: distinctiveness of organizational norms and values, control of party finances and material resources, presence of "catch-all" parties, selection patterns of party leaders, relations with its collateral associations, etc. Although geographical patterns of voting and regional strength of party support may serve as important and useful means to evaluate the degree of political institutionalization, electoral geography has been rarely employed to study comparative political parties. Many scholars argue that this is a significant shortcoming of party literature and call for a closer look at the "territorial dimension" of electoral politics and geographical aspects of party competition (Hopkin, 2003, 227). A good indicator of *autonomy* of a political party is the level of its nationalization, or, in other words, the extent of homogeneity of its electoral support base across the nation.[1] According to Kawato, "[T]he electorate with a nationalized configuration is one that shows few regional and district differences in partisan support" (1987, 1237). As a rule, highly autonomous parties manifest a relatively equal share of the vote in different territorial constituencies. Weakly institutionalized parties draw their electoral strength from a significantly smaller territorial segment.

Kenneth Janda is among a few scholars in comparative politics who emphasized the significance of geographical voting statistics for a study of

political parties. He developed the index of party's national orientation and differentiated between regionally oriented parties that "choose not to compete seriously at the national level" and nationally oriented parties that "compete with other parties across the country, and its success is rather uniform across regions" (1980, 34). For party systems this argument can be modified as follows: As a rule, the party system is likely to possess a high level of political *autonomy* and institutionalization if its main elements (i.e., individual parties) have a relatively uniform electoral support across the entire country and express the interests of most, if not all, geographical parts of a nation. On the contrary, the party system would rate low in the *autonomy* dimension of political institutionalization if it is dominated by political formations that are distinctly split according to regional lines, express narrow interests of some regions, and do not have a significant electoral base and influence in others.

One of the reasons why spatial approach has not been widely used for the study of political institutionalization of parties and party systems is a lack of reliable regional electoral data necessary for a cross-national comparison. Mainwaring and Scully acknowledge the value of political geography and explain their inability to use it in their investigation of party systems in Latin America: "[D]ata on electoral geography would be useful in showing how citizens perceive parties, measuring the strength of party support, and assessing voter stability in voters' electoral preferences. . . . Unfortunately we do not have sufficiently comparable data to undertake this effort here" (1995, 11). Although fewer than 10 years have passed since the publication of Mainwaring and Scully's work, data on electoral geography in newly democratizing countries has become more readily available, providing a researcher additional opportunities to study these nations. For example, the central electoral boards of the five countries under study maintain informative Web sites that contain comparable electoral data with constituency breakdown, making it possible to conduct a cross-national analysis. The availability of the necessary electoral data allowed Mark P. Jones and Scott Mainwaring to conduct a study of the nationalization of parties and party systems in 17 countries in the Americas, which according to the authors is the first attempt "to provide empirical information about party system nationalization outside of the advanced industrial democracies" (2003, 158).

* * *

NATIONALIZATION THESIS

The thesis of the nationalization of political parties in a modern society and its significance for democratic stability and survival is not new in political

science (Schattschneider, 1960; Stokes, 1965, 1967; Jackman, 1972; Claggett et al., 1984; Kawato, 1987). It is rooted in the political development approach, which "has emphasized the integration of peripheral cultural identities and economic areas within broader national contexts" (Caramani, 2004, 4). The nationalization process was "assisted by such factors as the growth of levels of mass literacy and of means of communications" (Jackman, 1972, 512). Students of democratic transitions emphasize the importance of political parties in the process of nationalization. They consider the existence of parties with uniform electoral support across space as an instrumental factor in consolidating and preserving democracy in a country with deep ethnic or national cleavages (Stepan, 2001; Jones and Mainwaring, 2003; Caramani, 2004).

The political science interpretation of the nationalization thesis was challenged by scholars in political geography. For example, John A. Agnew, a leading political geographer, has for years questioned its significance. Agnew recognizes that some "aspects of the nationalization thesis are unimpeachable. The locus of political activity . . . have expanded from the entirely local to the national. . . . As a result, national political parties and national-scale institutions have assumed increased significance as mechanisms of political incorporation and expression at regional and local scales" (2002, 77). However, Agnew argues that the nationalization thesis is not necessarily supported by empirical evidence. In his study of Italian electoral developments, Agnew found that the nationalization argument in Italian political science is based largely upon intellectual foundations of this academic discipline independent of empirical demonstration (1988, 307). He strongly warns against a tendency to underestimate the role of the place and regional cleavages in political mobilization: "[T]he national state . . . is dependent on the political patterns that places construct. It is as much at their mercy as they are at the national state's. Political nationalization . . . is a historically contingent result of electoral choices made under the pressure of distinctive socialization processes in different places" (2002, 110). The spatial variable should not be considered independently from historical influences and should be placed in a broader cultural context that has a great importance for geographical considerations (1990, 8). Reynolds (1990) and Lutz (1995) second Agnew "that spatial factors can indeed have great effects on political behavior" (Lutz, 1995, 57).

At the heart of dispute between the two sides, political science and political geography, about the nationalization thesis is the disagreement regarding the extent of influence of regional and local factors on nationwide electorates and party systems. The political science approach states that as votes for political parties homogenize across country districts the processes producing the uniform pattern are essentially national ones. On the contrary,

political geography asserts that nationalizing vote patterns are the product of a combination of several factors including local, regional, and national. National processes do not replace regional and local influences on the electorate.

More recently several empirical studies have tested the nationalization thesis. Daniele Caramani employed a number of quantitative techniques in his investigation of the dynamics and levels of territorial homogeneity of party support in Western European countries. He convincingly demonstrated "a clear trend toward increasing nationally integrated electorates and homogeneous party systems over the past 150 years. . . . During the period of time covered, territorial differences in electoral behavior within countries constantly decreased, and parties cover an increased proportion of national territories with candidates and organizations. . . . The empirical question of whether processes of territorial integration actually took place in Western Europe is therefore answered in the affirmative" (2004, 73–74). Yet, in spite of the general trend toward homogenization of geographical support for political parties, a number of regional and cultural cleavages remain salient in European party politics (ibid., 6).

The empirical evidence in this book appears to support both Agnew's argument about the enduring importance of the place in the era of national modernity and Caramani's finding about a clear trend toward greater homogeneity of party strength in European countries. On the one hand, despite many years of the shared political past under the Communist rule that attempted to eliminate any major social cleavages, the five post-Soviet cases under study manifested significant regional variations in the strength of voting support for different political parties in all postindependence electoral cycles. Thus, the East/West geographical split in Ukraine is perhaps the most critical cleavage that shapes national political scene in this country. Since independence, two leading political forces, the CPU, on the one hand, and prodemocracy organizations (Rukh, Our Ukraine), on the other hand, have never mastered more than 5 percent of the national vote in the westernmost and easternmost oblasts of this country respectively (table 4.1). Such profound differences have been caused by historical and cultural developments in these territories.[2] The city of Kaunas and Vilnius region in Lithuania, Latgale in Latvia, Estonia's northeastern areas, two federal cities and North Caucasus in the Russian Federation, which consistently produce electoral outcomes considerably different from the rest of their countries, demonstrate that the place in conjunction with its historical context has been and is likely to remain the primary predictor of political identity of their inhabitants (see tables 4.2–4.5).

On the other hand, my research shows that all five former Soviet republics manifest a distinct trend toward a greater regional uniformity of the national

Table 4.1 Ukraine: Coefficient of Variability (*CV*) of Main Political Parties in Post-Independence Elections

Political Organization	Electoral Cycle		
	1994	1998	2002
CPU	0.660	0.529	0.636
Rukh	0.739	0.907	
SPU	0.886		0.921
Agrarian Party of Ukraine	1.078	0.757	
Ukrainian Republican Party	1.079		
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	2.316		
Democratic Party of Ukraine	1.293		
Socialist Party of Ukraine and Peasant's Party		0.812	
Green Party of Ukraine		0.291	
NDP		0.398	
Hromada		1.822	
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine/Natalia Vitrenko Bloc		1.038	0.521
SDPU (U)		1.243	0.604
Party of Reforms and Order		0.838	
Working Ukraine		1.174	
Our Ukraine			0.833
For United Ukraine			0.671
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc			0.651
CV Mean	1.150	0.892	0.691

Notes: The 1994 Rada elections took place according to the double ballot absolute majority formula. Table 4.1 includes cumulative vote in single-member districts for individual candidates with party affiliation. The 1998 and 2002 electoral data represent proportional representation regional results. In the 1994 elections, all political parties combined obtained 33.52 percent of the total vote with independent candidates receiving 66.48 percent (www.essex.ac.uk/elections). The 1994 results reported in table 4.1 are calculated on the basis of the total national vote cast only for candidates nominated by political parties because the inclusion of the independent vote artificially decreases the *CV* value. The inclusion of the independents in the calculations produces $CV\mu = 0.93$ also preserving the consistent trend of the Ukrainian system of political parties toward greater nationalization over time.

Sources: Author's calculations based on data from the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine (www.cvk.gov.ua); Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (www.rada.gov.ua); the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, Department of Government, University of Essex (www.essex.ac.uk/elections); and the International Foundation for Election Systems, Archive of Ukrainian Elections: Full Election Results, Elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

party system and a more homogeneous pattern of voter support in all consequent post-1991 elections. Although the formation of the "nationalized" party system does not totally replace regional and local influences, a tendency toward a greater homogeneity of party support across the country may have positive consequences for national unity by minimizing potentially destabilizing effects of regionally based political forces and indicating a greater

Table 4.2 Estonia: Coefficient of Variability (*CV*) of Main Political Parties in Postindependence Elections

Political Organization	Electoral Cycle			
	1992	1995	1999	2003
Isamaaliit	0.313	0.413	0.345	0.315
Secure Home/Coalition Party	0.548		0.512	
Popular Front/Estonian Center Party	0.378	0.344	0.226	0.275
Moderates	0.780	0.902	0.264	0.407
ERSP	0.593			
Independent Royalists	0.733			
Better Estonia /Estonian Citizen	1.532	0.513		
Estonian Pensioners' Union	0.460			
Coalition Party and Rural Union		0.330		
Estonian Reform Party		0.393	0.359	0.372
Our Home Is Estonia/Estonian United People's Party		0.830	1.061	
Right Wingers		0.602		
Estonian Country People's Party/People's Union			0.874	0.777
Res Publika				0.174
Mean *CV*	0.667	0.541	0.520	0.387

Sources: Author's calculations based on data from the Estonian National Electoral Committee (www.vvk.ee) and the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, Department of Government, University of Essex (www.essex.ac.uk/elections).

Table 4.3 Latvia: Coefficient of Variability (*CV*) of Main Political Parties in Postindependence Elections

Political Organization	Electoral Cycle			
	1993	1995	1998	2002
Latvia's Way	0.267	0.152	0.197	0.110
LNNK	0.518			
Harmony for Latvia-Revival for the Economy/National Harmony Party	0.650	1.127	1.045	
Latvian Farmers Union (LZS)	0.302			
Equal Rights/Latvian Socialist Party	1.115	0.836		
Fatherland and Freedom	0.464	0.470	0.413	0.162
Latvian Christian Democratic Union (LKDS)	0.096			
Democratic Center Party/Democratic Party "Saimnieks"	0.396	0.098		
People's Movement for Latvia		0.344		
Latvian Unity Party		0.295		
United List of LZS, LKDS and Latgale Democratic Party		0.200		
LNNK and Latvian Green Party		0.452		
Coalition "Labor and Justice"/Social				

Continued

Table 4.3 Continued

Political Organization	Electoral Cycle			
	1993	1995	1998	2002
Democratic Alliance		0.428	0.222	
People's Party			0.379	0.435
New Party			0.207	
New Era				0.329
For Human Rights in a United Latvia				0.791
First Party				0.299
Alliance of Greens and Farmers				0.258
Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party				0.131
CV Mean	0.476	0.440	0.410	0.314

Sources: Author's calculations based on data from the Latvian Central Election Commission (web.cvk.lv) and the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, Department of Government, University of Essex (www.essex.ac.uk/elections).

Table 4.4 Lithuania: Coefficient of Variability (*CV*) of Main Political Parties in Postindependence Elections

Political Organization	Electoral Cycle		
	1992	1996	2000
LDDP	0.258	0.280	
Sajudis	0.381		
LKDP	0.555	0.300	0.348
LSDP	0.499	0.249	
Lithuanian Christian Democratic Union and Young Lithuania	2.416		
TS/LK		0.180	0.269
LCS		0.252	
Young Lithuania		0.331	
Lithuanian Women's Party		0.222	
Lithuanian Christian Democratic Union		0.470	0.336
Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles		2.241	
Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition			0.170
New Union/Social Liberals			0.217
Lithuanian Liberal Union			0.286
Lithuanian Peasants Party			0.525
CV Mean	0.822	0.503	0.307

Note: All postindependence Seimas elections in Lithuania were conducted according to a mixed proportional representation/majoritarian system. Since proportional representation constituency results for the 1992 elections are not available, table 4.4 reports cumulative vote for individual candidates with party affiliation in single-member districts for this electoral cycle. The 1996 and 2000 electoral data represent proportional representation regional results.

Sources: Author's calculations based on data from the Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania (www.vrk.lt); the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (www3.lrs.lt); and the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, Department of Government, University of Essex (www.essex.ac.uk/elections).

Table 4.5 Russia: Coefficient of Variability (*CV*) of Main Political Parties in Postindependence Elections

Political Organization	Electoral Cycle							
	1993		1995		1999		2003	
	CV 89	*CV* 15	*CV* 89	*CV* 15	*CV* 89	*CV* 15	*CV* 89	*CV* 15
LDPR	0.303	0.268	0.396	0.330	0.355	0.343	0.349	0.319
Russia's Choice/ Democratic Russia's Choice/SPS	0.400	0.405	0.745	0.692	0.479	0.360	0.579	0.418
CPRF	0.591	0.585	0.446	0.351	0.357	0.288	0.353	0.272
Women of Russia	0.324	0.275	0.404	0.344				
Agrarian Party of Russia	0.670	0.471	1.037	0.607			0.929	0.379
Yabloko	0.473	0.326	0.577	0.487	0.490	0.396	0.470	0.455
Party of Russian Unity and Accord	0.737	0.256						
Democratic Party of Russia	1.066	0.129						
Democratic Reforms Movement	0.440	0.368						
Our Home Is Russia			0.713	0.388				
Communists-Working Russia			0.393	0.233				
Congress of Russian Communities			0.542	0.353				
Party of Workers' Self-Management			0.536	0.307				
Unity					0.337	0.235		
Fatherland-All Russia					1.108	0.754		
United Russia							0.287	0.237
Motherland							0.440	0.384
Pensioners' Party/Party of Social Justice							0.473	0.450
CV Mean	0.556	0.343	0.579	0.409	0.521	0.396	0.485	0.364

Sources: Author's calculations based on data from the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation (www.cikrf.ru); Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (www.duma.ru); and the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, Department of Government, University of Essex (www.essex.ac.uk/elections).

commitment to national institutions. Numerous post-Communist transitional countries (e.g., former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Moldova) prove that these nations have been a long way from the consociational democratic model that explains political stability in several deeply divided Western European democracies through cooperation of regional elites. The destabilizing effects of geographical segmentation of political forces in new democracies might provoke

an authoritarian response from the central authorities that impedes a movement of the country to democracy. The relationship between a territorial homogeneity of a national party system, social stability, and democratic success or breakdown is a fascinating research question that requires further exploration.

* * *

THESIS AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to measure the degree and dynamics of geographical pattern of party support as an important attribute of party-system *autonomy* and institutionalization in the post-Soviet nations. Students who conduct multicountry geographical research often encounter a problem of finding comparable territorial units. An attempt to form comparable regional entities for a cross-national study brings another challenge—the so-called modifiable areal unit problem when results of a spatial study may depend on the scale of the unit aggregation (see Yule and Kendall, 1950; Openshaw and Taylor, 1979; Berglund, 1990). To avoid an arbitrary grouping of geographical units, I follow either the established electoral or administrative divisions adopted by the five countries. Thus, Estonia and Latvia employ a PR formula in multiple electoral districts with the magnitudes ranging from 7 to 12 in Estonia and 14 to 26 in Latvia. I use 12 electoral constituencies (11 constituencies in the 1995 and 1999 elections) in Estonia and 5 voting districts in Latvia as areal units for my analysis. Three other countries, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine, conduct proportional representation elections in a single multimember nationwide district. In these three cases, my spatial units are the largest administrative-territorial divisions created by the national constitutions or other legislative acts. Lithuania presents 12 units (10 *apskritys*, or counties, and 2 cities of Vilnius and Kaunas); Russia has 89 administrative-territorial entities (49 oblasts, 21 republics, 6 *krais*, 10 autonomous *okrugs*, 1 autonomous oblast, and 2 federal cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg); and Ukraine has 27 administrative divisions (24 oblasts, Crimean autonomous republic, and cities of Kyiv and Sevastopil'). For the reasons I explain below, the analysis of the party spatial support in the Russian Federation is presented in two alternative ways: (1) for all 89 administrative units; and (2) for 15 "super-regions."

I will analyze geographical patterns of voting to measure the regional strength of party support in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine in all consecutive elections to the national legislatures since these countries have achieved their independence in 1991. At the time when the present research was conducted, Estonia, Latvia, and Russia held four cycles and Lithuania

and Ukraine three cycles of generally democratic postindependence elections for their national legislatures. To assess the dispersion of party strength across the nation, I use the coefficient of variability (*CV*), which is a simple and useful measure for describing variations in distributions.[3] The *CV* measures a geographical dispersion of electoral support or, in other words, uniformity of the party's electoral strength across the entire territory of a nation. The variability coefficient of an electoral contestant is calculated according to the formula

$$CVi,\ t = \frac{Si,\ t}{\mu i,\ t}$$

where *CVi,t* stands for the variability coefficient of party *i* at election *t*, *S* is the standard deviation and μ is the mean value of shares of a district vote taken by a political party or electoral coalition throughout the country.

The standard deviation alone is not sufficient to study the regional strength of party support because it is biased toward larger electoral contenders, providing uneven analysis for parties that enjoy different levels of overall support. By dividing standard deviation by the mean value of the party vote one is able to compare the degree of variability in regional support for a political party or electoral coalition across country, regardless of its overall performance. Interpretation of this coefficient is fairly straightforward—the higher the index, the lesser the degree of political *autonomy* of an electoral contestant because of its narrow regional base and appeal.

The *CV* is a handy measure for a comparison of regional strength of individual political parties in the same nation. In addition, by calculating the average variability coefficient of major electoral contestants ($CV\mu$) per electoral cycle one can also conduct multiple-country and multiple-election comparative studies. I have to strike a note of caution here. A longitudinal comparison of the party system within the same country and with the same number of areal entities by using $CV\mu$ does not seem to present major methodological challenges. However, a cross-country investigation is more problematic: the coefficient of variability is sensitive to changes in the quantity of units and biased toward a larger number of units. Since the larger number of constituencies under analysis produces a higher coefficient value, a comparison of 5 percent electoral districts in Latvia and 89 territorial units in the Russian Federation can be made only with certain reservations.[4] In an attempt to present an alternative geographical scale and balance the manifestation of this bias, the Russian electoral data is reported in 2 ways: for all 89 regions and for 15 "super-regions" formed on the basis of geographical proximity and cultural similarities. Although the Russian "super-regions" are different from the 12 electoral constituencies in Estonia in many ways, a



Figure 4.1 Coefficient of Variability of Party Systems ($CV\mu$) in Post-1991 Elections in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine

Note: Values of the coefficient of variablity are taken from tables 4.1 to 4.5.

relatively comparable number of units for all 5 case studies provides an alternative approach for the use of the $CV\mu$ in a cross-country investigation. A comparison of both scales side-by-side allows us to draw a more consistent conclusion regarding the dynamics of political institutionalization in the Russian Federation and other four nations. As figure 4.1 demonstrates, both scales produce a similar tendency toward the nationalization of the Russian party system.

The reading of $CV\mu$ is also straightforward—a country (or an electoral cycle), which is dominated by political formations divided according to territorial lines would manifest a higher *CV* value and a lower degree of political institutionalization in comparison to a nation (or an electoral cycle) where major political parties enjoy relatively even support throughout the country. Only parties that claimed at least 3 percent of the national vote in a given

election are included in tables 4.1–4.5. A selection of any other threshold, for example, 2 percent or 4 percent of the vote, does not change the overall dynamics of regional strength of party support in the 5 countries.

* * *

Discussion of Results

Tables 4.1–4.5 and figure 4.1 report geographical strength of party support in postindependence elections to the national legislatures in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine.[5] A comparison of the geographical patterns of voting clearly shows that party systems in all 5 nations demonstrate a distinct trend toward a more uniform dispersion of regional party support over time. The average variability coefficient ($CV\mu$) in the three Baltic states and Ukraine has been constantly decreasing in all postindependence electoral contests. Thus, in the founding elections, the $CV\mu$ value in Lithuania, Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia was 0.822, 0.667, 1.15, and 0.476 respectively. The latest electoral cycle in these countries brought the variability coefficient down to 0.307, 0.387, 0.691, and 0.314 that correspondingly constitutes a steady 63 percent, 43 percent, 40 percent, and 34 percent decrease. Beginning with the second competitive election, Russia also displays a movement toward a more uniform pattern of regional support for major political formations.[6] However, this pattern is significantly weaker than in the other four countries. The $CV\mu$ values in the second and the latest, fourth, cycle of postindependence elections in the Russian Federation were 0.58 and 0.485 (89 regions), and 0.409 and 0.364 (15 regions), or a 16 percent and 11 percent reduction respectively. The finding that all five former Soviet republics demonstrate a positive tendency toward a more autonomous and institutionalized party system is important, but not surprising. One might expect that a party system in a transitional country would become better entrenched in the society over time.

Along with the overall tendency toward the nationalization of a political party system, all five countries feature a number of geographical regions that consistently produce electoral results noticeably different from the overall voting outcomes in the nation. For example, in Latvia, electoral contestants that champion the rights of non-Latvians perform particularly well in the Latgale district populated predominantly by Russian-speaking Slavs. At the same time, such political organizations manifest a poor showing in the regions where Latvians constitute the larger share of voters, for example, Kurzeme and Zemgale. Thus, Latgale awarded the Equal Rights coalition 15.65 percent of the constituency votes (in comparison, this electoral contender received 5.78 percent of the national vote) in 1993; the Latvian Socialist Party 15.83 percent

(5.58 percent of the national vote) in 1995; the National Harmony Party 35.84 percent (14.2 percent) in 1998; and For Human Rights in a United Latvia 36.8 percent (18.94 percent) in 2002. All these political formations promoted left-wing political and economic agenda, which led to the argument that the Russian-speaking population showed preference to the political left. Dzintra Bungs argues, "In areas where non-Latvians constituted a large share of the voters, the left-of-center lists did well, conversely, in areas where Latvians composed the larger share of the electorate, there was a clear preference for the right-of-center lists" (Bungs, 1993b).

Lithuania's Vilnius region, where ethnic Poles constitute a high proportion of its population, has overwhelmingly supported the Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles in all postindependence elections. The city of Kaunas provides disproportionate electoral support to right-wing nationalist political organizations elections after elections.

In the Russian Federation, the most atypical regions that consistently yield electoral results different from the rest of the country are the two federal cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as National Caucasus, which consists of several ethnic autonomous republics. Moscow and St. Petersburg serve as the most loyal geographical electoral base for both major prodemocracy market-oriented political parties: Yabloko and Russia's Choice/SPS. Until the last electoral cycle the North Caucasian republics provided extensive support for the CPRF, significantly exceeding the total vote for this party in the country: 38.6 percent and 13 percent respectively in 1993, 38.6 percent and 23.4 percent in 1995, 34.02 percent and 24.29 percent in 1999. In the 2003 electoral contest, the population of this geographical region gave 67.42 percent of the regional vote to United Russia, which was almost 30 percent higher than the national share awarded to this political party by the Russian electorate.

These cases, along with the East/West geographical cleavage in Ukraine, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, appear to provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that the territorial variable in conjunction with ethnic and historical factors may indeed have a profound influence on electoral behavior. The discussion in this chapter shows that some regions "resist" the overall trend manifested in the five nations toward greater nationalization of their party systems.

Many studies of the Russian political geography emphasize significant regional variations in party strength and the heterogeneity of its national electoral map (Slider et al., 1994; Orttung and Parrish, 1996; Clem and Craumer, 1995a, 1995b, 2000; Hough, 1998). However, my findings demonstrate that at the first competitive elections after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation represented a more homogeneous pattern in terms of the regional party support than other case studies. In

fact, the average *CV* value at the founding election in Russia was relatively low 0.556 for all 89 territorial units, and even lower 0.343 for 15 superregions, in comparison to 1.15 in Ukraine, 0.822 in Lithuania, 0.667 in Estonia, and 0.476 in Latvia.[7] The second cycle of postindependence elections narrowed a gap between the Russian Federation and other four nations. The latest electoral contest decreased the variability coefficients in Lithuania (0.307), Latvia (0.314), and Estonia (0.387) to or below the Russian level (*CV* 89 = 0.485, *CV* 15 = 0.364). In the past decade, the Baltic states experienced a solid positive dynamics toward institutionalization of their party systems. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which exhibited a relatively high degree of geographical variations of party strength in the early 1990s, were able to achieve a significantly more uniform pattern of party support across their countries 10 years later. In the Russian Federation, which manifested the most homogeneous regional pattern of party strength among the five countries after the disintegration of the USSR, further "nationalization of the Russian electorate" (O'Loughlin et al., 1996, 382) occurs very slowly.

The nationalization of the Ukrainian political parties is lagging behind four other former Soviet republics. Beginning with the first cycle of the postindependence elections, the Ukrainian party system consistently produces by far the least uniform spatial pattern of party support. It is a well-known fact that leading political organizations in this nation are clearly split according to territorial lines. Their electoral strength is narrowly concentrated in several geographically close regions. Outside such areas, the level of their support is significantly lower. The CPU and most parties of power dominate eastern and southern parts of the country. Western Ukraine and Kyiv region are the electoral strongholds of center-right, prodemocracy, and nationalist political formations (table 4.1). The winner of the 2002 elections, Our Ukraine headed by Viktor Yushchenko, received 23.53 percent of the national vote. This electoral coalition achieved a landslide victory in Galicia: Our Ukraine gained 74.61 percent of the vote in Ivano-Frankivs'k, 69.01 percent in Ternopil', and 63.92 percent in L'viv oblasts. At the same time, this organization failed to impress in the east obtaining only a meager share of the vote in Donets'k (2.69 percent) and Luhans'k (3.62 percent) regions. The CPU and coalition For United Ukraine, which comprised five regional parties of power, demonstrated a completely opposite voting pattern. Their main support came from the two easternmost regions. The CPU received 39.68 percent of the total vote in Luhans'k and 28.78 percent in Donets'k; For United Ukraine gained 14.38 percent and 36.83 percent correspondingly. Neither of these two organizations was able to obtain more than 4 percent of the vote in any of the 3 Galician oblasts. The 2002 elections were not an exception. Since this country achieved its independence,

major Ukrainian political organizations failed to appeal and mobilize the electorate uniformly across the nation and remain dependent on their geographical support base.

There are some signs that the Ukrainian party system has a potential for greater political homogeneity. In their spatial analysis of the 1998 elections to the Rada, Melvin J. Hinich, Valeri Khmelko, and Peter C. Ordeshook reach a conclusion that "the eastern and western parts of the Ukrainian electorate perceive things in similar ways and evaluate the alternatives that confront them using equivalent criteria. Preferences differ, but there remains a vast middle ground that can be nurtured in search of a national compromise, if not consensus" (1999, 182–183). My finding regarding the Ukrainian party system seems to agree with this argument. The latest Rada election produced the lowest *CV* value in Ukraine since its independence (1.15 in 1994, 0.892 in 1998, and 0.691 in 2002), indicating a trend toward a more even average party support across this nation. However, the gap between Ukraine and other four case studies is still very significant, which might be detrimental to the process of institutionalization of the national party system and overall stability in this society.

In addition to the overall downward tendency of the variability coefficient at the party system level in the five countries, many individual political organizations also demonstrate a clear trend toward a more uniform dispersion of their regional support. With the exception of two Russian prodemocracy parties, Yabloko and Russia's Choice/SPS, this observation is particularly valid in relation to those parties that contested at least three cycles of national elections in most cases under their own names. For example, the *CV* value for three political parties that dominated Estonian politics since its independence, the Isamaaliit, Reform Party, and Center Party, dropped consistently over time. Thus, in the 1992 elections, the combined *CV* for Isamaa and the ERSP, which merged before the next electoral cycle, was 0.453. It steadily decreased to 0.413 in 1995, 0.345 in 1999, and 0.315 in 2003. The variability of regional support for the Estonian Reform Party decreased from 0.393 in 1995 to 0.372 in the latest cycle of the parliamentary elections. Latvia's Way, which has been part of every single government in post-1991 Latvia until 2002, and its major coalitional partner, Fatherland and Freedom (TB), as well as the LDDP (Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition in 2000) demonstrate a similar pattern (tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4).[8] The *CV* value for the CPRF consistently decreased in all post-1991 elections from 0.591 in 1993 to 0.353 in 2003 (table 4.5). One can assume that the more uniform support achieved by these political formations among voters across all districts over time was due to increased party name recognition and expansion of their regional

organizational structures, which are key elements of political institutionalization.

The historical evidence suggests that a party system dominated by political organizations leaning toward the political center is conducive to a successful democratic transition. Conversely, the centrifugal party system that features a weak center and powerful political formations of the far right and far left may contribute to a democratic breakdown. A positive development for the consolidation of democracy in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is that centrist political parties consistently maintain relatively uniform regional strength in these nations, and parties with more extreme ideological beliefs do not. For example, the center-right TS/LK, Latvia's Way, Isamaaliit and Res Publika in Estonia, as well as the center-left Estonian Center Party and social democratic organizations in Lithuania manifested the lowest levels of regional variability in their nations year after year. At the same time, political formations that adhere to more radical leftist or rightist ideas are not able to master uniform support across their nations and draw their strength from a much narrower regional base. For example, the Nationalist Tautininkai Union, Young Lithuania, the Estonian Citizen coalition, or the hard-line Latvian Socialist Party exhibited the highest values of variability coefficient in their countries (tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4). The large number of moderate political parties that enjoy relatively even strength across voting districts is a healthy sign for political institutionalization of a democratic party system in a transitional nation.

Unfortunately for the Russian and Ukrainian democratic transitions, these two countries demonstrate a diametrically opposite pattern of party-system development. The party systems in Russia and Ukraine are dominated by the radical leftist or rightist political forces on one hand, and "pragmatic" parties of power on the other hand. These political organizations were able to consistently maintain the most uniform political support across the voting districts in both nations. The 2003 elections to the Russian Duma is a telling example (table 4.5). The hard-line CPRF and the extremist LDPR produced the lowest values of the variability coefficients: 0.353 and 0.349 for 89 constituencies (0.272 and 0.319 for 15 territorial units) respectively. Only the Kremlin-sponsored party of power, United Russia (CV 89 = 0.287 and CV 15 = 0.237), drawing on the power of the governmental apparatus and the ORT, which is the only TV station available in all Russian regions, faired better than the extreme left and right political forces. The LDPR, CPRF, and Unity/United Russia have performed very well in all other elections to the Russian national legislature. Their electoral success is in part due to their ability to continually maintain relatively even regional electoral support in the nation. In fact, the Communist Party is the only political party in Russia

that was able to consistently decrease the value of its variability coefficient in all post-1991 elections.

The electoral strength of two main Russian reformist political organizations—Russia's Choice/SPS and Yabloko—is geographically narrower than that of other major electoral contestants. These two parties "found their largest constituencies in the Northwest, Urals, and in Moscow city and oblast" (Clem and Craumer, 2004, 244). In most postindependence elections, Yabloko and Russia's Choice/SPS produced the highest values of their coefficients of variability in comparison to other meaningful electoral contestants. For example, in the 1995 elections to the Duma, Yabloko had one of the highest *CV* (89 = 0.487, 15 = 0.58) among all political organizations represented in the national legislature. Among electoral contenders that gained at least 4 percent of the national vote, Russia's Choice was the only organization that produced even higher *CV* value of 0.692 (15 units) or 0.74 (89 units). A similar scenario took place at the latest elections to the Russian legislature in 2003. A lack of uniform electoral support across Russia and the high degree of regional concentration of their constituents became a particularly serious issue for these "two liberal center-right parties" (Åslund, 2004, 280) in 2003, contributing to their failure to cross the 5 percent electoral threshold.

A comparison of the four post-1991 legislative elections shows that values of the variability coefficient of Russia's Choice/SPS and Yabloko were, in fact, higher in 2003 than 10 years earlier. For example, at the founding elections Russia's Choice/SPS demonstrated the *CV* value 0.400 for 89 regions and 0.405 for 15 super-regions. At the electoral cycle in 2003, its variability coefficient increased to 0.579 (89 units) and 0.418 (15 units). Yabloko manifested the same pattern. Evidently, both political organizations have not been able to widen their electoral support base, have lost a significant share of their vote in Russian provinces, and have become increasingly dependent on a smaller number of administrative units within the Russian Federation.

The weakening of a party's traditional support base and the failure to gain new ground proved to be a recipe for an electoral disaster not only for the Russian reformist forces, but also a matter of great concern for their counterparts in Ukraine. The inability of the major center-right political organization, Our Ukraine, to diversify its regional support and penetrate the most populated eastern and southern parts of the country is likely to negatively affect the future development of this coalition, as well as the Ukrainian party system in general. Consistently, Rukh and later Our Ukraine, as well as the center-left SPU, exhibit the highest *CV*s in comparison to other political organizations. In the 2002 elections to the Rada, Our Ukraine and the SPU displayed the least uniform regional pattern of party

support than other major political organizations, 0.833 and 0.921 respectively (table 4.1). Electoral support for government-sponsored For United Ukraine ($CV = 0.671$) and the SDPU (United) ($CV = 0.604$), as well as the hard-line CPU ($CV = 0.636$), was more evenly dispersed across the country.

* * *

CONCLUSION

Table 4.6 reports the levels of political institutionalization in the five countries according to the degree and dynamics of uniformity of regional support for major political parties and electoral coalitions across nations in the postindependence parliamentary elections. Analysis of electoral geography in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine shows that party systems in the five nations reveal diverse patterns of political institutionalization. Although all five countries manifest a tendency toward a greater regional uniformity of party support, the pace of this trend is different. After three Baltic states restored their independence, geographical support for their major political parties was gradually becoming more homogeneous with every electoral cycle. The center-leaning parties occupy key positions in the political system of the Baltic states and in comparison to more radical political forces enjoy relatively even electoral support across regions, which constitutes a positive

Table 4.6 Autonomy of the Party System: Regional Strength of Party Identification in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine, 1991–2004

	First Election	Second Election	Third Election	Fourth Election
Estonia (1992, 1995, 1999, 2003)	Medium-low	Medium	Medium	High
Latvia (1993, 1995, 1998, 2002)	Medium-high	Medium-high	Medium-high	High
Lithuania (1992, 1996, 2000)	Low	Medium	High	
Russia (1993, 1995, 1999, 2003)	Medium-high	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high
Ukraine (1995, 1998, 2002)	Low	Low	Medium-low	

Note: The rankings are based on comparison of the five countries. The scores are rough approximations. See the text for an explanation of the ranking criteria.

tendency in the development and institutionalization of their party systems, as well as in democratic consolidation in general.

The pace of "nationalization" of the Russian party system is visibly slower than in other four case studies. Reformist political parties in this country have a limited regional support base and so far lack an ability to expand their influence into new geographical ground, which eventually contributed to their fiasco in the 2003 Duma elections. Radical rightist and leftist political forces, as well as nonideological parties of power demonstrate the most uniform electoral support and dominate the party system in the Russian Federation.

The Ukrainian party system combines features of both Baltic and Russian patterns of political development. On the one hand, Ukraine demonstrates a distinct and healthy trend toward a greater nationalization of its system of political parties. The latest Rada elections produced the least heterogeneous national electoral map since Ukrainian independence. On the other hand, similarly to the Russian case, the Communist Party of Ukraine and a number of parties of power manifest the most even regional strength. Two most consistent prodemocracy formations, the center-right Our Ukraine and center-left SPU, show the highest values of their variability coefficients. In addition, all major political parties in Ukraine are clearly divided according to regional lines. The difference between Ukraine and other four countries in terms of the uniformity of regional party strength is very significant. A lack of broad geographical support for leading Ukrainian parties might be a serious obstacle on the road of this nation toward democracy, social stability, and perhaps territorial integrity.

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CHAPTER 5

STABILITY OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

THE SECOND BROAD DIMENSION OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION looks at the *stability* of the party system. In their analysis of the Latin American political parties, Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully argue that *stability* in the rules and the nature of interparty competition is the most important property of an institutionalized party system: "Where such *stability* does not exist, institutionalization is limited" (1995, 4–5). Indeed, stable and regular patterns of interactions among subunits of the system and a relative absence of change in its elements are necessary attributes of a developed party system. If new and previously unknown organizations can regularly enter into politics and become influential political forces in a society in a short span of time, a party system is characterized by a low degree of *stability* and institutionalization. Similarly, a system has a limited political institutionalization if leading parties regularly and quickly disappear from the national political arena without a trace.

* * *

METHODOLOGY

In this study, *stability* of a party system is operationalized in two ways: I analyze changes in the total share of the vote taken by the "old" political organizations and Pedersen's index of electoral volatility.

"OLD" PARTIES' VOLATILITY INDEX

It is an unusual occasion in a developed party system when a newly created political organization becomes a major political force of a national consequence in a short period of time. Internal *stability* of patterns of party competition,

above all, means that an existing set of political parties develops a certain mechanism that limits and restricts the impact of newly established groups on the political life of a country. In a highly institutionalized party system, "old" political parties are able to maintain their support among the electorate from one national election to the next and leave newcomers slim chances to gain a substantial share of the national vote. A total percentage of the vote in a parliamentary election taken by political organizations, which also participated in any previous electoral contest, measures *stability* of a party system by exploring how well existing political organizations are entrenched in a society. Let us call this operational indicator the "old" parties' volatility index. The higher the value of this measure, the more regular patterns of party interaction the system demonstrates. A weakly institutionalized party system would display a low index value and feature numerous successful political organizations formed shortly before every national parliamentary election.

PEDERSEN'S INDEX OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY

This is a popular measure to study political *stability* of a party system.[1] The index of electoral volatility is

$$Vt = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} |P_{i,t} - P_{i,t-1}|}{2}$$
$$0 \leq Vt \leq 100$$

where n stands for the total number of parties that are participating in the two elections and Pi,t is the percentage of the vote, which was obtained by party i at election t. Mogens Pedersen states that the index of electoral volatility "is simply the cumulated gains for all winning parties in the party system, or—if the symmetrical interpretation is preferred—the numerical value of the cumulated losses for all losing parties" (1990, 199). The index measures the net change of aggregate distribution of votes in two consecutive elections. Interpretation of this indicator, which has become a standard measure to assess electoral *stability*, is fairly straightforward—the higher its value, the lesser the degree of stability of a party system.

The "old" parties' volatility index and Pedersen's index of electoral volatility address somewhat different aspects of party-system *stability*. The level of the support for "old" organizations demonstrates the extent of the penetration of new political entities into the party system. Pedersen's index of volatility shows how stable are interaction patterns of subunits, that is, electoral parties and coalitions, in relation to one another within the system. Since Pedersen's index measures a total net swing of the party vote in consecutive elections and the "old" parties' volatility index emphasizes the strength of the

newly created as opposed to the existing electoral contestants, they do not necessarily lead in the same direction.

Political party theorists differentiate between electoral volatility *within* party families, or "shallow volatility," and "deep volatility" that occurs *between established and new parties* (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Kitschelt et al., 1999). "Deep volatility" "generates the most chaotic dynamic of party systems . . . particularly if this volatility does not subside over time. In this pattern, the electorate is indeed available to a wide range of appeals and does not engage in structured relations to parties" (Kitschelt et al., 1999, 400). Unlike Pedersen's statistic, which does not necessarily differentiate between the two varieties of volatility, the "old" parties' volatility index measures shifts in electoral support *between established and new parties*, or "deep volatility."

Although both measures, the "old" parties' volatility index and Pedersen's index of electoral volatility, seem pretty simple, they are not without their problems in terms of data collection and interpretation. Perhaps the most significant challenge for the calculation of the two volatility indicators derives from the fluidity of the party system: various kinds of splits and mergers among electoral contestants.[2] Party systems in all five post-Soviet states under study experienced extensive changes since the founding elections. In some cases, two or more political parties, which included both "old" as well as newly established organizations, merged under a new name. In other cases, a stronger party literally absorbed smaller subunits of the party system. Another problem springs from situations when a political party that had participated in a previous election formed an electoral coalition with a new organization (or organizations) to participate in an electoral contest. As Mogens Pedersen puts it, these problems of comparability across time "can be handled to a certain extent, but they cannot be handled in such a way that everyone will be perfectly satisfied" (1983, 34). The present study uses electoral data collected by Richard Rose and Neil Munro in *Elections and Parties in New European Democracies* (2003) and relies on their methodology as what constitutes a new or existing political entity in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine. Although I believe that Rose and Munro's assessments display some inconsistencies, their study is perhaps the most comprehensive and authoritative source of electoral statistics in East European countries available at the time when this project was completed.

* * *

Discussion

Table 5.1 and figures 5.1 and 5.2 report values of the "old" parties' volatility index and Pedersen's index of electoral volatility in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,

Table 5.1 Two Indexes of Electoral Volatility in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine

Country/Election	"Old" Parties' Volatility Index	Pedersen's Index of Volatility
Estonia		
Second elections (1995)	31.63	68
Third elections (1999)	86.41	48.97
Fourth elections (2003)	72.8	35.66
Latvia		
Second elections (1995)	69.29	55.06
Third elections (1998)	66.26	59.31
Fourth elections (2002)	31.54	72.62
Lithuania		
Second elections (1996)	45.84	63.96
Third elections (2002)	44.47	74.14
Russia		
Second elections (1995)	54.37	51.72
Third elections (1999)	42.34	54.69
Fourth elections (2003)	36.44	67.13
Ukraine		
Second Election (1998)	41.51	59.2
Third elections (2002)	39.13	64.99

Note: The double-ballot majority electoral system was employed in the first postindependence elections in Ukraine in 1994. The 1998 and 2002 elections were conducted according to the mixed PR/plurality electoral formula. Both volatility indexes for the second election are calculated on the basis of the party vote in the multimember district in 1998 and the total cumulative vote cast only for individual candidates nominated by political parties in SMDs in 1994. The total vote for nonaffiliated candidates, who received 66.48% of the national vote combined in the 1994 elections, is excluded from the calculations.

Source: Rose and Munro, 2003.

the Russian Federation, and Ukraine since these countries obtained their independence in 1991. Only one country, Estonia, demonstrates a distinct and consistent trend toward a more stable pattern of interactions within the national party system over time. Estonia's Pedersen's index of volatility, which was the highest among all other cases under study in the second postindependence electoral cycle, has been steadily decreasing in all consequent elections. Thus, the electoral volatility index in 1995 was very high, 68, and then it gradually decreased to 48.97 in 1999, and 35.66 in 2003. Currently, Estonia demonstrates by far the lowest value of Pedersen's index in comparison to its two Baltic neighbors, Russia and Ukraine.

Estonia's "old" parties' volatility indicator is less consistent. Similarly to Pedersen's measure of volatility, the "old" parties' index also demonstrates that in the second post-1991 elections the Estonian political party system manifested the least stable pattern of interaction between its existing and newly emerged elements in comparison with party systems in the other four countries. In 1995, electoral organizations that took part in the founding elections



Figure 5.1 Party System Stability: "Old" Parties' Volatility Index

Source: Table 5.1.



Figure 5.2 Party System Stability: Pedersen's Index of Volatility

Source: Table 5.1.

were able to receive only 31.63 percent of the national vote. In 1999, political parties that had contested any of the two previous elections performed much better and won 86.41 percent of the total vote. The only new entity, the Estonian People's Party (Eesti Maarahva Erakond), which participated in elections on an individual basis for the first time, was able to overcome the electoral threshold gaining 7.27 percent of the total vote. In 2003, the "old" parties' volatility index dropped to 72.8 percent. At the same time, the Pedersen index continued its descending trend. Such seemingly inconsistent results can be attributed to a fact that a new political formation, Res Publika, had burst into the established party system winning 24.6 percent of the total vote and 28 out of 100 seats in the Riigikogu, while other parties experienced relatively insignificant net swings.

The present analysis of electoral volatility in the five post-Soviet nations shows that Estonia is an exception from the rule: all other case studies manifest an increasingly more volatile pattern of the fluctuation in electoral votes over time. After four cycles of postindependent elections, the Latvian and Russian party systems are the least stable among the five countries, manifesting the most chaotic and problematic pattern of "deep electoral volatility." Since the second cycle of the postindependence elections, when initial volatility in both nations was significantly lower than in the other three cases, Latvia and Russia demonstrate a steady trend toward a less stable pattern of party - system interactions. Thus, in the second electoral contest, political formations that had participated in the founding elections were able to capture 69.29 percent and 54.37 percent of the total vote in Latvia and Russia respectively. Two electoral cycles later the "old" parties' volatility index sharply dropped to about a third of the national vote: 31.54 percent in the Baltic nation and 36.44 percent in the Russian Federation. In the same time period the value of the Pedersen's volatility index rose from 55.06 to 72.62 in Latvia and from 51.72 to 67.13 in Russia.

Although the increase in electoral volatility in Lithuania and Ukraine is somewhat less prominent than in Latvia and Russia, the former two countries closely follow suit. Political organizations that took part in the 1992 elections to the Lithuanian Seimas managed to receive only 45.84 percent of the total vote in 1996, and even a lower share, 44.47 percent, 4 years later. The value of Pedersen's volatility index increased from 63.96 in 1996 to 74.14 in 2000. In Ukraine, the difference between the second and third electoral cycles to the national parliament was 41.51 percent and 39.13 percent for the "old" parties' volatility measure, and 59.2 and 64.99 for Peredsen's index.

A trend toward greater party-system instability and electoral volatility in Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine has been caused by several factors. First, every post-1991 electoral contest in these four countries, as well as in Estonia, produced several influential newcomers that had been formed shortly

before elections and were able to obtain a significant share of votes. For example, in the 1998 elections in Latvia, two newly emerged political parties, the People's Party and the New Party, gained 28.65 percent of the vote combined. Four years later, two other new contestants, the New Era and Latvia's First Party achieved even better results obtaining 33.55 percent of votes and 36 out of 100 seats in the Saeima. Three political coalitions formed to participate in the 2002 elections in Ukraine—Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine, For United Ukraine, and Yulia Tymoshenko bloc—gained close to a half (44.26 percent) of the national vote. The New Union/Social Liberals in Lithuania, which was founded shortly before the 2000 legislative elections, managed to win a fifth of the national vote in the multimember constituency. Creation of two electoral "coalitions of power," pro-Kremlin Unity and regional-oriented Fatherland-All Russia, which together gained almost 37 percent of the national vote in the 1999 elections and 45 percent of the Duma seats allocated according to proportional representation, is a telling example of extremely low *stability* of the Russian political party system. The phenomenon of Unity (23.32 percent of the party vote and 28.44 percent of the MMD seats), which was created only three months before the election, deserves a special mention.[3] A regular and successful entry into the national politics of new political organizations formed on the eve of parliamentary elections in the post-Soviet countries under analysis contributes to high electoral volatility and generally low levels of political institutionalization of their party systems.

Second, virtually every election in Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine witnessed a disappearance from the national political map of one or more contestants who were relatively successful in the previous electoral cycle. Many parties that participated in one electoral contest have never participated in elections again. The Latvian party system is a primary example of the regular and abrupt rise and fall of major political organizations. In the 1995 elections, three organizations, the Democratic Party "Saimnieks," the People's Movement for Latvia (Siegerist Party), and the Latvia's Unity Party, won 37.37 percent of the national vote combined and obtained 42 out of 100 seats in the national legislature. Of these three parties, the Democratic Party "Saimnieks" had a small representation in the Saeima after the founding electoral contest held in 1993. In 1999, the three parties were able to receive meager 3.82 percent of the vote together and lost all of their seats in the national legislature. Four years later none of these organizations contested elections.

Two political parties that cleared the 5 percent electoral threshold in the 1993 elections to the Russian legislature, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (6.76 percent of the vote), the Democratic Party of Russia (5.52 percent), and the Russian Democratic Reforms Movement (4.08 percent) have disbanded before the second postindependence electoral contest 2 years later. Our Home Is Russia, the newly formed party of power, obtained

10.13 percent of the vote and became the second largest party in the Russian Duma as a result of the 1995 elections. In 1999, it received 1.19 percent of the vote and was swallowed up by another party of power shortly before the 2003 electoral cycle in the Russian Federation. Overall, 38 political organizations that took part in the 1995 race to the Duma and received more than 55 percent of the national vote combined vanished from the national political arena by the 2003 electoral contest.

Three electoral coalitions that had been formed within a year before the 1999 elections in Russia, that is, Unity, Fatherland-All Russia, and the Union of Rightist Forces, took 45.15 percent of the vote. A similar scenario occurred in 2003, when United Russia and Motherland gained 46.59 percent of the votes. Such hastily created electoral alliances often proved to be short-lived. For all practical reasons the SPS disintegrated in March 2004, failing to pass the 2003 electoral test. After Sergey Glazev made an unsuccessful bid for the presidency in March 2003, Motherland showed signs of discontent. The longevity of United Russia remains to be seen. Thomas Remington argues that "where new institutions have been produced by the stroke of a pen, as has frequently occurred, they have short shelf lives" (2003a, 57). Many parties of power fit this profile.

Third, besides Estonia none of the post-Soviet nations under analysis took effective measures to discourage the creation of highly inclusive and often ideologically vague coalitions that combine representatives of political parties, loose social movements, and ambitious individual candidates.[4] Many political organizations join their forces on the eve of elections to increase their electoral chances and often disintegrate as soon as the voting contest is over because of ideological differences or personal conflicts among political elites. In Latvia, the coalition For Human Rights in a United Latvia that won 19.09 percent of the national vote and 25 out of 100 Saeima seats in 2002 split 3 ways soon after elections citing ideological and personal differences. The electoral alliance of 5 regional parties of power For United Ukraine, which received 12.23 percent of the vote in 2002, broke into several parts before the 2004 presidential elections in this country. The Social Democratic Coalition of Algirdas Brazauskas, which was comprised of 4 center-left political parties (the LDDP, LSDP, Women's Party, and the Union of Russians), received 31.08 percent of the national vote and 51 out of 141 seats in the Seimas in the 2000 elections. Despite some signs of vitality and numerous attempts to merge into a united social democratic organization, members of the Brazauskas bloc of parties approached the 2004 legislative elections as parts of several different electoral alliances. Constantly changing compositions of electoral coalitions in the post-Soviet countries do not promote political *stability* of the national party system and negatively affects both electoral volatility indexes.

Fourth, many political parties in the former Soviet republics that had participated in several electoral contests independently from other organizations demonstrated considerable swings in their electoral support over time. For example, volatility of 3 major Russian political organizations that regularly compete in elections under their own label (i.e., the CPRF, LDPR, and SPS) was 21.7 percent between the third and fourth electoral cycles. The corresponding number for 2 leading postindependence Latvian political parties, Latvia's Way and Fatherland and Freedom, was at 22.6 percent. The 2000 elections in Lithuania produced even higher volatility value of 51.18 for political organizations that contested 2 consecutive elections under the same name (Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives, Lithuanian Center Movement, Lithuanian Liberal Union). Significant swings of electoral support for individual political parties in subsequent elections is an important factor that contributes to further fluidity of party systems in the post-Soviet countries.

Compared to consolidated Western democracies, all five post-Soviet countries manifest extraordinarily high levels of electoral volatility. Rose and Munro calculated volatility in 15 countries of the European Union from 1990 to 2003. They found that "in every EU country volatility was below Estonia, the country with the least great fluctuation in votes. The greatest degree of volatility, 37 points, has occurred in France, where 2002 elections to the National Assembly saw a major regrouping of parties" (2003, 85). The mean aggregate electoral volatility in Western Europe between 1950 and 1990 was low at 7.7 with even more stable patterns of vote fluctuation between major party families (Gallagher et al., 1995; Bartolini and Mair, 1990). It is hardly surprising that levels of electoral volatility in the post-Soviet countries are higher than in the Western European states that have well-institutionalized party systems. However, electoral volatility in the five post-Soviet states is also much greater than in the majority of Latin American nations. In their study of Latin American party systems, Mainwaring and Scully measured electoral volatility in 12 Latin American states from 1970 to 1993. Only two states, Peru and Brazil, were noticeably more volatile than Estonia, which scored the lowest in this respect among the five post-Soviet nations (1995, 6–8).

Table 5.2 shows ranking of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine by both indexes of electoral volatility combined. All five nations demonstrate high levels of electoral volatility and party-system instability. Estonia is the only country among my case studies that manifests a steady movement toward greater *stability* of its party system in all consecutive elections since this nation obtained its independence. All other former Soviet republics exhibit a trend toward the opposite direction: their party systems have been more volatile over time. Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine demonstrate a distinct and consistent pattern of "deep volatility" and low

Table 5.2 Stability of the Party Systems in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine, 1991–2004

	Second Election	Third Election	Fourth Election
Estonia (1992, 1995, 1999, 2003)	Low	Medium-high	High
Latvia (1993, 1995, 1998, 2002)	Medium-high	Medium	Low
Lithuania (1992, 1996, 2000)	Medium-low	Medium-low	
Russia (1993, 1995, 1999, 2003)	Medium	Medium-low	Low
Ukraine (1995, 1998, 2002)	Medium-low	Medium-low	

Note: The rankings are based on comparison of the five countries. The scores are rough approximations. See the text for an explanation of the ranking criteria.

institutionalization of their party systems, which appears to be an explicit problem "of former patrimonial communist regimes, particularly in those polities that emerge from the former Soviet Union" (Kitschelt et al., 1999, 401). There are four factors that affect the levels and dynamics of electoral volatility in the post-Soviet nations: (1) a regular entry of newly formed organizations to the national political stage; (2) a regular disappearance of one-time successful political formations from the political map; (3) the existence of inclusive and ever-changing electoral coalitions; (4) and significant swings of electoral volatility among political parties that contest elections under their own name.

CHAPTER 6

MEASURING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION: CONCLUSION

THE TOPIC OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE FORMER SOVIET republics and their implications for democratic transitions and consolidations has attracted significant attention of scholars throughout the world. Studies that investigate the development of political parties and party systems in the post-Communist countries underline the weakness and fragility of these political institutions. However, many explorations of the democratic institution building in the post-Soviet space lack a comparative perspective and fail to address the following important questions: Are there differences in the levels and dynamics of institutionalization of party systems in the countries that emerged after the breakup of the former Soviet Union? If so, what factors have caused relatively different degrees of political institutionalization in these nations?

The present chapter takes into account the drawbacks of the previous studies. It develops a detailed set of conceptual criteria and operational indicators to assess the levels and dynamics of political institutionalization in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. Then, this model is applied to the case studies under analysis and measures the strength of the party systems in the five post-Communist countries. Examination of the two dimensions of political institutionalization: (1) *autonomy* (patterns of recruitment into the legislature and executive, regional strength of party support); and (2) *stability* (two indexes of electoral volatility) shows striking variations in the extent to which party systems in the Baltic nations, Russia, and Ukraine have been institutionalized. Table 6.1 and figure 6.1 summarize my findings and present a ranking of the five countries by the two dimensions of political institutionalization discussed in this study. They demonstrate several distinct patterns of party-system development in the post-Soviet nations.

Table 6.1 Levels of Political Institutionalization in the Five Countries

	Indicator	First Elections	Second Elections	Third Elections	Fourth Elections
Estonia	Legislative recruitment	Medium-low	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high
	Cabinet formation	Medium-high	Medium	High	High
	Regional strength	Medium-low	Medium	Medium	High
	Stability		Low	Medium-high	High
Latvia	Legislative recruitment	Low	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high
	Cabinet formation	Medium-high	High	High	High
	Regional strength	Medium-high	Medium-high	Medium-high	High
	Stability		Medium-high	Medium	Low
Lithuania	Legislative recruitment	Medium	Medium-high	High	
	Cabinet formation	Medium	High	High	
	Regional strength	Low	Medium	High	
	Stability		Medium-low	Medium-low	
Russia	Legislative recruitment	Low	Medium-low	Low	Medium-low
	Cabinet formation	Low	Medium-low	Low	Low
	Regional strength	Medium-high	Medium	Medium-high	Medium-high
	Stability		Medium	Medium-low	Low
Ukraine	Legislative recruitment	Low	Medium-low	Medium	
	Cabinet formation	Low	Medium-low	Medium	
	Regional strength	Low	Low	Medium-low	
	Stability		Medium-low	Medium-low	

Note: See individual chapters for an explanation of the scores. The rankings are based on the comparison of the five countries. The scores of some dimensions of institutionalization are rough approximations. High = 5 points, medium-high = 4, medium = 3, medium-low = 2, low = 1.

Scholars of Estonian politics argue that "on a continuum from stable party system to an unstable party constellation, the Estonian case falls much nearer to the kaleidoscopic parties end of that continuum" (Grofman et al., 2000, 331; also Arter, 1996). This observation is certainly correct if Estonia is



Figure 6.1 Political Institutionalization of Party Systems in the Five Countries, 1991–2004

Source: Based on data from table 6.1.

compared with highly institutionalized Western party systems. At the same time, this study shows that Estonia is the only country among the five cases that displays a steady and consistent trend toward a more autonomous and stable party system. In the process of democratization, parties have become an essential element of the political system in this nation. They play an increasingly important role as vehicles of recruitment of political leaders into the national legislature. After the third cycle of the postindependence elections to the Riigikogu, the Estonian cabinet has been nearly exclusively comprised of the senior members of one of the parties that belong to a ruling coalition. Major Estonian political organizations have a relatively uniform regional support across the nation. Although electoral volatility of the Estonian party system is still above the European Union average, Estonia demonstrates the most stable pattern of interparty competition among the five countries.

The political profile of the Latvian executive gradually changed from the Godmanis-90 government of professionals to the Emsis-04 cabinet of politicians. Since 1997, only members of the parties who had formed the ruling coalition received ministerial posts. Political organizations control the process of Saeima candidate selection: the overwhelming majority of parliamentarians elected in 2002 were party members. However, the Latvian party system becomes more volatile in every succeeding electoral cycle. All postindependence electoral contests produce newly formed contenders that are able to

capture at least one-third, and in the most recent Saeima elections two-thirds, of the national vote.

In Lithuania, political parties started to develop earlier than in the rest of the former Soviet countries. Unlike those of other former republics of the Soviet Union, the Lithuanian political parties were allowed to nominate their own candidates and compete under their names in the 1990 elections to the last republican Supreme Soviet. Beginning with the first postindependence electoral contest, most political organizations attempted to include in their lists loyal party activists. With few minor exceptions electoral lists of leading contestants submitted for the 2000 elections to the Seimas included only active functionaries of political parties. In addition, political organizations achieve great success in constituencies where MPs are elected according to the majoritarian voting formula. Only a handful of independent candidates succeed in winning electoral races in single-member districts. Similarly to its Baltic neighbors, political parties play an instrumental role in the formation of the government and demonstrate a more homogeneous pattern of the geographical identification with every consecutive electoral cycle. Overall, the party system in Lithuania manifests an advanced degree of *autonomy* among the five case studies. However, its level of *stability* remains low in all postindependence elections.

In terms of both my dimensions—*autonomy* and *stability*—Russia has a weakly institutionalized party system. The role of Russian political parties as agents of recruitment of politicians into the national legislature is relatively insignificant. All post-1991 elections to the Duma were contested by many political movements and electoral alliances that lacked a coherent organization and rules of individual membership. Numerous independent candidates were successful in single-member districts. Political parties and movements have minimal influence on the formation of the Russian government. Ruling circles in this country prefer the so-called government of professionals. Such a cabinet is formed independently of the electoral results and consists of technocrats who, as a rule, are not affiliated with political parties. The concept of "the cabinet of experts" undermines the idea of political accountability of the government to the electorate and hinders the development of the meaningful party system. Electoral volatility has risen over every electoral contest in Russia.

Until the 2002 elections, political parties occupied a negligible place in the Ukrainian political system. Ukraine was lagging behind the other four cases on both dimensions: *autonomy* and *stability*. However, since the 1998 electoral cycle, the party system in Ukraine has shown signs of movement toward greater political institutionalization. This country demonstrates a growing significance of party affiliation in the process of legislative recruitment. The number of independent candidates had been consistently declining in all postindependence elections. After the 2002 parliamentary elections

and for the first time in its history, Ukraine has created a coalition government that consisted of members of the political parties that formed a majority in the Rada. Since this coalition comprised five nonideological regionally based parties of power, the Yanukovych cabinet could hardly be called political though. Similarly to other countries, Ukraine demonstrates a distinct tendency toward a greater nationalization of its party system. The latest elections to the national assembly produced the most homogeneous pattern of geographical party identification since this nation achieved its independence. However, major Ukrainian political parties are clearly split along territorial lines and have a relatively narrow regional support that might be detrimental to the process of this country's democratic consolidation.

The present analysis of political institutionalization shows that the systems of political parties in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine have been developing in several ways. In the following chapters four elements that seem to determine the fate of party systems in the five countries have been identified: (1) the role of ruling Communist elites during the initial stage of the party-system formation; (2) the type of executive-legislative relations; (3) laws that regulate the electoral process and activities of political parties; and (4) the influence of the parties of power on political institutionalization. The second part of this book tries to explain how these factors shaped and affected the path of party-system development in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine.

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Part II

Explaining Political Institutionalization in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine

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CHAPTER 7

THE ROLE OF THE OLD COMMUNIST ELITES DURING THE FORMATIVE STAGE OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AN INDIVIDUALISTIC (ELITIST) APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

THE COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS and processes of institutionbuilding have been important foci of classical sociological thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Alexis de Tocqueville, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and other prominent philosophers contributed to investigation of social institutions and institutional change.[1] The works of Max Weber, who lived and wrote at the turn of the last century, mark a milestone in the study of institutionalization. One of his major contributions to the theory of institutionalization was the analysis of the relationship between socioeconomic formations and historical developments, on the one hand, and the emergence and change of modern institutions, on the other hand. Unlike his predecessors who used comparative analysis to illustrate a universal trend of development for all societies, Weber showed "a certain particular trend which predominated in one society or group of societies. By analyzing such a trend, some light was then thrown on similar or opposite trends in other societies and conditions" (Eisenstadt, 1965, 4). Among the conditions that affect the development and change of social institutions in different countries Weber distinguished market economy, specific legal frameworks, and religion. However, along with socioeconomic characteristics, Weber emphasized the importance of individuals in

the shaping of institutionalized values. S. N. Eisenstadt argues that among modern sociologists, Weber came closest in recognizing significance of elites "when he stressed that the creation of new institutional structures depends heavily on the 'push' given by various 'charismatic' groups or personalities, and that the routinization of charisma is critical for the crystallization and continuation of new institutional structure" (ibid., 55).

New major developments in the study of the role of the individual in the process of institution building were achieved in the second half of the past century. Scholars in sociology and organizational theory further advanced an individualistic approach in the study of institutionalization and devoted significant attention to the investigation of the role of leadership, elites, or entrepreneurs in the formation, maintenance, and change of social institutions. Following Weber's tradition of historical and comparative analysis of institutions, S .N. Eisenstadt argued that the process of institution building is determined by two major factors: specific socioeconomic conditions and individualistic psychological aspects of institutionalization. In several of his works, Eisenstadt (1964, 1965, 1968) emphasized the importance of the individualistic approach in the study of institution building and argued that it is profitable to view institutionalization "as a process of crystallization of different norms and frameworks which takes place through a series of exchanges between people placed in different structural positions in the society and which, in turn, regulates some crucial aspects of such exchanges" (1965, 22). Analyzing the relations between individual attitudes and behavior and the processes of institutionalization, he was explicit about the role of elites and leaders in formulating goals and establishing organizational structures of social institutions:

> [I]n crystallization of institutional frameworks a crucial part is played by those people who evince a special capacity to set up broad orientations, to propound new norms, and articulate new goals. . . . The capacity to create and crystallize such broader symbolic orientations and norms, to articulate various goals, to establish organizational frameworks, and to mobilize the resources necessary for all these purposes . . . is a basic aspect or constituent of the flow of institution building in any society. (1968, xxxix)

Many scholars in the area of organizational theory and behavior have also focused their attention on the individual level of analysis in their studies of institutionalization. In his discussion of leadership in administrative organizations, Philip Selznick argues that "infusion of values" and definition of organizational mission are among the most significant aspects of institutionalization. The more precisely defined goals of an organization, the more advanced degree of institutionalization this organization has. The leader as an

agent of institutionalization "is primarily an expert" in defining the role of an organization and promoting its values (1957, 22). In addition, he or she is responsible not only for specifying the institutional goal but also for building this goal into the organization's social structure. Other students of organizational theory provided further evidence that existing organizations, their form, structure, and functions are imprinted by the environmental period of their founding (Stinchcombe, 1965), as well as by the attitudes, background, and past experience of an entrepreneur who is responsible for establishing a new organization (Boeker, 1989).

In his analysis of political parties in several European democracies, Angelo Panebianco (1988) revived a somewhat neglected approach in political science to study parties as organizations. Combining the comparative historical sociological perspective and advances of organizational theory, in particular findings about the significance of the formative stage of institutionalization and the role of leadership, the author formulated a theory of "organizational development" of political parties. Describing one of its main aspects, Panebianco argues,

> A party's organizational characteristic depends more upon its history, i.e., on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor. The characteristics of a party's origin are in fact capable of exerting a weight on its organizational structure even decades later. . . . The crucial political choices made by its founding fathers . . . and the way in which the organization was formed, will leave an indelible mark. (1988, 50, xiii)

This brief discussion of several relevant works in sociology, organizational theory, and political science provides a good starting point for the argument that I am going to advance in this chapter: the behavior pattern of the Communist elites during the formative stage of a party-system development has profoundly influenced different levels of political institutionalization in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine. Until now, social scientists explored the role of leadership on the formation of individual organizations and established a strong link between the attitudes of the founding fathers and organizational institutionalization. I apply the same logic to political party systems. It can be argued that policies adopted by the republican and All-Union Communist leadership toward emerging alternative political forces in the late 1980s and early 1990s have affected development of political parties in the five countries and, more specifically, have resulted in different levels of institutionalization of their party systems long after the former Soviet republics abandoned their Communist past. In countries where the republican and central Communist elites created relatively favorable conditions for the establishment of other political movements and parties; abandoned the use of force against the

opposition; opened access to state-owned television, radio, newspapers, and other mass media; abstained from launching a negative propaganda campaign against ideological pluralism and alternative political organizations, the level of institutionalization of their party systems 15 years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union is relatively higher. In countries where the republican Communist elite demonstrated strong intolerance toward political dissent at the formative stage of the party system, the level of political institutionalization is relatively weaker.

* * *

Some Analytical Assumptions

The emergence of alternative political groups to the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the prospect of the formation of a competitive party system in the USSR posed a serious problem and potential threat to the CPSU, which was firmly in control until the late 1980s. The entry of new social groups, which were previously excluded from participation, into the Soviet political arena meant a broadening of boundaries of the political system. Realizing that new political formations would challenge its leading role in Soviet society, the Communist Party attempted to control and shape the emergence of the party system in the country. Essentially, this was done in three ways: (1) adopting a set of legal documents concerning activities of new political organizations; (2) manipulating public opinion and attempting to form certain attitudes among the population toward emerging political currents and ideological pluralism in the society; and (3) developing a new pattern of relations with the opposition. Although these three policy areas overlap to some extent, each addresses a different and distinct aspect of the official line toward the newly created oppositional groups.

The Establishment of a Legal Framework

Article 6 of the 1977 Soviet constitution and corresponding articles of republican constitutions guaranteed the CPSU and republican Communist parties a monopoly on power in the society. No other political parties were allowed, and the Party controlled all branches of the government. The legislature represented a rubber-stamp body that automatically and unanimously approved all initiatives of the CPSU. Therefore, the Communist Party had all necessary legal means to adopt legislation that would regulate activities of newly emerging informal political groups, including their participation in the national and republican elections to Soviets.

THE FORMATION AND DISSEMINATION OF POLITICAL VALUES

The ruling political elite could not remain indifferent to emerging alternative political forces that were not always loyal to the existing regime and challenged the role of the Communist Party in Soviet society. The CPSU had to develop an official position toward a variety of new informal groups and convey it to the citizenry. In other words, the party and government attempted to thrust a certain set of political attitudes and values on the public, and influence the formation of a favorable public opinion for the ruling circles about newly created organizations by launching a propaganda campaign in the mass media. As in the previous case, the party had all necessary means for a successful conduct of such a campaign: the regime exercised a tight control over the mass media. Newspapers, television, radio, and other media were strictly controlled by the Communist Party.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE OPPOSITION

Historically, Russia and later the Soviet Union can be characterized by a low level of political tolerance toward the opposition. Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Stalin, and other rulers adhered to the ruthless principle "no person-no problem" in relation to individuals and groups who were viewed as adversaries of the regime, or "enemies of the people." Khrushchev and his successors used more "civilized" means: people who publicly questioned and criticized official policies were harassed, fired from their jobs, imprisoned, or forced into exile. During the period of liberalization of Soviet society in the late 1980s and early 1990s, old methods of dealing with the opposition were no longer acceptable. The party had to develop a new pattern of relating with oppositional groups. A tight control over the court system, law enforcement bodies, and secret services by the Communist Party provided the ruling circles ample opportunities in choosing the methods of dealing with alternative organizations.

During perestroika alternative political groups appeared in all constituent republics of the Soviet Union. However, despite the fact that the CPSU was built on the principle of strict centralization, different regional party organizations chose different strategies toward the emerging oppositional forces. Some republican Communist parties opted for a policy of cautious nonresistance and even encouragement of the gradual development of competitive party systems in their nations. Ruling elites in other Soviet republics chose a more neutral wait-and-see position. Still other republican party organizations actively opposed any political changes in the society and attempted to contain the development of oppositional groups. In addition to different approaches taken by different republican Communist parties, attitudes of the CPSU central leadership in Moscow toward emerging political forces were not consistent and were changing over time.

Defining the political elite always presents a challenge for a researcher. In this project I employ a "positional" approach, assuming that holders of top offices of the All-Union Communist Party including secretaries of the CPSU and members of the Politburo as well as corresponding officers in the republican party organizations constituted the Soviet Communist political elite. Leaders of national and regional legislative and executive branches are also included in this definition, because their government positions often overlapped with the posts they kept in the top party bodies. In my analysis I pay particular attention to the role of the Party leader both at the All-Union and republican levels since holders of these posts were a crucial and sometimes decisive factor in the decision-making process.

* * *

Composition of Communist Elites

To better understand political developments in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine in the late 1980s, a brief profile of the ruling Party elites in these former Soviet republics in the last years of the USSR is in order. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in April 1985, the overwhelming majority of positions in high-level party bodies were occupied by Brezhnev nominees who were appointed during the period of "stagnation." Perhaps the most essential features of this group of politicians were their old age, conservatism, blind adherence to the official dogmatic ideology, a lack of initiative, and inertness. It is not surprising that among the first steps of the new general secretary of the CPSU was a thorough reorganization of the cadre policy. Several weeks after taking power, Gorbachev initiated a campaign to bring "fresh blood" to the central party organs at the expense of conservative Brezhnevetes. By the conclusion of the 27th CPSU congress in March 1986, "nearly one-third of the top party leaders and one-half of the ministerial officials had been replaced (typically by younger technocrats)" (Banks et al., 1997, 697). During the several years after reforms started, a number of members of the Politburo who belonged to the old cohort (Nikolai Tikhonov, Mikhail Solomentsev, Andrey Gromyko, etc.) were replaced by younger politicians (Nikolai Ryzhkov, Aleksandr Yakovlev, and Vadim Medvedev, among others). However, the conservative element remained strong in the high-level party bodies, a fact that was later proved by the failed coup organized by the Communist hard-liners in August 1991. By the end of the 1980s, when informal political groups started to enter the Soviet political scene, the central Communist elite was split and consisted of several main currents. One group pushed for further and more radical transformations in economic and political spheres, while another wing attempted to slow reforms down and even reverse them.

Along with extensive personnel changes in top party bodies on the All-Union level, the leadership of some republican Communist organizations was also thoroughly reshuffled. Estonia was the first among the former Soviet republics that experienced the downfall of the old guard of Brezhnev appointees. Changes began in January 1988 when a moderate Indrek Toome replaced R. Ristlaan, a reactionary ideology secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia (CPE).[2] The next victim of perestroika was the First Secretary of the CPE Central Committee Karl Vaino. On the eve of the XIX Party conference, he, in fact, ignored the call by the All-Union Communist leadership to promote interparty democracy and elect delegates to the forum. Instead, Vaino picked delegates "the old reliable way" merely appointing the Estonian delegation to the conference. This decision caused an angry reaction from Gorbachev in Moscow and public protest in the republic, which, after a series of tumultuous events, led to Vaino's dismissal. The new First Secretary of the CPE was Vaino Vjaljas, formerly Soviet ambassador to Venezuela, and later to Nicaragua. Immediately after his appointment in June 1988, Vjaljas started a dialog with informal political organizations and initiated several important measures to promote liberalization and democratization of the Estonian political system. The resignation of Bruno Saul from the republican premiership largely completed the takeover of the Estonian political leadership by the reform Communists (Taagepera, 1993, 148).

Soon after cadre reforms began in Estonia, similar changes in the composition of political elites took place in the other two Baltic countries, Lithuania and Latvia: old Brezhnevete appointees were replaced by the younger generation of reform-minded Communists. During its meeting in November 1987, the Lithuanian Artists' Union changed its entire leadership and sharply criticized the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPLit) for a lack of political reforms in the republic. First Secretary (since 1973) of the CPLit Petras Grishkevichius was present at the meeting and died of a heart attack that night (Lieven, 1993, 224). He was succeeded by Ringaudas Songaila, "a lifetime *nomenklatura apparatchik* who followed his predecessor's footsteps and kept the brakes on political reform" (Vardys and Sedaitis, 1997, 98). The Lithuanian Communist leadership headed by Songaila and the Second Secretary Nikolai Mitkin attempted to contain liberalization of political life in the republic and, in fact, became an oppositional force to reforms launched by Moscow. Concerned with these developments, a member of the CPSU Politburo and Gorbachev's leading reformist supporter, Aleksandr Yakovlev, visited Lithuania and Latvia in August 1988. His visit led to a drastic reduction in state pressure against alternative political organizations and replacement of the hard-line Lithuanian Communist leadership over the next several months (Lieven, 1993, 225). On October 20, 1988, the First Secretary Algirdas Brazauskas and the Second Secretary Vladimir Beriozov were chosen

to lead the Lithuanian Communists. Several days after his appointment, the new leader of the CPLit delivered a speech at the Sajudis constituent congress of October 22–23, 1988. Brazauskas praised the newly formed organization for its contribution in "revolutionary renewal, democratization, glasnost" and struggle "against the forces of stagnation."[3]

Yakovlev's visit to the Baltic in August 1988 also led to dismissal of the leadership of the Communist Party of Latvia (CPLat). The post of the CPLat First Secretary at the time was occupied by Boris Pugo who continued repressive policies of his predecessors Arvids Pelshe and Augusts Voss. Juris Dreifelds argues,

> Latvia was much more oppressed than the other two (Baltic) republics. Policies of all kinds were much harsher, reflecting the greater consolidation of reaction and Communist dogma. . . . It was common knowledge among Balts that plays or literary works acceptable in Tallinn or Vilnius would be censored or vetoed in Riga. "Big Brother" was bigger, meaner and more petty in the middle Baltic republic. (1996, 48)

Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost that permitted the greater freedom of expression and associations were strongly opposed by the republican Communist Party. In September–October 1988 the Latvian political leadership was thoroughly reshuffled. Boris Pugo was transferred to Moscow and in December 1990 was appointed Soviet Minister of Interior Affairs. In August 1991 he took part in the attempted coup of the Communist hardliners and, after its failure, committed suicide. After Pugo's departure from Riga, reformers took over the republican party and government. Jan Vargis was awarded the post of First Secretary of the CPLat, Anatolijs Gorbunovs and Vilnis Bresis were elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic and chairman of the republican Council of Ministers respectively. However, although newly appointed reformers succeeded in mobilizing their supporters and implemented a number of important decisions, a pace of democratization in Latvia continued to be slower and more cautious than in other two Baltic republics.

The position of the Russian Federation within the political system of the former USSR was paradoxical. On the one hand, it was certainly a leading Soviet republic in terms of its economic potential, politics, and population. On the other hand, until the early 1990s, Russia did not develop many institutions that existed in other union republics: trade unions, an academy of sciences, and most important a republican Communist Party. It meant that regional party organizations on the territory of the Russian Federation were directly subordinated to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The politics toward emerging alternative political organizations in Russia in the late 1980s was directed

from the All-Union Center. However, the central Communist leadership was not homogeneous. It was divided into several political camps ranging from radical reformers to hard-line Conservatives. In addition, attitudes of the general secretary and the Politburo toward the pace of political and social transformations of the Soviet political system were changing over time.

In Ukraine, Brezhnev appointees remained in power much longer than in the four other countries. The accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership had minimal initial effect in Kyiv. The First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Vladimir Shcherbitskiy who remained in power until September 1989, impeded political and economic reforms initiated in Moscow. In alliance with Ideology Secretary Yurii Yelchenko, local KGB chief Vitalii Fedorchuk, and other archconservatives, Shcherbitskiy "kept a tight lid on Ukraine" until his dismissal (Wilson, 1997a, 99). Andrew Wilson writes that during Gorbachev's visit to Ukraine in February 1989, Shcherbitskiy "surprised his guest by arguing that the Communist Party's main task remained not the leadership of reform, but 'struggle with groups of political demagogues' declaring that 'we must unmask them and not allow these microbes to propagate' " (ibid., 99–100). Microbes in this case were emerging alternative political organizations including Rukh. The relative immunity of the Ukrainian leadership from pressure from Moscow can be explained in part by the fact that the CPU traditionally enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy within the CPSU. For example, it was the only union republic that had its own Politburo, a developed educational system for the Communist cadre, etc. A lack of any visible political changes made Ukraine "a preserve of stagnation" in the late 1980s.

In September 1989, Shcherbitskiy was replaced by Volodymyr Ivashko, a loyal ally of Mikhail Gorbachev. The new First Secretary tried to bring the CPU in line with the policies of Gorbachev. To some extent he was successful and during his rule the republic witnessed some liberalization. However, political and economic reforms in Ukraine moved at a slower pace than in the Baltic states and Russia. From the outset Ivashko lacked a sufficiently strong political base. The influential conservative wing in the Ukrainian leadership led by Stanislav Hurenko was a powerful brake on the policies of perestroika and glasnost. Most of the top republican party officers were "shocked" and disoriented by the changes brought about by reforms and tended to back the hard-liners in Moscow against Gorbachev (Wilson, 1997a, 102–103). Ivashko's career in Ukraine abruptly ended in July 1990 when he was transferred to Moscow and appointed second-in-command after Gorbachev in the All-Union Communist Party. After his departure, Ivashko left behind neither an approved successor nor a strong group of followers in the CPU-ruling bodies, and support for Gorbachev and his policies among the Ukrainian leadership diminished even further. Instead, political power in the republic

was divided between Conservatives and emerging national Communists. The former group nominated its leader Hurenko to the post of the CPU First Secretary. In July 1990, future Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk was elected chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and soon became the leader of the second political current, which advocated for state sovereignty but otherwise relatively little political and economic changes. This institutional divide became an instrumental factor in the Ukrainian political developments in the early 1990s since the epicenter of political power gradually shifted from the party to the parliament.

* * *

The Establishment of a Legal Framework of a Competitive Party System

Article 6 of the 1977 Soviet constitution and corresponding clauses in the republican constitutions legitimized the CPSU as the only legal political party in the USSR: "The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organizations and political organizations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for people and serves the people." Understandably, this constitutional provision was a major obstacle on the way to the emergence and development of a competitive multiparty system in the country.

Lone voices of Soviet political dissidents and their criticism of the party role in the society have become more numerous and loud during perestroika and glasnost. In the late 1980s not only members of informal groups or dissidents called for the abolition of Article 6, but representatives of the establishment voiced cautious objections to the guiding role of the CPSU and advocated for legalization of a multiparty system. In November 1988, a leading Soviet jurist from the USSR Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute, Boris Kurashvili published an article in *Izvestzya* about political changes in the country. He argued that a multiparty system is "one of the key elements of the future developed socialist democracy" and should be created and firmly established in the USSR).[4] A year later, a number of the reformist People's Deputies raised their disagreements with Article 6 from the podium of the Soviet legislature. For example, in May–June 1989, at the First Congress of People's Deputies televised in its entirety on the national TV, "Aleksei Emel'yanov assailed the existence of a one-party system in the USSR as an unwarranted monopoly of power" (Dunlop, 1993, 80). In September 1989, Gorbachev's political adviser, Georgii Shakhnazarov, discussed the need for the party dropping its constitutionally enshrined "leading role" and opening the way to a multiparty system in the USSR (Gill, 1994, 98–210).

However, during this period, Gorbachev opposed the revision of Article 6. On the one hand, he realized the enormous potential of the people's support for perestroika and argued that reforms should not be conducted over people's heads but together with the people. Gorbachev encouraged more active public involvement into politics and the growth of the public organizations. On the other hand, he believed that democratization should take place "under the one-party system, which was historically created and consolidated" in the USSR.[5] The CPSU leader argued in favor of single-party rule because "the party was a guarantor of socialism, the only effective integrating force in the country, had launched *perestroika* and was leading it forward, and could become an effective democratic force by democratizing itself" (Gill, 1994, 210). The formula "the CPSU is a nucleus of the Soviet political system" remained intact. This opinion was supported by other senior party functionaries.[6]

Political developments in the Baltic states, firstly in Lithuania, forced Gorbachev to change his position on the legal status of the party and eventually led to the establishment of a judicial framework for a multiparty system. After Brazauskas came to power in October 1988, the Lithuanian Communist elite encouraged a gradual development of a competitive party system in the republic. The next day after his appointment, when asked about the place of alternative political groups in the public life, Brazauskas said, "[H]istory shows that given the single ruling party, there is a need for various public organizations intensifying the life of society. With the assistance of the public, the party self-critically corrects its activity. The slogan 'the plans of the party are the plans of the people' should be transformed into 'the aspirations of the people suggest plans for the party.' "[7] As we can see, already at the beginning of his rule, the rhetoric of the Lithuanian party leader was notably different from that of general secretary of the CPSU. Talking about the relationship between the party and the public organizations, Brazauskas had shifted the accent from the word "party" to the word "public."

Deeds of the Lithuanian political leadership did not part from their words. In February 1989, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium, the body that consisted predominantly of the Communist Party members, adopted "The Decree on the Temporary Procedure for Registering Statutes of Citizens' Voluntary Associations."[8] Although the decree did not mention political parties by name (the constitutional provision about the leading party role was still in effect), it was clearly designed to legalize newly established political organizations, allow them to acquire a legal status, and provide with a judicial framework of their activities. Later, this legislative document was renamed "The Decree on the Temporary Procedure for Registration of Political Parties."[9]

At the end of 1989, Lithuania took an unprecedented step in Soviet history. On December 7, the Lithuanian legislature changed Article 6 of the

republican constitution, abolishing the Communist Party's monopoly on power in this Baltic nation.[10] The republican constitutional commission, which submitted to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet a draft law on constitutional amendments, was chaired by Algirdas Brazauskas. The preamble to the bill stated,

> The process of *perestroika* which have activated a life in the republic have radically changed the political face of Lithuania. Democracy is expanding, political pluralism has taken hold, and various political parties are being formed. All this created prerequisites for a gradual changeover to a multi-party system . . . It is quite obvious that Article 6 of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution does not correspond to the principles of the existence of a civilized democratic state.[11]

Estonia and Latvia followed the example of Lithuania, but chose a more cautious pace than their Baltic neighbor. To a certain degree it can be explained by the position taken by Vaino Vjaljas and Jan Vargis who supported Gorbachev's reservations about legalization of a multiparty system and argued against speedy abolition of the constitutional clause on the leading party role in the society. Addressing the CPE Central Committee Plenum in May 1989, Vjaljas said, "As far as the multi-party system is concerned . . . it should be said that the present extent of democracy allows for fairly extensive political pluralism in the country of the socialist democracy. Public movements here participate actively in political life, thus ensuring that all the main social forces are represented in politics" (Vjaljas, 1989). Vargis, the leader of the Latvian Communists, had similar views about a multiparty system.[12]

In January 1990, the Estonian Supreme Soviet discussed amendments to Article 6 of the republican constitution. The abolition of the constitutional clause about the leading party role was defeated by two votes. The bill was not passed largely due to the opposition from the top leadership of the CPE. Although leaders of the republican party agreed that in a democratic society there is no place for the power monopoly of one party, they argued that revisions of Article 6 should not be merely a political declaration but be accompanied by a more comprehensive legislative document about changes in political system.[13] The provision enshrining the guiding party role was finally removed from the Estonian constitution by the republican legislature on February 23, 1990, after the All-Union Communist Party in Moscow had approved similar revisions to the Soviet constitution. In Latvia, Article 6 had been altered in January 1990, shortly before the USSR constitution was amended.

Relative resistance of the Estonian and Latvian political leadership to abolish the legalized monopoly of the Communist Party to the political power did not mean that alternative political parties and groups were not allowed in these

two Baltic republics. Already in 1989 all political organizations in Estonia and Latvia, including radical groupings, were able to register and operate freely.[14] For example, in May 1989, the Estonian legislature passed the Law on Citizens' Associations, according to which all public organizations and movements in the republic were able to register and obtain a legal status.[15] Like similar legislation on citizens' voluntary associations in Lithuania, the Estonian bill avoided using the term "political parties"—Article 6 was still in effect.

Political developments in Lithuania accelerated the introduction of constitutional changes on the All-Union level. Position of Soviet political leadership on the "leading party role" clause underwent a gradual change. The day after the Lithuanian legislature amended Article 6 of the republican constitution, the main CPSU newspaper published an article that suggested that Article 6 of the Soviet Basic Law might be revised or even abolished outright.[16] In the following months, Mikhail Gorbachev and other party leaders in several public appearances hinted that this constitutional provision might not be essential.[17] At its February 1990 Plenum, the CPSU Central Committee (CC) agreed to review the clause on the party role in the country's political life. In his speech at the plenum, Gorbachev advocated for these changes arguing that democratization in the Soviet society would and should be accompanied by a growth in political pluralism. The culmination came on March 12, 1990 at the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which altered Article 6 that had enshrined the monopoly role of the party in the Soviet political system.[18] The legal foundation for a competitive multiparty system in the USSR was established.

In the late 1980s and beginning of 1990s, political changes in Ukraine were lagging far behind our other four cases. If Lithuania pioneered in introducing a multiparty system, Ukraine preserved the "leading party role" clause for seven more months after the similar provision in the All-Union Constitution had been repealed (see table 7.1). Only in late October 1990, the Ukrainian legislature

Table 7.1 Removal of the Provision on the Leading Party Role (Article 6) from the Soviet Constitution and the Constitutions of the Five Countries

Country	Date
Lithuania	December 7, 1989
Latvia	January 11, 1990
Estonia	February 25, 1990
USSR	March 12, 1990
Russian Federation	June 16, 1990
Ukraine	October 24, 1990

revised Article 6 of the republican constitution. Although the opposition repeatedly demanded the abolition of the party monopoly on political power and legalization of alternative political organizations, the CPU succeeded to keep this issue out of agenda of the republican legislature for a long time. On one occasion, the unwillingness of the Communist leadership to register emerging political groups led to an anecdotal situation. At one of the CPU Politburo meetings in 1989, the Ideology Secretary of the republican Communist Party, Yurii Yelchenko, proposed to ban Rukh, the first mass public organization that was being formed in Ukraine at the time. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium Valentyna Shevchenko objected to this suggestion on the grounds that it is impossible to ban an organization that had not been allowed and registered (Lytvyn, 1994, 129–31).

At the beginning of 1990, the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine held elections to republican legislatures. Of all five cases, only political parties in Lithuania were allowed to contest these elections, nominate candidates, and organize a campaign under their names. Four participants of the 1990 elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, the LSDP, LKDP, the LDDP (renamed Independent Lithuanian Communist Party), and TS/LK, which came out of Sajudis, have been playing a major role in the political life of postindependence Lithuania. The inclusion of newly created political organizations in the electoral contest was instrumental for broadening the Lithuanian political system, legitimization of political parties in the eyes of the public, and their introduction to political life. Although in Estonia, as well as in Latvia, political parties were allowed to register and operate freely, "party or group affiliation of candidates did not appear on the ballot at the insistence of the CPE leaders, whose personal name recognition surpassed the popularity of their party" (Taagepera, 1993, 176). In Russia and Ukraine, alternative political organizations were prevented from official registration until after the deadline for nomination of candidates to the Supreme Soviet had passed.[19] For example, Rukh was allowed to register on February 9, 1990, that is, shortly after the nomination of candidates to the Ukrainian legislature was over.

* * *

THE FORMATION AND DISSEMINATION OF POLITICAL VALUES

The emergence of alternative political organizations that challenged the Communist Party monopoly on power posed an important question before the ruling political elite who kept in their hands a powerful Soviet propaganda machine. The party could not afford to take a neutral stand on this issue. How should the CPSU and republican party organizations behave toward emerging informal groups? What kind of public opinion and political

values about a multiparty system should the party attempt to form and disseminate? Should the party actively oppose newly formed alternative groups or should it recognize their right to exist, try to co-opt them, and admit to the political life? Ruling elites in different republics answered these questions in different ways.

The leadership of the Communist party of Ukraine took the most intolerant position toward emerging political organizations, in particular toward the most popular of them—Rukh. The propaganda apparatus of the party came down upon embryonic alternative groups with the full strength. The Communist establishment used all means in a massive campaign against Rukh and its affiliates in order to create a negative image of these organizations among the population. In the official media (at the time almost all mass media in the republic were tightly controlled by the party), founders of Rukh were portrayed as criminals, tax evaders, people of low moral values, bourgeois nationalists, heirs of those who collaborated with Nazi Germany and exterminated the Jews, Russians, Poles, etc.[20] This witch hunt was a practical realization of the CPU Politburo decisions "to form favorable for [party leadership] public opinion" regarding Rukh (Lytvyn, 1994, 130).

Representatives of the emerging opposition were denied access to the media and were not able to use this venue to popularize their ideas. For example, when in March 1990 the Democratic bloc, a loose alliance of national democratic groups and independents, won local elections in the three westernmost oblasts and assumed control over the regional governments, the republican legislature immediately passed the bill to take the mass media and the police from subordination to the oblast-level Soviets. Rukh representatives were prevented from attending and addressing gatherings at large Ukrainian industrial enterprises. When local committees of the Communist Party, who certainly were not supporters of national democratic forces, at several major companies in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovs'k invited the founders of Rukh to discuss the statute of this organization with their employees, Shcherbitskiy personally prohibited these meetings, believing that they would give Rukh the opportunity to promote its ideas (Lytvyn, 1994, 120).

Unlike the ruling Ukrainian elite, who, in fact, opposed any manifestation of ideological disagreement and dissent, the All-Union Communist leadership conducted a policy of limited support for "political pluralism in a single-party socialist state." For example, in his report to the CPSU CC Plenum in February 1988, Gorbachev called for "socialist plurality of views" and more involvement of citizens in the process of democratization. He said that the task was to "create a developed system of social organizations. . . . The main task of social organizations is to advance sociopolitical activeness, to satisfy diverse interests" of citizens.[21] The Soviet leader repeated these ideas in his address to the 19th CPSU Conference in the summer of 1988 when he positively

assessed a variety of emerging public associations including people's fronts. However, he resolutely rebuffed groups "whose interests are far from the aims of perestroika and the interests of the people" and underlined that political pluralism is possible in a one-party system.[22]

Complying with the guidelines approved by the top party bodies, the official mass media became more open and invited moderate reformers to contribute to newspapers and TV programs. During 1988–1989 a number of polemic articles and shows on the development of a multiparty system in the Soviet Union were published or aired in the official mass media. Besides Kurashvili's article in *Izvestiya* on "a socialist multi-party system as a key of a socialist democracy," academician Zaslavskaya, poet Yevtushenko, and other prominent moderate public figures were able to express their views on this subject in the major Soviet newspapers, journals, and TV programs and encouraged more political pluralism in the society.

After 1990, and particularly after Article 6 of the Soviet constitution was amended, the overall tone of the state-owned media toward informal political groups and pluralism became more favorable. Even the main mouthpiece of the party, conservative *Pravda*, opened its pages for a debate on a multiparty system in the country.[23] In addition, the access of members of alternative political groups to the official media has also improved significantly. Vera Tolz writes, "The liberal periodicals, *Ogonek, Moscow News*, and *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, have become especially good in airing views of representatives of the democratic movements. . . . Since 1989, representatives of unofficial movements of various orientations have begun to appear regularly on Soviet television" (1990, 33).

The younger generation of the Communist leaders who came to power in the Baltic states in 1988 dramatically changed an official policy of their predecessors toward political pluralism and the development of a multiparty system. Whether it can be explained by the desire to co-opt the emerging opposition or adherence to democratic principles, ruling circles in the Baltic states became increasingly more tolerant to alternative political organizations. As soon as Vaino Vjaljas, Algirdas Brazauskas, and Jan Vargis were appointed to the top posts in the Communist Parties, they attempted to narrow a gap between the party, on the one hand, and popular fronts and many other public organizations, on the other hand. For example, after the change of party leadership in Estonia, the republican Communist Party promptly adopted many agenda points of the People's Front. In his first public speech since becoming the party leader, Vjaljas praised the Front and stated that "the pluralism of opinions does not threaten the system."[24] Addressing the founding congress of Sajudis several days after his appointment, the new leader of Lithuanian Communists Brazauskas, acknowledged contributions of this organization to the promotion of democratization and glasnost.[25]

The coverage of political developments in the official mass media in the Baltic states reflected the change of attitudes of the ruling circles toward political pluralism in the society. Since 1988 the general tendency of media coverage shifted from unconditional condemnation of informal groups to the discussion of vital social issues with representation of various points of view that often contradicted the party position. Members of alternative organizations obtained access to the state-owned television, newspapers, and radio. For instance, already in the late 1988, Sajudis was granted a regular time spot on the Lithuanian TV. Resources of unofficial, samizdat publications were significantly improved: newspapers of the popular fronts were published in the state-run printing houses. One should not, though, idealize the political situation in the Baltic republics: the party control over the pace of democratization, pluralism, and openness of the media was still relevant until early 1990. For example, during the 1990 electoral campaign to the republican legislatures in the three countries, the state-owned television and radio were heavily biased toward official, party-supported candidates and had limited coverage of activities of oppositional forces.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE OPPOSITION

At the dawn of political changes in the USSR, informal groups and political dissidents in all union republics had suffered the similar fate: they were harassed by the police, secret services, and other state bodies. Any public disagreement with the official policies was considered a challenge to the party rule and was harshly persecuted. Many members of the Latvian Helsinki-86 group and Ukrainian Helsinki Group (later Union), who advocated for implementation in the USSR of the Helsinki agreements on human rights, publishers of the Lithuanian and Russian samizdat, and other Soviet dissidents were arrested, forced to emigrate to the West, fired from their jobs, etc. The police used violence against unauthorized demonstrations and rallies; their organizers and participants were often jailed. For example, the militia brutally attacked demonstrations in Riga in November 1987, in Tartu, Vilnius, and Kaunas in February 1988, as well as numerous unsanctioned rallies in Russia and Ukraine. Until early 1988, the pattern of the relationships between the establishment and political dissidents was essentially uniform on the entire territory of the Soviet Union: the regime denied the political opposition, the Right, to exist and tried to crush it by any possible means.

Since 1988, the nature of relationships between the state and emerging opposition was different in different parts of the USSR. First among the union republics, the ruling circles in the Baltic states abandoned the use of

violence against the political opposition. In Estonia, the last police brutality took place on February 2, 1988 against an unauthorized demonstration held in commemoration of the Estonian-Soviet peace treaty of 1920 (Taagepera, 1993, 132). Although the government did not sanction mass rallies on Estonia's Independence Day, which took place three weeks later, the police did not disperse these gatherings. At the beginning of 1988, the Latvian Public Prosecutor warned Helsinki-86 that their actions were punishable as criminal offenses and if the group did not cease its "antisocial" activities, measures would be applied to its members. One of the group leaders was sent to a forced exile.[26] However, in March 1988, Anatolijs Gorbunovs who was a secretary of the CPLat at the time, stated that the party "shall not prohibit demonstrations."[27] Indeed, the police did not use the violence against mass rallies any longer. In Lithuania the last large-scale police assault against demonstrators took place in May 1988 in Vilnius.

The policy of central ruling elites in Moscow toward unsanctioned public rallies was different from that of the leadership in the Baltic states. Similarly to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, since spring of 1988 the authorities in Russia became more tolerant toward unofficial meetings and public gatherings. For example, in March 1988 the Moscow police, who outnumbered the demonstrators by two to one, did not break up the demonstration calling for the "total de-Stalinization of society."[28] Previously, similar rallies had been assaulted by the militia. At the same time, several political groups were subjects of police violence constantly during 1988 and 1989. One such group was the Democratic Union, "an instrumental catalyst for early anti-Communist social formations" (McFaul, 1993, 63), which was formed in May 1988 as a new political party. It was the first attempt to create a political organization independent of the Communist Party since Stalinist times. Michael Urban (with Vyacheslav Igrunov and Sergei Mitrokhin) write that instead of cooperating with progressive elements in the Communist party to promote reform, the leader of the Democratic Union Valeriya Novodvorskaya "advocated a fully independent political movement opposed to the party in every respect" (1997, 106). However, starting from the very first day of its formation, members of the Democratic Union were harassed by the authorities, their demonstrations were mercilessly attacked by the police, and rally participants were arrested. All in all, police brutality against demonstrations organized by the political opposition had not ceased in Russia until the mid-1990s. First, the Communist leadership used police forces against anti-Communist demonstrations, and then new reformist authorities sent the militia to assault pro-Communist public gatherings. In addition, the bloody events of August 1991 and October 1993 in Moscow did not contribute to the strengthening of political tolerance in the Russian society.

No surprise that during the formative stage of a multiparty system, the most intolerant position toward political dissent was taken by the Ukrainian Communist leadership. On a regular basis, organizers of unofficial meetings and demonstrations were prevented from attending these gatherings. For example, several hours before an unsanctioned meeting was scheduled, "unknown persons" often kidnapped oppositional figures, drove them 100–200 kilometers from the place of the public gathering, and set them free. Although the last major police violence in Ukraine took place in October 1989, when the police clashed with demonstrators in L'viv, organizers of political pickets and rallies, for instance, were arrested and convicted in February 1990 in Kyiv, in May 1990 in Poltava, in August 1991 in Kirovohrad.[29] The harassment of representatives of alternative political organizations in Ukraine and Russia lasted significantly longer than in the three Baltic states.

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Discussion

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the formative stage of the process of institution building. During this period the institutional framework, mission, and values were being formulated and developed. The structure and values acquired by a social institution at its initial phase may last for decades to come and affect the future life of the organization. Among different factors that shape a social institution since the first steps of its existence, the role of the individual or a group of individuals who are able to articulate institutional objectives, establish its foundation, and mobilize necessary resources has an instrumental importance. Obviously, this capacity to define norms and organize institutional frameworks "is closely related to control over basic institutional positions and resources such as power and wealth" (Eisenstadt, 1965, 30).

The perestroika movement initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 awakened a public interest in politics and caused a broader and more active political participation among the Soviet populace. At some point, the ruling Communist circles were forced to decide how to deal with emerging alternative political organizations that posed a potential threat to the party rule in the country. The Communist Party occupied an exceptionally strong position in the Soviet political system. The only legitimate political party, it was, according to Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system." The party strictly controlled the decision-making and legislative processes, as well as the mass media, law enforcement bodies, courts, secret services, etc. Undoubtedly,

the CPSU had at its disposal all necessary means in order to establish a legislative framework, form certain values among the population about emerging informal political groups and multiparty system, and shape the whole process of creation of new social and political institutions.

Before 1987–1988, the official approach toward political dissent was uniform across the Union: the regime took all possible measures to crush the embryonic political opposition. Since 1988, the republican Communist parties chose different strategies in dealing with political pluralism and alternative political organizations. Among our five cases, political elites in the Baltic states, and especially in Lithuania, had created the most favorable conditions for the development of a competitive party system in their republics. The younger generation of leaders who assumed power in the Baltic nations in 1988 initiated broad reforms toward liberalization and democratization of the political life. First among the Soviet republics, Lithuania, followed by Latvia and Estonia, pioneered in removing from its constitution the "leading party role" provision and created a legal framework for the development of a multiparty system. In Lithuania and her two Baltic neighbors "political organizations have been granted legitimacy as participants of the political process" through their early official registration (Krupavicius, 1997, 548). Representatives of alternative political organizations, who were often critical of the regime, obtained access to the state-owned mass media and were able to dramatically increase the number of unofficial publications. Since the beginning of 1988, ruling circles in the Baltic states ceased the use of violence against political opposition. Undoubtedly, all these measures advanced the level of political pluralism and tolerance and favorably affected the development of competitive party systems in the three nations. In some ways Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia played the role of catalyst of political and social changes on the All-Union level. For example, political reforms in Lithuania forced Gorbachev to change his position on the legal status of the Communist Party and establishment of a judicial framework for a multiparty system in the USSR.

Regional party organizations on the territory of Russia were directly subordinated to the All-Union authorities because the Russian Federation lacked its own republican party organs. In the late 1980s, the politics of the All-Union Center toward informal organizations can be best described as a limited support for social pluralism in a one-party "socialist state." Gorbachev and his closest lieutenants encouraged the development of "a socialist civil society," growth of public associations, more active grassroots support for perestroika, and people's involvement in political affairs. The authorities in Moscow became increasingly more tolerant to political opponents and ideological pluralism. Moderate reformers, who did not attempt to shake the fundamentals of the Soviet society, were granted access to the official television

and newspapers. To a certain extent, the public was presented with a variety of views on the important social issues. The regime stopped harassing the majority of those who thought differently from the ruling party. However, the central Communist leadership argued in favor of a single-party system and attempted to keep the constitutional clause on the leading party role intact. After Article 6 of the Soviet constitution was amended in March 1990, the CPSU leadership still continued to insist on the preservation of the socialist political and economic system. Those political organizations and individuals (e.g., the Democratic Union), who openly challenged the party rule and called for a change of the political system in the country, were subjected to harsh measures by the state.

The Ukrainian Communist leadership created the most unfavorable conditions for the development of a multiparty system. Ukraine was the last among the five nations to remove "the leading party role" provision from its constitution, to legalize oppositional organizations, and to discontinue using violence against them. The regime launched a broad campaign in the official mass media in order to create a negative image about emerging oppositional groups.

If in the Baltic states the All-Union party leadership played a positive role in developing of some institutions of civil society and ideological pluralism, in Ukraine the influence of the central authorities on political developments was significantly less important. In 1988, the CPSU ruling bodies were eager to support creation and activities of voluntary public associations that stood on the positions of moderate social reforms. The reformist section of the Moscow leadership thought that such a policy would help to control alternative political organizations and marginalize the most radical groups, as well as consolidate perestroika gains and make the reversal of political changes in the country impossible. Yakovlev's visit to the Baltic states in August 1988, when he had criticized the local party leadership for its inability to rule in new political conditions, and a consecutive change of the republican conservative elites by reformist Communists, gave a powerful impulse to the development of political pluralism in the three nations, reduced state pressure against alternative political organizations, and encouraged their development. In Ukraine, the politics of liberalization initiated by the All-Union party bodies was effectively resisted by Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and other archconservative republican leaders. In September 1989, Shcherbitskiy was replaced by Gorbachev's loyalist Volodymyr Ivashko who tried to bring the CPU in line with the policies of the central party leadership. However, by the end of 1989 the All-Union authorities abandoned their policies of support for alternative political movements because "it became increasingly clear that their notion of perestroika did not coincide with what Gorbachev had in mind" (Misiunas

and Taagepera, 1993, 318). Vera Tolz argues that the party "evidently underestimated how quickly unofficial groups, including the popular fronts, would begin to advance their own thoughtfully devised independent political initiatives and, instead of neutralizing 'radicals,' would themselves begin to make radical demands" (1990, 49). The new policy of the central Communist leadership could not stop the process of the formation of a multiparty system, which took full speed in the Baltic states. For Ukraine, however, the momentum of 1988, when the Moscow ruling circles viewed some reformist unofficial political organizations as their allies, encouraged their activities, and attempted to cooperate with them, was irrevocably lost.

The different approaches taken by the Communist leadership toward ideological pluralism and alternative political organizations had a long-lasting effect on the future development of multiparty systems in the five nations. In the Baltic states, the citizenry and local political elites have learned to accept political parties as legitimate players in the game called politics. Since the formative phase of the party system, oppositional organizations had become an essential part in the process of political negotiations and bargaining. Gradually, parties have gained more strength and soon they could effectively influence the processes of the government formation and decision making in the three republics. Already at the initial stage of the competitive party system in Lithuania, and to some extent in other two Baltic countries, newly born political organizations have filled a certain niche in the national political specter and 15 years later continue to occupy and strengthen it.

Inconsistent policy of the All-Union Communist Party leadership toward informal public groups and occasional violence against political opponents hurt the development of the multiparty system in Russia. In Ukraine, where the Communist elite did everything possible to blacken and undermine political pluralism, where the public was exposed to a vast negative campaign about informal political organizations, where those who disagreed with the official position were portrayed as demagogues and criminals, the people received an additional negative impulse about political parties and a competitive party system. The negative image of political parties caused a wide disbelief among the public in this institution that, in turn, led to a poor showing of candidates nominated by political organizations in the national legislative elections. The voters gave their preferences to independent power holders in the center and localities. In the 1994 elections, nonparty candidates obtained two-thirds of the total national vote. In comparison, only one independent candidate was elected in the Seimas in the first postindependence elections in Lithuania.

This chapter discusses the role of the ruling Communist elites during the initial stage of the multiparty system formation in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine. At the same time, the party leaders certainly did not live and

operate in a vacuum. There were other important players and factors that affected the development of political party systems at their formative stage in the five countries. Eisenstadt is correct when he argues that "the crystallization of any concrete institutional system . . . is variable, within broad limits, and depends on the concrete constellation of the position, power, and creeds of the various groups and individuals in any given situation" (1965, 39–40). The concrete institutional framework of the multiparty system that emerged in the five cases was the result of interaction between the ruling circles, consisting of several competing wings, and various emerging political organizations in a concrete historical and cultural setting. The very fact that in 1988 the reformist Communist forces came to power in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but not, for example, in conservative Central Asian republics, was largely due to the high level of political activity of the population in the Baltic states. New republican leaders had to cooperate, consult, and bargain with the popular fronts and other political organizations on important social issues. No doubt, the formation of relatively better conditions for the development of a competitive party system in the three Baltic republics than in Russia and Ukraine in the late 1980s shall be also credited to the political opposition. However, once again I have to emphasize the importance of politicians in crucial decision-making positions during the initial process of the institution building. It was particularly true in the case of the former USSR where the ruling Communist Party occupied an exceptionally powerful place in the Soviet political system.

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CHAPTER 8

The Type of Government and the Party System

The recent presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate generated a large body of literature on the role of institutional factors in advancing stable democracy. In a relatively short period of time since the 1990 publication of Juan Linz's article *The Perils of Presidentialism*, which raised the issue of what type of government is more conducive to a successful democratic transition, many political scientists across the globe have devoted their attention to the exploration of the nature of executive-legislative relations in postauthoritarian systems. Some of the arguments made at the dawn of the debate have been later supported with new evidence and advanced to a higher level of sophistication. Other propositions proved to have a short life and have been rebuffed by consequent research on the subject. Still new arguments are being offered in order to be scrutinized, supported, or questioned by other authors. In other words, a normal process of accumulation of knowledge, gathering of facts, crystallization of theories and methods takes place.

The goal of this chapter is to assess whether the arguments made by students of executive-legislative relations are applicable to the post-Soviet countries. This chapter will attempt to accomplish two main objectives: (1) to analyze some of the most important arguments advanced by scholars in the course of the presidents versus parliaments debate, and to make several new propositions concerning relationships between a type of government and the development of a party system in transitional countries; and (2) to discuss the validity of these propositions on the basis of the empirical evidence from the five countries at hand. At the beginning of the chapter I briefly analyze working definitions of the various types of the executive-legislative

arrangements and discuss reasons for the spread of mixed types of government in the post–Communist world.

* * *

DEFINING THE TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

Although real-world political systems come in a variety of shadings and often deviate from the two ideal forms of the government, I begin the discussion by defining the "pure" presidential and "pure" parliamentary democratic regimes. There are three principal characteristics of presidential democracy: (1) the chief executive, or president, and the assembly are popularly elected; (2) the terms of office of both the chief executive and the legislature are fixed; and (3) the president appoints and heads the cabinet.[1] The most essential feature of this type of government is that two branches of power, the executive and the legislature, are not dependent on each other in their origin and survival. Both the president and the assembly are popularly elected and "are not contingent on mutual confidence" (Shugart and Carey, 1992, 19), meaning that the chief executive cannot dismiss the assembly but, in turn, cannot be dismissed by this body.

In contrast to the dual legitimacy and mutual independence of the chief executive and assembly in a presidential regime, a parliamentary government is characterized by the dependence of one branch of power on another. In a parliamentary system, voters directly elect only the legislature, which, in turn, selects the chief executive and cabinet members.[2] The legitimacy and authority of the executive stems from the popularly elected assembly. The term of office of the chief executive in a parliamentary system is not fixed and depends on the confidence or "at least the passive support of a legislative majority" (Stepan and Skach, 1994, 129). The constitutions of many parliamentary regimes empower the prime minister to dissolve the legislature in certain extreme cases and call for new elections.[3] Other nations grant this authority to the head of state "who, while not popularly elected, may have been elected by a different coalition from that which sustains a given cabinet in power" (Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997, 14).

Before the wave of democratization swept Latin American and Eastern European countries, the academic debate about the virtues and nature of democratic governmental systems mainly focused on two "pure" structures: presidentialism and parliamentarism. Juan Linz's (1990) seminal article and the piece by Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach (1993) are typical in this regard: the authors did not discuss mixed cases that featured elements of both systems. In part, it might be explained by the fact that the empirical material for these studies was drawn mainly from stable democratic regimes that were

either overwhelmingly parliamentary or presidential in nature (the United States being the best known example of the latter). Even such unclear cases as Finland and the French Fifth Republic, which combine characteristics of both "pure" types and fit neither of two categories, often were not separated in a distinct group. For instance, Arend Lijphart in his typology of governments in 21 stable democracies classified Finland and France as presidential systems, arguing that the presidents in these two countries are more powerful than the prime ministers, and, hence, are real chief executives (1984, 70–71).

Since the beginning of the 1980s, the approach that focused on exclusively "pure" types of presidentialism and parliamentarism has been challenged by some scholars. In his analysis of six contemporary European cases (France, Portugal, Finland, etc.) and one historic case (the Weimar Republic), Maurice Duverger showed that in these nations a popularly elected president coexisted with the cabinet resting on the parliament's confidence. He argued that this type of government is intermediary between presidential and parliamentary systems and should be called "semipresidential." Duverger defined this type of political regime as one that combines three elements: (1) the president of the country is popularly elected; (2) the president possesses quite considerable powers;and (3) the president coexists with a prime minister and ministers who possess executive power and depend on the parliament's confidence (1980, 165–166). At the time when Duverger wrote this piece, all known semipresidential democratic systems could arguably be located in the middle of the presidentialism- parliamentarism continuum according to the criterion of the strength of the presidential power. Duverger's definition of semipresidentialism was criticized by other scholars on several important grounds including a misleading nature of this term (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Linz, 1994; Stepan and Suleiman, 1995).

Further advances in our understanding of mixed government structures were made in the 1990s. Matthew Shugart and John Carey argued that an attempt to place semipresidential regimes "midway along some continuum running from presidential to parliamentary" is misleading because such systems exhibit special characteristics and, therefore, should be considered as a separate, "premier presidential," form of government. The distinguishing features of this type of regime are the primacy of the prime minister and the presence of the president with significant powers (Shugart and Carey, 1992, 23, 24). Along with two "ideal" types of democratic regimes with popularly elected presidents (i.e., pure presidentialism and premier presidentialism), Shugart and Carey identified several other government systems. One of them, "presidential-parliamentary" type, which is particularly important for our further discussion, is defined as (1) the people elect the president; (2) the president appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers; (3) the cabinet is subject

to parliamentary confidence; and (4) the president has the power to dismiss the assembly. The most significant features of this type of regime are "the primacy of the president, plus the dependence of the cabinet on parliament" (ibid., 24). Shugart and Carey completed their sophisticated study of executive-legislative arrangements in 1992, that is, a year after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Naturally, they could not anticipate the emergence of a "superpresidential" regime in the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet nations.

The multiauthored collection *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (1994) featured several articles that explored the regimes with dual executive authority and provided additional theoretical insights into this variation of government. In his revised and amended version of the original piece that initiated the president versus parliament debate, Juan Linz analyzed concrete historical circumstances in different countries that adopted governmental structures with bipolar executive. He elaborated defining criteria of the semipresidential system and highlighted the differences between this constitutional model and presidentialism with the "cover" of a presidential prime minister. Linz argued that "a prime minister who heads a cabinet and directs an administration, is freely appointed and dismissed by the president, and does not need the confidence of parliament is not to be confused with the semipresidential, semiparliamentary constitutional model. Creating such an office is only a form of delegating presidential powers, which might allow the president to avoid some criticism and to displace it onto the prime minister. . . . In such a system, the president continues to be the only and ultimate decision maker and legitimator of decisions made by others" (Linz, 1994, 60). Although in this study Linz never named Russia as an example of presidentialism with the "cover" of a prime minister, this is an accurate brief description of the Russian superpresidentialism as well as the current state of the executive-legislative relations in this country.

An attempt to defend Duverger's approach to semipresidentialism was made by Robert Elgie in a multiauthored investigation *Semi-presidentialism in Europe* (1999). Elgie slightly reformulates Duverger's original concept of this government type and gives a very inclusive definition of semipresidentialism: "[T]he situation where a popularly elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament. This is a purely constitutional definition of a concept" (1999, 13). Such a broad approach that focuses only on the de jure constitutional powers of the head of state, head of government, and the legislature allows the author to "unambiguously establish" a list of 23 countries on the territory of Europe and the former Soviet Union that have adopted a semipresidentialist model. Although separate chapters in this volume make a solid contribution to general knowledge of the history and nature of the political regime in individual

nations, the overall outcome of this study as a whole is somewhat puzzling. The inclusion of stable and democratic France, a parliamentary republic with a directly elected president in Bulgaria, superpresidential Russia, and sultanistic Uzbekistan in the same study group ignores crucial differences between these nations, their state of democracy, de facto political arrangements among different branches of power, and brings a great deal of confusion in understanding of the concept of semipresidentialism.

* * *

The Rise of Interest to Mixed Parliamentary-Presidential Types of Government

What factors spur the interest of political scientists to pay more attention to constitutional models with dual executives in the 1990s? Undoubtedly, the successful performance of the French and Finnish political systems, as well as propositions to introduce parliamentary features in some Latin American and even U.S. presidential regimes were among reasons that contributed to the rise of interest among academics and politicians to the semipresidential constitutional structure.[4] Another important reason stems from the predominance of the government with dual executive in the post-Communist East European countries where "the norm is a directly elected president with very strong *de jure* and *de facto* prerogatives coexisting with a prime minister who needs the support of parliament" (Stepan and Skach, 1993, 4).

Although the concrete constitutional framework that emerged in the nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union depended on a specific historical setting and the relative bargaining strength of the main political players, some generalizations about the spread of the constitutional model with dual executives across this region can be made. Before radical political and economic changes were initiated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, countries of the former Soviet bloc were characterized by a one-party rule. For example, the CPSU Politburo that enjoyed a monopoly of decision–making power in the USSR was at the apex of the highly centralized Soviet political system. One of the most challenging objectives of Mikhail Gorbachev and his supporters during perestroika was to shift the principal mechanism of decision making from the unchecked Communist Party bodies to the legislature that would be accountable to the public. To a certain extent, these pre-1991 reforms were successful: the policy-making role of the party decreased and the Soviets were granted greater authority. Despite the fact that the 1989 elections to the USSR Soviet People's Deputies were held under rules that strongly favored the candidates loyal to the establishment

and could be hardly called democratic, they introduced a competitive element previously unknown to Soviet citizens, more meaningful political participation, and public debate of acute social issues. For a while, the Soviet legislature became the epicenter of the political struggle in the country.

However, the existence of representative institutions alone is not sufficient for the establishment of the effective and cohesive policy-making mechanism. In order to become an influential part of a political system, the legislature must be a political actor in its own right, with fixed roles, norms, and traditions (Opello, 1986). The assembly should develop a set of stable internal and external rules of behavior, and patterns of interaction of its elements. It should be supported by coherent political parties and legislative factions that have clear policy objectives and incentives to pursue them. Otherwise, instead of "a council of consent," where various factions meet to resolve their differences and define common objectives, the legislature becomes "a council of convenience," where competing factions meet to shout at one another on the floor of parliament (Sisson and Snowiss, 1979). Unfortunately, assemblies in many East European, and particularly post-Soviet, countries suffered from this syndrome. In a short time, a lack of parliamentary culture showed itself: the legislatures became discussion clubs without rules and public arenas for self-promotion of ambitious politicians. Individual members of parliament, who were not bound by party discipline, voted to please narrow interests of their constituencies as well as their own ambitions. Legislatures could rarely reach compromise. Engaged in personal attacks and threats, they lacked the ability to adjust to rapidly changing circumstances and act efficiently in emergency situations. In other words, because of their immobility and impotence, at the beginning of the 1990s legislatures in many East European transitional societies failed to become effective political bodies that could exercise control over the decision-making process.

The political situation in transitional nations required a more effective institution of authority and decision making. As any society during the period of radical social and economic reforms, post-Communist countries required the concentration and centralization of power that was "necessary to smash the old order, break down the privileges and restraints" of the ancien regime, "and free the way for the rise of new social groups and the development of the new economic activities" (Huntington, 1968, 126). The introduction of the presidency with vast political powers was a means of concentration of authority in a single office, and overcoming of the immobility and impotence of the legislature. However, this political institution brought a potential threat to new fragile democracies. Drafters of the East European and post-Soviet constitutions were aware that in spite of the accountability of the president (either by means of popular elections or selection by the assembly), a great deal of the decision-making process in the presidential apparatus

would potentially be out of public control. A policy–making mechanism in the presidential apparatus could resemble the Communist Party top body that had a final say on all issues and was completely unaccountable for its decisions. A separation of the executive power and the establishment of the office of premier, who needs at least the passive support of the assembly, would provide a check on the presidency. In turn, the cabinet would be checked by the legislature. The institution of the head of government separated from the head of state was also supported by presidents with strong constitutional powers who otherwise objected to any limitation of their executive duties. By delegating some authority to the Prime Minister, the president would place the cabinet leader in a position where he/she is forced to make the unpopular government decisions and be responsible for them. Under critical circumstances which are not rare in a transitional society, the Premier would serve as a protective shield to the president from the growing public discontent. Therefore, a constitutional system of a dual executive with a president who possesses significant powers and a prime minister who depends on the legislature's confidence became a logical choice of the founders. This model provided a general institutional framework within which specific historical conditions and relative strength of main political actors in different East European nations determined a concrete constitutional design and the nature of executive-legislative relations.

Along with other post-Communist countries, the nations that have emerged after the breakup of the Soviet Union became a living laboratory for the students of the executive-legislative relations. A rapidly growing literature on the presidential, parliamentary, and mixed types of government in the post-Soviet societies addresses a variety of important aspects of this subject: the origin and historical conditions that surrounded the creation of a particular system (White, 1997; Wilson, 1997b); the balance of powers between the president, prime minister, and national assembly (Urbanavicius, 1999; White, 1999; Wilson, 1999; Remington, 2003a, 2003b); the relations between the type of government and the party system (Harris, 1997; Ishiyama and Kennedy, 2001; Moser, 2001a); powers of the chief executives (Markov, 1993; Frye, 1997; Roper, 2002; Protsyk, 2004); the concept of superpresidency (Huskey, 1999; Fish, 2000, 2001b, 2001c; Shevtsova, 2003); and the influence of the strength of the executive on stability and democratic consolidation (Easter, 1997; Protsyk, 2003; Colton and Skach, 2005). However, with several exceptions, these investigations have a typical shortcoming: they overwhelmingly represent single-country studies. A lack of a cross-national comparative focus makes it difficult, if not impossible, to accurately evaluate political consequences of different models of executive–legislative relations in post-Soviet transitional nations. This chapter is an attempt to surmount such a shortcoming. I test a number of

propositions made in the literature on this subject using empirical material from the five former republics of the Soviet Union.

* * *

Proposition 1. The strength of a presidency varies inversely with the strength of a party system. A presidency which occupies a predominant position in a political system and possesses strong political powers is not conducive to the development of a party system. On the contrary, a presidency with relatively weak powers is more likely to further political institutionalization of a party system.

* * *

In their study of the constitutional design of executive-legislative relations and its influence on a democratic performance and the survival of democracy, Matthew Shugart and John Carey state, "[W]e have evidence for our proposition that it is the balance of presidential-congressional powers, more than presidentialism per se, that has hampered democratization in many countries" (1992, 37–38). The strength of presidencies varies inversely with the strength of parties; in other words, strong presidencies tend to be associated with weak political parties and vice versa (Shugart, 1993, 30–32).[5] For example, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, as well as some other former Soviet republics with more clientelistic and less programmic parties or proto-parties adopted presidential or mixed presidential-parliamentary systems with a strong executive. At the same time, in countries where outgoing Communists or incoming programmic movements like the Baltic popular Fronts were crucial in designing the system, the parliament has a more important status and the presidency is either nonexistent or is granted weak constitutional powers (ibid.). Exploring political institutions in East European countries, Barbara Geddes found additional evidence to support the "strong presidents-weak parties" argument. For instance, Poland and Romania have both the weakest political parties and the strongest presidencies in this geographical region. Geddes further developed the theoretical argument on the association between weak parties and strong presidencies. She asserts that general fragmentation and weakness of the party system makes for a weak legislature and undermines "the legislative ability to pursue its own aggrandizement at the expense of the presidency and thus contribute to the accretion of presidential powers" (1996, 29).

As follows from chapter 3, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union the Russian Federation has gradually developed the superpresidential model "with the 'cover' of a presidential prime minister" (Linz, 1994).[6] Ukraine

belongs to the group of presidential-parliamentary republics that combines "the primacy of the president" with unambiguous and proven dependence of the cabinet on the legislature (Shugart and Carey, 1992).[7] Under the presidency of Algirdas Brazauskas, political practice in post-Soviet Lithuania was leaning toward parliamentalism,[8] which was confirmed by a 1998 ruling of the Constitutional Court that Lithuania is a parliamentary republic.[9] Although Valdas Adamkus has reversed a parliamentary "tradition" and strengthened de facto powers of the Lithuanian presidency, this nation represents a "premier presidential" form of government with the primacy of the prime minister and the presence of the active president (ibid.). In fact, in his study of 10 premier presidential European regimes, Steven Roper (2002) found that the Lithuanian presidency is by far weaker than comparable institutions in other nations. The constitutions of the two other Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, establish a "normal" parliamentary regime with indirectly elected head of states. However, all postindependence presidents in both nations tended to interpret their de jure powers broadly and take an active position in the decision-making process in their polities.

The five cases in this study provide a strong support for Shugart's and Carey's argument about the inverse relationship of party strength and executive strength. My analysis shows that Russia and Ukraine have the least institutionalized system of political parties and their presidents possess the greatest powers, both in the Russian constitution and in practice. The Baltic states demonstrate a different pattern: their party systems are better developed and their heads of state are noticeably less powerful in comparison to the former two cases. Albeit with some reservations, our case studies also seem to support the hypothesis that a weak legislature with weak and fragmented political parties is not able to withstand pressure from the executive to create a strong presidency. Indeed, in all five nations political parties were the principal oppositional force against a powerful presidency. In those countries where the party system was relatively more coherent and stronger, the balance between the executive and the legislature leaned more toward the latter. In the nations with relatively weak party systems, the presidency secured a predominant position. For example, the issue whether the country should have a strong or a weak presidency was perhaps the main stumbling block during the 1992 constitutional debates in Estonia. A group of supporters of Arnold Rüütel, a former top *nomenklatura* administrator, favored a strong president and expected Rüütel to take this office. Riina Kionka writes, "Opposing the option was an ideologically diverse array of political parties that sought to squelch Rüütel's presidential ambitions or at least weaken the post. In the end, Rüütel's opponents proved the stronger" (1992c). The emergence of the mixed regime in Lithuania was a result of a compromise between the LDDP that proposed a parliamentary republic and Sajudis

whose leader Vytautas Landsbergis was "believed to be best placed to win the presidential election" (Urbanavicius, 1999, 152). In 1995–1996 in Ukraine, the concept of a strong presidency was opposed not only by the Communists and their Socialist and Peasant allies, but also by a number of centrists and national democrats who "worried that too much power was being concentrated in the president's hands" (Wilson, 1997b, 87). Unlike in Estonia, though, President Kuchma and other proponents of a powerful presidency in Ukraine prevailed over weak parties. The Russian superpresidency was shaped in the conditions of the 1993 political crisis when the opposition lacked any ability to influence the constitutional design of the Russian Federation.

As we could see, weak parties contribute to the increase of the president's powers. However, this connection does not stop here. The relationship between the strength of the party system and the powers of the presidency is a two-way street. The strong presidency itself affects the party system in different ways, making it weaker and hampering its institutionalization. Thus, a regime with a powerful presidency experiences a shift of the principal decision-making mechanism from the Cabinet of Ministers, which according to the constitution can be checked by the parliament, to the presidential apparatus directly subordinate and responsible only to the head of state. The justification for the growth in size and authority of the presidential administration, or, in other words, an institution that is unaccountable to the assembly is the need for the president to perform effectively his/her vast constitutional duties. The Russian case is a good illustration of this point. After 1991, the executive branch in this country consisted of the Cabinet of Ministers and presidential apparatus that was out of parliamentary control and included the Administration of the President and the Security Council. The Administration of the President was responsible for cadre policy as well as all political issues, while the Security Council supervised Russia's foreign, defense, and security policies. The Cabinet of Ministers was mainly in charge of the economy. The powers of the presidential apparatus have been gradually increasing. Thus, in February 1994 the president set up a division within his administration that was given responsibility to oversee all major personnel appointments in all federal executive bodies (Rahl, 1994). In January 1996, Yeltsin approved a new structure and statute of the presidential administration, strengthening its authority and putting it in charge of "coordinating of all organs of power."[10] The transfer of the decision-making function on political, foreign, defense, and security issues to the bodies that were not responsible or accountable to the parliament and political parties further marginalized these two political institutions. Further strengthening of the Russian presidency under Vladimir Putin led to the accusation that the Fradkov cabinet is run as a department of the presidential administration.[11]

Ignoring the democratically elected legislature and narrowing the decision–making arena to a small number of handpicked nonparty technocrats can be a slippery slope to dictatorship (Colton and Skach, 2005, 117).

The extraordinary appointment and legislative rights of the presidency in Russia made the parliamentary electoral competition for power among political parties in these countries less meaningful (if not irrelevant) than in the Baltic states. In chapter 3 I showed that although Our Home Is Russia took only 10 percent of the total popular vote in the 1995 elections to the Duma, or just around 5 percent of all eligible votes, the leader of this movement, Viktor Chernomyrdin, continued to occupy the post of the Russian prime minister. Acting according to his constitutional rights, President Yeltsin decided against changing the government leader, and the national assembly did not have any de facto power to reshuffle the cabinet. Certainly, the political impotence of the legislature over executive appointments had not contributed to the rehabilitation of the idea of party politics.

A factor that might neutralize the retarding for political parties' role of the strong presidency to a certain degree is the party affiliation of this public figure. Indeed, in the environment of democratic elections the identifiability and accountability of a presidential political party may serve as a stimulus for party-system development. On the contrary, the "above-party" status of the head of state removes this "positive characteristic" of presidentialism (Linz, 1994, 10) and makes an additional damaging impact on the party system.

* * *

Proposition 2. The supra-party position of the president as "a representative of a whole nation" neglects the process of institution building and causes a relatively low level of institutionalization of the party system. In contrast, the presidency which is affiliated with a political party advances the party-system development. Since the nonparty head of state is more likely to be elected in a direct vote by the population than by indirect vote by the legislature, the presidential system is potentially more damaging for institutionalization of the party system than parliamentarism.[12]

* * *

If this proposition is correct, Russia and Ukraine probably have the "above-party" presidency, and the heads of state in the Baltic nations are likely to be affiliated with political organizations. This is indeed the case. Although Boris Yeltsin was among the initial leaders of the Democratic Russia movement, he suspended his membership in the group before he was elected chairman of Russia's Supreme Soviet. By the time of the First Congress of Democratic

Russia in October 1990, Yeltsin had ceased any formal relations with this organization. Lev Ponomarev, one of the leaders of Democratic Russia, noted that Yeltsin always kept some distance between himself and this movement, which provided him with organized support during the first Russian presidential elections in June 1991.[13] Although from time to time, Yeltsin or his lieutenants recognized the need for a democratic pro-presidential party with a wide popular appeal, he continued to stay away from developing close relations with political parties. For example, in November 1992, in his address to the Second Forum of Supporters of Reforms, Yeltsin called for the creation of an inclusive political party or movement of reformist orientation. Moreover, he announced that he was ready to be "with and within" such an organization.[14] These words, however, have never been realized in practice. By the time of the 1996 presidential elections, Yeltsin had strengthened his image as a president who is above political parties. In April 1996, Sergey Filatov, former chief of the presidential administration, argued, "[T]he president has no party of his own, and this is good for the country. He takes guidance not from ideology in his activity, but from the Constitution. . . . Party interests will inevitably be placed above the interests of the state and the individual. . . . Boris Yeltsin is the president of the whole people, not just a certain section of people, and he is ready to remain such a president."[15]

Although Vladimir Putin also poses himself as a representative of the whole nation, relations between him and Unity/United Russia are different than relations between the pro-presidential parties and his predecessor. On the one hand, United Russia has been "Putin's custom-crafted" project (Stoner-Weiss, 2006, 112). This political organization supports the Russian president virtually on every possible occasion: "Unity supports Putin, and Putin leans on Unity."[16] On the other hand, Unity/United Russia is a political instrument of the Russian head of state created as one of the elements to eliminate "every possible counterweight to presidential power," particularly in the national legislature (Ryzhkov, 2004, 53). Putin always keeps some distance from Unity/United Russia and has never been accountable to this political organization.[17] It remains to be seen what happens when the utility of this party of power seizes to be useful for any reason for the Russian presidency. It is likely that it would follow the fate of other pro-presidential scapegoats and be substituted by another party of power, several of which have been waiting in line since the 2004 elections.

Both post-Soviet Ukrainian heads of state, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, also maintained the status of the "above-party" president. During his rule, Kravchuk made several mostly unsuccessful attempts to co-opt national democratic parties and develop informal relations with them. Throughout his presidency though, he never joined any political party, and never declared publicly that he would join one.[18] In October 1993, his future

successor, Leonid Kuchma, who was the leader of the Ukrainian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs at the time, was one of the two cosigners of the declaration about the creation of the Interregional Bloc of Reforms. Apparently, in the 1994 parliamentary elections he ran as a member of this bloc. However, unlike the majority of other parties, candidates who represented the IBR did not include their party affiliation in the ballots and de jure contested elections as independents. Realizing the weakness of the IBR, Kuchma departed from this organization prior to standing for election for the Ukrainian presidency. In the 1994 presidential campaign both main contenders, Kravchuk and Kuchma, ran as independent candidates. At the first news conference after his election as the Ukrainian head of state, Kuchma said, "[T]his is good that not a single political party supported me during the elections, as I am going to serve people and not the party."[19] During his term in office, Kuchma had uneasy relations with political parties. On one occasion he complained about the composition of the national legislature: "[U]nfortunately, many representatives from political parties were elected in it."[20] He has always lacked a broad and reliable base in the parliament and often faced the painful task of coalition building on every major legislative issue. At a time of despair Kuchma once said, "I would love to take our deputies in parliament and send them into orbit aboard one of our rockets. We would welcome them back, say, in two years, with open arms."[21]

Unlike the Russian and Ukrainian leaders, all presidents in the Baltic states have had closer affiliation with major political parties. Algirdas Brazauskas was the founding father of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, the successor of the former independent Communist Party of Lithuania, which separated itself from the All-Union CPSU in 1989 and later adopted a social democratic rhetoric. Brazauskas led the LDDP to its landslide victory in the 1992 parliamentary elections and won the 1993 presidential contest running as the leader of this party. As required by the Lithuanian constitution, he resigned from the post of the LDDP chairman and suspended his activity in the party after his election to the post of the Lithuanian president. However, Brazauskas continued occasional participation in meetings organized by the LDDP leadership, could influence the party decision-making process, and, in fact, remained one of its leaders. As a result, the political opposition repeatedly accused the president of "remaining a subordinate subject"[22] of the LDDP and of his failure "to disassociate himself even to a limited extent from the policies being carried out by his party."[23] Although Valdas Adamkus won Lithuanian presidency as an independent both times, he was strongly supported by a major party or parties every race. For example, in 1998 he was backed by the Center Union, in 2002 by all major parties still losing the race, and in 2004 by the Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives and several other organizations. Ronaldas Paksas won the presidency in 2002 as the head of the Liberal Democratic Party.

By definition, the support of a party or a coalition of parties in a legislature is a must for a successful candidate for the post of indirectly elected president in a parliamentary system. Before his election as the head of state in July 1993, Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis was an active member of the Latvian Farmers Union, one of the largest political parties in the nation. At the extraordinary congress of the LZS, which took place one month later, he was elected honorary chairman of this party and continues to occupy this post during his presidency. On many occasions, Ulmanis reconfirmed that he is a representative of the Farmers Union.[24] The second postindependence president, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, received support from the People's Party, Fatherland and Freedom, and the Social Democratic Workers Party in 1999. Four years later, she was overwhelmingly reelected with the backing of most leading parties.

As well as in most of our other cases, the Estonian constitution requires the president to suspend his/her membership in political parties upon assuming the office. It was one of the reasons why a member of the Isamaa electoral coalition, Lennart Mery, who was nominated by this political organization to the post of the Estonian president, suspended his party activities after his election as the head of state in 1992. In the 1996 presidential contest, the incumbent president was nominated again by several rightist and right-of-center political parties whose support was instrumental in his reelection. His successor Arnold Rüütel was the leader of the Estonian People's Union (formerly the Estonian Country's People's Party) since its formation.

Why does the supra-party status of the president hurt the development of the party system in post-Soviet transitional countries? There are several plausible explanations. *First*, for the president who is not identified with political parties and is not bound by party discipline, criteria other than party affiliation become determining factors in his/her cadre policy. A nonparty president does not have the responsibility to promote members of the winning party to the leading posts in the executive branch. Instead, appointments are made according to the criteria of personal loyalty to the president, the professional or "technocratic" skills of an appointee, geographical or clan identification, etc. As a result, ambitious politicians who want to pursue their careers in the government do not view political parties as any useful means to achieve their goals. Therefore, one of the most important functions of a political party in a democratic society, that is, the channeling of career opportunities and determining access to power, remains underdeveloped in a system with the above-party presidency. The recruitment of political leaders into government bodies takes place via other channels.

The fact that the head of state in a presidential system may appoint representatives of political parties, including members of oppositional organizations to the cabinet, does not change the overall picture. Ministers

who are affiliated with parties are selected mainly as individuals because of their professional skills or personal loyalty, not as members of an enduring and disciplined pro-presidential coalition (Stepan and Skach, 1993, 20). In addition, the extent of a cabinet portfolio to a member of a political party does not necessarily mean that this party would support the president, as it does in a parliamentary system (Mainwaring, 1993). Therefore, the inclusion of members of political parties in the cabinet, which is composed by the above-party president, does not strengthen the role of parties as vehicles of political recruitment.

The *second* explanation is connected to the first and deals with electoral identifiability, which denotes the degree to voters can already identify the possible alternative governments and policies that may emerge after the election before the election occurs (Shugart and Carey, 1992, 45). Electoral identifiability is high "when voters can assess the competitors for control of the executive and can make a straightforward logical connection between their preferred candidate or party and their optimal vote. Identifiability is low when voters cannot predict easily what the effect of their vote will be in terms of the composition of the executive" (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997b, 461–462). The voters' ability to predict the potential composition and policies of postelection governments is likely to be seriously impeded if electoral presidential contestants are not affiliated with political parties and are not responsible for implementing a party program in practice. For example, during the 1994 and 1999 presidential elections in Ukraine, probably nobody including Leonid Kuchma himself could have guessed the composition of the future government and policies that it would pursue. At the same time, in 1993, Lithuanian voters who elected the LDDP leader Algirdas Brazauskas as their president certainly made a more informed choice than the Ukrainian electors. Low electoral identifiabilitity and accountability (see below), which result from "the above-party" status of the presidency, hampers the institutionalization of the party system because voters do not identify electoral contestants, as well as postelection governments, with political parties and party programs. Therefore, the supra-party presidency defies another crucial function of a political party in a democratic setting—its participation in elections.

Electoral accountability, which is closely related to identifiability, refers to "the degree and means by which elected policymakers are responsible to citizens. The more straightforward the connection between the choices made by the electorate at the ballot box and expectations to which policymakers are held, the greater accountability" (Shugart and Carey, 1992, 44). The president who is not a member of any political party is likely to weaken electoral accountability and confuse the voter because the head of state who is not bound by the party line has more room for a political maneuver than a party

president and can more easily change his/her ideological and policy orientation. For example, a frequently changing image of President Yeltsin, first as a radical democrat, then a cautious reformer, a patriot and protector of the state integrity by any means, and again a moderate democrat, as well as less dramatic but still significant changes of Kravchuk's and Kuchma's priorities, would be less likely if these presidents were contained by party discipline, ideology, and responsibility to implement a coherent and elaborated party program.

A nonparty president tends to portray him/herself as a representative of the interests of the whole country, not just narrow group interests. The creation of the image of the head of state as a consolidator of the nation, guarantor of the constitution, and defender of rights and interests of every citizen is a wishful attempt to overcome the majoritarian character of the presidency (see Linz, 1990a, 1994). No doubt, it is a barely realizable task, especially in a transitional country with its acute social, economic, and political conditions that might go out of control at a moment's notice. In order to defuse the situation and relieve the growing public discontent from time to time, the president needs a scapegoat. "Should anything untoward develop, any piece can disappear" from the political chessboard so that the king may stay.[25] In Russia and to some extent in Ukraine, it was the main reason for the constant reshuffling of the executive branch, including the cabinet and prime minister. Frequent and major changes of the cabinet composition weaken the level of electoral accountability in the nation. Since the government is not formed from representatives of a victorious party on the basis of the election results, and its failures are not associated with a particular political organization or organizations, the retrospective voting as a means of punishment of a "guilty" party does not make much sense. In addition, there is no way to hold accountable the head of state who is not affiliated with political parties and cannot run for reelection. Therefore, the ability of the electorate to choose among candidates and policies of identifiable political parties is seriously impeded in the system with the supra-party president.

Finally, the supra-party president, as a rule, does not have the strong consistent support of a parliamentary majority.[26] During principal conflicts between the executive and legislative powers, he/she tends to appeal directly to the population for support. The 1993 Russian referendum initiated by Yeltsin on confidence in the president and support of his policies, as well as Kuchma's threats in 1995 and 1996 to put first the Law on Power, and then the Ukrainian constitution on a referendum in order to break a stalemate with the Rada, are just several examples of such a "ruler-people" political style. The presidency that is not supported by political organizations and increasingly relies on a direct appeal to the people marginalizes political parties and hurts the development of civil society (Stepan and Skach, 1993, 20).

The "above-party" head of state is more likely to surface in the presidential regime with its mechanism of direct popular elections of the national leader.[27] Examples of Leonid Kuchma, Vladimir Putin, and Aleksandr Lukashenko, demonstrate that so far a support of a political organization is not a necessity for a successful presidential race in the post-Soviet nations that feature a powerful head of state. In other words, the institute of a directly elected presidentialism encourages greater personalism at the expense of party building (Mainwaring, 1990, 172). On the contrary, leaders of the executive branch in a parliamentary regime are directly dependent on their parties. Prime ministers have a strong interest in party building because "not being elected by popular vote, they necessarily have had lengthy party careers that have culminated in their selection as party leaders" (ibid.).

Therefore, presidentialism is potentially more damaging for institutionalization of the party system than parliamentarism, where the fate of the head of state, who is elected by the legislature, is dependent on support of political parties. However, even if a parliamentary system's assembly decides to elect a president who is not identified with any party, the importance of this political player and his/her influence on the party-system development is less significant than that of the head of state with vast powers.

* * *

Proposition 3. The presidential regime may increase the undue influence of extremist political parties. The zero-sum game in presidential systems raises the stakes of presidential elections. Presidential candidates in two-candidate races in multiparty systems cannot afford to ignore any more or less sign significant segment of population and, hence, may look for support from extremist parties. Accordingly, extremist organizations may ask for concessions favorable for them from the president as a reward for their support during elections.

* * *

Proposition 4. Bipolarized elections in a regime with a strong presidency reduce the weight of extremist political parties.

* * *

Let us analyze these two seemingly diametrically different propositions in more detail. In his article "The Perils of Presidentialism," which initiated the presidents versus parliaments debate, Juan Linz argues that the presidential regime may promote the growth of extremist political organizations. He explains, "One of the possible consequences of two-candidate races in

multiparty systems is that broad coalitions are likely to be formed . . . in which extremist parties gain undue influence. . . . One or more of them can plausibly claim to represent the decisive electoral bloc in a close contest and may make demands accordingly" (1990, 57–58). Scott Mainwaring develops this point, arguing that the existence of powerful extremist and antisystem organizations, which have some influence on the political leadership in the nation, contributes to further ideological polarization of political parties and, consequently, are less favorable to stable democracy. This is one of the reasons why multiparty democracies with intense ideological divisions have been more prone to breakdown (1993, 219–220).

This argument is challenged by Ezra Suleiman's study of the French presidentialism. He found that the introduction of the popularly elected president in the French Fifth Republic led to the consolidation and restructuring of the party system in this country. After 1962, the presidential regime helped to transform the highly fragmented political parties in the Fourth Republic to the party system that clearly manifested bipolar tendency. On the one hand, two major political currents, the Gaullists and the Left, composed of several separate parties, joined their forces and tended to support a single candidate for the president. On the other hand, in order to win elections and avoid alienating the major fragment of their electorate, they decided against any cooperation with extremist organizations. As a result, the weight of the extremist parties had been considerably reduced (Suleiman, 1994, 147–148).

Our three country cases with directly elected presidencies, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine, do not provide a definite answer that allows either to reject or to accept either of these two propositions. However, the following tentative observations about the nature of relationships between the presidency and extremist political organizations can be made:

1. Some presidential candidates in the nations under study attempted to appeal to a wider segment of the electorate and create the broadest possible coalition, including extremist political groups. As a reward for their support in elections, the extremist political parties tended to make certain demands. However, such demands were likely to be rejected by presidential candidates who were afraid to alienate their more moderate core supporters. In the December 1995 elections to the Russian Duma, voters faced an array of 43 political parties and coalitions, including more than 10 distinctly left and "patriotic" organizations. As a result of this split of the leftist-oriented electorate, only one contender, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, managed to overcome the 5 percent threshold of the party-list vote. After the parliamentary elections, the left-wing politicians had agreed that the left camp should nominate a single candidate to challenge Yeltsin in

the 1996 presidential contest. The CPRF leader, Gennadiy Zyuganov, was appointed as the candidate of "popular patriotic forces" at the fourth party conference in February 1996.[28] Within one month, more that 100 organizations, including the influential Agrarian Party, Rutskoy's Derzhava, Baburin's All-People's Union, and Ryzhkov's Power to the People movement, endorsed Zyuganov. However, one very important political current was missing in this group—orthodox antisystem Communists. The Communists-Working Russia-For the Soviet Union bloc, which in December 1995 had performed much stronger than expected, gaining 4.5 percent of the party-list vote, or over 3,137,000 individual votes, could provide the CPRF leader with much needed support. Zyuganov attempted to secure the backing of the orthodox Communists who had rejected him earlier as too moderate.[29] In response, the radical Russian Communist Workers Party announced that it would join Zyuganov's electoral bloc only if it proclaims its definite pro-Communist orientation. However, avoiding alienation of its more moderate core supporters, the CPRF declined this "offer," stating that Zyuganov's coalition "will not be weakened by the radicals' absence."[30]

2. Most presidential candidates in all three countries, while making efforts to attract the widest possible audience, had avoided, at least publicly, including extremist political parties in their electoral coalitions. Although during the 1991 presidential elections in Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk had carefully designed his centrist-oriented electoral campaign trying to secure backing from the left-leaning electorate and achieve consensus with the Right, he apparently was not seeking support from nor was he endorsed by die-hard Communists (Wilson, 1997b, 70–71). Three years later during the second postindependence presidential contest, the radical political organizations were also, in fact, marginalized by the leading candidates to the post of the head of state. Thus, the incumbent, President Kravchuk, who appealed to the national-conscious and Western-oriented electorate, was endorsed by major center-right and rightist political organizations except for several radical and extremist parties, including Stepan Khmara's Conservative Republican Party, the State Independence of Ukraine party.[31] Shortly before the elections, the authorities raided the headquarters of the paramilitary ultranationalist Ukrainian National Self-Defense Organization and arrested as many as 30 of its activists.[32] One of the possible explanations of this raid was to demonstrate to the public that the government actively opposed and fought extremist right-wing groups. During the 2004 presidential race Viktor Yushchenko distanced himself from Oleh Tyahnybok and his radical grouping after Tyahnybok made nationalist comments that could alienate centrist electorate.

3. Our three cases demonstrate that no radical or extremist political force visibly succeeded in increasing its undue influence as a result of lending its

support to the president during the electoral campaign. Thus, Zhirinovsky's LDPR, which indirectly supported Boris Yeltsin in the second round of the 1996 Russian presidential elections, asking its electors not to vote for the Communist candidate, did not receive publicly any rewards from the victorious president. The Ukrainian left- wing bloc, which had indirectly supported Kuchma in his presidential bid in 1994, also did not reap any fruits. On the contrary, President Kuchma, who gravitated toward the political right after his election, became a harsh critic and opponent of a left majority in the Verkhovna Rada. The Union of Poles in Lithuania, which was dominated by the former Communist *nomenklatura* and had backed Algirdas Brazauskas as a candidate for the Lithuanian presidency in the 1993 elections, did not seem to receive any visible tangible concessions from President Brazauskas during his rule. President Adamkus had not publicly favored radical rightist organizations that supported his presidential bid in 1998. These examples challenge Juan Linz's argument that a presidential regime may increase the undue influence of extremist and radical political parties.

4. Most presidential elections in the three countries had a distinctly bipolarized character. In some cases the bipolar tendency of the presidential contest was somewhat less evident (Russia in 1991 and Ukraine in 1991), in other cases (Lithuaniain 1993, 1997–1998, 2002; Russia in 1996; and Ukraine in 1994, 1999, 2004) such a trend appeared more prominently. As a rule, in these elections the voter faced a choice between candidates who appealed either to the right-of-center or left-of-center electorate. Leading contenders represented two principal ideological currents, which included an array of parties ranging from the political center to the Right (or Left). In parliamentary elections these parties, which often claimed to occupy the same ideological niche, would normally compete against one another. The majoritarian character of the presidential elections, though, forced them to cooperate with one another by forming two broad and loose electoral coalitions in order to secure a victory for their joint candidate.

If voters are not massed bimodally near the extremes, bipolar elections tend to marginalize the influence of the extremist political parties. In his classic *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Anthony Downs argues that electoral competition in a two-party system causes each party to move toward the political center. Such movement would occur because each party knows that extremists at its end of the scale are more likely to prefer it to the opposition, "since it is necessarily closer to them than the opposition party is. . . . As the two parties move closer together, they become more moderate and less extreme in policy in an effort to win the crucial middle-of-the-road voters, i.e., those whose views place them between the two parties" (1957, 116–117). For example, Boris Yeltsin and Gennadiy Zyuganov as well as Leonid Kuchma

and Petro Symonenko gravitated toward the center during the presidential race in 1996 in Russia and in 1999 in Ukraine respectively. Under these circumstances, an extremist party has two basic choices:

1. It can support the candidate who is ideologically closer to this organization because "it is always rational *ex definitione* to select . . . a lesser evil before a greater" (ibid., 119). It was the reason why the extremist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and Pamyat' backed Yeltsin in 1996, radical rightist groups supported Stasys Lozoraitis in 1993 and Valdas Adamkus in his three presidential races in Lithuania, the Ukrainian Communists with their allies indirectly endorsed Kuchma in 1994, radical nationalists organizations backed Kuchma in 1999 and Yushchenko in 2004, and Natalia Vitrenko's Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine was behind Viktor Yanukovych in 2004.

2. It can also refuse to vote for the ideologically closer candidate if he/she moved too far from the end and the extremist party becomes disgusted with his/her newly acquired identity. This suggestion helps to explain why the radical Russian Communist Workers Party declined to support Zyuganov in the 1996 presidential elections in Russia. In any case, whether the extremist party decides to throw its support behind the candidate who moves closer to the political center in a bipolar presidential election, or refuses to vote for such an aspirant, it is more likely to become marginalized and its political influence to decrease.

The analysis of the three post-Soviet cases with the directly elected presidencies shows the hypothesis that a presidential regime may increase the undue influence of extremist political parties (*Proposition 3*) has no evidence to support it. At the same time, these cases back the argument that the bipolarized elections in a presidential regime tend to reduce the weight of extremist political parties (*Proposition 4*).

* * *

Proposition 5. In countries with multiple and fragmented political parties, the impetus to coalesce for presidential competition may contribute to a consolidation of the party system. (Shugart and Carey, 1992, 32)

* * *

The bipolar character of the presidential elections, mentioned in the analysis of *Proposition 4*, forced left-of-center and right-of-center political parties in Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine to cooperate with one another and consolidate their forces in two broad electoral blocs in order to achieve a victory for

their joint presidential candidate. A logical continuation of this argument is *Proposition 5*, which states that the collaboration of political parties during the presidential campaign may lead to a long-term cooperation among them between electoral cycles, as well as a possible merger of some organizations under the same roof, and, as a result, a higher level of consolidation and institutionalization of the party system as a whole. Immediate postelectoral developments in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine seem to provide some support for this hypothesis. Thus, within one month after the 1996 elections in Russia, the largest political organizations that supported Zyuganov's presidential bid used the "uniting" momentum and formed a left-wing umbrella movement called the Popular Patriotic Bloc of Russia (NPSR). The new organization excluded the most radical representatives of the "irreconcilable" opposition (e.g., Viktor Ampilov, Viktor Tyulkin, Stanislav Terekhov). By stressing nationalism rather than socialism and depicting the Communist Party as only one of many groups in the NPSR, it appealed to those who opposed Yeltsin but were reluctant to identify with Communists.[33] An attempt to unite was also made by some supporters of President Yeltsin. In the fall of 1996, seven groups that backed the incumbent head of state in elections, including Yegor Gaidar's Democratic Russia's Choice and Irina Khakamada's Common Cause, formed a "liberal coalition."[34] In addition, radical groups of orthodox Communists who refused to vote for Zyuganov also created a new movement called Communist and Socialist Forces of Russia.[35]

The subsequent fate of these postelectoral alliances was more problematic. The main incentive, a joint presidential candidate, that kept different political groups together within one coalition was gone and significant ideological differences between, for example, the nationalist and Communist wings in Zyuganov's coalition, became wider and more obvious. The "popular patriotic" bloc suffered several major blows that resulted in the split of Baburin's All-People's Union and the mainstream Communist Party in 1998. Yegor Gaidar's "liberal coalition" fared even worse; it became, in fact, defunct soon after its formation.

In Lithuania, an alliance of center-right and rightist political parties and movements that supported Stasys Lozoraitis in his 1993 presidential bid against the LDDP leader, Algirdas Brazauskas, proved to be more stable and long-lasting. In November 1992, shortly after the first post-Soviet legislative elections, a number of right-wing political organizations, including Sajudis and the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party, created the Tevynes Santara (Homeland Concord) parliamentary coalition and signed a pledge to cooperate in the Seimas.[36] In February 1993, Tevynes Santara backed the presidential candidate, Stasys Lozoraitis, who was nominated by centrist parties.[37] Although Lozoraitis lost to Brazauskas, the presidential elections brought the parties of the right-wing coalition closer together. In May 1993, several members of the Tevynes Santara (Sajudis, the Citizen's Charter, the Union of Political Prisoners), which had a long record of mutual cooperation, merged into one party, the Homeland

Union/Lithuanian Conservatives (TS/LK), the most influential center-right political organization in postindependence Lithuania. To continue the movement toward the further consolidation of the party system, the TS/LK developed very close working relations with other major members of Tevynes Santara, the Christian Democrats, and the Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees, which eventually led to the merger of the three organizations into one political party before the 2004 elections. Some observers of Lithuanian politics argue that this country developed, in fact, a two-party system (i.e., the TS/LK and its allies versus the Social Democratic Coalition formed around Algirdas Brazauskas).

What were the reasons for the stability of the Lithuanian right-wing coalition in comparison to the postelectoral alliances in Russia? First, the Lithuanian Tevynes Santara bloc faced a challenging situation when the leftist president was supported by an absolute parliamentary majority that belonged to the presidential party. In order to be a coherent and effective opposition to the LDDP government, the parties of the Right were forced to coordinate their activities with each other and learn how to reach a compromise. In Russia, where antipresident forces controlled an overwhelming majority of seats in the Duma, the opposition could more easily upset Yeltsin's attempts to master parliamentary support on major legislative issues. Second, unlike the Russian regime with the superpresidency and weak parliament, the Lithuanian Seimas is an important political player with considerable influence over the decision-making and policy-implementing mechanism in this Baltic country. Therefore, the institutional design of the Lithuanian political system with its strong parliamentary element provides a greater incentive for the opposition groups to coordinate their activities in the legislature.

The analysis of the post-Soviet nations with the popularly elected presidency shows that in these countries with fractionalized political parties, the impetus to coalesce for bipolar presidential competition has a positive effect on the consolidation of the party system. Such an effect, though, tends to be short-termed, since ideological and policy differences among heterogeneous member-parties of a loose preelectoral presidential coalition are likely to broaden with time. However, if a president enjoys solid parliamentary support in a political regime with a relatively strong assembly, then the need to keep a predominant political party (or parties) in check may serve as a powerful incentive for a political opposition to expand the postelectoral momentum toward developing a long-term cooperation among members of the oppositional coalition.

* * *

CONCLUSION

A growing body of literature on the presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate has produced a variety of arguments on the role of institutional factors in the process of transitions to democracy. In this chapter, I discussed some of

these arguments in the light of the relationships between the type of government and the development of the party system in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine. My analysis is backed by the empirical evidence from the five post-Soviet countries.

First of all, reiterating what has been already repeated many times, I have to emphasize that political institutions do matter. The type of government—presidential, parliamentary, or some combination of both—has a strong impact on the process of institutionalization of the political party system in transitional countries in numerous ways. I concur with a mainstream argument within the presidents versus parliaments debate that presidentialism is less conducive to the development of the party system and democratic stability in general.

Since presidents are elected by direct popular vote, this type of regime is prone to produce a head of state who is not identified with any political party. The "above-party" president who portrays him/herself as a representative of the whole nation encourages personalism at the expense of institution building and, as a result, causes a relatively low level of political institutionalization. Since the executive branch in a parliamentary regime depends on political parties, prime ministers have a strong interest in party building.

I concur that the strength of the presidency varies inversely with the strength of the party system. A presidency that is granted strong political powers hampers the development of the party system. A powerful president tends to shift the principal decision-making mechanism to bodies directly subordinate and responsible only to the head of state. The increasing imbalance between a strong presidency and weak parliament further diminishes the role of the legislature and political parties. In addition, the introduction of regional presidential representatives who are not accountable to the local representative bodies impedes the development of party organizations on the local level.

The combination of these factors, which resulted in an extremely powerful supra-party presidency with undisciplined parliamentary parties, negatively affects the process of political institutionalization in the two Slavic states: Russia and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine. At the same time, in the Baltic nations, where the executive branch is formed by a victorious political party or parties on the basis of electoral results and the presidential powers are restricted by a constitution and in practice, the party systems achieved a significantly higher degree of political institutionalization.

In addition to the deserved criticism of presidentialism, my analysis also shows that not all accusations made in the literature against this type of regime are supported by empirical evidence. Thus, the argument that the presidential system may increase an undue influence of extremist political organizations is not supported by any of our three cases with the popularly elected heads of state. On the contrary, similarly to the French Fifth Republic, the Russian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian examples show that the

bipolarized presidential elections tend to reduce the weight of extremist political parties.

The analysis of the post-Soviet nations with the directly elected presidents also demonstrates that in the countries with multiple and fragmented political parties, the impetus to cooperate during the bipolar presidential elections may contribute to a consolidation of the party system. However, such an effect may not last because ideological differences among diverse parties that formed a loose preelectoral presidential coalition are likely to broaden with time.

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CHAPTER 9

Political Consequences of the Post-Soviet Electoral Systems

In September 1993, at a meeting with representatives of political parties and social movements shortly before the national elections to the Russian parliament, President Boris Yeltsin proposed the introduction of some changes in the electoral legislation that would favor political parties. Yeltsin welcomed enhancing the role of parties in his address, because he preferred "the communists and national-patriots to stand for elections rather than on the barricades."[1] The author of these words, who ordered tanks to fire upon the Russian parliament the next day, can justifiably be accused of hypocrisy. However, this project is not about the morality of politicians. My research explores relationships between electoral laws and institutionalization of the party system; the Russian president made an important claim that is directly relevant to this topic. Yeltsin referred to an electoral system as a determinative factor of the development of the political party system and regime stability in general. Does an electoral system really matter? The electoral results in a democratic country are nothing more than a statistical inventory of party and/or candidate preferences. Only when the votes have been translated into seats can the election lead to a distribution of power. Since the rules of translating votes cast by the electors into seats in the national legislature can be arranged differently depending on the electoral system, a selection of a particular formula might generate far-reaching outcomes. A growing body of literature on political consequences of electoral laws agrees that any decision about "the most easily manipulable feature of a political system" (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, 4) may affect many important issues, including the process of political institutionalization and the nature of the party system.[2]

Since 1985, when Arend Lijphart described the field of electoral studies as "the most underdeveloped subject in political science," quite a few insightful cross-national comparisons have been published on this topic (Riker, 1982, 1986; Sartori, 1986, 1994; Duverger, 1986; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1990, 1994, 1999; Cox, 1997; Katz, 1997; Farrel, 2001; Norris, 2004). Many of these investigations explore the effect of different electoral arrangements on political parties, including the proliferation of the party system and political stability in general. Such studies of the political consequences of electoral laws have made an important contribution to the advancement of our knowledge about the causal relationship between the electoral model, party system, regime stability, and democracy. The empirical material for nearly all of these projects is drawn primarily from stable institutionalized democratic regimes with highly developed party systems. Until fairly recently, most publications on the subject, which appeared in the West, failed to investigate the political effects of electoral rules and procedures in transitional societies, particularly in post-Communist nations. Those relatively few studies that do deal with the political consequences of electoral laws in East European and post-Soviet countries have concentrated either on the origins of new voting systems, their influence on fragmentation of party systems, or degree of proportionality (Kukorelli, 1991; Vinton, 1993; McGregor, 1993; Gabel, 1995; Filippov and Shvetsova, 1995; Gebethner, 1996; Geddes, 1996; Simon, 1997). While these topics are undoubtedly important for electoral studies, the old scheme of the electoral debate was automatically applied to the new political setting. Moreover, the scope of these projects is narrow—almost all of them focus on a single nation.

The most recent work by John Ishiyama, Robert Moser, Sarah Birch, Grigorii Golosov, Misa Nishikawa, Erik Herron, and other scholars, which draw on the empirical data from the transitional countries of the former Soviet Union, convincingly demonstrate that these nations are different from the advanced Western democracies in several important ways making a mechanical transformation of traditional research agenda within the PR versus majority debate to new political conditions less useful. Some of these instrumental differences are a lack of well-developed political parties in post-Communist countries at the present time and the complete absence of a competitive party system, which is a necessary attribute of any democratic polity, not long ago. Since a successful consolidation of a democratic regime requires an autonomous and stable political party system, the critical issue of the electoral debate in the post-Soviet countries is the relationship between the electoral model and the development of a meaningful party system.

How do electoral laws influence institutionalization of political parties and party systems? What electoral arrangements are more favorable for the fastest, safest, and least painful establishment of the institutionalized party

system? What electoral system is more conducive to the creation of strong political parties that would become an influential group of players in the national political arena in the shortest possible time? What is the most efficient way to create boundaries of the party system in order to limit political influence of small organizations in the society and parliament, encourage the fusion effect in the party system, and prevent the penetration of new organizations into the system? Cross-national comparative studies of the former republics of the Soviet Union using the most similar cases design could provide insightful answers to these questions.

* * *

ELECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE BALTIC STATES, RUSSIA, AND UKRAINE

Before we proceed to a discussion of the political implications of electoral laws in the five post-Soviet nations, a brief overview of the most important aspects of their postindependence electoral systems is necessary.

ESTONIA

Estonia was the first among former Soviet republics that "determined to rid itself quickly of the vestiges of Soviet institutions and power structures" (Bungs, 1993c). Estonia had become the only republic within the USSR that rejected the traditional Soviet two-ballot majority system in single-member districts for the elections to the republican legislature that took place in 1990. Instead, one year before the breakup of the Communist empire, this nation employed the single transferable vote formula.[3]

The Estonian electoral system, which was used with fairly insignificant changes for all four cycles of postindependence elections, was criticized for being "needlessly complex." The election law, passed in April 1992, mixed "Finland, Germany, and unique divisors" (Taagepera, 1995, 329) and combined three rounds of vote counting.[4]

New versions of the Estonian electoral model, revised before every electoral cycle, introduced mostly minor changes to the voting mechanism, leaving all its principal elements intact. For example, in 1992 voting took place in twelve electoral districts with magnitudes ranging from five to thirteen. In 1995, the number of districts was reduced to eleven with magnitudes seven to twelve. The 2003 contest was again conducted in twelve constituencies. Political implications of an important innovation introduced before the third post-1991 race—a ban on electoral coalitions—will be discussed later in this chapter. To summarize the most essential characteristics of Estonia's electoral

arrangements, we can note that this is a moderate PR system with medium-size electoral districts and a 5 percent voting threshold.[5]

LATVIA

Preserving the historical continuity and traditions of the interwar republic, Latvia restored not only its original constitution, Satversme, but also many main provisions of the parliamentary election law of 1924. In October 1992, the Latvian Supreme Council passed the Law on Elections of the Fifth Saeima. Along with preservation of the general framework of the interwar electoral procedure, several important changes directed mostly against the proliferation of political parties, for example, the introduction of the electoral threshold, have been made. The territory of the country was divided into 5 electoral constituencies with district magnitude varying from 14 in Kurzeme to 26 in Vidzeme. Electors voted for party lists of candidates but after selecting one of the proposed ballots, they could also affect the order of contestants on that specific slate. The voter had the right to mark the name of either the preferred candidate or the one that he or she did not want. Only those political parties that had obtained at least 4 percent of the national vote gained parliamentary seats. Within each party list, the order of contestants was rearranged in order to reflect the actual preferences of the voters.

Shortly before the second postindependence race, on May 25, 1995, the Saeima approved a new law regarding its election. Although the new legislation introduced several important innovations to the electoral rules, it essentially copied the voting procedure of the founding contest. Among the most significant changes were the increase of the electoral threshold and exclusive authorization of political parties or their alliances to participate in elections (see below). A reapportionment of electoral constituencies to reflect population shifts since the previous legislative elections did not change main elements of the Latvian electoral system for the 2002 race. Therefore, similarly to Estonia, Latvia also adopted a moderate proportional representation formula combined with a medium-range district magnitude and a 5 percent electoral barrier.[6]

LITHUANIA

On July 9, 1992, the Lithuanian parliament passed the Law on Elections to the Seimas that introduced a mixed majoritarian/PR electoral system. The elections took place in 71 single-member constituencies and one multimember district with 70 parliamentary mandates. A total of 141 Seimas members were chosen. In single- member districts (SMDs), members of parliament were elected by the majority run-off formula. To win in the first ballot, a candidate had to obtain at least 50 percent plus 1 of the valid votes, and turnout should exceed 40 percent. If no candidate had won an outright majority, the

top two finishers met in the second round, with the contender who received more votes being elected. The double-ballot rule was changed to the plurality formula by the third postindependence race. The remaining 70 MPs were elected on the basis of a proportional system according to the number of votes received by each political organization in one nationwide district. Only party lists that had obtained at least 4 percent of the national vote were eligible to share in the proportional distribution of the parliamentary seats. Two organizations representing national minorities, the Lithuanian Union of Poles and Concord of Lithuania, were not required to overcome the 4 percent barrier but only to win the number of votes sufficient to elect 1 deputy under the proportional system, or roughly 2 percent of the national vote (Girnius, 1992).

On June 27, 1996, before the second post-1991 contest, the Seimas adopted a new version of the parliamentary election law. The principal electoral arrangements, that is, mixed majority/PR system where 71 MPs were elected in single-member districts and the remaining 70 candidates in one nationwide constituency, remained unchanged from its original form. At the same time, several important revisions to the electoral system were made. The minimum share of votes needed to win seats in PR voting was raised to 5 percent for single political parties, and a new 7 percent electoral threshold was introduced for electoral coalitions. The privileges for national minority parties were also abolished. In addition, similarly to the Latvian case, a rating system that enabled voters to express their negative or positive opinion for one or more candidates in a party list was introduced. These ratings were to be weighed by the Chief Electoral Commission against the rankings submitted by the political parties to determine which candidates win seats in the Seimas.[7] Although in contrast to Latvia, party "pre-ranking" of candidates "did factor in the selection of MPs, voters' preference significantly constrained parties' control over candidates' ranking" (Pettai and Kreuzer, 1999, 177). Other modifications to electoral rules disallowed political movements and interest groups from submitting party lists in the multimember districts. Since 1996, the right to participate in the PR election belongs exclusively to political parties.[8]

RUSSIA

The debates over the nature of the electoral law, which took place in 1992–1993 in Russia, were arbitrarily resolved by President Yeltsin's Decree on Election of State Duma Deputies signed on October 1, 1993. The decree established a mixed PR/plurality electoral system and laid down the basic rules that regulated all four cycles of post-1991 elections to the lower house of the Russian Federation. Half of the seats to the State Duma, which has a total of 450 seats, were elected from single-member constituencies according to the first-past-the-post formula. The remaining 225 deputies to the lower chamber were chosen on a proportional basis in the multimember nationwide

district. In order to prevent the proliferation of small political organizations, the election law imposed a 5 percent threshold on the party-list system.

After a renewed battle over the electoral system between the State Duma, the Federation Council, and the president on the eve of the 1995 elections, the legislature approved a new version of the election law in June 1995. Despite the heated and occasionally confrontational nature of the debates over the new electoral system, no significant changes in the electoral arrangements were introduced in the new bill. In fact, all essential elements of the Russian voting model set up by Yeltsin's decree remained unchanged until 2003–2004, when the electoral system in the Russian Federation underwent a major overhaul.

Perhaps the most significant innovation introduced in 1995 was a provision that most of the candidates included in the party list should represent not Moscow but other regions of the country.[9] To enforce this rule, only 12 of the party's leaders were allowed to be included in the federal part of the electoral list (in 1999 this number was increased to 18 candidates), while the remaining deputies were to represent Russia's regions. In short, Russia, as well as Lithuania, established a mixed majority/PR electoral system for all cycles of the post-1991 elections (run-off formula in1992 and 1996 and plurality in 2000 in Lithuania, plurality in Russia). The proportional representation part in both countries may be characterized as moderate to extreme because it combines a high-magnitude multiseat nationwide district and a relatively high electoral threshold.

UKRAINE

Among our five cases Ukraine was the only country that retained an obsolete Soviet-type electoral system for its founding elections. On November 10, 1993, the "Communist Zoo," as Seghiy Holovaty called the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet formed in 1990,[10] adopted the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine. Four hundred and fifty deputies were elected in single-member constituencies according to the absolute majority run-off formula. In order for elections to be valid in any given constituency, the electoral law imposed 2 tough hurdles: 50 percent plus 1 of the eligible electorate had to vote, and 50 percent plus 1 vote was required for eventual victory.[11]

On October 22, 1997, the Verkhovna Rada followed the example of several other post-Communist countries and changed the Ukrainian electoral legislation, introducing a mixed plurality/PR system. New electoral arrangements were employed for the two consecutive postindependence elections to the national assembly that took place in 1998 and 2002. Two hundred and twenty-five members of the Ukrainian parliament were chosen in single-member districts according to the first-past-the-post formula. The remaining 225 deputies were elected in a nationwide constituency by a party-list vote. Only those lists of political parties that received over 4 percent of the national vote were eligible for parliamentary representation in the proportional distribution of seats.

After the 1998 race the Rada and President Kuchma engaged in a bitter battle over the new version of the electoral model, which lasted for several years. An effort of the two largest parliamentary parties, the CPU and Rukh, to introduce a complete PR system and an attempt of the president to restore a complete SMD formula resulted in a new electoral bill, which preserved all significant elements of the voting system employed for the 1998 elections to the Rada.[12] In December 2004, at the peak of the Orange Revolution and shortly before the end of Kuchma's presidential term, the parliament prevailed; as a part of the constitutional compromise the Rada has passed the bill introducing a full proportional representation for elections of the national legislature with a 3 percent threshold.

* * *

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

This chapter's purpose is to analyze the underlying assumptions about the relationship of the electoral laws and the development of the party system in the post-Soviet states. In the following discussion, I generate a set of propositions about the political consequences of electoral laws in transitional countries derived from the general literature on the subject, and then analyze the validity of these propositions on the basis of the empirical evidence from the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine.

* * *

Proposition 1. The simple majority system with second ballot favors multi-partism.

* * *

Proposition 2. At the time of transition the majoritarian electoral arrangements restrain political institutionalization and hamper the development of the political party system.

* * *

Proposition 3. In a transitional nation, "the use of single-member districts tends to magnify the seat share of the largest party" creating de facto the dominance of one large party.

* * *

Obviously, *Proposition 1* is a part of the famous Duverger's hypothesis (1963). *Propositions 2* and *3* have been advanced by Sarah Birch (2005) in

her study of the relationship between single-member districts electoral arrangements and the party system in transitional countries. Besides, *Proposition 2* found some support among other scholars.[13] Before we proceed to the discussion of these three hypotheses, it must be acknowledged that the empirical basis for the present analysis of the double-ballot majoritarian system is extremely limited, $N = 1$. Since Ukraine was the only nation among the five countries under study that employed an entirely majoritarian model for its postindependence parliamentary elections in 1994, my analysis of the relationship between this type of electoral formula and the party system is based exclusively on the Ukrainian case. For reasons discussed in chapter 2, the 1990 elections to the republican Supreme Soviets in Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine cannot be considered truly competitive multiparty contests. Therefore, the 1994 elections to the Rada serve as a sole testing ground for the three propositions. I believe that the present discussion is important for better understanding of the genetic and early development stages of the Ukrainian party system. However, it would be a mistake to generalize about the double-ballot SMD model based on a single and rather atypical case of first postauthoritarian elections in the conditions of a high level of uncertainty.

The 1993 electoral law that regulated the founding elections in Ukraine was called "Byzantine" and "archaic." I agree with these epithets. Indeed, more than 50 years ago Maurice Duverger wrote that the simple majority double-ballot system "is in fact an old method which is little used nowadays" (1963, 239). Most of the democratic nations that had employed this voting model at some point in the past abandoned it at the beginning of the twentieth century. At the turn of the twenty-first century, this system is abundant only in the world of authoritarian states including post-Soviet nations that established nondemocratic regimes.[14]

Another distinguishing characteristic of the electoral system used for the 1994 elections to the Rada was its distinctly antiparty nature. The Ukrainian electoral engineers designed an electoral law that was conspicuously biased against political parties. This law created favorable conditions for the nomination and registration of independent candidates and representatives of the informal party of power, on the one hand, and weakened the electoral function of political organizations and restrained the development of the national party system, on the other hand.

For example, under the 1993 election law, a candidate could be nominated by one of the following three groups: an undefined "workers' collective," informal "group of voters," and a registered regional branch of a political party. To nominate a candidate by a political party was strikingly more complicated than by a group of coworkers or independent electors. Article 23 that

regulated the nominating procedure stated,

> In order for voters to nominate a candidate for deputy, no less than 10 voters of a given electoral constituency who reside within the boundaries of an electoral constituency in which the candidate is nominated, must sign an application
>
> In order for the labor collective to nominate a candidate for deputy an application on behalf of the collective must be signed by a person authorized for that by a meeting or conference, which nominates a candidate. . . .
>
> In order for a meeting (conference) of a regional branch of the party to be valid, no less than two-thirds of the party membership of the regional branch of the party or delegates, elected to participate in a conference and which belong to the appropriate regional branch if it has no less than 100 members of the party, must participate in the meeting. The conference must have no less than 50 delegates. A party nominating a candidate for deputy shall enclose with the application: (1) an extract from the minutes of the meeting (conference) of the regional party branch; (2) a list of 100 party members which belong to the appropriate regional branch.[15]

The U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe pointed out that Ukrainian parties had to submit 30 different items of information dealing with the nomination of candidates to the Verkhovna Rada, while groups of voters and labor collectives only required 8 items and 1 document respectively.[16] A much simpler procedure for the nomination of a candidate by a group of 10 voters or unspecified number of coworkers forced many members of political parties to choose one of these methods of entering into the electoral race. Although contestants named by labor collectives or groups of voters could choose to indicate their party affiliation on the ballot, easy nonparty nomination rules resulted in a proliferation of independent candidates: three out of four ran on a nonparty ticket. This had the effect of confusing many electors (Arel and Wilson, 1994a, 9–10) and further impeded the principle of the priority of political parties in the electoral process in a democratic regime.

In addition to a subjective antiparty bias purposefully designed by the Ukrainian electoral engineers for the 1994 elections, the majoritarian system in a transitional nation with an underdeveloped party system creates inevitably both mechanisms of hindering political institutionalization and a favorable environment for nonaffiliated candidates to compete for seats in the national assembly. Sarah Birch gives a good explanation of this phenomenon: "[B]ecause they focus on electoral strategy in relatively small districts, single-member systems encourage candidacies by small groups of political entrepreneurs; candidates only have to organize in one district to have a chance of representation. This basic fact provides a strong incentive for independents to run" (2005, 285–286).[17] Robert Moser seconds this

claim: "Single-member districts allow individual candidates with name recognition and financial resources to find success regardless of party affiliation" (1999b, 377). The outcomes of the 1994 electoral contest to the Ukrainian legislature provide a strong empirical support for this argument. The first round of the Rada elections held in March–April 1994 returned 64.5 percent of nonaffiliated members of parliament. A repeat election several months later produced a record high share of independents—86.4 percent.

As can be seen, the results of the majoritarian elections to the Ukrainian national legislature lend their full support for *Proposition 2*. However, *Proposition 3*, which states that the SMD systems in transitional nations tend to create single-party dominant majorities, is rejected. Sarah Birch writes that at the beginning of democratization newly emerged parties are "often underinstitutionalized . . . poorly organized, poorly resourced, inexperienced in mass mobilization and have weak links with distinct sectors of mass electorate. Under these circumstances, the authoritarian successor party may well be the only electoral contender in a position to benefit from the 'large party effect' characteristic of single-member systems, even if its overall level of support is modest" (2005, 286). Although this is an accurate description of the early postindependence political reality in Ukraine, the threat of the all-powerful majority of the authoritarian successor party, the CPU, after the 1994 elections to the national legislature failed to materialize.

Table 9.1 compares vote and seat shares in post-Soviet nations in the founding elections. Though these results have no statistical significance, they help in understanding the extent of an antiparty bias of the SMD system employed in Ukraine in 1994. In comparison to other nations that emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, all of whom used either PR or mixed electoral models in the first postindependence elections, the largest party in Ukraine obtained a significantly smaller share of both votes and seats: 12.72 percent and 25.40 percent respectively.[18] The same indicator for post-Soviet countries with the mixed formulas was 31.97 percent and 43.23 percent. Proportional representation countries produced 32.53 percent and 39.52 percent respectively.

Ukrainian electoral statistics differ drastically from comparable aggregate data of other nations that employed the SMD systems in their first transitional election. The mean proportion of votes and seats won by the largest party in such nations constitutes 43.38 percent and 56.23 percent correspondingly (Birch, 2005, 289). Another important indicator of a relative significance of the largest party is a difference between its proportion of votes and/or seats and the proportion of votes/seats won by the second largest party. Again, results of the 1994 elections to the Rada (7.57 percent and 19.48 percent) stand in drastic opposition to other countries (mean value 14.04 percent and 36.67 percent) (ibid.). Other former republics of the

Table 9.1 Mean Seat and Vote Shares in the Legislature after the First Postindependence Elections

Outcomes of First Post-Soviet Elections	Majoritarian System ($n = 1$)[1]	Mixed Systems ($n = 4$)[2]	Proportional Representation Systems ($n = 3$)[3]
Mean proportion of seats won by the largest party	25.40%	43.23%	39.52%
Mean difference between the proportion of seats won by the largest party and the proportion won by the second largest party	19.48%	31.54%	18.94%
Mean proportion of votes won by the largest party	12.72%	31.97%	32.53%
Mean difference between the proportion of votes won by the largest party and the proportion won by the second largest party	7.57%	17.41	16.61
Mean ratio of seat shares to vote shares for the largest party	2.00	1.32	1.22

Notes

[1] Ukraine, 1994.

[2] Armenia I, 1995; Armenia II, 1999; Lithuania, 1992; Russian Federation, 1993.

[3] Estonia, 1992; Latvia, 1993; Moldova, 1994.

Sources: Birch (2005, Appendix A). All available post-Soviet nations are included. Table 9.1 based on Birch (2005, Table 2, 289).

Soviet Union also demonstrated considerably greater values of the gap between two leading contestants than their southern Slavic neighbor: 17.41 percent and 31.54 percent for the mixed electoral model countries and 16.21 percent and 18.94 percent for the PR nations.

The outcomes of the Ukrainian elections should not be interpreted in a way that the SMD system in this nation has not produced a tendency to create an overlarge majority of the largest political party in the national legislature. The last row in table 9.1 shows that such a trend did exist. The ratio of seat shares to vote shares in Ukraine's first transitional election had a very high value of 2 in comparison to the means of both the post-Soviet nations (1.22 for PR and 1.32 for mixed systems) and other countries of the world with majoritarian models (1.37) (ibid.). However, the tendency toward one-party dominance in Ukraine was severely suppressed by the overall antiparty character of the 1993 Law on Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine.

Many studies of majoritarian systems emphasize that this electoral formula is conducive to "localism and constituency-centered politics" (Sartori, 1994, 57).

William Irvine found that "a seriously discrepant distribution of seats relative to the distribution of votes may give rise to regionalism as different blocks of voters come to feel that they are unable to have their views expressed in the national parliament" (1988, 25–26; see also McAllister and Rose, 1984). Giovanni Sartori also describes this troubling for efficient governing effect of the SMD system and argues that a well-institutionalized nationwide party system serves as one of the most effective barriers to "centrifugal and localistic pulls" of the majoritarian model (1994, 57–58). In chapter 4, I demonstrated that the geographical homogeneity of party electoral strength is different in the democratizing countries and stable democratic nations with the developed system of political parties. Most transitional countries feature "underdeveloped and/or incompletely nationalized" party systems that can hardly resist centrifugal tendencies of SMDs. To complete this vicious circle, an electoral system that does not encourage nationalization is likely to magnify party- system heterogeneity (Birch, 2005, 285). The situation was particularly grave in Ukraine in 1994. No doubt that along with historical and cultural cleavages in Ukrainian society, the single-member constituency voting model has greatly contributed to the highest variability coefficient of the party system demonstrated in Ukraine in the first postindependence elections in comparison to all other electoral contests in all five nations under analysis (see figure 4.1).

The 1993 Law on Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine that regulated the first postindependence elections to the Rada continued the traditional Soviet majority-based system with two ballots. A combination of subjective antiparty elements in this electoral bill and a "natural" antiparty bias inherent in the SMD system failed to facilitate the political integration of the Ukrainian society and stimulate the development of the nationalized party system. The Ukrainian version of the majoritarian model diminished the value of party identification and produced the amorphous legislature with a large number of deputies who were not affiliated with political parties. Such members of parliament were not bound by party discipline and often strived to please narrow interests of their constituencies or their own personal ambitions. The nonparty status of many deputies who either never joined any parliamentary faction or often changed their faction affiliation made the legislative policy-making process more difficult and hampered electoral identifiability and accountability of parliamentary factions and political parties in general. The majoritarian electoral arrangements employed for the founding elections in Ukraine did not contribute to the strengthening of the party system in this country. The antiparty nature of the Ukrainian electoral legislation was so powerful that, contrary to the expectations formulated in *Proposition 3*, it suppressed the creation of a

dominant one-party majority in the legislature that often causes a democratic breakdown.

* * *

Proposition 4. Proportional representation stimulates the development of the political party system in the post-Communist countries.

* * *

Both critics and advocates of the proportional representation model in the nations that emerged after the breakup of the Soviet Union recognize the weakness and fragility of the party system in these countries. However, they draw diametrically different conclusions from this observation. Opponents of PR hold that this electoral formula overemphasizes the importance and gives too much influence to numerous underdeveloped and small pseudo- and proto-parties. According to this view, the employment of party-list voting is premature because political parties are merely in their formative stage, lack a social base, and do not adequately represent any more or less significant group of voters on a broad scale.

Supporters of PR in post-Soviet countries agree with their political antagonists that parties are weak indeed. However, they argue that first to form influential parties and only then to hold party-based elections is akin to the idea to first "accomplish structural changes in the economy and bring about abundance of consumer goods, and only then to move to a market and private property."[19] It is a well-known thesis that strong and stable political parties are a vital element for the consolidation and normal functioning of a democratic society. The party-based electoral arrangements serve exactly this purpose—they boost opportunities of political parties to participate in elections, test their weight and the compatibility of their platforms with public interests. In other words, proportional representation generates the potential for enhancing the role of parties in the legislature and political system, and stimulates the development of the institutionalized party system. This seemingly self-evident statement deserves further elaboration.

It goes without saying that PR makes "party formation unavoidable" (Golosov, 2003, 913). By excluding independent candidates from meaningful electoral game de jure (Latvia) or de facto (Estonia), the MMD systems put political parties in the heart of the electoral process: "[T]he basic principle of proportional representation is that seats should be distributed among *parties*" (Blais and Massicotte, 2002, 65, emphasis in the original). This electoral model affects institutionalization of the party system in several important

ways. First, it legitimates the concepts of a political party and multiparty competition. Long years of the CPSU hegemony in the Soviet society discredited the very idea of a political party. The monopolistic Communist Party eliminated any notion of political competition and attempted to impose upon the Soviet populace increasingly dogmatic "omnipotent" Marxist-Leninist ideology. The closed and unaccountable decision-making mechanism within the CPSU did not contribute to its attempt to portray itself as the only legitimate institution that coherently represents all interests of the many-sided and complex Soviet society. A lack of public trust in the Communist Party was "mechanically" transferred to newly emerging alternative political organizations. New political parties suffered from a social allergy among the population to the very concept of "party." Numerous public opinion polls conducted in the five countries in the 1990s repeatedly revealed an extremely low level of public knowledge about and confidence in political parties.

By introducing party-based elections and admitting nascent political parties to participation in the electoral competition, the creators of the constitutional framework sent a clear signal to the public that political organizations are expected and encouraged to play an instrumental role in the emerging democratic political system. The framers showed their interest and support for the active participation of a wide variety of organized political groups in the formation of the legislative power, as well as the parties' consequent inclusion in the decision-making process. In other words, proportional representation has legitimized political parties and multiparty competition in the post-Communist transitional countries.

A party-list electoral mechanism contributes to the development of the organizational infrastructure of parties. During an electoral campaign, which is the peak of activities of political organizations, their opportunities to reach the electorate (e.g., via guaranteed free TV and airtime, financing from the state budget, etc.) are vastly expanded. On the eve of elections, parties intensify their efforts to recruit new supporters and extend the network of local organizations. Proportional representation in the post-Soviet nations encourages breaking down "psychological barriers to political activism and to party affiliation on the part of a population largely used to avoiding trouble by avoiding politics."[20] This electoral formula also helps to popularize political parties and disseminate information about them among the population. Thus, in order to make an informed choice, the conscious voter is forced to learn more about electoral competitors and get acquainted with the electoral programs of political parties running in the elections. PR advances the development of civil society in post-Communist states. People in these nations were forced to live within the official structures and rules of behavior developed by the party-state establishment. The increasing role of political parties

as a medium between the government authority and the general population helps to build the foundations of civil society in post-Soviet countries.

Unlike the SMD system that inhibits "the spread of parties in new areas by increasing the persistence of territorial and subcultural electoral strongholds" (Caramani, 2004, 228), the PR models promote nationalization of the party system. The larger the number of seats in the MMD the more incentives political parties have to appeal to the nationwide vote. Principles of seat distribution under proportional representation force all major parties to conduct a rigorous electoral campaign even in those areas where their candidates in single-member constituencies would not stand a single chance to win a race. Caramini is right: "the lowering of entry barriers caused by [PR] is considered to be an important incentive for parties to spread in all constituencies—including those where they are weak" (ibid.). After collecting a necessary number of ballots enabling a party to pass an electoral threshold, every additional vote whether it is gained in a traditional stronghold or in "ostracized" areas can make a difference. Among 18 electoral cycles covered by this analysis only 1 contest (Ukraine, 1994) was held under a SMD system. Without pretending to make a generalization, I should still emphasize that precisely this election produced by far the highest value of the variability coefficient: 1.150, followed by 0.892 in 1998 in Ukraine and 0.822 in 1992 in Lithuania (tables 4.1–4.5). It is not a coincidence that almost a one-fourth drop of the *CV* value between the two electoral cycles in Ukraine has happened simultaneously with the introduction of the PR element for the 1998 Rada elections.

* * *

Proposition 5. A mixed proportional representation/majoritarian electoral system combines principal elements of two different electoral models. The PR component tends to bolster the status of political parties, stimulate the development of the party system, and guarantee the more complete and fair representation of the distinctive interests of different social groups. The majoritarian formula, particularly its plurality variation, tends to constrain the fractionalization of a party system and secure the representation of regional interests.

* * *

Mixed electoral systems and their political consequences in the cross-national context have come to the close attention of the academic community for the first time only since the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the 1990s, many nations across the globe, including both advanced and new democracies, have adopted a variation of a mixed proportional representation/majoritarian system for elections to the national assembly. In fact, Louis Massicotte and

André Blais write that at the turn of this century about 30 countries, including 6 G-8 members and "totaling about one-fifth of the world's population, use mixed systems for elections of their first or single chambers" (1999, 341). Although five years after the publication of this article several nations including two G-8 members (Italy, Russia, as well as Ukraine) abandoned a mixed electoral system in favor of proportional representation, the number of countries that employ some combination of different electoral formulas for national legislative elections remains very high. The spread of the mixed electoral systems leads Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin Wattenberg to believe that an attempt to combine the best features of the dominant electoral models of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (majoritarian and PR respectively) may represent the major electoral reform of the new century.

Accumulation of the empirical electoral data has allowed scholars to conduct cross-cultural studies of mixed voting systems. A pioneering article, "Mixed Electoral Systems," by Louis Massicotte and André Blais (1999),[21] has made several major contributions to the development of this academic field. The authors proposed "a rigorous definition" of mixed systems, suggested their classification identifying five types of hybrids, and put a cross-national examination of mixed models on the research agenda in electoral studies. Afterward, a mushrooming collection of literature on mixed electoral systems focuses on several main topics: definition and typology of mixed models (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997; Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001; Nishikawa and Herron, 2004), voting and party campaign strategies (Moser and Scheiner, 2000; Klingemann and Wessels, 2001; Herron, 2002a), legislative behavior (Shugart, 2001; Herron, 2002b), and, of course, the impact of mixed models on the party system (Herron and Nishikawa, 2001; Moser, 2001a, 2001b; Kostadinova, 2002; Cox and Schoppa, 2002; Nishikawa and Herron, 2004; Moser and Scheiner, 2004).

A nation that employs a mixed electoral system may be expected to achieve what Shugart and Wattenberg call " 'the best of both worlds' ": "a multi-party system, but one in which most parties are aligned with one or two broad blocs such that voters can choose between potential center-left or center-right governments" (2001, 582). *Proposition 5* is formulated on the basis of the mainstream argument that, with some modifications, found abundant empirical support in the literature on the political consequences of electoral laws in advanced democracies. However, since the late 1990s this argument has been challenged by studies of electoral systems in the post-Soviet countries (Krupavicius, 1997; Moser, 1997, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b; Meleshevich, 1998, 1999; Shvetsova, 1999; Moser and Scheiner, 2004). These investigations of the transitional elections arrived at two important conclusions: (1) the argument based on the Duverger's postulates about the outcomes of electoral systems is not supported by empirical material from the

post-Soviet nations, the post-Communist societies are different from institutionalized democracies; and (2) contrary to expectations, the SMD elections in conjunction with proportional representation tend to promote multipartism and fractionalization of the party system.

Three post-Soviet nations, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, have adopted at some point of their postindependence development a mixed electoral formula for elections to their national assemblies. Many similar characteristics of all three models put them in the same category of mixed systems proposed in the literature. The main common feature of the voting models in Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine is the absence of any linkage between the SMD and PR tiers. "There are thus two sets of deputies, each elected under different rules. Both FPTP or majority and PR apply throughout the country, and operate independently of each other. Notably, PR seats are filled without any consideration of the results in single-member districts" (Massicotte and Blais, 1999, 349). Reynolds and Reilly (1997) call such a system "parallel," Massicotte and Blais (1999) "superposition," and Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) "mixed-member majoritarian." Whatever the name of this model is, the absence of linked tiers allows to treat both SMD and PR components as "two distinct electoral arrangements operating side by side" (Moser, 2001a, 21). Another common element of the Lithuanian, Russian, and Ukrainian voting systems is that the three nations conduct their PR race in only one MMD that equals the whole country.

Although more research is needed, perhaps it is no accident that three similar electoral systems produced some similar political effects. Thus, contrary to *Proposition 5* that (1) PR promotes more complete representation and, as a result, causes the fractionalization of party system; and (2) the majoritarian element tends to contain the proliferation of political parties, these two different electoral formulas had quite opposite consequences in the post-Soviet countries. In the Lithuanian, Russian, and Ukrainian cases, party-based voting tended to limit the number of parties with parliamentary representation. At the same time, the majority formula in conjunction with PR brought to the three national legislatures numerous representatives of small political parties contributing to party-system proliferation.

There are two reasons that help to explain why PR became a constraining factor in the proliferation of parliamentary political parties: the large number of parties that contested elections and a relatively high electoral threshold. As expected, the party-based voting in Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine had invited many political organizations to participate in elections and, as a result, led to the further fragmentation of the emerging party systems. However, the number of contestants that succeeded in overcoming an electoral barrier and gaining representation in the national parliament is significantly smaller. Table 9.2 compares the Laakso and Taagepera effective

Table 9.2 Effective Number of Electoral (*Nv*) and Parliamentary (*Ns*) Parties in the MMD in Postindependence Elections in Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine

Country	First Election			Second Election			Third Election			Fourth Election		
	Nv	*Ns*	*Nv*−*Ns*	*Nv*	*Ns*	*Nv*−*Ns*	*Nv*	*Ns*	*Nv*−*Ns*	*Nv*	*Ns*	*Nv*−*Ns*
Lithuania	4.12	2.85	1.27	8.0	3.41	4.59	5.59	3.58	2.01			
Russia	8.33	6.45	1.88	10.87	3.31	7.56	6.85	4.57	2.28	5.43	2.79	2.64
Ukraine				10.75	4.95	5.8	7.46	4.65	2.81			

Sources: Author's calculations based on data from the Central Electoral Committee of the Republic of Lithuania (www.vrk.lt); the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (www3.lrs.lt); the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine (www.cvk.gov.ua); Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (swww.rada.gov.ua); the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation (www.cikrf.ru); Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (www.duma.ru);and the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, Department of Government, University of Essex (www.essex.ac.uk/elections).

number of political parties index for the PR part of the postindependence elections held under the mixed formula in the three countries. The index is designed "to determine the number of parties in a party system taking into account each party's relative size" (Moser, 1995, 387), and can be calculated either on the basis of vote shares or seat shares.[22]

Table 9.2 shows striking differences between the effective numbers of electoral (*Nv*) and parliamentary (*Ns*) parties in the three nations. For instance, in the second post-1991 lections, the effective number of electoral parties in Lithuania was 8, in Russia 10.87, and in Ukraine 10.75, which indicates an extreme fractionalization of the national party system. At the same time, the value of *Ns* in the three countries is notably lower: 3.41 in Lithuania, 3.31 in Russia, and 4.95 in Ukraine. For comparison, Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart (1989) calculated the effective numbers of both electoral and parliamentary parties in 48 countries, "which had elections with some choice" in the first half of the 1980s. The median value of *Nv* for all 48 cases was 2.8, which is by far lower than in the three post-Soviet nations, and only one country (Ecuador, $Nv = 10.3$) demonstrated a result that came close to the Russian and Ukrainian cases. However, the effective number of parliamentary parties computed by Taagepera and Shugart was much closer to the pattern shown by the post-Soviet states. For *Ns* the median value was 2.4 and quite a few countries had the notably higher effective number of parliamentary parties than the three East European nations, for example, Belgium (7.0), Denmark (5.5), Finland (5.1), and Switzerland (5.3), etc. In their study, Taagepera and Shugart found that no country had more assembly parties than electoral parties. They argue that typically, an electoral system tends to reduce the number of parties by almost one half of a point ($Ns = Nv - 0.4$). Except for one "markedly deviating" case (India, 2.2), the largest reduction in the number of parties from votes to

seats level was 1.4. My study shows a drastically different pattern: the gap between the effective number of parliamentary and electoral parties in the post-Soviet countries is significantly wider than in Taagepera's and Shugart's cases. For instance, for the party-based part of the second postindependence elections the difference between the values of *Ns* and *Nv* was 7.6 in Russia, 4.6 in Lithuania, and 5.8 in Ukraine. With a single exception of the founding elections in Lithuania in 1992 ($Nv-Ns = 1.27$), all other electoral contests produced a much higher value of $Nv-Ns$ as calculated by Taagepera and Shugart. Such a significant difference between the effective numbers of electoral and parliamentary political parties in Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine supports my previous suggestion that the PR element of mixed systems in post-Soviet nations, particularly a combination of a high number of contestants and an electoral threshold have produced a mechanical effect causing the profound reduction of the number of parties with parliamentary representation.

The voting in single-member districts in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine also brought unexpected results. Contrary to the expectation that the SMD electoral arrangements would constrain the number of political organizations, a large number of representatives of small parties were elected to the national parliaments in the three countries. Robert Moser writes, "Single-member first-past-the-post elections are supposed to encourage pre-electoral consolidation of like-minded political forces into larger parties. Small parties are presumably punished for their inability to win a significant number of pluralities in individual districts. Consequently, they do not win sufficient representation to sustain existence or do not even bother to run candidates" (1995, 389). The electoral results in the single-member constituencies in our three cases provide empirical evidence that defies this argument. Many Lithuanian, Russian, and Ukrainian political parties and electoral blocs that failed to overcome the voting threshold in the party-list elections won numerous parliamentary seats in the majoritarian districts. Moreover, some of these electoral contestants were represented in the legislature by a group of MPs sufficient to form their parties' parliamentary factions. For example, in the 1995 elections to the Russian Duma 19 political organizations, which received less than 5 percent of the national vote in the multimember district, won parliamentary seats in the single-member constituencies. Overall, these electoral blocs achieved victory in 65 out of 225 electoral districts, which constituted 28.9 percent of the total number of parliamentary seats determined by individual races. The Agrarian Party took 20 seats; Russia's Choice and Power to the People, 9 seats each; the KRO, 5; Women of Russia, Forward, Russia! and the Bloc of Ivan Rybkin, 3 each; the Pamfilova-Gurov-V. Lysenko bloc, 2; and 11 other contestants won 1 parliamentary seat each. For comparison, four "grands" (i.e., the CPRF, LDPR, NDR, and Yabloko) that passed the electoral threshold prevailed in only 83 individual districts.

This scenario repeats itself in other post-1991 elections in the Russian Federation, but to a lesser extent. Thus, in addition to political parties that passed a threshold, the 2003 contest brought to the Duma 8 parties that won overall 32 seats in SMDs. Lithuania and Ukraine also demonstrated a similar pattern. In the 1996 elections to the Seimas, in addition to the 5 parties that gained more than 5 percent of the party vote nationwide, 9 political organizations won parliamentary seats in the single-member constituencies. Altogether, in November 1996, these parties gained 10 seats in the national assembly out of 71 contested seats in individual districts. In 2000, this number increased: 15 delegates (or 21.1 percent) of 9 parties without parliamentary representation in the MMD won SMD races. After the 1998 elections to the Ukrainian legislature, 20 political organizations won Rada seats including 8 contestants who were successful in the multimember district. Although 12 others failed to overcome the 4 percent electoral threshold, their representatives were victorious in 29 SMD races.

What explains the failure of the single-member majority/plurality districts in Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine to constrain the number of political parties with parliamentary representation? I argue that a mixed voting system that combines PR and majoritarian elements creates conditions that are favorable for the election of the leaders of minor political organizations to the national legislature from single-member districts. Many small parties that won one or two parliamentary seats in individual constituencies had been established shortly before the elections by well-known political figures as a personal vehicle that would bring them to power. Such political parties, which above all were closely identified with their leaders, lacked organizational infrastructure, regional support, and certainly did not have any realistic chances to take more than 5 percent of the national vote. However, these " 'temporary organizations' . . . that would not outlast election day" (Belin, 1996b, 16) gave their leaders an advantage in individual races in single-member constituencies. Laura Belin writes about the 1995 Russian elections to the Duma: "The electoral law guaranteed all registered parties free advertising time on state-owned radio and television. Moreover, every party on the ballot received 80 million rubles (about $18,000) to spend on the campaign. Many tiny parties that had to chance winning five percent of the vote registered merely to improve their leaders' chances in single-seat races. This strategy proved successful: Colonel-General Boris Gromov (My Fatherland), Konstantin Borovoi (Party of Economic Freedom), Irina Khakamada (Common Cause), Stanislav Govorukhin (Bloc of Stanislav Govorukhin), and former Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray (Party of Russian Unity and Accord) were all elected to the Duma in district races, even though none of their parties gained more than 1 percent of the party-list vote" (ibid.).[23]

The list of "generals without troops" in the Russian Duma can be continued and includes also Stanislav Fedorov (Party of Workers' Self-Management), Boris Fedorov (Forward, Russia!), Ivan Rybkin (Bloc of Ivan Rybkin), Ella Pamfilova and Vladimir Lysenko (Pamfilova-Gurov-V.Lysenko Bloc), etc. Parliamentary electoral results in Lithuania and Ukraine proved that this particular effect of a mixed PR/majority system is not limited only to Russia but occurred in other post-Soviet nations with similar electoral arrangements. For example, in the 1996 elections to the Seimas many leaders of political organizations that did not overcome the voting threshold won seats in single-member districts, including Stanislovas Buskevicius (Young Lithuania), Albinas Vaizmuzis (Peasant Party), Kazimiera Prunskiene (Women's Party), Rimantas Smetona (Nationalist Union), Kazys Bobelis (Christian Democratic Union), and Saulius Peceliunas (Democratic Party). Their mainly marginal political parties secured, nevertheless, a parliamentary seat for their leaders. Outcomes of other electoral cycles in the three countries proved that this is a typical scenario for post-Soviet politics with mixed electoral system.

Proposition 5, based on the findings of previous studies about political consequences of electoral laws, states that a mixed electoral system combines two different principles that tend to produce different effects. The PR element allows for the fragmentation of a party system, and the SMD formula tends to constrain the proliferation of political parties. Empirical evidence from three post-Soviet country cases, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine, which adopted mixed PR/majoritarian electoral systems, challenges this proposition. My findings show that because of a relatively high electoral threshold and the abundance of political organizations contesting elections, the party-based voting tends to reduce significantly the number of political parties with parliamentary representation in comparison to electoral parties. At the same time, the SMD element in conjunction with PR failed to promote the consolidation of a party system and brought to the parliaments in the three countries numerous representatives of marginal political organizations contributing to the fragmentation of the party system. This conclusion supports my criticism regarding the "mechanical" applicability of a Western perspective on electoral systems to post-Communist transitional societies. My analysis of the post-Soviet nations, which manifest a peculiar pattern of the relationship between electoral arrangements and the party system, shows that consequences of electoral systems in transitional countries should be studied in a different light from the advanced and stable democratic states.

* * *

Establishing Boundaries of the Party System

During the process of political institutionalization, the party system should develop effective mechanisms how to differentiate itself from its environment, drive out alternative organizations from a distinct social niche that belongs to parties in a democratic society, restrict the entry of new political groups into the system, and moderate their impact. In other words, the developed system of political parties has to establish clearly defined boundaries that would be relatively difficult to "cross" for newly emergent parties or nonparty formations. The rationale of the creation of boundaries is to contain the fractionalization of political parties, prevent the spread of small, "sofa-type" organizations, and advance the overall coherence of the party system. In the words of the founding father of the Russian electoral system, Viktor Sheinis, "[T]iny parties do not have the right to exist and the electoral law should encourage the formation of a few strong parties, just as wolves preserve a 'biological balance' by eating weaker animals."[24] Electoral arrangements is one of several possible ways to establish party system boundaries; others include the legislation on political parties, party financing, etc. Setting up the boundaries is a gradual process that, in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine, started essentially at the stage of designing their first postindependence electoral systems. In the founding elections, not only emerging political parties but also various social movements, electoral alliances, and other loose formations were allowed to field candidates. It realistically reflected the situation in these countries at the time: "[T]here was an abundance of small political parties and organizations but very few larger ones" (Bungs, 1993c).

After the founding elections, all five nations took certain measures against the proliferation of parties by gradually imposing requirements that were more rigid for new political organizations to enter the party system. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia pursued a more active and consistent policy in this area. The prewar electoral law to the Latvian parliament, which served as a foundation for the Law on Elections of the Fifth Saeima adopted in 1992, did not institute any electoral threshold. The nomination rules were very inclusive: any group of 100 voters could nominate a candidate to the Saeima. The first version of the 1992 Law on Elections of the Fifth Saeima, passed by the Latvian parliament in the first reading, established a 2 percent voting barrier. The threshold was raised to 4 percent in the final version of this legislative document. However, the provision that any 100 eligible voters had the right to file a candidate to the parliament has remained unchanged. Before the 1995 elections to the Saeima, the electoral barrier necessary to gain parliamentary representation was raised again from 4 to 5 percent of the national vote. New electoral legislation passed in May 1995 also changed the nominating procedure: only registered political parties or their alliances were allowed to field

candidates for the Saeima and participate in elections. In addition, in April 1995 Latvian legislators changed the registration rules for political parties. If the old law on political organizations allowed the official registration of parties with a membership of 10 persons, the new regulations required all political parties to re-register in the Justice Ministry and submit a list of at least 200 party members. Otherwise, their registration was annulled.

Shortly before the 1998 elections, the Saeima adopted amendments to the electoral law stipulating that political parties must receive at least 5 percent of the vote and alliances 7 percent in order to be eligible for parliamentary seats. These amendments, however, were later rejected by President Guntis Ulmanis.[25] The parliament also outlawed electoral alliances, at the same time allowing "political 'unions' among parties to field candidates during the October 1998 elections" (Pettai and Kreuzer, 1999, 178). As a result, the Latvian electoral regulations have de facto preserved *apparentements*, or an ability of political parties to file joint lists.

Since 1991 the Lithuanian electoral legislation has been gradually elevating the status of political parties as electoral agents. For example, Article 30 "Nomination of Candidates" of the Law on Elections to the Seimas used for the 1992 elections allowed loose and amorphous "public political movements" and electoral coalitions along with more disciplined political parties to participate in the national elections to the Seimas. In May 1994, the Seimas passed a controversial law on municipal elections that permitted only political parties and organizations to contest elections. Despite the presidential veto and protest from Lithuania's national minorities, which insisted on the inclusion of various social organizations in the electoral process, the law was eventually adopted without any changes. The new version of the Seimas election law adopted in 1996 reconfirmed the rule that only electoral contestants duly registered according to the Law on Political Parties and Organizations were able to nominate candidates in single-member and multimember districts. Article 37 of the new election bill also permitted individual self-nomination in the majoritarian constituencies. As has been discussed above, the new law has increased an electoral threshold from 4 percent of the national vote to 5 percent for parties and 7 percent for coalitions of parties. It has also removed a preferential threshold for entry to the Seimas established for ethnic minorities four years earlier.

Among the five countries Estonia conducts the most consistent and coherent policy of containing the proliferation of the party system. This policy includes several important elements, some of which do not exist in other four nations. The Law on Political Parties passed by the Riigikogu in May 1994 has imposed a very tough requirement for an official registration of a political party sharply raising the minimum required party membership from 200 to 1,000 persons. This is a significant number for "a country that has

only 770,000 adult citizens. In Latvia, the number is only 200, while in Lithuania it is 400" (Pettai and Kreuzer, 1999, 180) and in the Russian Federation is 10,000. For a comparison, the population size in the latter 3 nations is 1.7, 2.6, and 106.3 times higher than in Estonia. In addition, the Estonian party law contains several other provisions intended to discourage small parties. For example, if a party fails to win any parliamentary seats in two consecutive elections to the national legislature, its registration may be revoked. The law also obligates the government to provide financial support for political parties from the state budget. Since funds are distributed only among the parties with parliamentary representation according to the number of seats they hold in the Riigikogu, larger parties are the main beneficiaries.

On the eve of the 1999 elections the national legislature took another important step to strengthen the national party system. A steady tendency toward the multiplication of parliamentary factions forced the Riigikogu to outlaw electoral coalitions. In order to overcome a 5 percent threshold parties tended to form electoral alliances shortly before the Riigikogu race and then "split into separate parliamentary factions immediately after the election" (Fitzmaurice, 2001, 142). For example, when the parliament started in October 1992, it had seven official factions. The number of factions increased to nine by April 1994 and twelve after the second electoral contest in 1995. Despite a ban on coalitions, a number of parties found a loophole and presented "joint lists" for the 1999 elections. The Riigikogu reacted by closing this loophole: "Those who run together must stay together in the parliament or continue as independents," without material inducement that go to official factions (Grofman et al., 2000, 342). Estonia became the first and at the time of completion of the project the only post-Soviet nation that has ended *apparentements*.

A decision to ban electoral coalitions "brought many smaller parties face to face with the choice of either running alone (with the risk they might fall short of the constitutionally required five percent electoral threshold) or subsuming their candidates under the list of a larger party, thereby losing their identity" (Constitutional Watch, 1999). If a party, which attempts to preserve its identity and run alone, does not collect the necessary share of the vote to clear the threshold, then it is excluded from the state financial support and its registration may be revoked after the second unsuccessful race. Running on a ticket of larger parties without a hope to form a parliamentary faction under its own name makes a small party fully dependent on its larger partner, erodes its grassroot support and trust of rank-and-file members, and de facto brings to an end party's name recognition and identity. Both scenarios have negative consequences for small parties. Table 9.3 demonstrates a distinct tendency of the Estonian party system to get rid of small parties. Thus, in 1995, 16 organizations presented their party list for the Riigikogu elections. This number

Table 9.3 Selected Statistics from Elections to the Riigikogu, 1995–2003

	1995	1999	2003
Total number of political organizations that submitted their electoral list	16	12	11
Number of successful contestants	7	7	6
Total percentage of the national vote for contestants without parliamentary representation	12.4%	7.0%	4.4%

Sources: The Estonian National Electoral Committee (www.vvk.ee) and the Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, Department of Government, University of Essex (www.essex.ac.uk/elections).

decreased to 12 in 1999 and 11 in 2003. In the past 3 electoral cycles the overall share of the national vote obtained by parties without parliamentary representation also significantly decreased from 12.42 percent in 1995 to 7.00 percent in 1999 and 4.4 percent in 2003. A ban on *apparentements* in combination with other measures proved to be successful in eliminating many small parties.

If Estonia has achieved tangible results in setting up boundaries of the party system, outcomes of the postindependence elections to the Rada demonstrate that Ukraine still has to develop an effective mechanism to address this issue. The Russian Federation presents mixed evidence. As strange as it might sound, the 1995 Federal Law on Elections of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation did not make any direct references to political parties. Article 6 states, "The right to nominate candidates for deputy belongs to the voters and electoral associations or electoral blocs," which are formed by at least two electoral associations. At the same time, the legislation did not provide any definition of "an electoral association." Asked to explain this form of organization, Nikolay Ryabov, chairman of the Russian Central Electoral Commission, gave the following answer: "[S]o far there is no such concept in our legislation. . . . Willy-nilly we have to use [this] formulation, although everyone admits it is rather artificial. Under it even three people can create a movement, or it could be done by 300,000."[26] A lack of clear definition of the electoral association qualified 256 various organizations, which stipulated in their charters electoral participation, to compete in the 1995 elections, including the Association of Rock-Climbers, the Union of Boxers, and the Union of Beekeepers.[27] In fact, some of these "strangers," for example, the Union of Housing Construction Workers, did take part in the 1995 elections to the Duma.

Although the Russian electoral legislation experiences some modifications from election to election, a clause about electoral associations remains essentially

unchanged. For example, Article 2 the Law on Fundamental Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participation in a Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation passed in 1997 established that "the right to nominate candidates for any election belongs to voters, the candidates themselves, and to electoral associations and electoral blocs. An electoral association is described in the law as a political-social organization (a political party, organization, or movement) devoted to the various forms of political activity defined in that article" (Middleton, 1998). Timothy J. Colton argues that Russian electoral rules fail to differentiate "duly certified and titles parties . . . apart from quasi-parties. . . . Russia's electoral laws bring both quasi-parties and parties under the tent of "electoral associations" . . . and afford them the same prerogatives to nominate and promote candidates" (2000, 4). Needless to say, the failure of the electoral legislation to emphasize directly and promote the electoral function of political parties contributed to the erosion and devaluation of their status as electoral agents and impeded the process of development of the Russian party system in general.

On numerous occasions Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized the importance of a strong party system for Russian society. His deeds did not depart from his words, and within a year of his presidency Putin submitted to the national legislature a new law on political parties that was passed in June 2001. This law includes a number of provisions against a proliferation of political parties, for instance, requiring all parties to re-register and imposing stricter rules for their official registration.[28] Aleksandr Veshnyakov, the chairman of the Central Election Commission, which drafted the new party law, "predicted that it would reduce the number of parties and movements from the current 200 to between 10 and 30" (Constitutional Watch, 2001). These expectations, however, failed to materialize. Although the number of electoral contestants in the MMD somewhat decreased from 26 in the 1999 elections to 21 four years later, the total percentage of the vote collected by electoral associations and blocs that failed to gain Duma representation noticeably increased from 13.38 percent in 1999 to 23.07 percent in 2003.

* * *

CONCLUSION

A while ago social scientists and electoral engineers recognized that an electoral system has a profound effect on a party system. Along with other political consequences, electoral arrangements may encourage or discourage the development and consolidation of individual parties as well as the party system in general. They can be a determining factor of the survival or the demise of a political organization. The influence of the electoral system on

the party system is particularly instrumental in the post-Communist countries that lacked a competitive party system and civil society. Many studies of transitional societies emphasize that strong and stable political parties are an essential element for the consolidation and normal functioning of a democratic regime. In this chapter I attempted to address the question: what electoral arrangements are more likely to promote a successful institutionalization of the political party system in a post-Soviet transitional society?

I argue that the proportional representation formula helps to foster *autonomy* of political parties in post-Soviet nations and generates the potential for enhancing the role of parties in the legislature and political system. The party-based voting affects the process of political institutionalization in several ways: it legitimizes the concepts of a political party and multiparty competition, contributes to the development of the organizational infrastructure of parties, furthers the nationalization of the party system, and advances civil society. However, my discussion of the Russian electoral legislation demonstrates that the effect of the proportional representation element, which tends to advance the role of parties in the society, can be neutralized by other variables, including laws on elections and political parties.

In addition to the voting formula, other elements of the electoral system have a deterministic effect on political institutionalization. Both Estonia and Latvia employ voting models whose most significant characteristics are similar; both are moderate PR systems with medium-size electoral districts and a 5 percent voting threshold. For reasons discussed in the paragraph above, both nations have achieved high marks on the *autonomy* dimension of institutionalization. However, they demonstrate strikingly different results on another criterion of institutionalization: party-system *stability*. If Estonia is the only nation among our five cases that exhibits a consistent trend toward greater *stability* of its party system, then Latvia shows no less consistent tendency toward greater instability of her parties. Our discussion in this chapter demonstrates that voting formula alone does not explain patterns of electoral volatility in these countries. Neither does the increase of the voting threshold for electoral coalitions unaccompanied by other strategies to confine party-system proliferation. I argue that other components of the electoral system, above all a ban on *apparentements* in conjunction with other aggressive measures to contain the spread of small organizations and encourage the strengthening of few large political parties, that is, party registration rules, membership requirements, finance regulations, play a decisive role in advancing political institutionalization in post-Soviet nations.

Among the five cases at hand, only one country retained Soviet-type absolute majority run-off elections in single-member constituencies for its founding elections. The Ukrainian version of the majoritarian electoral system was clearly biased against political parties. The 1993 Law on Elections to

the Verkhovna Rada created favorable conditions for the nomination and registration of independent candidates and representatives of the informal party of power, on the one hand, and weakened the electoral function of political organizations and restrained the development of the national party system, on the other hand. Contrary to expectations, the antiparty character of the Ukrainian electoral legislation suppressed the formation of single-party dominance in the Rada.

Three post-Soviet nations under study, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine (for the second and third electoral cycles), adopted mixed PR/majoritarian electoral models that feature many similar characteristics and produce some similar consequences. Thus, contrary to the conventional wisdom that (1) the PR element tends to contribute to the proliferation of the party system; and (2) the majoritarian element tends to contain the fragmentation of parties, these two electoral principles had quite opposite consequences. All three cases show that party-based voting tended to limit the number of parties with parliamentary representation because of a relatively high electoral threshold and the abundance of political organizations contesting elections. At the same time, the SMD formula in conjunction with PR brought to the national legislatures in the three countries numerous representatives of small political organizations contributing to the fractionalization of the party system.

CHAPTER 10

"PARTIES OF POWER" AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

POLITICAL SCIENCE AS AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE HAS BEEN in existence in Western society for over a century. During this time the study of government experienced periods of prominence and decline, went through the stages of "normal" knowledge accumulation and the cycles of "scientific revolutions." Today, it is a robust and multifaceted academic field with thousands of researchers employed in hundreds of universities and think tanks who produce an impressive quantity of diverse and sophisticated work published in numerous journals and printing houses.

For the countries that have emerged after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, political science is a new area of scholarship. There was no need for this discipline in the USSR: social scientists were not allowed to question the official and "omnipotent" Marxist-Leninist ideology that was supposed to give correct answers to all possible questions facing a society. In the past 15 years the field of political science has been rapidly growing in some post-Soviet nations. In certain areas it started to make a solid contribution to the overall development of this academic subject. A study of the post-Soviet phenomenon of a party of power is one of such branches of learning where Eastern European social scientists have made significant advances.

The term "a party of power" has been widely used in the Western studies of the post-Soviet political parties; almost any publication on the subject refers to this concept. However, such investigations have several major shortcomings: (1) the majority of authors do not define a party of power in their works; (2) vast differences between those few definitions of a party of power that can be found in the literature make an application of the term confusing; (3) a near complete absence of the English-language political science studies that not just mention this concept but *explore* the phenomenon of a party of

power; (4) a complete lack of a cross-national approach: a small number of inquiries that do focus on parties of power represent exclusively single-country studies with a heavy emphasis on Putin's Unity/United Russia (Fish, 1995; Colton and McFaul, 2000; Smyth, 2002).

Academic research on the topic of parties of power in the post-Soviet nations fares much better; scholars address various aspects of this concept: a definition of a party of power (Wilson and Yakushyk, 1992; Khenkin, 1996, 1997; Andrey Ryabov, 1997, 2005; Serhiy Ryabov, 2001; Meleshevich, 2006), their origin and history (Golosov and Likhtenshtein, 2001; Tanchin, 2005, electoral strategy (Khenkin, 1996; Likhtenshtein, 2002), relationship with the executive (Andrey Ryabov, 1997, 2005; Pavlenko, 1999), consequences for democratization (Ryabchuk, 1994). Perhaps the main limitation of these studies is their predominant focus on a single country: either the Russian Federation or Ukraine. In addition, an important topic such as the influence of parties of power on the overall development of a party system remains largely unexplored in both Western and post-Soviet political science.

The objectives of this chapter are as follows. First, I provide a definition of the concept of a party of power drawing on the existing literature. Second, I discuss a simple typology of parties of power based upon a single dimension: its level of formal organization. Third, I trace a transformation of parties of power from an unorganized bloc of elites in the early 1990s to formal political parties at present. Fourth, I offer some tentative suggestions about the impact of parties of power on the institutionalization process of a national party system in post-Soviet countries. In no way does this chapter represent an attempt to fill all the gaps in the study of parties of power. Above all, it should be considered as an agenda-setting item, which hopefully will lead to more research on the subject.

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Defining a Party of Power

There is little agreement among students of post-Soviet political parties as to what constitutes a party of power. Some scholars define parties of power in a very broad way that makes such definitions practically meaningless. For example, Nadia Diuk argues that a party of power is an organization that supports a president, has "the large number of government officials in its ranks," and "places itself in the middle of the spectrum" (1998, 106). In addition to some pro-presidential formations in former Soviet republics, such a broad definition allows classifying as a party of power any catch-all party in a postindustrial democratic society with directly or indirectly elected head of state who is affiliated with this organization. Including the Democratic Party under President Clinton's rule and Putin's United Russia in the same category does not help to

understand the nature of a party of power. Other authors propose even more inclusive definitions of this concept. Perhaps any major parliamentary party in a democratic country would be a party of power if one accepts its description as "a political organization that participates in elections and has its representatives in the bodies of power at different levels" (Andrey Ryabov, 2005, 4).

There are two most common approaches to the definition of a "party of power" in the literature.[1] According to the first approach, a party of power is "a political bloc that includes pragmatically oriented and deideologized upper level circles of the old [Communist] *nomenklatura*, representatives of the state apparatus, mass media, managers of traditional sectors of industry and agriculture" (Wilson and Yakushyk, 1992, 164). The second approach argues that "parties of power are electoral blocs organized by state actors to participate in parliamentary elections and forge national organizations for presidential elections. They rely on state resources over building a party bureaucracy and depend heavily on charismatic appeals to voters to win support" (Smyth, 2002, 556). In addition to several less significant dissimilarities between these two definitions, one difference is instrumental. As I show in my discussion below, this is the difference between informal and organized parties of power.

Drawing on the definitions by Andrew Wilson and Valentyn Yakushyk, and Regina Smyth, I define a party of power as a political bloc that

1. has a deideological, pragmatic, and centrist nature;
2. is created (i.e., founded or utilized) by and acts in the interests of the executive branch of government;
3. relies on state and other "administrative" resources available to representatives of the executive managers to achieve its goals including participation in elections; and
4. bases its electoral participation on a strong personality-centered factor.

The first feature of a party of power is its nonideological and pragmatic character. Igor Tanchin notes that ideology for a party of power is an impermissible luxury since ideology should not prevent the authority from achieving its objectives (Tanchin, 2005). The statement of Yevgeniy Nazdratenko about one of the Russian parties of power is illuminating in this regard: "The ideology of Unity is the lack of any kind of ideology."[2] Pragmatism, which substitutes ideology, provides a room for maneuvering and allows a party of power to adjust flexibly to an ever-changing environment.[3] For a pragmatic and ideologically ambiguous organization, the most convenient location on the political spectrum is the centrist position. In fact, Regina Smyth argues that "the success of the party of power is contingent" (2002, 558) on its ability to portray itself as a centrist organization. Parties of power place themselves in the middle of the political continuum between the Left and the Right.

In Russia, this is a broad political space between the CPRF and Zhirinovsky's LDPR. The Ukrainian parties of power claimed to occupy the middle position between the national democratic (Rukh, Our Ukraine) and nationalist (UNA/UNSO) forces, on the one hand, and leftist parties (CPU, Progressive Socialist Party, SPU), on the other hand.

The second characteristic of both types of parties of power emphasizes the role of the executive elites in the creation of such political blocs. I agree with Anna Likhtenshtein that it is hardly a surprise that many parties are formed by political elites. However, in the past, parties founded by elites had a parliamentary origin; they grew up from parliamentary groups.[4] Parties of power in the post-Soviet space are different: they are created by the executive branch of government. In the Russian Federation, these organizations have been established directly by the executive (Likhtenshtein, 2002). Our Home Is Russia was founded by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin with the tacit support of President Yeltsin; Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) was formed by leading representatives of regional executive authorities, Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev; President Putin and Ministers Sergey Shoigu and Boris Gryzlov were behind the conception of Unity and later United Russia.

The process of creation of the Ukrainian parties of power was somewhat different. Instead of establishing new parties from scratch, Ukrainian executive elites have utilized existing marginal political organizations. For example, although the Popular Democratic Party was founded in 1996, it became the first Ukrainian party of power in 1997 when Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoitenko, Minister Anatoliy Tolstoukhov, and several heads of oblast administrations joined the NDP. It caused a snowballing effect and at the pick of its popularity the NDP included 4, 200 representatives of the executive branch and 1, 900 of them occupied top governmental positions (Rakhmanin, 2002). The Party of Regions has transformed into a party of power several years after its birth when the head of the Tax Police Mykola Azarov and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych joined this organization.

The third important attribute of parties of power is linked to the previous one and refers to their ability to muster state or "administrative resources" to achieve party objectives including the development of party infrastructure and/or participation in elections. In other words, members of a party of power who occupy executive or top management positions in the government or industrial enterprises abuse their access to authority and divert state or other "administrative resources" controlled by them for the party (in a case of a formal party of power) or individual (in a case of an informal bloc) purposes. Examples of such mobilization of administrative resources are limitless; many of them plainly overstep the boundaries of legality. Among the most widely used levers are manipulation of the mass media, the use of

the tax police and other law enforcement bodies against political opponents and for extracting funding for electoral campaigning, electoral fraud, etc.

Finally, electoral campaigning conducted by parties of power displays a distinct personality-centered character. Thus, a SMD race of nonaffiliated contenders is necessarily focused on individual candidates. By definition, representatives of the informal party of power do not belong to any organized political group and have to appeal to the voters on the personal basis. A formal party of power is built around a single strongman or a group of top holders of the executive power who, on the one hand, stimulate the influx of representatives of the state apparatus to the party, and, on the other hand, appeal to the electorate to support the president (Unity/Putin), prime minister (Our Home Is Russia/Chernomyrdin, Popular Democratic Party/Pustovoitenko, Party of Regions/Yanukovych), or a group of regional leaders (Fatherland-All Russia/Luzhkov, Shaimiev).

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The Organizational Transformation of Parties of Power

In the process of their organizational development, parties of power have evolved from the informal type of this phenomenon to their formal variety retaining all their distinguishing characteristics. At first, parties of power emerged as an amorphous group of political and industrial elites with common interests. After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the CPSU real political power remained in the hands of the old Communist *nomenklatura* who occupied most leading positions in the regional executive branch and industrial enterprises. In order to stay in power, this social stratum had to adjust to a new game—democratic elections. Many regional and local bosses, whom Kimitaka Matsuzato (2001) calls "meso-elites," did not need ideology or a party label to run a successful electoral race. The costs of joining a party were too high, and the benefits were too uncertain to join a political party. Pragmatism and mobilization of state and "administrative" resources available to them were sufficient to win a legislative seat and obtain a clout of democratic legitimacy. Deconcentration of state power and the SMD electoral system were instrumental in the emergence of the informal party of power. At the outset, nothing seemed to link meso-elites dispersed throughout the whole territory of the nation except their common desire to maintain their power. A safe and efficient way to pursue this goal was to form "centrist" groups in the national assembly that would claim their support virtually to any government that was in place at the time. A typical example was an influential parliamentary faction "Center" created in the Ukrainian Rada

after the 1994 elections by the representatives of the informal party of power.[5]

The formation of progovernmental parliamentary groups signified the beginning of the evolution of parties of power and the advent of their formal organization. To some extent, this process resembled the origin and transformation of political parties in the United States. Rephrasing John Aldrich's argument—many of the nonaffiliated meso-elites began to recognize that the use of powers, resources, and institutional forms of the organized group "increases their prospects for winning desired outcomes" (Aldrich, 1995, 24). The introduction of the PR electoral system was another strong stimulus for a transformation of the informal party of power. Although electoral laws in some post-Soviet countries do allow blocs of independent candidates or single independents to run in the PR constituencies, their realistic chances to get to the legislature are extremely low. The main reason of the formalization of parties of power is the goal of the incumbent executives to claim a share of the PR vote.

Until the introduction of proportional representation for the elections of all members of the national assemblies in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the informal and organized parties of power coexisted and interacted with each other. The mixed electoral system well suited both types: SMDs produced great numbers of nonaffiliated meso-elites, and PR provided opportunities for their colleagues with party tickets. The informal party of power has been a reliable and consistent partner of its formalized counterpart in several ways. First, it continued to produce nonparty meso-elite MPs who would form numerous "pragmatic" progovernmental factions demonstrating their loyalty to the central authority. Second, the informal party of power served as a good breeding ground for the formalized parties of power which actively sought to co-opt the nonparty elites. A powerful party of power, which can demonstrate an unambiguous and consistent support from the central authority, has enough persuasive arguments and incentives to "convince" pragmatic and nonideological regional and local bosses to join the party. For example, Putin's United Russia has greatly improved its performance in the SMDs in the 2003 parliamentary elections in comparison to the previous contest at the expense of independent candidates. In 1999, Unity won 9 Duma seats in the majoritarian constituencies that constituted 4.17 percent of all SMD seats. Fatherland-All Russia faired better and was successful in 31 races, or 14.35 percent. Four years later, United Russia was triumphant in 104 single-member constituencies, and took 46.22 percent of the majoritarian Duma seats. A significant share of the newly elected United Russia members represented regional and local state apparatus.

The abolition of the mixed electoral systems in Russia and Ukraine in favor of pure proportional representation completed the transformation of the party of power from its informal variety to the formal political organization.

Proportional representation elections leave no choice to aspiring political elites but to join parties.

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Parties of Power in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine: Three Scenarios

The same highly centralized hierarchical system controlled from a single political center existed on the whole territory of the former Soviet Union. The composition of the Soviet political and industrial elites was also essentially the same in all union republics; all of them had their share of the Communist *nomenklatura*, "red directorate," and managers of collective and state agricultural farms. Many representatives of the ruling stratum remained at their positions when the USSR broke apart. However, soon after independence, different post-Soviet nations developed different models with different roles for *nomenklatura* and parties of power in their political systems: the absence of parties of power in the Baltic states, numerous regionally based and competing parties of power in Ukraine, and a single and monopolistic party of power in Russia.

When the Communist parties in the Baltic states lost power in the early 1990s, "the establishment of party *nomenklatura*—officials, industrial managers, *kolhoz* and *sovkhoz* bosses and so on—remained, to be sure, largely intact" (Arter, 1996, 119). As soon as the Baltic nations restored their sovereignty, the pro-Moscow segment of the former Communist apparatus lost any legitimacy and political significance. At the same time, a large part of the pro-independence *nomenklatura* managed to stay in the game. In the new democratic environment, the most effectual way to continue meaningful political activities and aspire to the governmental posts was to form a political party and participate in elections. Among the parties founded by the former Communist *nomenklatura* were the Secure Home alliance, and later the Coalition Party (disbanded after the third electoral cycle) and the People's Union (Estonian Country People's Party) in Estonia; Latvia's Way in Latvia; and the LDDP in Lithuania. Today, each of these political formations occupy a recognizable ideological niche on the national political map, accept rules of democratic participation, compete in elections, assume governing responsibility in cases of electoral victory, resign state posts, and play a role of political opposition in cases of electoral loss. In other words, political organizations, which were created by the former Communist power holders and had a potential to mutate into a party of power-type organization, transformed into "normal" parliamentary parties and constitute a part of a competitive and democratic party system in the present-day Baltic states.

A clan-based nature of Ukrainian politics and inability or unwillingness of President Kuchma to forge a single party of power are two main factors that contributed to the creation of the party system that combines two levels of competition. In addition to a regular intraparty competition, regionally based parties of power also vie for power, influence, and access to the president between themselves. It is a well-described fact that the Ukrainian political scene has been dominated by a number of parties of power that draw their strength from different geographical regions in the nation. Perhaps the best known since the Soviet times clan comes from the city of Dnipropetrovs'k, which produced Leonid Brezhnev, Vladimir Shcherbitskii, and Leonid Kuchma among others. Dnipropetrovs'k became a power base of several major parties of power including the NDP run by the former prime minister Pustovoitenko and Labor Ukraine, which had a 40 member parliamentary faction after the 2002 elections. The center of the Ukrainian coal industry Donets'k hosts another influential party of power—the Party of Regions headed by another former head of government, Viktor Yanukovych. The Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) is centered in Kyiv and led by the former Head of the presidential administration Viktor Medvedcuk. Kimitaka Matsuzato writes that the appearance of the regional parties suggests that "regional elite clans, hiding under the names of official parties, are transforming their regions into their own electoral patrimonies (*votchyny*)" and exploit these patrimonies for their political resources in national politics (2002, 1969). The relations between the regional clans and their parties of power have not been easy. Several attempts to coordinate their efforts and merge into one broad political alliance (e.g., For United Ukraine in 2002) resulted in failure in the long run.

President Kuchma seemed to adhere to the "divide-and-rule" principle by carefully maintaining the rivalry between the parties of power and allocating between them leading governmental positions. For example, after the 2002 parliamentary elections the Party of Regions received the posts of the prime minister (Viktor Yanukovych) and prosecutor general (Gennadiy Vasiliev), the SDPU (U)—the head of the presidential administration (Viktor Medvedchuk), and Labor Ukraine—the head of the National Bank (Serhiy Tyhypko). By dividing authority between major pro-presidential organizations Kuchma was able to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of the leaders of one political party who could challenge his leadership. Some scholars argue that Kuchma wanted but was not able to create a single prevailing party of power because of the great regional diversity in Ukraine (see Tanchin, 2005). Whatever the reasons of the nonexistence of a dominant party of power are, it certainly had positive consequences for preserving a vigorous intraparty competition on several levels and securing a robust and active political opposition in the nation on its way toward democratic consolidation.

Attempts to create a two-party-of-power system made by President Yeltsin's administration before the 1995 elections ended in almost a complete fiasco. The right-of-center party led by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin managed to receive slightly over 10 percent of the vote despite a heavy reliance on the state resources during the electoral campaign. The design of the Ivan Rybkin bloc, which was supposed to perform a role of the left-of-center party of power, was flawed from the beginning. Rybkin, who served as the Duma speaker at the time, lacked a dependable access to the "administrative resources" controlled by the executive branch. By definition, a party of power is not able to run a successful electoral campaign without the state-administered resources. It is not a surprise then that this bloc obtained meager 1.1 percent of the vote and as few as 3 SMD seats in the national assembly.

The next electoral cycle brought an unforeseen competition between two parties of power: OVR and Unity, which had been created by the regional and central executive elites correspondingly. Among the founding fathers of the "center-left grouping" Fatherland-All Russia (Sakwa, 2001, 94) was a group of high-ranking regional leaders: Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, St. Petersburg Governor Aleksandr Yakovlev, Tararstan President Mintimir Shaimiev, Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov, etc. Since unlike the Rybkin bloc OVR was not a Kremlin-born project, and many of its leaders were not among sympathizers of President Yeltsin and his "family," the Russian central authority was alarmed. In many respects, Unity was established as a counterweight to OVR. Although it was originally designed inside the presidential circles, 39 regional leaders including some Communist-affiliated governors eventually supported Unity (Colton and McFaul, 2000, 205). The outcome was stunning: the newly born pro-presidential organization won almost a quarter of the national vote, well above 13.3 percent gained by OVR.

Nevertheless, Fatherland-All Russia remained a very powerful organization of regional authorities and represented a constant challenge to the federal presidency. According to the Kremlin, which promised to bring consolidation and accord to Russia, a presence of the alternative influential center of power could have potentially destabilizing consequences for the nation. The OVR leaders became a primary target of the central authority: negative public relations campaign, bribing the OVR representatives into defecting from the bloc, "harassment of bloc leaders by the tax authorities, . . . physical threats against the families of the OVR candidates," electoral fraud against regional leaders "who have resisted Putin's authority" (Colton and McFaul, 2000, 208; McFaul and Petrov, 2004, 26) became realities of Russian politics. After the 1999 elections the ORV leadership faced the following choice: to play an independent political game, challenge the federal presidency and likely to perish as a political power, or declare their support and loyalty to the president and survive. For the pragmatic leaders of the Fatherland-All Russia the answer was obvious.

McFaul and Petrov wrote, "Wielding carrots and sticks, the Kremlin eliminated the serious divisions among regional elites that had structured the main drama of the 1999 parliamentary elections. By the fall of 2003, almost all regional leaders were supporting Putin and United Russia. The regional strongmen who had created Fatherland-All Russia fours years earlier had become staunch United Russia supporters" (2004, 26). An alternative source of power was removed and the single monopolistic party of power was created. "The ruling group had established its complete and unconditional dominance," and Russia became "anything but opposition" (Gel'man, 2005, 13, 5). Perhaps the main intrigue of the 2003 legislative elections was whether United Russia would be able to muster the absolute majority of the Duma seats. It did. Most students of democratic theory would agree that the concentration of political power in the hands of one institution and a lack of meaningful competition for governmental posts are the antithesis of democracy and a road toward authoritarianism.

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PARTIES OF POWER AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION

In this work, I argue that political institutionalization has two main aspects: *autonomy* and *stability*. The institutionalized party system in a democratic society features political parties autonomous from their environment and demonstrates stable patterns of interaction between them. Parties of power hurt both dimensions of the political institutionalization process. The stronger the role of parties of power in the national political system is, the lower the degree of party-system institutionalization is likely to be.

PARTIES OF POWER AND *AUTONOMY*

An informal party of power and its ability to elect numerous parliamentarians correspond to a very low level of political institutionalization. An electoral success of the informal party of power demonstrates that organized political parties have no practical significance for either political elite or the electorate. No doubt that a transition from the informal party of power to its formal variety advances the role of parties in the political system. Political elite recognize the value of party affiliation and rely on party label and resources in the electoral race. The voters must learn about political parties and accept their significance to make an informed electoral choice. However, although the emergence of formal parties of power is a step toward greater political institutionalization, these political formations have a detrimental effect on the overall development of the party system.

A highly institutionalized system of political parties should have an independent status and value from other social institutions. Advanced parties should perform their exclusive functions and firmly occupy their unique niche in the political system. In contrast, parties of power develop a heavy dependence on other institutions in two respects. First, they do not and cannot exist outside of the realm of the executive power. Parties of power are created by the executive branch of government as a tool to achieve certain political goals including electoral participation. In order to run a successful electoral race, a party of power, a nonideological organization without a solid social base, must rely on its main source of strength—state and other "administrative resources" available to the executive bodies. Second, this type of a political organization is prominently centered on the party leader or a group of leaders who represent the executive power. Some parties of power may develop charismatic leadership that is "generally associated with strong resistance to institutionalization" (Panebianco, 1988, 66–67). Association of a political organization with a strong leader, a president, prime minister, or a group of top regional governors, makes it even more dependent on the executive government. A removal of the party leader from his position displays an inherent weakness of a party of power and results in its decline. Valeriy Pustovoitenko's NDP and Viktor Chernomyrdin's Our Home Is Russia are telling examples. When both prime ministers lost their top executive jobs and were transferred to other positions that deprived them of state resources in the electoral and party-building purposes, the fate of both organizations was decided—in a short while they ceased to be influential political players in their nations. *Autonomy* of political parties is reversely correlated with the status of parties of power in the political system.

PARTIES OF POWER AND *STABILITY*

Throughout this work I argue that an assessment of parties' electoral lists serves as a solid measure of political *autonomy*. Indeed, if leading parties present electoral tickets, which exclusively consist of their formal members, then a party system as a whole is firmly in control of its unique social niche and demonstrates a high degree of institutionalization. Some possible exceptions do not change the overall pattern of candidate selection in countries with an advanced party system. However, political identification with parties of power might have a different meaning. For example, one of the major parties of power in Ukraine, the SDPU (U), led by the former head of the presidential administration under Leonid Kuchma, submitted an electoral list for the 2002 elections that had "very few strangers and non-members" (Rakhmanin and Mostova, 2002). In fact, among the top 100 candidates there were 95 party members, 4 nonparty leaders of the youth organizations affiliated

with the SDPU (U), and a senior judge from Luhans'k oblast who was not allowed to join any political organization during his service on the bench. At the first glance, it appears that the party presented an almost "pure" electoral list. However, as Yuliya Mostova and Serhii Rakhmanin (2002) correctly note, "[N]ot all candidates are in the party for ideological reasons. Some joined it seeking a reliable shelter from political storms, others use it as a springboard for future political or business career." Such members do not see any value in a party membership unless it brings some tangible personal benefits.

It goes without saying that political parties should offer their ambitious members selective incentives. However, a party of power is able to provide shelter and promote career aspirations only when it controls some influential segment of the executive government. As soon as such a political organization is ousted from power, by definition it ceases to provide opportunities, which results either in a significant reduction of membership or a complete disappearance of a party from the national political scene. Again, the NDP and Our Home Is Russia are good examples of the two scenarios. The NDP was the most powerful party in the Rada during the premiership of the party chairman, Valeriy Pustovoitenko. However, as soon as Pustovoitenko was dismissed from his position, many party members left the party. Thus, seven NDP members of the top 10 names on the party list submitted for the 1998 elections quit the party for a variety of reasons soon after the appointment of a new prime minister. An example of the second scenario is Our Home Is Russia, which formed one of the largest Duma factions after the 1995 elections when Viktor Chernomyrdin served as the prime minister and virtually vanished by the next electoral cycle when he was transferred to a less significant job.

Many members of the "out of favor" parties of power quit their former benefactors, switch their party loyalties, and join new favorites without a moment's thought further contributing to a greater fluidity of individual political parties and the party system as a whole. Cases similar to a Ukrainian parliamentarian Serhiy Podobedov who switched his political affiliation three times within several years every time joining a new party of power are not exceptions.[6] Frequent cabinet reshuffles in Russia and Ukraine (see chapter 3), the desire of numerous newly appointed prime ministers to lead his own political organization (which survival is not likely to exceed the duration of the term in office of its leader), and repeated shifts of party membership by many "pragmatic" representatives of the executive government are among major contributing factors to high electoral volatility levels in these two countries.

Conclusion

The purpose of this book is twofold. First, it evaluates the process of political institutionalization in the five post-Soviet states: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. Striking variations in the extent to which party systems have been institutionalized in these nations are discussed in chapter 6. The second part of the book aims to explain different levels of political institutionalization achieved by the former republics of the Soviet Union. The study identifies four factors that shaped the status of the party system in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine: (1) the role of the old Communist elites during the initial stage of the formation of the party system; (2) the executive-legislative arrangements; (3) the electoral system; and (4) the place of parties of power in the national political system. It goes without saying that along with these four variables, many other factors have affected the development of political parties in the five countries: pre-Soviet historical heritage, social cleavages, political culture, etc.

The significance of the formative stage of a political institution is difficult to overestimate. It is largely during this period that the institutional framework, values, and mission are being formed and developed. Among various factors that influence social institutions in their formative phase, the role of individuals who evince the ability to articulate objectives and shape the organizational framework has instrumental importance for the process of institution building. Since 1988, the Communist leadership in the five countries addressed here has adopted different approaches toward political pluralism and emerging alternative political organizations influencing the future development of national party systems. Local Communist elites in the Baltic states created the most favorable conditions for the development of political parties. First among the Soviet republics, Lithuania, followed by Latvia and Estonia, established a legal framework of a multiparty system by removing from their constitutions the provision about "the leading party role" in society and adopting the laws that secured new political formations the right to operate freely. Already in 1989 the Baltic governments ceased using violence against political opposition and granted it access to the state–owned media.

In the late 1980s in Russia, the All-Union Communist leadership pursued a policy of limited support for social pluralism in a one-party "socialist state." On the one hand, Gorbachev and his closest lieutenants promoted the idea of "a socialist civil society," growth of public associations, and more active people's support for perestroika. The authorities in Moscow became increasingly more tolerant to political opponents and to ideological pluralism. On the other hand, the central political elite argued in favor of a single-party system and preservation of the constitutional clause on the leading party role. Those political organizations that openly challenged the party rule were still subjected to harsh measures by the government.

During the genetic phase of a competitive party system, the most unfavorable conditions for political pluralism among the five cases occurred in Ukraine. The republican Communist leaders took the most intolerant position toward emerging non-Communist groups. Ukraine was the last among the five nations to remove "the leading party role" provision from its constitution, legalize oppositional organizations, and cease using violence against them. By launching a broad campaign in the official media, the establishment contributed to the formation of a negative image of oppositional groups as well as a multiparty system in general. This negative image of political parties caused a wide disbelief among the Ukrainian public in this institution that, in turn, contributed to a poor showing of candidates nominated by political organizations in the founding postindependence elections and the overall low level of political institutionalization in this country.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine developed different models of executive-legislative arrangements. Estonia and Latvia established a parliamentary form with an indirectly elected head of state. In practice, however, the Lithuanian mixed system is leaning toward parliamentarism. The powers of the Russian superpresidency vastly outweigh the authority of the national legislature. Although Ukraine has been gradually moving toward strengthening of its presidency, the Rada and the cabinet remain influential institutions creating a "power triangle."

My discussion supports and develops the mainstream argument within the presidents versus parliaments debate that presidentialism is less conducive to the development of the party system and to democratic stability in general. Since the head of state in the presidential regime is elected by direct popular vote, this type of government is more likely than parliamentarism to produce a chief executive who is not affiliated with any political party and who portrays him/herself as a representative of the whole nation. Examples of "the above-party" presidents in the post-Soviet space—Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin in Russia—provide a good illustration of this argument. The nonparty presidency encourages personalism at the expense of institution building. One of the critical functions of a political party in a

democratic society, channeling career opportunities and determining access to power, remains underdeveloped in a system with a strong supra-party presidency. The recruitment of political leaders into government takes place through other channels: personal loyalty, professional skills, geographical or professional identification, etc. On the contrary, prime ministers in the parliamentary system are more likely to be interested in strong political parties, since the executive branch in a parliamentary regime is formed on the basis of legislative elections by a victorious party or parties.

Analysis of five post-Soviet nations shows that the strength of the presidency varies inversely with the strength of the party system. A powerful presidency shifts the principal decision-making mechanism to bodies directly subordinate and accountable only to the head of state. The increasing imbalance between a strong "above-party" presidency and a weak legislature further undermines the role of political parties and negatively affects the process of political institutionalization in Russia, and to a lesser extent in Ukraine. At the same time, parliamentary systems in the Baltic states contributed to a significantly higher degree of institutionalization of their party systems.

Students of electoral studies agree that a voting formula has a profound effect on a party system. The effect of electoral arrangements on political parties was particularly important in the post-Soviet transitional states, where a competitive party system did not exist for generations. Many studies of political institutions in democratizing countries underscore that an advanced party system is an instrumental factor for a democratic consolidation. Different electoral arrangements in the five studies (i.e., a moderate PR model in Latvia and Estonia, a mixed PR/majority formula in Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine, and a majority run-off system used in Ukraine in 1994) contributed to different levels of political institutionalization in these nations.

The Ukrainian version of the double-ballot majoritarian model employed for its founding elections was clearly biased against political parties, thus weakening their electoral function as a medium between the voters and the government. Since this formula favored independent candidates, most of whom represented the informal party of power, the first postindependence elections resulted in an amorphous legislature with a majority of nonparty deputies. The Ukrainian SMD model did not contribute to the strengthening of the national party system. On the contrary, proportional representation helps to promote the development of political parties in post-Communist states and generates the potential for reinforcing the role of parties in legislative bodies and in the larger political system. Party-based electoral arrangements contribute to the legitimization of parties and multiparty competition among the voters and foster the organizational infrastructure of parties.

All three mixed PR/SMD electoral formulas, adopted by Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine, produced unforeseen consequences for the political party systems in these nations. Contrary to the expectations, the majoritarian element in conjunction with PR contributed to the proliferation of the party system in the three countries, bringing to the national legislatures numerous representatives of marginal political formations. At the same time, the party-based element tended to promote the consolidation of the party system by limiting the number of parties with parliamentary representation.

The place of parties of power varies in the five case studies. In the Baltic states, political organizations that had been created by the Soviet *nomenklatura* and could transform to parties of power, accepted rules of the democratic game and became elements of competitive party systems. Ukraine features several regionally based parties of power that compete for political and economic influence between themselves as well as with other political organizations. The Russian Federation developed a single monopolistic party of power that de facto removed meaningful political opposition. The existence of parties of power negatively influences political institutionalization. Parties of power demonstrate low levels of political *autonomy* because they are heavily dependent on the executive branch of government. They also add to electoral volatility because their life expectancy is not likely to exceed the duration of the term in office of its leader. The stronger and less competitive the party of power is, the lower levels of institutionalization the party system tends to display.

Analysis of the four explanatory variables helps to explain different levels of political institutionalization in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine. Thus, since obtaining its sovereignty in 1991 until the second postindependent elections in 1998, Ukraine suffered from the least favorable conditions for the formation of the competitive party system among the five cases. Openly negativist attitudes and policies of the ruling Ukrainian Communist elites in the late 1980s and early 1990s toward emerging alternative political organizations discredited the very institution of the political party in the eyes of the public. The informal party of power, which controlled the executive and managerial positions across the nation and held the majority of Rada seats after the 1994 elections, was not interested in the development of organized parties. A combination of the strong nonparty presidency, weak discipline of the parliamentary parties, and electoral legislation that was clearly biased against political organizations further undermined the institutionalization of the Ukrainian party system. Since the 1998 elections, the Ukrainian party system has shown signs of movement toward greater political institutionalization. Among the factors contributing to the development of Ukrainian parties were (1) the introduction of proportional representation, which legitimized the place of political parties in elections; (2) a transition of the informal party of power into its formal variety and the emergence of

several regionally based parties of power which despite their negative overall impact on the party-system institutionalization have not impeded a meaningful political competition; (3) a reasonable strong position of the parliament and the cabinet that, for the most part, remained powerful independent players in the Ukrainian power game counterbalancing the growing strength of the presidency.

As in the previous case, the political circumstances in Russia were not conducive to adequate party development. Limited tolerance of ideological pluralism by the All-Union Communist leadership in the formative stage of the party-system development; an enormous imbalance of power between the supra-party head of state and legislative branches of government; the total dependence of the prime minister on the presidency; a peculiar combination of outcomes of PR and majoritarian electoral principles, which awarded numerous parliamentary seats to representatives of small and noisy political formations, contributed to the widespread distrust of the party system among both the general public and ambitious politicians. Laws on elections and political parties further eroded the parties' status as electoral agents. It is likely that the creation of the monopolistic party of power, United Russia, would add to the electoral *stability* of the Russian party system. But at what cost? The ultimate reliance of this organization on the institution of the presidency and the executive government obstructs *autonomy* of the Russian party system. If the Russian Federation remains truly committed to further democratization proclaimed by President Putin on numerous occasions, then the preservation of a dominant party of power and a lack of meaningful political competition may cause the baby to be thrown out with the bathwater.

The Baltic states demonstrated a different approach from the two Slavic nations toward the establishment of viable political parties and strengthening their role in each society. In the late 1980s (first among the Soviet republics), the Lithuanian Communist elites, followed by the republican leadership in Latvia and Estonia, started to cooperate with the political opposition and began the gradual inclusion of alternative formations to the process of political negotiations. Political organizations formed by the former Communist *nomenklatura* became a part of the democratic political process. The parliamentary form of government (in the Lithuanian case, mixed premier presidential regime which is leaning toward parliamentarism), where the cabinet is formed by a victorious party or coalition of parties on the basis of electoral outcomes, enhances the party function as a vehicle of political recruitment and increases party electoral accountability and identifiability. The PR principles of the distribution of parliamentary seats also elevated the status of political parties and stimulated the organizational development of the party system. The party-based electoral arrangements in Estonia,

Latvia, and Lithuania (the PR element in the latter case) were reinforced by other provisions in the electoral and political party laws, which emphasized the exclusive electoral function of this institution in a larger political system.

Among the five cases, Estonia is the only nation that has demonstrated a continuous progress on both dimensions of political institutionalization: *autonomy* and *stability*. In fact, only Estonia displays a steady tendency toward greater *stability* of the national party system. What distinguishes Estonia from other post-Soviet countries is a consistent policy of creating and enhancing boundaries that differentiate the party system from its environment, thus promoting the coherence of the party system by restricting and moderating the impact of new political groups. Estonia took an unprecedented move in the post-Soviet space; it imposed a ban on electoral coalitions that in conjunction with party finance regulations, membership and registration requirements, etc. have strengthened few large political parties at the expense of small political organizations.

* * *

SOME TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS AND AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

It goes without saying that taking into account the limitations of this study (i.e., the small number of cases and yet smaller number of explanatory variables), it would be naïve and superficial to give a definite answer to the question of what political and institutional conditions are more conducive to the establishment of a stable and coherent political party system, a necessary element of every democracy. However, facing a risk of justified criticism, some tentative recommendations for designers of democratic institutions in transitional countries may be offered (a detailed explanation of each of the following points may be found in corresponding parts of this work).

1. The formative stage of the party system has an instrumental significance for the future status of political parties in society. Democratic reformers in decision-making bodies in a transitional country should establish as early as possible a pattern of tolerance and peaceful cooperation with oppositional political organizations, avoid using violence against the opposition, and initiate political negotiations of major political forces. The struggle for power among ideological adversaries should be conducted without undermining the institutions of the political party and competitive party system.

2. A strong presidency is associated with weak political parties. A transitional country should strike a delicate balance between the executive and legislative branches of government. The parliamentary electoral competition should be

meaningful and result in the formation of a government on the basis of electoral outcomes. The national assembly should be an independent and effective policy-making body that is able to withstand the pressure from the executive to curtail its authority. This objective is more likely to be achieved in a parliamentary or premier presidential system. However, the impetus to coalesce for competition for the post of even a relatively weak head of state, which may have a positive effect on the consolidation of the party system, is not to be ignored.

3. The executive branch should be formed according to the partisan principle. The party affiliation of the head of state and/or chief executive promotes the electoral identifiability and accountability of political parties and advances party system development. Recognizing a natural tendency of the head of state to portray him/herself as the representative of the whole nation, it should be also acknowledged that the "above-party" president slows down institutionalization of the party system. The supra-party head of state/chief executive is more likely to surface in a system with direct popular elections of the national leader.

4. In order to foster the legitimization of the concept of a competitive party system, a transitional country has to adopt an electoral formula that is based on the PR principle for all or at least a significant part of parliamentary seats. Pure plurality/majority voting arrangements in a country that lacked a meaningful multiparty system for a long while are more likely to bring to the national legislature local nonparty strongmen. These politicians would appeal to regional interests of their electorate at the expense of the national issues and impede the development of the nationwide party system.

5. To contain the proliferation of small political parties and advance the overall coherence of the party system, designers of democratic institutions should strive to establish boundaries delimiting the party system from its environment. In addition to the ban on *apparentements* that proved its effectiveness in Estonia, imposing a high electoral threshold, raising minimum party membership required for its official registration, financing political parties from the state budget according to the share of seats they hold in the parliament and other legislative measures would contribute to a more restrictive entry of new political organizations into the party system.

6. Designers of democratic political institutions should create conditions preventing the emergence of both informal and formal parties of power that hurt autonomy and stability of the party system. The establishment of a monopolistic party of power that brings together and elevates the status of the executive governments at different levels is particularly harmful for the competitive party system and democratic transition. Such an organization may eliminate political opposition and lead to an enormous concentration of power in the hands of one institution.

The academic literature on democratic political institutions, which is one of the principal areas of exploration in political science, is vast, sophisticated, and multifaceted. The empirical material for the great deal of this research was drawn from the stable democratic nations of the Western world. In the late 1980s post-Communist countries started their transition from the authoritarian rule, there was an understandable tendency to study political institutions in these nations in the light of the research agenda developed by scholars in their investigations of the Western democracies. Throughout this book I argue against a "mechanical" application of the research agenda of Western political institutions to the post-Communist societies. Such treatment of transitional societies is flawed because it overlooks many important issues that are taken for granted in the long-lasting stable democracies, but pertinent for societies that undergo rapid social change. Study of post-Communist institutions calls for its own research agenda and its own methodology. One of the profound differences between advanced democracies and post-Communist transitional societies is the lack of institutionalized party systems in the latter. Since a successful consolidation of a democratic regime requires the presence of developed political parties, the underlying objective of this book is to examine which contributing factors are more favorable for the creation of strong parties and the establishment of a meaningful competitive party system.

In the past 15 years many nations that comprised the former Communist bloc broke away from their authoritarian past and aspire to establish or consolidate a democratic political system. The findings and recommendations listed above are based on the study of only five of these "most similar cases." Undoubtedly, the expansion of the theoretical framework developed in this book to other transitional Eastern European and particularly post-Soviet nations may either provide additional support for arguments advanced in this project or reject them. It would also remedy the deficiency of the post–Communist studies that are still dominated by investigations of a single country. How did the ruling political elites at the formative stage of the party system in the former Communist states affect the future development of political parties in these nations? What is the relationship between the nonparty status of the post-Communist presidents Lech Walensa and Ion Iliescu and weak political parties in Poland and Romania? What is the impact of the relatively weak Bulgarian presidency, the directly elected head of state in Moldova, the strong Armenian president, as well as the increasingly authoritarian chief executive in Belarus, which is the vivid example of the "third reverse wave" of democratization, on their fragile party systems? Did the activist position of the presidents in the Czech Republic and Hungary, which adopted a parliamentary model, make a difference for their party systems? How did different electoral arrangements in post-Soviet countries

influence the process and dynamics of political institutionalization? What is the status and political impact of the parties of power in the former republics of the Soviet Union?

The second group of questions relates to the countries that have experienced cardinal changes in their institutional framework including the electoral system and executive-legislative relations. Such cases allow analyzing the effect of one important explanatory element by controlling other contributing factors. For example, how will a shift from the mixed PR/majority formula to a pure proportional representation voting system influence the Ukrainian and Russian party systems? What is the outcome of the recent changes in the power balance between the president, cabinet, and parliament in Ukraine?

This book does not explicitly study party organization, which became a focus of a number of recent investigations. No doubt, that a comparative multination and cross-time examination of the evolution of party organizations in the post-Communist countries would be an important addition to the wealth of knowledge of political institutionalization in transitional countries.

Finally, this project attempts to explain different levels of institutionalization of party systems in the Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine by four explanatory variables. However, there are other instrumental factors that contributed to the process of political institutionalization in these nations—such as pre-Communist historical legacy, the system of social cleavages, the effect of political culture, a link between economic and political interests of elites, etc. The analysis of these and other factors would certainly allow one to draw more comprehensive conclusions about the institutionalization of the party systems in the post-Soviet countries.

This suggested research agenda should not be viewed as an attempt to minimize the importance of many excellent studies that address the topics listed above. After all, a better and more profound understanding of the development and alteration of political institutions in the countries that experience democratic transitions and consolidations would expand our knowledge of such nations.

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Notes

1 Conceptual Framework and Operational Indicators of Political Institutionalization

1. The "old" institutionalist approach that dominated political science until the early decades of the twentieth century "was largely nontheoretical" and "was more that associated with moral philosophy and less that of empirical science" (Scott, 1995, 6). For a detailed discussion of "old" institutionalism, see also Bill and Hardgrave, 1981.
2. For more on the new institutionalist theories in social sciences see, e.g., March and Olsen, 1989; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Brinton and Nee, 2001; and Peters, 2005.
3. Another body of literature on political institutionalization focuses on legislative systems in transitional countries. For more details see note 4.
4. See Polsby, 1968, who studies institutionalization of a legislative body—the U.S. House of Representatives. Some of his indicators of institutionalization (e.g., increase in terms served by incumbent members; increase of staff aid, salaries, and other aids to members of a legislature, etc.) cannot be applied toward the measurement of institutionalization of political party systems. Therefore, I focus only on those measures that are relevant to this book.

   Polsby's article gave birth to a large body of literature on institutionalization of legislative bodies. Among them are two edited volumes, *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective* by Allan Kornberg (1973) and *Legislative Systems in Developing Countries* by G. R. Boynton and C. J. Kim (1975), Walter Opello, Jr.'s study of the Portuguese national legislature (1986), analyses of the British House of Commons by John Hibbing (1988) and the U.S. Congress by David Canon (1989), Peverill Squire's (1992) investigation of the California Assembly, Steven D. Roper and William Crowther's (1998) study of the Romanian Parliament, etc.
5. For an alternative view see Randall and Svåsand, 2002.
6. In his study of the Brazilian party system Scott Mainwaring (1999) uses essentially the same set of dimensions of political institutionalization: *stability, strong roots in society, legitimacy*, and *party organization*.
7. Gunnar Sjöblom employs a similar concept called *partyness of society* to investigate party influence in the Scandinavian countries: "[*P*]*artyness of society* refers to the role of parties in the overall society. . . . Parties may dominate interest

organizations, religious associations, promotional groups, grass roots movements, etc.—and if they do so, we may speak of 'partyness of society' " (1987, 157).

8. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) believe that data on electoral geography would be a useful indicator of the second dimension of institutionalization. However, this indicator was not used in their analysis because of insufficient comparable statistics. For more detail see Chapter 4.
9. In addition to its external aspects discussed in this chapter, autonomy has an internal facet—(in)dependence of an organization from a popular charismatic leader. See Panebianco (1988, 66–67) for a discussion of institutionalization of charismatic parties.
10. Although my external and internal dimensions of institutionalization are somewhat different from those suggested by Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand (2002), I found their discussion of these two aspects helpful for the present analysis.

2 *Autonomy* of the Party System: Recruitment into the National Legislature

1. For a current research agenda of legislative recruitment studies in Western democracies see Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Norris, 1996; Hazan, 2002.
2. For a detailed description of the electoral systems in the five nations, see chapter 9.
3. After the third cycle of elections to the national assembly, the LSDP merged with the LDDP, and the LKDP with the TS/LK.
4. *Tiesa*, March 10, 1992, in *FBIS-URS-92-047*, April 25, 1992.
5. *Lietuvos Aidas*, July 21, 1992, in *FBIS-URS-92-107*, August 24, 1992.
6. *Atgimimas*, September 14, 1992, in *FBIS-URS-92-133*, October 19, 1992.
7. *BNS*, December 12, 1995.
8. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, September 14, 1992.
9. *Atgimimas*, September 7, 1992, in *FBIS-URS-92-133*, October 19, 1992.
10. The agrarian associations' lobby was strongly represented on the LDDP list. Six members of the party's top candidates were agrarians. See *BNS*, May 16, May 20, May 23, September 9, 1996.
11. *BNS*, July 15, September 9, 1996.
12. *BNS*, August 20, 1996.
13. *BNS*, September 16, 1996.
14. See http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexElections.asp?country=LITHUANIA&election=lt20.
15. *Lietuvos Rytas*, January 26, 2004.
16. Before 1991, Supreme Soviets in all former republics of the Soviet Union were elected according to the absolute majority run-off electoral formula. Estonia became the only republic within the USSR which rejected the traditional Soviet electoral arrangements for the elections to the republican legislature

which took place in 1990, i.e., before this country received its independence. Instead, Estonia employed the single transferable vote system. For the discussion of the origination and political consequences of the 1990 electoral model in Estonia, see Ishiyama, 1994, 1996.

17. A number of pro-independence political parties, including the influential Estonian National Independence Party, did not present candidates in the 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet of Estonia. They considered the elections and the resulting legislature illegitimate because the Republic of Estonia was occupied and foreign Soviet troops were stationed on its territory.
18. See *TASS*, March 23, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV-90-058*, March 26, 1990.
19. *Sovetskaya Latvia*, March 23, April 7, April 12, 1990.
20. The electoral coalition Isamaa consisted of five political parties: the Estonian Conservative Party, the Estonian Christian Democratic Party, the Estonian Christian Democratic Union, the Republican Coalition Party, and the Estonian Liberal Democratic Party. Before the 1992 election, the first four organizations agreed to form a united party, the founding congress of which took place on November 21, 1992.
21. *Toonisson News*, no. 62, July 27–August 2, 1992.
22. The Royalists organized events such as mock pagan rites before the start of parliamentary sessions (in protest against efforts to institute a morning prayer), or shackled themselves to Tallinn's medieval town hall if they thought they have done something shameful, etc. Before the 1995 parliamentary elections the Royalists held an eating strike to protest the ruling of the National Electoral Commission which rejected some of their candidates. The eating strike was in contrast to a hunger strike held at the same location by two other candidates for the election. See *Baltic Republics Discussion List, BALT*, post 4107 "some responses to previous messages," November 26, 1993; and *Eesti Ringvaade: A Weekly Review of Estonian News*, 5.7, February 12–18, 1995.
23. The relationship between the electoral system and the development of the party system is discussed in more detail in chapter 9.
24. *BNS*, July 3, 1995.
25. Constitutional Watch, *East European Constitutional Review*, 4.2, Spring 1995.
26. *BNS*, January 16, 1995.
27. *BNS*, January 23, 1995.
28. See "The List of the Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Council of the Russian Federation," *Rossiyskaya Federatsiya*, 2 (1994).
29. *Izvestiya*, November 24, 1993.
30. The proportion of deputies who were members of the CPRF had increased when Valentin Kovalev, who ran as a non-party candidate on the slate of the Communist Party, joined this organization.
31. *Interfax*, August 27, 1995, in *FBIS-SOV-95-166*, August 28, 1995.
32. *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, January 12, 1996.
33. *ITAR-TASS*, September 4, 1995, in *FBIS-SOV-95-166*, August 28, 1995.
34. *Izvestiya*, December 23, 1995.

35. In 1999, the LDPR run as the Zhirinovsky Bloc. Russia's Choice was renamed Democratic Russia's Choice in 1995, and became the major constituent part of the Union of Rightist Forces.
36. According to an unnamed CPRF official, "Yukos paid for #15 spot on the federal list for Yuly Kvitsinsky," Russia's Ambassador to Norway. See Mereu, 2003b.
37. See chapter 10 for a discussion of the concept and developmental stages of the party of power in the post-Soviet context.
38. For a detailed analysis of the Our Ukraine electoral list submitted for the 2002 elections, see Rakhmanin and Mostova, 2002.

3 *Autonomy* of the Party System: Recruitment into the Executive Branch

1. For an analysis of the reasons and dynamics of the politization of the executive branch of government, including the presidency and the cabinet, in the French Fifth Republic, see Williams and Harrison, 1960; Suleiman, 1974; Frank Wilson, 1982; Reif, 1987.
2. For a discussion of the patterns of government recruitment in the 14 Western European countries in 1945–1984, see de Winter, 1991, 44–69.
3. *The Baltic Independent*, January 15–21, 1993
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. *BNS*, January 17, 1995.
7. *Eesti Ringvaade*, October 10, 1994.
8. *BNS*, April 5, 1995.
9. *Diena*, November 15, 1991, in *FBIS-USR-92-018*, February 25, 1992.
10. Upon Kazimiera Prunskiene's resignation on January 8, 1991, Albertas Simenas, who belonged to the Center faction in the legislature, was appointed prime minister. However, he disappeared and could not be traced during the bloody crisis on January 12–13. The Supreme Council promptly elected Gediminas Vagnorius to lead the government.
11. *Respublika*, July 24, 1992, in *FBIS-URS-92-109*, August 28, 1992.
12. In their study of Lithuanian Cabinets of Ministers, Müller-Rommel and Hansen state that the Lubys, Slezevicius, and Stankevicius governments consisted exclusively of the members of the LDDP (see 2001, Appendix 2, 217). This observation is not accurate. In addition, the names of prime ministers Lubys and Paksas are misspelled (ibid., 42, 43, 217).
13. *The Baltic Observer*, December 17–23, 1992.
14. Bronislovas Lubys was a nonparty member of the Liberal faction in the legislature, vice president of the Manufacturers' Association, and director of the huge "Azotas" production alliance.
15. *BNS*, September 22, 1994.
16. *Tiesa*, May 17, 1994, in *FBIS-USR-94-064*, June 16, 1994
17. *Tiesa*, February 15, 1994, in *FBIS-SOV-94-039*, February 28, 1994.

18. *ITAR-TASS*, June 15, 1994, in *FBIS-SOV-94-116*, June 16, 1994.
19. *BNS*, November 6, 1996.
20. The first "all-party" cabinet in Latvia was formed by Valdis Birkavs in July 1993, a month after the first postindependence elections to the Saeima. It comprised 11 ministers from Latvia's Way, including the prime minister, and 3 ministers who represented the Farmers Union. However, Müller-Rommel and Nørgaard argue that Latvia's Way was nothing more that a club of notabilities that "never had more than between 100 and 200 members. . . . The party was and is an elite coalition which brings together previous communist *nomenklatura* politicians, intellectuals, professionals of the Soviet-type middle class and representatives of Latvian diaspora. . . . Parties play only a minor role in cabinet" (2001, 35).
21. On several occasions, nonparty experts, who have been nominated by one of the ruling coalition parties, were invited to join a government. For example, a professional diplomat Sandra Kalniete served as the foreign affairs minister in the Repse government (October 2002–February 2004), and nonaffiliated Olari Taal was the interior minister in the Siimann cabinet (March 1997–March 1999).
22. See, e.g., "Res Publika Holds Congress in Tartu," *RFE/RL Analytical Reports: Baltic States Report*, September 23, 2003.
23. Often for the purpose of increasing the level of professionalism in the government its leaders tend to include representatives of ruling parties in the cabinet who have extensive prior experience in their specific area of responsibility. However, the fact that party identification is the principal criteria for eligibility for government posts occasionally leads to the appointment of inexperienced cabinet members. Aivars Aksenoks, who was appointed as the Minister of Justice in the Einars Repse cabinet in Latvia in 2002, explains, "I think that the Justice Minister must be a professional who knows about legal issues. . . . When ministries were offered to political parties, none wanted to take the judicial portfolio. I was a candidate for the job of transport minister, which would be appropriate for my education. . . . I took the [justice] job, but I did it with a heavy heart" (see "New Latvian Justice Minister . . . ," 2002).
24. *OMRI*, December 12, 1995.
25. For example, in January 1996 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin said that postelectoral cabinet changes were "only designed to make the government work better and had no relation to the elections to the State Duma" (Belin, 1996a). In August 1996 President Yeltsin described the government's new composition as "professional" and underlined that it was chosen not on the basis of private or party loyalties but on individual business qualities (see *Interfax*, August 16, 1996, in *FBIS-SOV-96–160*, August 16, 1996).
26. For a detailed description of the cabinet led by Boris Yeltsin, see Rahl, 1993.
27. *Interfax*, November 5, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV-91-216*, November 7, 1991.
28. Oleg Lobov worked with Boris Yeltsin in Ekaterinburg (former Sverdlovsk) for more than 30 years. Alexandr Rahl states that his loyalty to Yeltsin is "unwavering" (see Rahl, 1993).

29. In September 1993, Egor Gaidar replaced Oleg Lobov in the post of first deputy prime minister in charge of economic reforms.
30. In March–April 1994 both Sergey Shakhray and Aleksandr Shokhin were reappointed as deputy prime ministers of the Russian government. In November 1994 Shokhin resigned from the cabinet.
31. *Kommersant-Daily*, November 10, 1994.
32. *Jamestown Foundation: Monitor*, December 18, 1995.
33. *FBIS-SOV*, June 16, 1996
34. *RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly*, March 12, 2004.
35. Official Biographies of the Members of the Russian Federation Government, http://www.government.ru/government/officials/index.html, accessed September 5, 2004.
36. For an analysis of the political situation that led to the formation and dismissal of the Primakov cabinet, see Shevtsova and Klyamkin, 1999, 36–45.
37. See Sekarev, 1992.
38. *ITAR-TACC*, June 15, 1994, in *FBIS-SOV-94-116*, June 16, 1994.
39. *Holos Ukrainy*, May 23, 1995, in *FBIS-SOV-95-101*, May 25, 1995.
40. *Reuters*, September 10, 1996.
41. *Jamestown Foundation: Monitor*, January 12, 2000.
42. On December 10, 2003, Vitaliy Hayduk was replaced by Andriy Kluyev, who was a member of the Party of Regions.

4 *Autonomy* of the Party System: Geographical Patterns of Party Support

1. For a detailed discussion of different meanings of the concept of "nationalization" see Kawato, 1987; Jones and Mainwaring, 2003; Caramani, 2004.
2. See O'Loughlin, 2001 and Barrington and Herron, 2004 for a debate on the significance of regionalism in Ukraine.
3. See Lane and Ersson, 1999, 114–117; Allison, 1978, 877. For alternative measures of territorial homogeneity of electoral behavior and party nationalization, see also Caramani, 2004, 58–63; Jones and Mainwaring, 2003, 142–143.
4. In their study of the nationalization of party systems in the Americas, Jones and Mainwaring (2003) encountered a similar problem comparing 50 territorial units (states) in the United States and 7 provinces in Costa Rica. Their Gini-based index showed that the party system in Costa Rica (0.9) was more nationalized than the U.S. party system (0.84). The authors considered the United States as an "intermediate nationalization country" and Costa Rica as a "high nationalization country." However, similarly to the *CV*, the Gini index is sensitive to the number of units: it produces a less nationalized pattern of a party system as the number of units increases. The more comparable number of units in the two countries would most likely result in changing of their overall nationalization ranking.
5. The detailed tables that report both the *CV* and standard deviation results for each country as well as each geographical region individually within each

country are available on the Web site of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy: http://www.ukma.kiev.ua/eng_site/en/edu/under_gr/f_law/cv/dod/index.php. These tables are also available from the author (ameleshe@ukma.kiev.ua).

6. The 1993 Duma elections took place shortly after the dismissal of the Russian national legislature, which resulted in the October political crisis and the ban imposed on the CPRF. Although the CPRF was allowed to participate in the contest, elections have been conducted in a heavily controlled environment, which prevented this party to effectively compete with other electoral contenders. It must be noted that the *CV* scores of the CPRF and the LDPR, which attracted a large segment of the Communist Party's electorate, and, as a result, the mean $CV\mu$ for this election are somewhat artificial.
7. It would be appropriate to reemphasize that the *CV* is biased toward the larger number of units producing a higher coefficient value.
8. Although Latvia's Way *CV* value was low 0.110 in 2002, this party failed to overcome 5% electoral threshold and is not represented in the Eighth Saeima.

5 *Stability* of the Party System

1. See, e.g., Przeworski, 1975; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995.
2. For a discussion of the fluidity of the party system and its effects on the electoral volatility index, see Pedersen, 1983.
3. For a more detailed discussion of Unity's origin see Petrov, 2000.
4. For a detailed discussion of establishing boundaries of the party system in the five nations, see chapter 9.

7 The Role of the Old Communist Elites during the Formative Stage of the Party System

1. For discussion of historical background of the study of institutionalization, see Eisenstadt, 1965.
2. *Sovetskaya Estonia*, January 17, 1988.
3. *TASS*, November 1, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV-88-220*, November 15, 1988.
4. *Izvestiya*, November 15, 1988. Boris Kurashvili can also be credited with the idea of "a popular front in support of perestroika." In December 1997, he published an article in an academic legal journal where he introduced this concept of a political organization that proved to become a major political player in many republics of the Soviet Union (see Kurashvili, 1987, 8; Urban with Igrunov and Mitrokhin, 1997, 112).
5. See Gorbachev, 1988.
6. For example, CPSU Politburo member Vadim Medvedev said about the multiparty system in the USSR in summer 1989: "Our fundamental position on this matter has been repeatedly made clear. The point is that in the specific situation prevailing in society an emphasis on a multi-party system would inevitably belittle the party's role, lead to a weakening of the potential of

perestroika, and essentially push the country into a vague position from which it would be difficult to find a way out" (*Moskovskaya Pravda*, June 23, 1989, in *FBIS-SOV-89-134*, July 14, 1989).

7. *TASS*, November 1, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV-88-220*, November 15, 1988.
8. *Sovetskaya Litva*, February 23, 1989.
9. See *Sovetskaya Litva*, December 8, 1989.
10. The new edition of Article 6 of the Lithuanian constitution read as follows: "Parties, public organization, and public movements are set up according to the procedure established and are in effect within the framework of the Constitution and laws of the Lithuanian SSR."
11. *Sovetskaya Litva*, December 8, 1989.
12. See *Sovetskaya Latvia*, June 20, 1989.
13. For example, see Vaino Vjaljas' report on Article 6 to the CPE Central Committee Plenum in December 1989, *FBIS-SOV-89-239*, December 14, 1989.
14. In July 1989, the Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium banned Citizen's Committees organized by the Latvian National Independence Movement, the Helsinki-86 Group, and several other pro-independence organizations. The purpose of Citizen's Committees was to register citizens of pre-1040 Latvia. However, political organizations that formed Citizen's Committees were not outlawed.
15. *Sovetskaya Estonia*, May 24, 1989.
16. *Pravda*, December 8, 1989.
17. More on the transformation of views of the central CPSU leadership on "the leading party role" clause of the Soviet Constitution in December 1989–February 1900; see Gill, 1994, 98–100.
18. The new version of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution read as follows: "The CPSU, other political parties, trade unions, youth, social organizations and mass movements participate in shaping the policies of the Soviet state and in running state and social affairs through their representatives elected to the Congress of People's Deputies as well as in other ways." It should be noted that unlike the Soviet Constitution, the new version of Article 6 in Lithuania did not mention the Communist Party at all.
19. For an analysis of different methods used by the Communist Party to refuse the registration of alternative groups and block the nomination of informal candidates for the 1990 elections to the republican legislatures in Russia and Ukraine, see Tolz, 1990, 36–45.
20. For a detailed account of the mass media campaign launched by the CPU against Rukh and other national democratic forces in 1988–1991 in Ukraine, see Haran, 1993; Lytvyn, 1994.
21. *Pravda*, February 19, 1988.
22. *Pravda*, June 29, 1988.
23. See, e.g., *Pravda*, February 21, 1990. In this issue E. Kulapin, chief of the Magadan Oblast CPSU Committee Ideology Department, and S. Afanasiev, lecturer in Political Economy at Moscow State Technical School, argued

respectively against and for the introduction of a multiparty system in the Soviet Union.

24. *AFP*, September 15, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV-88-179*, September 15, 1988.
25. *TASS*, November 1, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV-88-220*, November 15, 1988
26. *TASS*, March 15, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV-88-050*, March 15, 1988; *TASS*, February 19, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV-88-035*, February 23, 1988.
27. *Morning Star*, March 24, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV-88-061*, March 30, 1988.
28. *AFP*, March 7, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV-88-45*, March 8, 1988.
29. *Radio Vilnius Domestic Service*, February 28, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV-90-040*, February 28, 1990; *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, May 24, 1990; *Kiev Radio*, August 14, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV-91-159*, August 16, 1991.

8 THE TYPE OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

1. For a detailed analysis of the nature and defining characteristics of the presidential and parliamentary forms of government, see Linz, 1990; Linz and Valenzuela, 1992, 1994; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Stepan and Skach, 1993; Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997.
2. In some countries with a popularly elected president (e.g., Haiti, Slovenia, Bulgaria), the holder of this office exercises such limited powers that scholars classify these nations as parliamentary regimes with an elected head of state. See Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997, 15.
3. The chief executive in a parliamentary system may have different official names: prime minister, chancellor, premier, head of government, etc.
4. See Valenzuela (1993) for an argument in favor of parliamentarism in Latin America.
5. See also Shugart 1993, 1998. For an alternative argument that superpresidentialism's effect on party development "is greatly overstated," see Ishiyama and Velten, 1998; Ishiyama and Kennedy, 2001. The mainstream argument about the negative political consequences of the presidentialism has been also challenged by Power and Gasiorowski, 1997.
6. For a detailed analysis of the strength of the presidency in the five nations in the Constitution and in practice, see Meleshevich, 1998.
7. According to Steven Roper (2002, 255), the Ukrainian regime falls in the "presidential-parliamentary" category.
8. Algirdas Brazauskas called the institution of presidency in Lithuania a "Paper tiger" (Nørgaard and Johannsen, 1999, 64).
9. See Banionis, 1998.
10. *Rossiyskie Vesti*, January 31, 1996.
11. *RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly*, March 12, 2004.
12. In this chapter I discuss the influence of the above-party president on the development of the party system. However, it is not a one-way street, since the strength of the party system also affects the chances of a nonparty presidential aspirant to enter and win the race. I agree with Juan Linz, who argues that institutionalized party system makes it difficult for a candidate who is not

identified with any political party "to enter into a presidential competition and even more difficult to win the competition" (see Linz, 1994, 34–36).
13. See Urban, 1992.
14. See *Khronika mnogopartiinosti (Informatsionnyi Bulleten)*, no. 4, October–December 1992.
15. *Moskovskie Novosti*, March 31–April 7, 1996, in *FBIS-SOV-96–065*, April 3, 1996.
16. *Itar-TASS*, December 1, 1999, in Colton and McFaul, 2000, 211.
17. See Balzer, 2003, 202.
18. Shortly before the 1998 parliamentary race to the Rada, Leonid Kravchuk joined the SDPU (U) and ran for the legislature on the list of this party.
19. *Uryadovyy Kuryer*, July 16, 1994, in *FBIS-SOV-94-139*, July 20, 1994.
20. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, May 31, 1994.
21. *Reuters*, April 4, 1995, in Kuzio, 1997, 90.
22. *BNS*, January 5, 1996.
23. *BNS*, November 6, 1995.
24. *BNSs* January 16, 1996.
25. *Kuranty*, January 23, 1996.
26. Arturo Valenzuela (1993) argues that a lack of cooperative legislative majorities is the fundamental weakness of presidential governments in Latin America.
27. For a discussion of structural reasons for the election of the president-" outsider" who is not identified with political parties, see Linz, 1994, 26–29.
28. See Belin, 1996c.
29. Originally, Zyuganov received the endorsement of Viktor Ampilov, the chairman of the radical Working Russia movement and one of the leaders of the Russian Communist Workers Party. However, "other hard-line communist leaders refused to fall in line, and Ampilov was removed from the Central Committee of the RCWP for his heresy" (Belin, 1996c, 13).
30. *OMRI*, July 22, 1996.
31. See *Vybir*, June 6, 1994; Arel and Wilson, 1994b.
32. See Nahaylo, 1994.
33. *OMRI*, July 19, 1996.
34. *OMRI*, October 1, 1996.
35. *Reuter*, October 13, 1996.
36. *Baltfax*, November 27, 1992.
37. *RFE/RL News*, January 5, 1993.

9 Political Consequences of the Post-Soviet Electoral Systems

1. *RFE/RL Research Institute Daily Report*, October 1, 1993.
2. See also Sartori, 1968.
3. For a discussion of the electoral debate in Estonia in 1989, as well as some political effects of STV in this former Soviet Republic, see Ishiyama, 1994, 1996.

4. For a detailed description of electoral systems in post-1991 Estonia, see Kionka, 1992, 7; Taagepera, 1995; Pettai and Kreuzer, 1999; Grofman et al., 1999, 2000; Fitzmaurice, 2001; Pettai, 2004.
5. Arend Lijphart makes a useful distinction between extreme PR and moderate PR. The former poses few barriers to small parties. The latter "limits the influence of minor parties through such means as applying PR in small districts instead of large districts or nationwide balloting, and requiring parties to receive a minimum percentage of the vote in order to gain representation" (1991, 73).
6. More on the electoral systems used in Latvia for elections of the Saeima, see Pettai and Kreuzer, 1999; Davies and Ozolins, 2001, 2004.
7. *BNS*, June 27, 1996; *OMRI*, June 28, 1996.
8. See Krupavicius, 1997; Clark, 1998; Pettai and Kreuzer, 1999; Fitzmaurice, 2003 for a more detailed description of the Lithuanian electoral model.
9. See "Constitutional Watch," *East European Constitutional Review*, 4.3 (1995). Moscow has a total population of approximately 9 million residents, or around 6 percent of Russia's 150 million population. In the 1993 elections, the parties elected 133 Moscow residents, or 59.1 percent of the 225 party-list deputies. On the 1995 electoral law debates and the further development of the electoral system in the Russian Federation see also Wyman et al., 1994; Orttung, 1995; Sakwa, 1995; Remington and Smith, 1996; Wyman, 1997; Clark, 1999, 2002; Smith and Remington, 2001.
10. *Vechirniy Kyiv*, October 9, 1993.
11. For a good analysis of the drawbacks of the 1993 Ukrainian election law see Arel and Wilson, 1994; Bojcun, 1995; Andrew Wilson, 1997a.
12. For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the Ukrainian electoral legislation see Bojcun, 1995; Birch, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2003a; Birch and Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Birch, 1999.
13. In his study of the Russian regional legislative elections Grigorii V. Golosov (2003) found that the single-member plurality system does not support party formation. At the same time, he also found that counterintuitively to expectations, the double-ballot majority formula "tend[s] to be relatively supportive of party formation" by suppressing "strong, ideologically rigid parties while opening the window of opportunity for small and flexible ones" (2003, 912, 932).
14. See Birch, 2005.
15. See The Law of Ukraine "On Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine," in *Election Law Compendium of Central and Eastern Europe* (Kyiv, Ukraine: The International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1995), 346–359.
16. Ukraine's Parliamentary Election, March 27, April 10, 1994 (Washington, DC: The Staff of the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, April 1994), in Kuzio, 1997, 14.
17. On the relationship between the electoral system and the nationalization of party politics see also Sartori, 1986 and Caramani, 2004.
18. For a detailed explanation of the methodology used in this section, see Birch, 2005.
19. *Rossiyskie Vesti*, August 3, 1993, in *FBIS-URS-93-111*, August 25, 1993.

20. See The Verkhovna Rada Election in Ukraine. March 27–April 10, 1994 (Kyiv: Report of the Democratic Elections in Ukraine Observation and Coordination Center, Part One, 1994), in Kuzio, 1997.
21. Most earlier investigations of mixed electoral systems either represented single-country studies (Bawn, 1993) or lacked a sufficient cross-national empirical base (Blais and Massicotte, 1996).
22. The Laasko and Taagepera effective number of political parties is calculated according to the following formula:

    $N = 1/\sum pi^2$

    where pi = any party's decimal of the vote (vi) or seats (si).

    Arend Lijphart explains how to interpret the Laasko and Taagepera index: "In a two-party system with two equally strong parties, the effective number of parties is exactly 2.00. If one party is considerably stronger than the other, with, for instance, respective vote or seat shares of 70 and 30 per cent, the effective number of parties is 1.72—in accordance with our intuitive judgment that we are moving away from a pure two-party system in the direction of a one-party system. Similarly, with three exactly equal parties, the effective number formula yields a value of 3.00. If one of these parties is weaker than the other two, the effective number of parties will be somewhere between 2.00 and 3.00, depending on the relative strength of the third party" (Lijphart, 1994, 69).

    For a more detailed explanation of this index, as well as other measurements of fractionalization of the party system, see also Laakso and Taagepera, 1979; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989.
23. See also Shvetsova, 1999; Moser, 2001.
24. *OMRI, Special Report*, November 21, 1995.
25. *RFE/RL Newsline*, February 20, February 27, 1998.
26. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, May 16, 1995, in *FBIS-SOV-95-096*, May 18, 1995.
27. See Lapaeva, 1995.
28. For a detailed discussion of the 2001 Law on Political Parties of the Russian Federation, see Bacon, 2004.

10 "Parties of Power" and the Party System

1. Some scholars define a party of power not as a political bloc but as "a strategy needed for the adaptation of the elites, which lack experience of electoral participation, to the new institutional environment" (Golosov and Likhtenshtein, 2001, 6). See also Mäkinen, 2004.
2. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, October 2, 1999, in Hale, 2004.
3. Most experts of post-Soviet politics identify Russia's Choice as the first party of power in the Russian Federation. However, I agree with Andrey Ryabov that it does not belong to this category. Russia's Choice was a distinct ideological formation that firmly stood behind a strategy and policy of radical market reforms (Andrey Ryabov, 2005). Although Russia's Choice during the "kamikaze" government of Egor Gaidar had some features of a party of power,

it took an unambiguous responsibility for the market shock therapy and lost the 1993 election as a result.

4. See Duverger, 1963.
5. For a discussion of the origin of the parliamentary group "Center" in the Ukrainian national assembly see Karatnycky, 1995, 124–125.
6. See Mostova and Rakhmanin, 2002.

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