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**ZIONISM**  
**AND**  
**WORLD POLITICS**





# ZIONISM AND WORLD POLITICS

*A Study in History and  
Social Psychology*

BY  
HORACE MEYER KALLEN, PH. D.  
OF THE  
NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH



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TO  
**JACOB AND RUTH BILLIKOPF**



## PREFACE

**THERE** are two types of prejudices about the Jews —those entertained by Jews, and those entertained by non-Jews. The former are rooted in an invincible vanity, expressed in the conception of the “Chosen People,” reinforced by tradition, and confirmed and automatically justified as a psychological mechanism of self-defence by the tragic status of the Jew in the religious doctrine and social practices of the Christian world. The latter arises primarily out of the implications of the Christian religious system, which gives the Jew a cosmic centrality unparalleled by the status of other peoples, even while it outlaws him from the fellowship of mankind. Both sets of prejudices are the creations of the passions of hope and fear. Both can be much mitigated, if not entirely dissipated, by knowledge. Both have indeed undergone noticeable modification through the expansion of science and the growth of the objective studies of social groups and social events. Prejudices, however, being the symbols of feeling and not of understanding, die hard. Their lives are the longer in the degree in which they are implicated in those massive sentiments of society whose vital spark is emotion involving the fear of death and the hope of salvation, and whose body is an ancient tradition and a tissue of customs concerned, in however

fanciful a manner, with the alleviation and gratification of these feelings. Any sudden interruption of the normal current of sentiment and behaviour, any break or shift in the continuity of social action, any cataclysm or catastrophe, throws these emotions into intense activity and revivifies the whole dead mass of past fancies, ideas, imaginings, doctrines, and practices, no matter how silly and absurd they may be. The Great War has done this with respect to wide areas of the historic field of religion and superstition. It has done this also with respect to the Jews. The misery and unhappiness of the race in central Europe can be measured by the intensity of their compensatory hope toward Zion, and the misery and unhappiness of their Gentile neighbours can be measured by the sensibility with which they respond to revivals, in somewhat modernized guise, of mediæval opinions about Jews by militarist, royalist conspirators from Germany, Russia, Hungary, Poland, acting with malice prepense. The mood of central Europe is a poison which has infected, not without purposive assistance from these same conspirators, England, France, the United States. There has rarely been a time when the truth about the Jews was so needful as an antidote to prejudice regarding the Jews among both Jews and Gentiles.

It is the truth about the Jews which I have sought, as a psychological and philosophic student of history, to set down, so far as in my power lay, in this book. The studies of which it consists were begun in 1915, long before there was any suspicion of the terrible shattering of the structure of European society which is the outcome of the war to make the world safe for

democracy. The continuation of them was modified by American participation in the war, which gave them, willy-nilly, a somewhat different direction than was originally intended. Some of the events here recorded and analyzed I have participated in directly; others, I have been a close witness of. Many I have studied, prior to the Peace Conference, as a member of the Government inquiry into the terms of peace headed by Colonel House, in the light of the probable needs of the American delegation there for correct information. Portions of the studies, being pertinent to special occasions, have been previously printed. These are the sections of the early chapters which deal with the evolution of European nationalism and its influence on the Jewish position, a section of the chapter on American Jewry, and an abridgment of the last chapter. They appeared, respectively, in the *International Journal of Ethics*, the *American Jewish Chronicle*, and the *Menorah Journal*.

To Leo Wolman and Wesley Clair Mitchell, my colleagues at the New School for Social Research, I am indebted for much valuable criticism and suggestion; to Miss Lurene MacDonald, the Librarian at the School, for assistance in the classification of the material and preparing the index; to my ever-helpful sister, Ida Kallen, and to my old friend and pupil, Marvin Lowenthal, for aid in reading the manuscript and getting it ready for the press; to my dear fellow-worker, Julian W. Mack, for help with the proof and many valuable suggestions and corrections. These acknowledgments can only scantily express what I owe them.

H. M. KALLEN.

*The New School for Social Research.*





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**ZIONISM**  
**AND**  
**WORLD POLITICS**



# Zionism and World Politics

## CHAPTER I

### PIONEER, O PIONEER

FIFTY miles southward from Lemberg, in the direction of Odessa, there is a hostel owned and managed by a Polish Jew. His inn is a house by the side of the road, and since 1914 all manner of men have taken shelter in it. It has survived a hundred battles and five campaigns, shabbier and more rickety after each one, but still offering a roof over the head, and, on rare occasions when its owner can make a dicker with the peasants, a bite to eat. Most of its guests bring their own food, according to their rank and station, generals from Austrian and Russian armies, Polish and Ukrainian raiders, once even Soviet cavalry, French and British military emissaries, American Red Cross men and Y. M. C. A. workers. On occasion women and children of the country have taken refuge in its cellars, until the military pest should pass. Its bar has seen unspeakable cruelties committed upon non-combatants. To-day its guests are mostly young Jews and Jewesses, on their way to Palestine.

The road beside which the inn stands is one of the barbarous ungraded roads of Slavic Europe. It is long and narrow and uncared for, pitted with deep holes, and speckled with hummocks. Throughout

the greater part of the year it is an unending ditch of black, sticky mud.

Throughout the greater part of the year came these young Jews and Jewesses—tramping, tramping, tramping, slowly, painfully, unflinchingly on their way to Palestine. Often their feet burst through their worn shoes or are so swollen that they cannot bear to put shoes upon them; their clothes are rags, and they lean upon sticks as they walk. They carry no food in their knapsacks and bundles, and there is no money in their purses. The tavern-keeper takes them in, gives them shelter and, so well as he can, feeds them. For they are on their way to Palestine.

They are very young—these pilgrims—some no more than sixteen, the oldest no more than twenty-five. Some have been on the way for many, many months; others have come quickly—in a day or two days. They come from everywhere. One may be the last surviving son of a Berlin manufacturer, ruined by the Great War. Another may be the only child of a merchant of Nijni Novgorod; a third, a rabbinical student from the Yeshibah at Lodz; a fourth, an ex-secretary of the Bund in Warsaw, a fifth, a medical student; a sixth, a musician—and so on. Few of them set out in companies. Their companies form and dissolve by the wayside, like clouds adrift in the summer sky. Each reveals a spirit, an urge, that carries his frail body on, alone, tramping, tramping, tramping toward Palestine. They take their night's rest in the tavern of their fellow-Jew, and in the morning pass on their way through the endless mud of the endless road.

Their like is to be found everywhere—in Warsaw, in Berlin, in Kovno, in Bukharest, in Kishineff, in

Vienna, in Constantinople. They come from universities and gymnasia, from Talmudical colleges and from schools of music and art. And everywhere they are fed and housed as in the tavern fifty miles southward of Lemberg, owned and managed by a Polish Jew.

Officers of the Red Cross, agents of the American Jewish Relief Committee, emissaries of the Zionist Organization see them in these places and converse with them. They ask for nothing, save to be helped as quickly as possible to Palestine. They are all of high sensibility and delicate nurture. They have all undergone inconceivable hardships; some have suffered intolerable indignities on their long way, often of a thousand miles, on foot. They speak of these things without bitterness, without complaint. They wish only to get to Palestine. To reach Palestine they will endure everything, they will stop at nothing. They have heard that it is to be the national home of the Jewish people. They have dedicated themselves to build it up. They are the *Halutzim*, the pioneers.

To them who know the story they bring to mind nothing so much as the Children's Crusade.

Yet they are not like those crusaders, persons of mediæval faith and believing passion. They are intellectuals, with the scepticisms and the deliberations of the modern point of view ingrained in their mental habit and established as their spiritual method. In their regard Palestine has been, from among the many alternatives in the rebuilding of their own lives and the lives of the peoples of Europe out of the ruins of the war, their considered choice. It is not by an alarm that they are moved. If in them the House of

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Jacob has once more arisen and gone forth, it is because, they say, they have willed that it should be so. They are at once the embodiment, the victims and the vindicators of that ever-young passion toward Zion which has been the animating spirit of the Jew through the generations and which now seems to be on the threshold of its consummation, converting the Zionist into the Judean.



## CHAPTER II

### THE ORIGIN AND BASIS OF ZIONISM

ZIONISM is the contemporary phase of an unyielding loyalty, a practical idealism, which is without parallel in European history for constancy, duration, and force. Crossed by all the currents of aspiration and disillusion that were the changing mind of Europe for two thousand years, this loyalty or idealism remained, until recently, distinct in itself. It is the Jewish aspect, older than its setting, of that hunger for safety and happiness which, in the century before the beginning of the Christian era, gripped the civilization of the Mediterranean in an other-worldly grip, spread in later years to all Europe, and held it, with all its mutations, to the present day. The old Zionism whose heart is the hope of a new Zion was coeval with the moral surrender of the Stoic. It antedated the passionate other-worldliness of early Christianity. It confronted, and survived, the religious imperialism of the Church Triumphant when that was efficacious. It underwent the impact of the newer protestant order. It met the challenge and fecundation of science and free thought, of naturalism and secularism. And it has emerged, more essentially continuous with itself, more essentially like what it was in its beginnings than any other aspiration or adventure which the great tradition of Europe knows.

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Of this tradition the biography of Zionism is an integral part, both soil and substance of its ancient roots, and leaf and branch of its spreading life, seeking the free air and the sun. Its nature is at once that of a vision and that of an adventure. Of a vision, because it sets forth no incarnate and existing society, no operating association of men. Of an adventure, because it never altogether lost grips with reality, never was quite cut off from the spot of tangible earth which might be not only sought, but found and touched and, in spite of all disillusion, loved, in the world of living men and real things. To make this spot of earth once more theirs in fact as it was in spirit, men and women of Jewish blood, generation after generation, during two thousand years, abandoned their all and went apilgrimming toward the Promised Land. Zionism is simply to-day's phase of the unyielding effort of the Jewish people to make good the Promise of the Promised Land.

This Promised Land, glamour though much of it is, is yet no Land of Beulah, no Kingdom of Heaven in regions supernal. It is a definite piece of the earth's surface, of definite dimensions, bordering on the Mediterranean and lying at the junction of the three continental masses of the Eastern Hemisphere. It has been the battle ground of the civilizations of antiquity. It has been the motherland of the dominant religions of the western world. The names of its mountains and its valleys, of its cities and towns and villages, have been woven into the texture of the mind of Europe. For a thousand years its chief city was regarded as the centre of the very universe and all its places as holy places. Yet important as has been the rôle of these

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and of the land that holds them in the life of mankind, that importance is of small degree beside the rôle of this land in the life and labours of the Jewish people. It is from the latter, in fact, that the former derives. Palestine has been the centre of the Jewish theory of life and the Jews' outlook on the world. Their national tradition is built around it. Entering it, staying in it, being driven from it, returning to it, are the instigating motives of their historic narratives, of their prophetic books, of their psalms, their liturgy, their prayers, their collective endeavour in the community of mankind. No people in history has identified itself in joy and in sorrow, and always in aspiration, so completely with a single land, and a land which the great majority of their generations have known only in prayer, in idea, in vision, for a thousand years.

This identification is itself a universally accepted commonplace of the great tradition of the Western world. The connection between the Jew and Palestine, the connection between Palestine and the Jew is customary, natural, a matter of course even to the least literate of Europeans. So, also, by and large, is the reunion of these two that have been separated.

The original source of these commonplaces of the European mind is of course that body of varied documents, sacred to Jew and Christian alike: the Bible. A secondary but equally potent source is Christian theology. According to the biblical narrative, the history of the Jews as a people may be said to begin with the hope of the Promised Land, with the consciousness of a goal to be attained collectively, in return for the assumption of a collective obligation to a super-

natural being. This consciousness in the course of time converted a congeries of tribes into a nation, and the nation into a self-conscious aspirant toward that righteousness without which must come disaster. Israel, in a word, regarded himself as a "chosen people." Between him and Jehovah there is a contract. Israel is to devote himself to the exclusive service and worship of Jehovah: Jehovah, in return, is to lead Israel to the Promised Land, to keep him and to prosper him there. The service and worship of Jehovah and the prosperity and growth of the nation in Zion were functions of one another. How, under the influence of the changes from a nomadic to an agricultural order of life, the nature and terms of the contract changed; how, under the propaganda of the prophets, from Amos to Isaiah, ritual in the service of Jehovah was replaced by righteousness; how national security became correlative, in idea at least, with social justice, are commonplaces of all critical histories of the ancient Jews. Already in Amos the prophetic philosophy of history is manifest: Divine Law requires justice and loving-kindness between men and states; disobedience of this law is followed by disaster, brought through God's will by one state upon another, all states and kings being merely the tools and servants of God. This philosophy is already ripe in the sermons of Jeremiah, but tradition accords supreme excellence to the expression given it by the second Isaiah. Applied to the domestic history and foreign relations of the Jewish state, it interpreted national defeat at the hands of enemies of Israel as the consequence of domestic iniquity, and national survival and national victory as coincident with domestic righteousness. Righteousness became

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the condition of political and military security. Expulsion from the Promised Land was, hence, the consequence of sin, and return thereto would be the reward of a return to righteousness.

Events subjected this philosophy to a drastic test. That it did not possess a monopoly over the thinkers of Israel may be seen from the theory of life promulgated in the Book of Job, which divorces fortune from morals altogether, but there is in the prophetic theory a certain compensatory dimension, a quality of consolation and justification, which renders it more relevant than the Joban theory to the aboriginal hopes of men and to Nature's disregard of them. Carried to its logical limit, it must lead the man who has been righteous but unfortunate all his life to the conception of another life and another world beyond Nature, in which he will be fortunate as well as righteous, and in which the wicked will be unfortunate as well as wicked. This is precisely what Christianity, once extended beyond the bounds of Jewry, did. But the Jews then and there did not go so far. For them, reward and punishment were here and now, where sin and virtue were, and the hope of good fortune for the righteous was a hope for this world and not another. Particularly was this the case for a whole people, a nation, whose span of life overarches the brief mortality of the individual. The people of Israel, banished from its land for its unrighteousness, should be restored for its righteousness. This was Jehovah's promise, and in this promise his people might take comfort. The restoration would be bodily, political, physical. It would install an era of international peace and international comity, the rule of law replacing the

rule of force and the life of coöperation, the life of conflict.

And it shall come to pass in the end of days,  
 That the mountain of the Lord's house shall be estab-  
 lished in the top of the mountains,  
 And shall be exalted above the hills;  
 And all nations shall flow into it.  
 And many people shall go and say:  
 "Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord,  
 To the house of the God of Jacob;  
 And he will teach us of His ways  
 And we will walk in His paths."  
 For out of Zion shall go forth the law,  
 And the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.  
 And He shall judge between the nations  
 And shall decide for many peoples;  
 And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares  
 And their spears into pruning-hooks;  
 Nation shall not lift up sword against nation,  
 Neither shall they learn war any more.<sup>1</sup>

Dithyrambs such as this, of different imagery, but of the same identical spirit and outlook, are scattered throughout all the prophetic books. They are the well-springs of subsequent Jewish speculation about the nature and destiny of the Jewish people, from the primal passions of the prophets to the sophisticated formulations of modern Jewish theology-mongers. The conception of the "mission" of Israel, which the latter make so much of, springs from them, and the Jewish repudiation of that conception springs equally from them. They underlie the Jew's loyalty to his law or *Torah*, and the invincible optimism with which the mass of the Jewish people have clung to it. "This

<sup>1</sup>Isaiah II, 1-5.

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is the law," says the daily prayer, "which Moses set before the Children of Israel, according to the word of the Lord. To all who cling unto her, she is a tree of life, and it is well with those who depend upon her. Her ways are ways of kindness, and all her surrounding is peace." The real and adequate practice of the law, however, the prayer-book also tells us, can be achieved only in the Promised Land, nor can the law prevail among the nations until the restoration to the Promised Land is accomplished.

This restoration, from the first exile in the seventh century before the beginning of the Christian era through the first millennium after it, is conceived in political terms. The prophets, indeed, are politicians and statesmen, concerning themselves with both domestic and foreign problems, and using "the word of the Lord" as authority for their political doctrine and social policy. The "law" which they preached, as we have it in Deuteronomy and Leviticus, is an obvious response to the challenge of the injustices of ancient—and for that matter, of modern—society. The ideal of international peace under a general law for all nations is the outcome of the bitter political experience of a small state situated at the junction point between the competing military imperialisms of Asia and Africa. The Prophets were nothing if not *realpolitiker* with a passion for the preservation of Israel for Zion and of Zion for Israel, and they grew to realize that the only device by which this could be secured was an international order and a single law. After the manner of the ancients, they attributed to this law a divine origin and sanction, and described its rule as the rule of God. But the substance of their

vision is not other than that of the vision of all internationalists who regard the realities of the relations between nations and states and hope for their improvement. It was evoked by the same recurrent causes: how could it have other than the same essence?

Their glory is that they were the first in all the world to envisage and to utter that essence, but they uttered it, none the less, out of the fervour of their patriotism, and not because they had blurred the living diversities of mankind in an unreal abstraction, labelled "HUMANITY." Prophetic "universalism" did not abolish the nations, it harmonized the nations; and it was nationalistic to the point of giving to Israel a dominant tone in the international harmony, and to Zion the foremost place. Indeed, when it was most "universal," it was most actively nationalistic, for the rhythms of deutero-Isaiah, the utterances of Zechariah and of Haggai framed the conspiracy to restore the independence of the Kingdom with Zerubbabel, servant of the Lord, scion of the House of David, for King.<sup>1</sup> Behind the conspiracy was an urge to independence and to freedom from the foreign yoke which never subsided so long as there was the semblance of a Jewish government in Palestine. When prophet gave way to priest as the master of the mind of Judea, it was the unconscious cause of the friction between the native and the foreign administrations. It underlay the successive resistances, both spiritual and physical, to Persian and Greek conquerors. It animated the Hasmonean uprising and found itself in the Hasmonean independence, and when the alliance with Rome which was to guard that independence became its ravisher, it took

<sup>1</sup>Zechariah vi, 9-15.



the form of the new schisms within the state; the resistance to Herod, the hope of a champion, of a Messiah like Judas Maccabæus; the rebellion against Titus and the final uprising and brief success of Bar Kochba. Even after the terrible revenge which the imperial government took for that uprising, the will of the Jews for a free Zion remained unbroken. Oppressed and persecuted by emperor after emperor, particularly after Christianity had become the imperial religion, they had strength enough to join in the seventh century the invading Persians against the Romans, in the hope of reëstablishing their ancient state. That hope was again disappointed. When the country reverted to Byzantium, the monks persuaded the Emperor Heraclius to exterminate the Jews. Those who escaped joined their brethren in Egypt and elsewhere in the mediterranean world, to hope anew.

The most lasting thing which these exiles, like all their kind, carried with them was, then, this hope of the restoration to Palestine. It dominated the liturgy and the poetry of the exile; it governed Jewish policy and suffused the Jewish outlook. It underlies the organization of the Jewish communal economy, contributing elements in the practice of the ritual and the observation of the seasons. For a thousand years it continued to be an aspiration of practical political import, reënforced with religious faith. Wherever a Jewish community was to be found, then as now, the prayer could be heard: "For our sins have we been banished from our country and removed far from our land," together with the invocation for the return to Zion, for the reëstablishment of the Davidic throne, for the realization of the prophetic pledge. "We cannot,"

says the prayer, "in our banishment serve Thee according to Thy commandment." "Next year in Jerusalem," is a change rung again and again in the liturgy both of week days and Sabbaths, and of holydays. It links itself with the political activities of a whole millennium: hardly a century passed in which the Jews of one country or another were not called upon by a self-proclaimed Messiah to gird up their loins and, by miracle or militancy, win back to Zion. In fifth-century Crete, one Moses, assuming miracles, led his people into the sea, where most were drowned. David Alroy, again in the twelfth century, actually succeeded in developing a military adventure strong enough six hundred years later to rouse the imagination of Beaconsfield, who made a novel about him. The expectancy of a political restoration, under the leadership of an earthly Messiah, was a commonplace in the mood of Europe. It is sharply evinced in the tenth-century letter of Chasdai ibn Shaprut to the King of the Chazars, judaized by conversion; and it is literally accepted by non-Jewish Europe. To the Christian mind, no less than to the Jewish, Palestine is the Jewish land and the Jews are the Palestinian people, foreign to Europe, absent from their own land, and in the fulness of time to be returned to it. The equity of the Jew in Palestine has remained a strand in the great tradition of the Christian world. The return of this chosen people to this promised land was regarded by multitudes as an essential preliminary to the second coming of the Saviour, and the fulfilment of the forecasts of Christian eschatology. To Christians of the first millennium this return was more deeply implicated in a system of supernaturalism than to the Jews, but however implicated, it was expected.

The development and final enthronement of a similar supernaturalism among the Jews were accomplished in the twelfth century. The position of the Jews in European countries grew steadily worse. Disability and persecution were multiplied, and the temper of the Crusades brought them to a climax. Under the circumstances, the notion of a naturalistic, though divinely predetermined, restoration which should be salvation from horror and evil, could not withstand the assault of misfortune. That the restoration must come, the Jews of the world became more and more convinced: how else could Israel escape alive out of the inferno which the Church Militant had made for them of their lives? But that it could come out of their own strength, a natural eventuality of the process of history, was no longer conceivable. They were too weak, too battered, impotent against their persecutors. Only the might of a miracle could save them and restore them. And as the figure and mode of their salvation had already been established in tradition and legend as Messiah the son of David, this Messiah acquired a more and more supernatural character.

Already in the beginnings of the Messianic legend there had been a potential differentiation between an earthly and a heavenly Messiah. The failure of the earthly Messiahship of the leader of the little sect that later developed into the Christian multitude led to the immediate compensation of the other-worldly ideal which is the Messiahship of the Christian; salvation from evil and happiness both became heavenly things: earth was regarded as a trial and a transition, to be abandoned and spurned. The Messiah was God

and the Son of God, miserable on earth but omnipotent in the universe. This ideal denial of real failure the Jews had refused to accept. They fought and hoped on for twelve hundred years. And when, finally, misfortune and the contagion from their intellectual and emotional setting made other-worldliness a part of their outlook, it did not become the overruling part. The Messiah became a supernatural figure indeed, preëxisting, and destined to conquer the enemy and persecutor and to restore Israel by means of miracle, but the end achieved was still to be a natural and historic end continuous with the rest of the movement of history, even if the means were to be discontinuous and supernatural. From the twelfth century on, the self-proclaimed Messiahs are more and more miracle-workers, philosophasters, men of a psychopathic strain. Their moral and intellectual settings are misery, magic, and mysticism, the two latter being the complement of, and escape from, the former. For the same reason the puerilities of the Kabbala became constitutional to their outlook and Kabbalism itself a dominant influence on the mind and fortunes of Jewry. But the misery and the compensatory supernaturalism reached their height in the seventeenth century. Their symbol was the false or pseudo-Messiah, Sabbattai Zevi of Smyrna. Only that he was a charlatan, weak and without integrity, not that he was a false Messiah, must be regarded a reproach to him. All Messiahs are false when they fail, for the success of works, not faith, is the only proof of true Messiahship, and how is the success of works to be achieved by the means and attributes of the Messiahs of thaumaturgy? The importance of Sabbattai Zevi was due to the European

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character of his influence. Not only Jews fell under it. It touched statecraft and affected the policies of the world. It is the ironic and picturesque expiration of a period in the history of the European struggle for democracy.

## CHAPTER III

### RELIGIOUS IMPERIALISM AND THE JEWISH POSITION

THE year 1648 is a momentous one in the history of Europe. It is the year of the Peace of Westphalia and of the formation of the Puritan Commonwealth in England. It marks the end of over a hundred years of warfare and the final overthrow of a political principle which had dominated Europe to its hurt since the Council of Nicæa, in the 325th year of the Christian era. This was so built into the social system of the Christian world that much of the history of this world might be described as a narrative of the methods hit upon or chosen to evade or oppose it. The principle might be designated, briefly, as the principle of religious imperialism. It was a new thing when it was promulgated. The ancient and pagan world knew nothing about it. It came to Europe as a logical implication of the Christian philosophy of life, and the status and fate of the Jews were closely bound up with it. Although the religions of the states of antiquity, Athens, or Sparta, or Corinth, or Judea, or Rome, were state religions, they did not imply intolerance toward the gods of other states, particularly when those states were not at war. Between these gods and their worshippers there was held to be a certain community, looking back to a community of blood, which gave the gods a prerogative and monopoly on the reverence

and worship of the citizens, and the citizens a claim to priority on the good-will and protection of the gods. All gods, as we see most conspicuously in the case of Jehovah, had certain tribal, civic, national predilections and obligations, even when most universal and all-embracing in their divinities. They remained to a great degree chthonic, with larger powers and jurisdiction over special places, and very specific centres of worship and residence. The men of the ancient world expressed this divine economy by paying due reverence to the gods of the lands in which they travelled or sojourned. Even military conquerors, like Alexander, in a day so late as his, worshipped at the shrines of the divinities whose lands they had devastated and implored them for favour and coöperation. Later and more sophisticated times retained this sense of chthonic over-lordship, and the Romans made it a practice to remove the religious holies from the lands of their conquest to appropriate sanctuaries in Rome. The protective power of the divinities, it was supposed, would then accrue to the state of their domicile. Thus pagan Rome was not only tolerant of, but hospitable to, the diversity of religions and of the nationalities of which religions were among the distinguishing marks. The growth of the empire, in fact, exercised in this regard a liberalizing influence, in that it necessitated a very large degree of differentiation between citizenship and cult. Because of the tribal background of the small city-states and of their tradition of blood-brotherhood and common ancestry, an alien could rarely become a citizen, even in Athens, the freest of them: he could only be a righteous stranger, as the Bible has it, a sojourner, entitled to justice, but not to

participation in the intimacies of the state's life. The empire founded by Alexander, which had a sharply conscious missionary character, continued this tradition. Although it imposed Greek forms of political and social organization and Greek habits of life and thought upon the mediterranean world, it did not establish a common citizenship which should be detached from the local society wherein the privileges of citizenship had to be predominantly exercised. This was an achievement of Roman imperialism.

Roman imperialism, preoccupied from the outset with maintaining the Roman hegemony, the *pax Romana* of the Roman legions and the Roman law, left local customs and practices intact, indeed subsidized and encouraged them. Nationalities and cults flourished and had heyday in the empire so long as they were considered not to be dangerous to the state. Until the advent of Christianity there were no religious persecutions in Rome. There was police and military action against political criminals, who practised or were supposed to practise a doctrine subversive of loyalty to the state. Otherwise, freedom of thought, of belief and cult was, as in some places in recent times, untrammelled. Had they not been, Christianity never could have made headway against its rivals. When, for reasons of his own, Constantine made Christianity the religion of the state, the empire was thrown back to the position of the city-state which it had outgrown, and worse. This deteriorative reversion was inevitable from the assumptions of Christianity itself. For these assumptions the Judaism of the priests, as distinguished from the Hebraism of the prophets, has its own responsibility. So long



as men admit that alternatives are possible to any theories or doctrines they may entertain, the rigours of intolerance and the arrogances of infallibility cannot develop. Experience remains the court of last resort in the judgment of truth. Truth remains a thing not primary but eventual, and this eventuality in the knowledge of what is true and what is false among alternatives keeps them more or less equal, and bars intolerance. This was the case with the congeries of national divinities of most of the city-states of the ancient world. With hieratic Judaism there came, however, a difference. It assumed the sole and exclusive right to the acquisition and possession of the truth, as revelation. Everything else, consequently, no matter what it was, nor how or where it came from, had to be regarded as error. Truth being given finally and completely, its possessor was infallible, and debate, experiment, the whole intellectual enterprise, the scientific attitude of mind, became malice and perversity. Difference became either concealed agreement or blasphemous defence of error. For people to whom Holy Scripture was the sum and substance of all wisdom, the philosophers and scientists must needs be either its interpreters or its enemies, and were so held.

When the Christian sectaries made of the script which had become to the Jews the revealed word of God their own holy, adding thereto the New Testament, they also made their own the assumption of infallibility of hieratic Judaism. The adoption of Christianity as the state religion gave them the force wherewith to make this assumption effective. Citizenship became conditional on conformity to certain artificial

standards of right doctrine, those opinions which failed to conform being, *ex hypothesi*, false, and the judges of the failure being the ruling class to whom the guardianship of the standards had accrued. The Jews were, by the implications of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, non-conformists, and hence without title to citizenship. Imperial edict deprived them of it in the year 339, and the bulk of them have remained thus deprived to the present day. In the course of time all infidels, non-conformists, dissenters, heretics, became automatically outlaws, and a large portion of the history of European civilization is the history of an attempt, on the one side to crush them out, by fire and sword, on the other side to compel their acquiescence by force or persuasion. No doubt other motives than the religious were involved; no doubt the latter was often used as an excuse for other types of greed and aggression, but until the Reformation and after, it remained the foremost in the consciousness of Europe.

To the consciousness of Europe the world was basically an Augustinian epic. Eternal and Omnipotent God, it held, had created in six days' time a perfect world. This perfection would never have lapsed if Adam had not of his own free will disobeyed the command of Eternal and Omnipotent God. His disobedience brought death into the world and all our woe. It caused his banishment from Paradise. The sin, original with him, became a hereditary, constitutional, outstanding element in the nature of all his offspring. All, together with the world God made for them, were deserving of, and under God's justice were predestined to, eternal destruction, had God's mercy not prevailed

against God's justice and provided atonement. At various times, hence, he manifested himself to a selected portion of the sons of Man, to the seed of Abraham, namely. To these he delivered his law, with the view of an eventual atonement for Adam's original sin, and the redemption of man from the penalty of it. Hence the incarnation and the crucifixion. These are the atonement, vicarious of course, but none the less the salvation of those predestined to believe. Such, predestinate from the beginning of time, are the citizens of the City of God, of the Church catholic, universal. All others are citizens of the City of the World. The Jews, particularly, belong to this latter city. They had been God's first chosen. To them he had revealed himself, with them had made his covenant, to them had sent as Messiah his only-begotten son who was only another form of himself, for the redemption of sin-cursed mankind. And they had rejected the Messiah and had had him nailed to the cross. For this God rejected them in their turn and cursed them to live under the ban of his rejection, outcast from the community of the saved, plying forbidden vocations in disaster and dispersion until the second coming of the Messiah of the Lord, and the restoration at his hands.

This eschatology, furthermore, was inextricably interwoven with the social system of the feudal order, a system that has its maximum ideal expression in the bull *Unam Sanctam*. It is a thing of logic tempered by rebellion, resting consciously in metaphysics as few social systems have. Its basis is the omnipotence of God, without whose sustaining grace nothing can be or come to be. But this sustaining grace is not

regarded as being distributed equally and impartially among all the children of God. Existence is a hierarchy and its parts are related as the links of a pendent chain. Each hangs from the other, without which it would fall into the abyss. Since the greatest strain is on the highest link, in that must be concentrated the greatest power, and as there is no strain to speak of on the lowest link, least power is needed or belongs in that. The highest link, directly pendent on God, is the Pope, his vicegerent on earth, the visible symbol and concretion of the Church universal. In him, consequently, must be the maximum concentration of the grace of God. From him it passes downward and outward, to the princes of the Church and the temporal power, like light decreasing in intensity with its distance from the source, so that when it finally reaches the peasant serf there is enough left for the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, marriage, and burial, but nothing else. Everybody in society depends on somebody higher up, and woe to the man who has no overlord to depend upon. He is a "masterless man," without status or right, the prey of any power strong enough to seize him.

The enforcement of this social system, save in the case of the serfs and the Jews, was never complete. The temporal struggled against the arrogations of the ecclesiastical power, emperors against popes, kings against emperors, noblemen of lesser rank against kings, cities against dynasts, and on occasion even the peasants rose. The great majority of these conflicts were, however, conflicts within a framework of unanimity. The hand of every man was against the infidel, the dissenter, the non-conformist. The Inquisition

was as impartial as the temporal power was debauched. Religious imperialism was stronger than political imperialism and for a long time succeeded in maintaining by force as truly catholic a unanimity as, human nature being what it is, was humanly possible. One dissentient sect after another arose and went down before this force, from the Arians, Lollards, Hussites, to the Huguenots. The Jews alone, in the heart of Europe, underwent without resistance a religious war waged against them by the whole of Europe, and survived it. They were the everlasting protestants.

But the conscience of Europe was not freed until the mutual interplay and rivalry of religious and dynastic interests brought about that military confrontation in religious terms which we know as the Wars of the Reformation. Those wars, quite as much a conflict of dynasties for empire as of doctrines for domination, and carried on almost continuously for nearly a century and a half, finally destroyed the imperialism of religion in Europe. They left the continent a desert, the feudal order shattered, the local sovereign an autocrat, and the peasantry almost destroyed. But particularly they left the mind of Europe free from the central fixation to which religious imperialism had compelled it, and both the misery and enterprise of Europe free for intellectual adventure. The destruction of the imperialism of the Church converted it into the opportunist foe of the temporal power, and its theorists, like the Jesuit brothers Mariana and Suarez, opposed the people to the kings and superimposed the Church on both. Protestantism itself, again, by setting the authority of the Bible against that of the Pope and abolishing intermediaries between

God and the hearts of men, struck at all authority, political as well as ecclesiastical. The idea of the natural rights of man was used to confront the tradition of the divine rights of kings. Political doctrine took imaginative wings. The challenge to sovereignty was made effective in England by a formal trial and genuine execution of a king according to the law of the land above which he had, as its supposititious source, been held to be. In the rest of Europe this challenge became a potential menace, working in the background of men's thoughts, and bursting now and then into the foreground in action.

But if men found themselves in real ideas of this type, they sought also to escape from the misery to which the ideas were a response in a new lease of supernaturalism and a new magic. The substitution of the Bible for the church as the seat of authority in religion aroused interest, intellectual but by no means kindly, in the People of the Book and all their works. The Kabbala had almost immediately seized the wandering imagination of Europe. Its mysteries, letters, phrases, and calculations, its pretensions to magical powers, allied as they were with hidden meanings universally attributed to the Bible, fascinated the imagination of Europeans, from Pico della Mirandola to the latest English Bibliotaster mulling in mysteries. This, together with the complete emotional and intellectual decentralization, could not but lead to anticipations of the Messiah. The time of the restoration of Israel to Palestine and of the second advent was held to be at hand. Kabbalistic calculations among Jews put it in 1648. And Christian millennialists put it in 1666.

Between 1648 and 1666—the era of Sabbatai Zevi's "mission"—came, however, one of the very darkest pages of the history of the Jewish people. Their status in Europe derived from two assumptions, both implicit in their alienation from citizenship in 339. The first was that they were members of a foreign nation, living in their own communities, under their own laws, and governed by their own hereditary or elective rulers. The stress thrown by theology on the absence of the Jews from Zion, the designation of their absence as a *Galuth* or dispersion, has obscured the truly national character of the Jewish community, national both in the political and the cultural sense. Men forget that absence from Palestine meant presence somewhere else, and it happens that there has been hardly a period in the history of the Jewish people without the concentration of the greater part of them upon a single continuous area, into a community organized and operating under Jewish law. That it was not sovereign, in the sense of being a war-making, peace-making community; that it was a subject-nationality, largely at the mercy of its neighbours; that it was hence a repressed community without freedom for its spontaneous energies, are matters of record. Nevertheless, it was a political entity, self-determined and with almost complete internal autonomy, and was until the nineteenth century dealt with as such by the masters of Europe and Asia. Such an entity was the Exilarchate of the House of David, which came into being with the Babylonian Captivity; such was the Nagidate in Egypt; such was the *Wa'ad Arbah Arazoth* (Council of the Four Lands) or *Congressus Judaicus* in the Polish Empire. The

latter dominion, extending at the time when this Congress flourished almost from the Baltic to the Black Sea, was the great area of concentration for the Jewish people of Europe from the thirteenth century onward. These Jewish governments acted for the Jewish people in all matters affecting their relations with their landlords, conquerors, or overlords.

The *Congressus Judaicus*, indeed, was an echo of the Polish *Saym* resting on a foundation of congregational units and achieving what was for the time a very high degree of democracy. It was responsible to the Polish kings both for the domestic and the foreign affairs of the Jews, particularly for taxes. It was the one agency that stood between the Jewry of Poland and the total destruction that menaced it with the Chmelnicki uprising in 1648. The Messianic afflatus of the period was largely a function of this uprising. An act of revolt and resentment on the part of the Ukrainian *khlops* or peasantry against the unbearable exactions of their Polish overlords, it struck hardest at the Jews. The Jews had been agents of these overlords—taxfarmers, factors, and such—and they were the first to pay. Chmelnicki organized a Jew-hunt that ranged from Podolia and Volhynia to Lithuania and White Russia. He was followed by the Great Russians, who had declared war upon the Poles. The Russians were followed by the plague. In the course of little more than a decade the Jewish people had lost 675,000 of their number, their homes were devastated, their property destroyed. Thousands fled to western Europe, other thousands sought safety in baptism. Without the help of the Jewry of western Europe, which came swiftly and generously, the *Congressus Judaicus* of Poland could never



have reconstituted the economy of their nation. But the great comfort of their misery was the word out of the East of the imminence of the Messiah and the return to the Promised Land. They believed—how, so miserable, could they help believing?—and their belief sustained them.

Religious doctrine had its own part in their misery. It was the second and other ground of their disability, a more terrible ground, for the position of the Jew in the European religious system, no matter what the sect, was regarded as determined by divine revelation and was a commonplace of faith that was taught to the poorest serf. The Jew was held to be eternally excommunicate from the gates of the common salvation, rejector of it, and cursed for the rejection. His existence, hence, could be maintained only on sufferance. Being beyond communion, he was incommunicado, without rights, civil or personal. The Church might order his destruction, over-ruling even the will of the king, whose property, according to the mediæval custom, the Jew was automatically held to be. The Church authorities in Poland were indefatigable in their efforts against the Jews and their faith. They drove them from the public service, assaulted the general principles of their charter, demanded and compelled sumptuary laws against them, both of dress and domicile, spread against them blood libels and levied on them illegal and extortionate taxes. The Reformation gave the Church in Poland, as elsewhere, an added animus. Jewish influence was credited with causing the heresy, and any punishment short of death was not too great. "The Church," declared the Ecclesiastical Synod of 1542, "tolerates the Jews for the sole purpose of re-

minding us of the torments of the Saviour." Between 1648 and 1666 the Catholicism of Poland finished off the uncompleted depredations of Chmelnicki and his Haidamacks and of the Muscovite and his troops. The misery of the Polish Jews reached a depth so ultimate that their minds could not conceive of a salvation less so. The new Messiah was believed in with a fervour measurable only by the tragedy from which he was to save his people. "The Jews of Ukrainia," writes the Christian, Galatovski, who flourished at the period, "abandoned their all in readiness to be carried on a cloud to Jerusalem."

In sum, then, between 1648 and 1666 the political, intellectual, and emotional condition of the whole European world was such that the achievement of the restoration of the chosen people to their promised land was generally accepted as the imminent precursor to a millennial change. The anticipation moved all classes of society equally, from the miserable and expropriated peasantry and Jewry, seeking in magic salvation from fact, to the most intellectual and scientific protagonists of that new adjustment of cosmic outlook which we call science. It is used by Mennaseh ben Israel in his successful effort to persuade Cromwell to remove the ban against the settlement of Jews in England. "The opinion," he writes, "of many Christians and mine do concur therein that we both believe that the restoring time of our Nation into their native country is very near at hand." It is the subject of exchange between the Gentile scholar Oldenburg and the Jewish philosopher Spinoza. "All the world here," Oldenburg writes to Spinoza, "is talking of a rumour of the return of the Israelites . . . to their own

country. . . . Should the news be confirmed, it may bring about a revolution in all things." And Spinoza, many years later, when the Sabbattian craze was already subsident, arguing in the *Theologico-Political Tractate* for the equality of all peoples before God, insists that whatever election the Jews were beneficiaries of was national and social, that it "had no regard to aught but dominion and physical advantages, for by such alone could one nation be distinguished from another." "Nay, I would go so far as to believe that if the foundations of their religion have not emasculated their minds they may even, if the occasion offers, so changeable are human affairs, raise up their empire afresh and that God may a second time elect them."

The significant thing about the whole Sabbattian adventure and the development that led up to it is the fact that nowhere in Europe was there any question that the Jews are a nation, that Palestine is "their own country," that the two belong together. Nor has there been any question in the European mind since.

## CHAPTER IV

### EFFECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL RIGHTS UPON THE JEWISH POSITION

FOR Europe the Messianic expectancy was only a passing mood. Science, begun as an adventure, became an institution; its temper of interrogation and challenge forced everything under analytical scrutiny, from the least-regarded spontaneities of nature to the most sacrosanct taboos of man. The eighteenth century incorporated into its common sense what had been daring imagination in the seventeenth, and its calm and satirical eye discerned underneath all the differences of race, faith, colour, wealth, power, station, nurture, and capacity, a "natural man" the equal and the peer of his fellows. Inequalities, it declared, were the artificial effects of the institutions of civilization; the effects of the State and the Church, which, again, were the perversions of nature by the few in their immemorial exploitation of the many. One God, one law, one human nature are at the foundation of all life. Each man is the like of every other man; each is equally and inalienably entitled with all others to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; each has contracted the insurance of his title by consenting to the creation of government; each has been then defrauded by the government he has created of just that natural right which he had designed it to protect.

Strip away government, the Church, the economic order, and you abolish crime and poverty and the whole hierarchy of social inequalities. All these are man-made. They do not exist in nature, and they should not be tolerated by enlightened men. By nature men are citizens of the world, not of the state; followers of natural religion, not of this or that fabrication of priests; like lovers of one another, not haters seduced thereto by artificial diversities. By nature, men are equal and alike, they differ only by nurture.

This teaching, common to England and to France, particularly strong in France, was not, of course, the pure deduction of science. It was quite as much, and perhaps more, resentment against the concentrated absolutism which had become characteristic of the state system of Europe in the eighteenth century. In England alone had this failed to fix itself firmly, and the period from the restoration of the Stuarts to their final expulsion and the formulation of the Bill of Rights was a period of actual conflict between a dynastic absolutism grounding itself on the traditional divine rights of kings, and a democratic nationalism grounding itself on the scientific natural rights of man, with a final practical victory for natural rights. On the continent, the victory was entirely dynastic. States were conceived as estates—“*l'État c'est moi*” was no paradox of a paranoiac king—and populations and territories changed hands in marriage and warfare conducted as the purely private and self-sufficient enterprises of royal privilege. Everything was property, including opinion. Thus, religious imperialism had not given way to tolerance. It merely had been replaced by religious nationalism. Citizenship re-

mained an appurtenance of conformity to certain standard dogmas and beliefs. This, as Locke's essays on toleration attest, was as true in England as on the continent; and the winning of toleration was itself a political event compelled mostly by the political strength of the disabled religious minorities. Toleration is in substance religious democracy. Whatever may be the situation *de jure*, it is impossible without at least a *de facto* distinction between Church and State, a distinction that becomes possible only when sects are so numerous and varied and powerful that the alternative to toleration is civil war. Over the major part of the continent of Europe religious nationalism prevailed to within the third year of the Great War, and citizenship and church membership were coimplicative and coincident. The greater the strength of this artificial coimplication, the more centralized and absolute the government which sustains it; the more complete, the more logical and systematic the theoretical repudiation which according to time, place, and circumstances it undergoes. Such was the case in France. The theorizing of the Encyclopædists, from Diderot and Voltaire to Montesquieu and Rousseau, carried to their logical limit the practical assumptions of Locke and the other authors of the English Bill of Rights. They made good in idea the shortcomings of the social facts.

That their logic should ultimately be extended to the Jews was inevitable. In England this extension had been proceeding in the normally piecemeal and muddling British way. Although it was not absolutely completed until 1890, it was begun practically with their readmission to England in Cromwell's day, and progressed in the usual English parliamentary fashion

from then on. In France, the extension was shorter, sharper, more purely theoretical. First made in formal terms by Montesquieu, it received practical application and defence at the hands of Mirabeau and the Abbé Grégoire. During the Revolution the two latter fought for it in the National Assembly against the clericals, and it was finally carried (1791) as an inevitable corollary of the Constitution. The effect was formally to convert the Jews from a nationality into a sect: "Judaism," wrote Deputy Schwendt to his constituents in Alsace, "is nothing more than the name of a distinct religion." The Jews were enfranchised, not as they had been disfranchised, in their collectivity, as a corporate entity, a nationality; but individually, Jew by Jew, each as a "natural man," the equal of all other "natural men," without heredity, history, language, culture, or social memory, a mere "now" in the temporal extent of the generations. The stripping of his selfhood which this requires from any man was of course an impossible price to pay for enfranchisement. It was suicide, and a nationality can only die or be killed, but has so far shown no ability to commit suicide. Nevertheless, the Jews of western Europe fancied that they could pay the price and survive as Jews. They accepted the responsibility of the affirmative to Napoleon's questions of 1806. Without this affirmative he would have withdrawn from them the civil freedom which the Revolution had won for them. Their yielding it initiated, so far as social history is concerned, the mental attitude and development of what is called the Reform movement in Judaism.

In this movement there is nothing primarily religious.

It began with no great inspiration, no great vision and gospel of inner regeneration, which are the traits of genuinely religious reforms. Its beginnings rest in a political and social position, and to this day it has not advanced from this position. It stands still on the intellectual platform of the eighteenth century and the French Revolution, on the doctrine of natural rights and natural law and the rule of abstract reason. It strips from the Jew all that makes of him a concrete human being, all his reality. It denies in its very form the existence of the social personality called the Jewish people. It substitutes for the vision of the Messiah, which sustained the Jews in the Middle Ages, the conception of "the mission of Israel," to justify such minimal Jewish traits as the organizers of Reform could not bring themselves to abandon. It restates, with an inverted valuation, the mediæval conception of the status and function of the Jewish people. Where, for example, Christianity declares that the Jews had been condemned by God to dispersion because of their rejection of the Saviour, the Reform Jews say, "The dispersion is a fact, but is not due to the curse of God, but to the realization of the divine purpose to bless the world." Where Christianity says, "Jews are dispersed and will continue so as a living witness to the prophecies of the Bible which proclaims their dispersion," the Reformers assert that this dispersion is predestined so that the Jewish sectaries who have been chosen by the Lord may be everlasting witnesses to the truth of the Bible and its prophecies. And where Christianity declares that this dispersion will last until the second coming of Christ, until the appearance of Christ as the Paraclete, the Reform sect de-



clares that this dispersion is to continue until all men shall acknowledge the "Jewish God." In this way the movement has attempted automatically, under the rule that ideals are compensatory for facts, to convert into a merit what to Christian theology is the shame of the Jewish people. It did that, I think, on the whole, if I read the literature aright, with something like a broken heart. It wanted for the Jewish people the same values that other peoples in the world were getting. There is no question about the amiability of the intentions of Reform, and there is no question about the magnificent distinction of one phase of Reform achievement, not noticed by Reformers. This is the liberation of woman in the Jewish community and if nothing else justifies it, this does. But once it has liberated the Jewish woman, it has done its whole work. The intention of Reform was excellent but the method it used, being contrary to the trend of social history, failed to achieve the results intended. . . .

Other states slowly imitated France. Western Europe completed the enfranchisement of the Jews, severally, only toward the end of the nineteenth century. And this enfranchisement, of course, has the defects of its virtues, for Western Jewry took, with respect to the enfranchisement it sought, a position which was an acknowledgment that Jewish qualities, Jewish forms of life and thought were in Jews unworthy; that Jewish differences from their neighbours were, on the whole, inferiorities, and that Jews must become—except that they call their priests "rabbis" and worship in "temples" and not in churches—the same as the Gentiles. The Reform movement,

therefore, has been what is called an assimilationist movement. That is, it has wanted for Jews not an equal but a similar happiness to that of all other peoples. And what it has accomplished in order to get this life and happiness has been to rob the enfranchised Jew of the self-respect of his birthright as Jew; has been to compel him to act on the assumption that the whole substance of the Jewish background and tradition, the organization of Jewish life with its implications, is a worthless thing, a thing to be abandoned.

\* This whole process rests on the illusion that equality is similarity. It is concomitant with the uncritical doctrine of natural right and natural law; with the resentment which this doctrine expressed against the artificial inequalities of the dynastic and ecclesiastical systems that robbed men of their due of freedom and happiness. The doctrine is compensatory; a protest, not a description. But in animating and guiding the French Revolution it served a high purpose. It enfranchised the peoples of Europe, even in the course of the Napoleonic attempt to enslave them. It awakened their dormant corporate consciousness. It led them to realize their nationality and to struggle for its freedom. To say this is to say that people "were becoming conscious, in trying to respond to the call of the Revolution, of what nature and habit and hope they and their neighbours were, and of how these were expressed in language and tradition, in memory and custom, in all that makes a community's cycle of life. The revolutionary call to Equality meant, for the daily life, the abolition of all caste and property distinctions. . . . The Revolution's call to Fraternity meant for the daily life comradeship on an

equal basis with any one with whom communication could be effectively held—in truth, with the neighbour near at hand, who speaks the same language and has the same background, who, by virtue of this sameness, *understands*. The Revolution's call to Liberty meant, first and foremost, the overthrow of the traditional oppressor at home and the achievement there of self-government, the replacing of dynasty by commonwealth.

“Had the new French nation continued to treat the peoples its armies set free as peers, as fellow-citizens, not as subjects; had Napoleon not once more restored piratical imperialism to the place from which the ideas of the Revolution had driven it, the ruling caste of Europe could never have succeeded in duping their subjects into believing in the identity of their respective interests and the community of their cause. Even so, their success depended on a concession to the principle that sovereignty rests in the people. For the call to resist Napoleon had to be made through an appeal to self-appreciation, through a propaganda, sometimes inspired, sometimes spontaneous, exhorting the various peoples of Europe to consider the excellence and dignity of their ancestries, their cults, their traditions, their histories, their ways of living, their arts, and particularly their languages. The most conspicuous continental instance of such a propaganda is the series of ‘Addresses to the German People,’ by the philosopher Fichte.”

But there were many others. It is part of the irony of the Jewish position that those Jews who were in contact with the great movements of the day, scions of the one people that had from antiquity on been champions of nationality against all imperialism and

tyranny, should seek themselves to repress and destroy their own at a time when nationality was awakening to renewed life among the peoples of the whole continent of Europe—in Greece and among the other victims of Turkish domination; in Germany; in Poland; in Ireland. That the restoration of Palestine to the Jewish people and the Jewish people to Palestine had even in this period touched the interests and hopes of Jews and Gentiles both, there is much in the record to show. An anonymous letter to the Jews of France by “one of them,” proposed in 1798 the creation by the Jews of the world of a Jewish council which should treat with the French government for the restoration of Palestine to its traditional people. “The country we propose to occupy,” he wrote, “shall include (subject to such arrangements as shall be agreeable to France) Lower Egypt, with the addition of a district, which shall have for its limits a line running from Acre to the Dead Sea, and from the south point of that lake to the Red Sea.”<sup>1</sup> He pointed out the economic advantages of the position, situated at the juncture of three continents, and concluded: “Oh, my brethren! What sacrifices ought we not to make to attain this object! We shall return to our country, we shall live under our own laws, we shall behold those sacred places which our ancestors rendered illustrious with their courage and their virtues. I already see you all animated with a holy zeal. Israelites! The term of your misfortunes is at hand. The opportunity is favourable. Take care that you do not allow it to escape.” Just how the opportunity was favourable is not known, but it is significant that the *Moniteur*

<sup>1</sup>Cited by A. M. Hyamson, in “Palestine,” p. 165.

*Universelle* of 1799, 23 *Germinal*, records a proclamation ordered in Constantinople by Napoleon, inviting the Jews of Asia and Africa to enrol under his banners for the purpose of reëstablishing ancient Jerusalem. The failure of both the Western and Eastern Jewries to respond to these calls had probably no slight connection with the Napoleonic impatience and severity in 1806, when the Emperor practically compelled by his questions the Jews of his domains either to repudiate their nationality or to put themselves in a position to affirm it by force. The Council of Notables or *Sanhedrin* which he called repudiated it: the bulk of them came not from the free heart of France but from clericalist and priest-ridden Alsace. The writer of the letter of 1798 came from a freer-hearted and clearer-visioned time in the history of France.

Significantly, the one great parallel of this period issues a generation later from the world's other great seat of freedom and republicanism, where the conception of "natural rights" dominated—the United States of America. It is there overlaid a little with elements of mountebankery and melodrama, and takes some time to come clear. But clear it does come finally, and its terms are remarkably similar to those of the letter of 1798. Its terms are promulgated by Mordecai Manuel Noah. Its first shape in his mind was that of a Messianic adventure tempered by the business of real estate speculation. Sensitive to the sufferings and disabilities of his people, he conceived the notion of founding for them on Grand Island, not far from Buffalo, New York, a city of refuge, which he designed to call Ararat, and to establish himself as Chief Judge of Israel. He persuaded a Gentile friend to

invest in the land, and in September, 1825, proceeded amid much comic circumstance and public comment to lay the corner-stone of his city in an Episcopal church in the village of Buffalo. On the occasion he issued a proclamation, appointing commissioners, levying taxes, ordering a census and so on, and reviving and reëstablishing the ancient "Government of the Jewish Nation, under the auspices and protection of the constitution and laws of the United States of America."<sup>1</sup> The enterprise was, of course, damned from the outset by its charlatanic character. At its core, nevertheless, were good sense and sound statesmanship. The idea persisted in Noah's mind, but it turned from a city of refuge on the North American continent to a complete restoration in Zion. To this he reverted repeatedly, always with the notion that the United States might act as the liberator. "The United States," he wrote in 1844, "the only country which has given civil and religious rights to the Jews equal with all other sects; the only country which has not persecuted them has been selected and pointedly distinguished in prophecy as *the nation* which, at a proper time, shall present to the Lord His chosen and downtrodden people, and pave the way for the restoration to Zion." This could be done simply by the guarantee of protection in the purchase and holding of land in Palestine. The idea met with the approval of John Adams, President of the United States, 1797-1801. "I really wish," he wrote Noah, "the Jews again in Judæa, an independent nation, for, as I believe, the most enlightened men of it have participated in the amelioration of the philosophy

<sup>1</sup>Cf. "Mordecai M. Noah," by A. B. Makover.

of the age; once restored to an independent government, and no longer persecuted, they would wear away some of their asperities.

“I wish your nation may be admitted to all the privileges of citizens in every part of the world. This country (America) has done much: I wish it may do more, and annul every narrow idea in religion, government, and commerce.”

## CHAPTER V

### THE NATIONALIST TRANSVALUATION OF "NATURAL RIGHTS" AND THE RETURN OF JEWISH NATIONALISM

THE first families of Europe and their stewards, usually called prime ministers and secretaries of state, who sought to reapportion this continental domain of theirs according to their vested rights as those had been understood prior to the French Revolution, counted without the Revolution. The Congress of Vienna lasted, with interruptions, some five years. Its final act was not signed until May, 1820, and by that time every position and attitude it had taken in the adjustments of the family squabbles and dower disputes of kings had been challenged by the rising discontent of peoples. This turned all royal benevolence into defensive tyranny, as in the instance of the notorious Holy Alliance, and royalty has remained on the defensive ever since. The Revolutionary gospel of liberty, equality, and fraternity had awakened peoples—at least to liberty. Even in the Napoleonic tyranny there had been an element of overturn and equalization. Napoleon himself was a symbol of what opportunity freedom might create for a man, and his Empire a dominion of careers open to and won by talents. A complete reversion to the old feudal caste system of Europe was impossible. The mind and mood of Europe had turned from it. But equally impossible



was the attainment of that abstract equality and fraternity of the "natural man," the "human being" that had been the inspiring vision of the Revolution. Both the Revolution itself and the urgent need of dynasts, appealing at last to their subjects to save their thrones, gave it an immediate concrete and specific application in that neighbourliness of common speech, common customs, traditions and memories which are the very heart of nationality.

These supplied to the abstractions of the Revolution both body and force. These are the explosive elements in democracy, and it is these primarily that throughout the nineteenth century made of the democratic aspiration an efficacious dynamic in the lives of men. The nineteenth century has been called the century of nationality and, indeed, it was; but it was no less the century of democracy, and the two cannot be separated. One after another the European and Christian subjects of the Turk, the Magyar and the Slavonic and the Italian subjects of the Germans, the Polish subjects of the Russians, the Irish subjects of the English, rose against their masters, some to failure only and some to freedom. One after another peoples arose against governments in France, in Germany, in Austria, in England, in Spain, in Portugal. In all these uprisings, they won, in spite of setbacks, to constantly freer position—sometimes by force, as in France, sometimes by somewhat more legislative action as in England; but they won. The winning marks the rising wave of nationality in Europe, its first phase culminating in 1830 with the revolutions in France and Poland, the liberation of Greece, the integration of Switzerland; its second phase in 1848, with uprisings all over Europe,

and its third phase in 1878 with the Council of Vienna. Its fourth phase culminated in the Great War. This very probably marks the end of the era of nationality as a programme and an ideal. The terms of peace have converted it, in words at least, from a motive into a condition, have established it as an acknowledged fact under the protection of international law, and have thus permitted the emergence into the foreground of history of the second great social motive which was a spring of action in the nineteenth century—the motive of economic justice. That has already sprung clear in Russia and has defined itself sharply in the mass movements of England and Germany and Italy and France. We shall see how it challenges all government anew and ineluctably as nationality challenged government after 1815. The future belongs to it.

The past, however, has been governed by the aspirations of nationality. The utterance and philosophy of these reached their height in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, and its noblest and truest voice was Giuseppe Mazzini. His outlook is simple, a complement rather than a contradiction of the outlook of the eighteenth-century thinkers whose ideas gave birth to the French Revolution. He criticizes them, Voltaire and Montesquieu and Rousseau particularly, for their political and historical formalism. "It is not by the force of *conventions* or of *aught else*," he writes,<sup>1</sup> "but by a necessity of our nature that societies are founded and grow." Hence nationality and the aspirations of nationality. Hence its implication in democracy and democracy's implication in it. Hence the need for collective action. "Nations are initiated

<sup>1</sup>"Thoughts on the French Revolution of 1789."

into the worship of liberty by the sufferings of servitude." Individuals cannot by themselves win liberty, they can only die for it: "individual faith makes martyrs; social faith gains victories . . . The charter of each Nation's liberty is a clause in the charter of Humanity." These excerpts are from "Faith and the Future," written in French at Bienne in 1835, as a reply to Louis Philippe's treachery against democracy. The essay states the whole Mazzinian philosophy of democratic nationalism. What he thought of the Jewish position, its hopelessness and degradation, may be gathered from the reference to them—I have italicized it—in the fifth of the lectures to the Italian workers on the Duties of Man—The Duty to Country.<sup>1</sup> "Without Country," he declares, "you have neither name, token, voice, nor rights, no admission as brothers into the fellowship of the Peoples. You are the bastards of Humanity. Soldiers without a banner, *Israelites among the nations*, you will find neither faith nor protection; none will be sureties for you. Do not beguile yourselves with the hope of emancipation from unjust social conditions if you do not first conquer a Country for yourselves; where there is no Country there is no common agreement to which you can appeal; the egoism of self-interest rules alone, and he who has the upper hand keeps it, since there is no common safeguard for the interests of all. Do not be led away by the idea of improving your material conditions without first solving the National question. You cannot do it. . . ." All his other writings are either anticipations or echoes of this passionate nationalist philosophy. Its conception of society is in-

<sup>1</sup>Everyman's Edition, pp. 53-54.

dependent of its metaphysical or theological doctrines. The former might go with any of the latter and, in point of fact, did. The unity of mankind is for Mazzini organic; nations are organs of humanity.

"We believe," he declares, speaking for Republicanism, "in the *Holy Alliance of the Peoples* as the broadest formula of association possible in our age—in the *liberty* and *equality* of the peoples without which association has no true life—in *Nationality*, which is the conscience of the peoples, which assigns to them their share of work in association, their office in *Humanity*, and hence constitutes their mission on earth, their *individuality*, for without Nationality neither liberty nor equality is possible—and we believe in the holy *Fatherland*, that is, the cradle of nationality, the altar and patrimony of the individuals that compose each people."

This creed has remained, though crossed by newer and later visions and aspirations, the creed of the *peoples* of Europe. It is the living spirit in the poetry of Swinburne and the political philosophy of Hegel. It is the centre from which departs the new economic internationalism of the Socialists and the cultural and financial imperialism of the pan-German and pan-Slavist and other pan-ethnic organizations that precipitated the Great War. Its application to the Jews, whose creed and aspiration it has been from the beginning of their history, of the outlook of whose prophets it is a restatement, is obvious enough. And, indeed, the application was made in Mazzini's day as a matter of course. Not merely in the remote speculations of the aged Mordecai Noah in the America of the '40s. It was given the nearness of political practicality and

religious action in both England and France, and among Gentiles more largely and generously than among Jews. To Hollingsworth, writing in 1852 in England<sup>1</sup>, the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was not only an act of humanity and justice, but a political necessity, present in the British mind to this very day, in the safeguarding of the highway across Asia Minor to India.<sup>2</sup> To Laurence Oliphant, who himself settled with a colony near Haifa, the restoration to the Promised Land was, as it still is to so many pious and devout Christians, the indispensable preliminary to the return of the Saviour. The idea energized the mind of Abraham Petavel, a Protestant minister and professor in Neuchâtel. His pamphlet,<sup>3</sup> published in 1864 in Geneva, utters much the same piety and humanism that are apparent in Laurence Oliphant, with somewhat greater regard for the political "realities" of the time. National justice to the Jewish people was one of the ruling passions of Henri Dunant, founder of the Red Cross and author of the Geneva Conventions. He urged the French *Alliance Israélite Universelle* to settle the Jews in Palestine; appealed to the Jews of Berlin, to the Anglo-Jewish Association. Failing of sympathetic response from them, he organized the International Palestine Society and the Syrian and Palestine Colonization Society. But the Jews of western Europe were still too preoccupied with piecemeal and individualistic emancipation, with the dominant abstractions of the

<sup>1</sup>"Remarks upon the Present Condition of the Jews in Palestine."

<sup>2</sup>Its immediate stimulus was the agitation about the Suez Canal. This great project had stirred Frenchmen to the same ideas. Cf. Denbie's "New Oriental Problem," and "The New Eastern Question" by E. Laharame.

<sup>3</sup>Devoir des nations de rendre au peuple juif sa nationalité.

eighteenth century, and the Gentiles were too absorbed in their own problems to concern themselves with the problem of the Jews in a purely objective, sociological, and historical as well as a sentimental way. The sentiment was to be noticed all over Europe. It gave tone to much of the literary avocation of Beaconsfield; it was a note in a play of Dumas *filis*<sup>1</sup>; it became a great preoccupation of George Eliot. The restoration of the Jewish people to the Promised Land is a theme she returns to again and again—in “Theophrastus Such,” in “The Modern Hep, Hep,” in “Daniel Deronda.” The latter, indeed, may be said to make this restoration its subject-matter. And to the present day there is, to my mind, no more eloquent statement of the sentiment which energizes Zionism than she puts in the mouth of Mordecai:

When it is rational to say: “I know not my father or my mother; let my children be aliens unto me, that no prayer of mine may touch them,” then will it be rational for the Jew to say, “I will seek to know no difference between me and the Gentile; I will not cherish the prophetic consciousness of our nationality. Let the Hebrew cease to be, and let all his memorials be antiquarian trifles, dead as the wall-paintings of a conjectured race. Yet let his children learn by rote the speech of the Greek, where he adjures his fellow-citizens by the bravery of those who fought foremost at Marathon; let him learn to say, ‘That was noble in Greek, that is the spirit of an immortal nation!’ But the Jew has no memories that bind him to action; let him laugh that his nation is degraded from a nation; let him hold the monuments of his law which carried within its frame the breath of social justice, of charity, and of household sanctities; let him hold the energy of the prophets, the patient care of the masters,

<sup>1</sup>La femme de Claude.

the fortitude of martyred generations, as mere stuff for a professorship. . . .”

In the multitude of the ignorant on three continents who observe our rites and make the confession of Divine Unity, the soul of Judaism is not dead. Revive the organic centre: let the unity of Israel which has made the growth and form of its religion be an outward reality. Looking forward to a land and a polity, our dispersed people in all the ends of the earth may share the dignity of a national life which has a voice among the peoples of the East and of the West—which will plant the wisdom and skill of our race so that it may be, as of old, a medium of transmission and understanding. Let that come to pass, and the living warmth will spread to the weak extremities of Israel and superstition will vanish, not in the lawlessness of the renegade, but in the illumination of great facts which widen feeling, and make all knowledge alive as the young offspring of beloved memories. . . .

There is a store of wisdom among us to found a new Jewish polity, grand, simple, just, like the old—a republic where there is equality of protection. . . . Then our race shall have an organic centre, a heart and a brain to watch and guide and execute; the outraged Jew shall have a defence in the court of the nations, as the outraged Englishman or American. And the world will gain as Israel gains. For there will be a community in the van of the East which carries the culture and the sympathies of every great nation in its bosom; and there will be a land for a halting-place of enmities, a neutral ground for the East as Belgium is for the West. Difficulties? I know there are difficulties. But let the spirit of sublime achievement move in the great among our people and the work will begin. . . .

Let the torch of visible community be lit! Let the reason of Israel disclose itself in a great outward deed; let there be another great migration, another choosing of Israel to be a nationality, whose members may still stretch to the ends of the earth, even as the sons of England and Germany, whom enterprise carries afar, but who still have a national hearth and a tribunal of national opinion. . . . Let the central fire be kindled again, and the light will reach afar.

The degraded and scorned of our race will learn to think of their sacred land, not as a place for sacred beggary, to await death in loathsome idleness, but as a republic where the Jewish spirit manifests itself in a new order founded on the old, purified, enriched by experience our greatest sons have gathered from the life of the ages. . . . The sons of Judah have to choose, that God may again choose them. The Messianic time is the time when Israel shall will the planting of the national ensign. . . . Let us help to will our own better future and the better future of the world—not renounce our higher gift, and say, “Let us be as if we were not among the populations,” but choose our full heritage, claim the brotherhood of our nation, and carry it into a new brotherhood with the nations of the Gentiles. The vision is there: it will be fulfilled.

Nor were the Jews of western Europe themselves altogether untouched by this resurgent nationalism. By and large their first reaction to the emancipatory call of the French Revolution had been, as we have seen, one of surrender and self-effacement. Suffering for a thousand years from the over-emphasis of their difference from the other families of mankind, they accepted eagerly the escape from suffering which the eighteenth-century declaration of the sameness of all men opened to them. They launched themselves upon a piteous obliteration of their corporate entity, upon the comminution of their nationality into its individuals and the dilution of their social personality into the undistinguished and neutral association of the reformed congregations. They threw themselves with passion into the republican emancipatory movements of their fellow-subjects of other stocks. They declared themselves Frenchmen or Germans or Englishmen of the Mosaic persuasion, and as such they laboured



with not untraditional fervour in the enfranchisement of their fellow-subjects. Members of the race are particularly conspicuous in the Polish and Hungarian rebellions, in the republican uprising in Germany of '48. Even more conspicuous were they in the new internationalism, an internationalism running across and in many respects denying the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century and the ideas of the French Revolution.

This internationalism is a conclusion from the philosophy of Socialism. Its strongest authoritative voice was that of the Jew, Karl Marx; its most heroic practical defender the Jew, Ferdinand Lasalle; its unseen root the economic doctrine of the Jew, David Ricardo.

The whole of this internationalism is an inflation of a new social condition into law, the identification of a changing social fact with an unchanging social principle. The new social condition was the use of machinery in industry. The changing social fact was the realignment of the classes of men in accordance with the operation of the automatic machine, the adaptation of society to machinery. Machinery was both "labour-saving" and "over-productive." Machinery both multiplied the division of labour and created the unemployment and the competition of labour. It changed the labourer from a semi-independent, self-supporting householder to a factory accessory, from a man into a "hand," to be bought in the open market as other things are bought, according to the "law" of supply and demand. Society seemed destined merely to produce commodities for foreign markets, and the miseries of men, declared the pundits of the

“dismal science,” as political economy was at once called, were the indispensable condition of the progress of society. The creation and encouragement of capital came to be considered the exclusive aim of the state, and men and women and children simply the tools and servants of capital, whether as labourers sacrificed, or employing high priests sacrificing.

Thus the eighteenth-century idea of the “natural man” was confronted by the nineteenth-century idea of the “economic man.” The sameness of men according to nature was opposed by the sameness of men according to machinery, and in the minds of the more reflective men of the age the latter sameness became the obsessing one. Men were classified from the Ricardan standpoint with respect to their relation to the great god Capital, their natures and realities were held to be determined by whether they owned it, or whether they created it. Between owners and creators, capitalists and labourers, an eternal conflict had necessarily to be waged, under the “iron law of wages,” by which the rich were constantly growing richer and the poor poorer. If only the poor, the workers, would become conscious of this conflict, if they would recognize their community of interest and cease competing with each other, they could then wage successful warfare against their enemies, whose enmity was predetermined by the nature of things: “Workingmen of all the world, unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains.”

Such is the burden of the gospel according to Karl Marx, the gospel which has been made the established religion of the Russian nation and is becoming such, in ever-growing proportions, of the whole population

of Europe. Its progress was, as is natural, slow and piecemeal. Its exemplification in the trades unions has been more real and effective than its exemplification in the political party. Like all gospels, it is a compensatory correction of a condition, not the description of a fact. But it set a pace for Europe. It had the courage of its conclusions, and its protagonists made of them a programme which they have tried with all their might and constantly increasing success to carry out. They created the famous "Internationale." They set themselves against the traditional processes and institutions of European society. They repudiated kings and priests and war as well as capitalism. They failed, of course, but it is not their fault that the habits and passions and interests of men cannot keep pace with their intellects. Their real fault is that, being gossellers, they ignored or denied the realities of human nature which did not fit into their system of salvation, so retarding their own progress in realization and converting into opponents forces that might have been aids. Economic internationalism, in short, could no more discount nationality than political cosmopolitanism. And this impossibility is conspicuous with no people so much, perhaps, as with the Jews.

For the greater men of the race, those who, in John Adams's quaint terms, contributed to "the amelioration of the philosophy of the age," either shut their eyes to the Jewish question or, facing it squarely, adopted the nationalist attitude. Marx and Lasalle shut their eyes; Beaconsfield was a nationalist with immense racial pride. So was the French patriot, Joseph Salvador, son of a Jewish father and a Catholic

mother; physician, protagonist of the "higher criticism" of the Bible; close student of the constitutional development of the ancient Jewish state; hated of the clerical party, one of the foremost influences in bringing about the revolution of 1830. He (*circa* 1837) called for the assembling of a European congress for the purpose of restoring the Jewish people to their promised land. So was Lazar Lévy-Bing, prosperous banker of Nancy, large participator in the affairs of the French commonwealth. His Zionism had a religious colour, derived from Pétavel, whose work had opened his eyes to the Jewish problem. He saw in the restoration he so passionately advocated a religious as well as a political event, and in the restored Jerusalem the fulfilment of the prophecy that the law should go forth from Zion and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.

Even Jews of purely philanthropic intention, to whom piecemeal emancipation was the sole way out of the difficulties of the Jewish position, could not elude the spirit and outlook of the age, or avoid the impregnation of the Mazzinian philosophy. Thus the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* is the creation of the philanthropic impulse of emancipated Jews. It is a charitable organization, evoked in 1860 by a great need, rendered vivid in the misery and persecution for religious reasons suffered by the Jews of Damascus in 1840, and again, and more terribly, in 1860. Among its founders is the notable Adolphe Crémieux, ten years later a minister of justice in the French Cabinet, and in all essentials an "assimilated" and "emancipated" man. Yet the statement which explained the organization he helped to found is near to the practical essence of the nationalist political philosophy of the time. "All

other important faiths," it declared, "are represented in the world by nations; that is to say, they are incarnated in governments especially interested in them and officially authorized to represent them and speak for them only. Our faith alone is without this important advantage; it is represented neither by a state nor by a society, nor does it occupy a clearly defined territory." And that the hope and desire to create this "important advantage" was in the minds of the founders of the *Alliance* may be gathered from the report of Charles Netter, among them the passionate devotee in the creation of this society, on the Agricultural School which it had established near Jaffa. The report tells the central committee which it addresses of the refuge from persecution it is preparing. It speaks of the "peaceful winning of this Holy Land." It assures the committee that the land can and will be thus won. Since Netter's day the *Alliance* has had many a change of mood, swayed by every fashion of feeling and opinion that infected France and threatened the position of the timorous Frenchmen (like Salomon Reinach, a contemporary director) "of the Mosaic persuasion." Yet the whole influence of the work of the *Alliance*, in spite of the wishes of the directors, is witness to the correctness of Netter's prediction. . . .

However, the distinguished example of the incapacity of abstract cosmopolitanism and internationalism to withstand the realities of human association on the continent of Europe is Moses Hess. Born in Germany, in 1812, his childhood and youth were passed in the turmoil of conflicting systems, ideas, and organizations of which Germany was the theatre between that year and the fateful '48. Son of a profoundly

orthodox father, his education stripped his orthodoxy from him like an outworn garment and alienated him from his family. A brief conciliation was followed by a marriage with a Gentile girl of questionable reputation and rendered the alienation permanent. He was early impregnated with the dominant Hegelianism of the period. But it was the Hegelianism of the left, and it led him first of all to a sharp and lasting opposition to the Hegelianism of the right, that Hegelianism which accepted the Prussian state as the goal and ultimacy of social life, and its dominion as the rule of spirit. This opposition endured until his death. For his participation in the revolution of 1848 Prussia proscribed and pursued him until he found refuge in France. When, in 1870, France expelled him as an alien enemy, he replied with his book, "The Defeated Nation." This book was a call to all Europe to arm against a Germany dominated by Prussia.

The affirmations of his Hegelianism were primarily and basically socialistic. By temperament and aptitude a libertarian and activist, he was naturally the antithesis of Marx, and the opposition more than once found literary expression. Nevertheless, the two men collaborated in the enterprise of proletarian organization. Hess gave himself from 1845 onward to the propaganda of the Communist programme, so much so that Arnold Ruge satirized him as the "Communist Rabbi Moses." He contributed to Marx's *Jahrbücher*. He risked his life by returning to Germany to organize workmen with Lasalle. In the intervals he studied biology and ethnology. The effect of his studies was the concretion of the abstraction *Humanity* to whose service he had dedicated himself, of the ab-

straction *Labour* for whose liberation he was risking his life, into societies of men and women with character, customs, habits, speech and culture, history and traditions attached to places, times, and circumstances. He discovered, in a word, nationality. His conceptions became very similar to those of Mazzini, with the difference in philosophical background and assumptions that the training and practical preoccupations of the two men made. The amplification and vitalization of view which Hess's discovery of nationality effected, he registered, 1862, in "Rome and Jerusalem, the Latest National Question."

This book is a series of twelve letters, addressed to a doubting friend. It utters Hess's whole theory of life, with special emphasis on its bearing upon the fate of the Jewish people. Life and the world are, in his view, an organic and living whole of which the continuous, infinite multitudes of change and mutation in Nature and in history are manifestations and expressions. They are, in the words of Bergson, to whom Hess bears a somewhat striking resemblance, a single undivided *élan vital*, differentiating itself as life and the universe. This *élan* is particularly lucid in human life, and history is its clearest self-utterance. In the development of this history each race has its own function or mission equally with all others. That of the Jews is the realization of the laws of social justice in organized society. Properly to discharge this function the Jewish people must be restored to free community, to national independence in Palestine. Nothing else can restore them, economically, socially, spiritually, to normal. Throughout the western world they are an uprooted and disin-

herited people, in its economic life, middlemen or traders rather than producers; in its social and civil life, outcasts and pariahs, in the life of the spirit chameleons, imitators, because repudiators of their own living tradition, unhappily fossilizing in the eastern world. The return to the Promised Land would give them roots, enable them to become once more the producers and creators they should be, and assure the discharge of their proper functions in the family of nations. The technique of restoration he regards as very simple—a Jewish Colonization Association devoting itself with French protection to the resettling of Jews in Palestine, under the sanction of a Jewish Congress supported by the powers.

Hess wrote in the Epilogue to "Rome and Jerusalem":

The more perfect a people is in its own special function, the more it appreciates the functional individuality of other peoples, and the more willingly it borrows from them the ideas, conceptions, and inventions, which are necessary to modern life. This tendency is especially noticeable in the German people, and it certainly does honour to the German spirit.

The Jewish nation, therefore, must not hesitate to follow France in all matters relating to the political and social regeneration of the nations, and especially in what concerns its own rebirth as a nation, and Germany in everything which bears upon the revival of intellectual life. Only a stupid reaction, which is consciously or unconsciously carried away by its own alarms, can bear us malice when we sympathize with France in all matters of a social, political nature, and yet try to absorb and assimilate everything good in German spiritual and intellectual life.

The cause of national regeneration of oppressed peoples can expect no help and sympathy from Germany. The problem of such regeneration, dating not from the second restoration of the monarchy in France, but from the French



Revolution, began to find its definite solution in Europe only recently, with the outbreak of the Italian War. Germany met it with mockery and derision: in spite of the fact that it is urgent, that it is almost everywhere, even in Germany, foremost, the Germans have labelled it, "the nationality trick." And our Jewish democrats, also, exhibit their German patriotism by accusing the French and the peoples sympathizing with them of designs of conquest. The French, say the German politicians, as well as the Allies will only be exploited by the second monarchy, in order to restrain liberty rather than to promote it. The German people should, according to the profound logic of these politicians, obey the Kaiser and the kings in order to be able to frustrate the aggressive desires of the French. But these politicians and patriots forget that the conquest of France and Italy by Germany to-day would result merely in placing the entire German people under police law and in depriving the Jews of their civil rights in a worse manner than after the War of Liberation—when the only recognition granted by the Germans to their Jewish comrades in arms was exclusion from civil life. And truly, the German people and the German Jews do not deserve any better lot when they allow themselves, in spite of the examples of history, to be entrapped by mediæval reaction.

The study of science and my experiences in life have both served to confirm my political sympathy for France, particularly after I got to know the French people. I have formulated my thoughts as follows:

The life tendencies of a society are, like the theories of life of the minds of men, typical and primal creations of race. Originally, the history of mankind moved only in the circle of struggle—struggles of race, struggles of class. The race struggle is primary; that of class, secondary. The last dominating race is the German. But, thanks to the French people—who succeeded not only in reconciling race antagonisms in their own land, but also in uprooting every form of race domination within its borders—the race struggle is nearing its end. And with that the class struggle will also end. The equalization of all classes of society will neces-

sarily follow the emancipation of the races, for equalization will become simply a scientific problem in social economics.

Yet it seems as if a final race war is unavoidable if the German politicians, failing to apprehend the situation, make no endeavour to oppose the mighty sweep of reaction. This, left to itself, will ultimately carry Germany into collision with the Latin peoples and entangle the progressive German democrats in the net of romantic demagoguery. Twice during the present century did mediævalism frustrate the effort of the German people for political and social regeneration—once during the War of Liberation and again during the Italian War. It did so by appealing to the racial instincts of the lords of war who regard themselves as lords of the land by divine right and the people as their rightly inherited slaves. It is not impossible, in case of a war between Italy and Austria, that German democracy will for the third time be engulfed in the whirlpool of the reactionaries and join hands with the Austrians in a struggle for race domination the outcome of which must adversely affect progress. But out of the last race struggle . . . there will ensue no fresh dominant race and the equality of the historical peoples of the world will follow as a necessary result.

Hess's metaphysics, it will be seen, has its alternatives—what metaphysic has not?—but his sociological acumen and his historical judgment are almost contemporary. Both the quotation from the Epilogue to "Rome and Jerusalem" and the storm which his work raised in German Jewry are witness. The storm was only a passing storm. It led the historian Graetz to remark upon it—upon the anger of the anti-Semites, the fears of the Jewish cosmopolitans, the hopes of the orthodox. But Graetz drew no conclusions. He was too timid. The great bulk of the Jews of western Europe, particularly those of Germany, were too timid. Hess called them to self-assertion and self-help. Their

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reply was—self-concealment and impotence. They were afraid collectively to conquer freedom as a people's victory; they were not afraid to have emancipation ungraciously thrown to them as a master's generosity.

## CHAPTER VI

### SECULAR NATIONALISM AMONG THE JEWS OF EASTERN EUROPE

THAT Eastern Jewry should, all things considered, provide its fair counterpart of Western Jewry was, of course, natural. It did reproduce, line for line, the disturbances and perturbations which shook the Jews of western Europe. It reproduced them, but with a difference. In this difference lies, however, the secret of the vitality of Zionism and the continuity and vigour of its vision and aspiration in the hearts of the great bulk of the Jewish nationality, whose home is in central and eastern Europe. Its history, from the failure of the Sabbattian adventure on, leaves nothing to be desired for tragic irony. The government of Poland itself was disintegrating. Kings, powerless before the unspeakable *Shlakhta*, whose arrogance, sloth, and selfishness ruined Poland, perforce turned the kingship into an engine of intrigue. The royal protection written into the terms of the Jewish charter became a scrap of paper. The Jews themselves were compelled to become the victims and the instruments of the irresponsibilities of the landed magnates, whose absolutism on their lands was exceeded only by their misrule. In addition to the exploitation and abuse of these magnates, the Jews had to suffer the aggression of the urban German burgher

class, always pressing to eliminate the Jewish rival, and the persecution of the Churchman, whose religious zeal had a superlatively powerful dynamic in economic greed.

The conflicting impositions, demands, and restrictions of these three classes broke up the integrity of the Jewish community. Their pressure squeezed the vitality out of the *Congressus Judaicus*, destroyed its authority, and denuded it of its representative character. It converted the *Kahal* from a town meeting into a tyrannical corporation of oligarchs. It cut off the contact of the Jews both as individuals and as nationality from the rest of the world.

At just the time when the bans and taboos of mediævalism were broken in Europe and the spirit of man could adventure free through thoughts and things, persecution and disaster imposed them upon Jewry. The thought and feeling of the great Jewish community turned inward and fed upon itself. The spirit so nourished is a queer and twisted thing of dialectic, passion, and devoutness, as irrelevant to the realities of the business of living as anything mediæval Christianity so devised. It converted changing social customs into everlasting rituals, accidents of fashion in garments and hairdressing into religious vestment, accidents of diet into sacraments. It imagined a gross, material Otherworld that echoed to the last nuance the literalness of mediæval Christianity of which it had until then been free. It found in the wonder-working rabbi of the Chassidic sect the precise analogue of the Christian mystic, the saint, the hermit, the lay brother who did miracles for a price, and it clung to him with a passion of faith and devotion which

is a secure measure of the degradation and horror into which the community had fallen. Not an ill nor an evil in this life but had its precise and material compensation in the world to come! That world assumed all the specification and definiteness of the Christian eschatological system—a region of the habitation of dead saints and unborn saviours, of delectable food and drink and clothing, of magical efficiency and of vengeance upon the persecutor. The lineaments of the real Zion were absorbed into it. The true Messiah became in effect a supernatural being, his appearance contingent upon supernatural events and the restoration of Palestine a heavenly thing, unconnected with things of earth. Life throughout this period, which lasted some two hundred years, and aspects of which are still dominant, was for the Jews a somnambulism wherein the community and individual escaped from the harsh oppression of the poignant facts. The barren dialectic of Rabbinism and the hopeless inarticulation of mysticism were the whole of it. For once in their history the Jews were at last truly and completely a “religious,” that is, a demoralized, people.

The political event which broke into this somnambulism was the partition of Poland. The partition divided Jewry no less than the Poles between three new and active forces, whose impact brought not only different and new oppression, but also different and new social and intellectual contacts. Prussian and Austrian and Russian monarchs, much under the seductive infection of the liberal ideas of the eighteenth century, could not endure that their Jews should be different from their other subjects. They brought to bear

upon them all the malicious pressure of bureaucratic machinery to "modernize" and "assimilate" them. That this should be met with stiffening resistance was inevitable. Neither Joseph I of Austria, nor the first Russian Alexander, nor his successor Nicholas, succeeded in developing among Jews any actual living *movement* toward modernization. The Jews went as far as they were compelled to, and no farther. And wherever the pressure was relaxed, they reverted to the initial form. Nevertheless, they did get modernized, and with unparalleled swiftness. The power which achieved this was not, however, political but intellectual and social, and it operated not by force, but by contagion.

The process of its operation is usually called the "Haskalah" or Enlightenment. It is an inward change in the complexus of the Jewish nationality in eastern Europe, responding to the contacts of the new peoples, new forces, and new ideas which the partition of Poland brought about. It began in Germany, spread thence to Austria and to Russia. Its great protagonist was Moses Mendelssohn. A Polish Jew, come to place and power in Berlin, Mendelssohn felt, and felt truly, that the renewal of Jewry must come first through the force of liberal ideas, such ideas as were the currency of the fashionable and humane cosmopolitanism of his day. The movement he began was a movement to "Germanize"—in his day, the equivalent of "civilize" in all eastern Europe—in the matter of dress and manners (in the course of time to dress or to be otherwise "deitch" became a matter for excommunication) as well as in science and letters. But the medium for the transmission of these "German" ideas was

inevitably Hebrew, always the *lingua franca* of the multi-lingual Jewish people. Hebrew, the holy tongue, was to be used for profane and secular purposes. There is the true animus of the Haskalah. It was an enterprise in secularization, and the resistance to it took the same form as some centuries earlier had been taken by the resistance to the renaissance in the wider world. Religion was set over against wisdom, superstition against knowledge, authority against freedom. The protagonists of the Haskalah made alliances with the government, to effect their secularizing ends. The more the Rabbinitists insisted on the dominion of their power the further the protagonists of Haskalah, called by the Jews *Maskilim*, went in the loosening of a community which was merely, and so, superstitiously, religious. In the end, the confrontation ceased to be one of religious Rabbinitism or scholasticism with secular Hebraism. It became a confrontation of orthodoxy with "assimilation."

Of this assimilation, of this perennial detachment of Jew after Jew from his community and his absorption in the community of the non-Jewish majority, the protagonists of the Haskalah had conceived high hopes. The impulsive and uncertain benevolences of Alexander II, the "Tzar liberator," which opened to Jews the schools of the land and promised improvement of their economic ills, drew thousands of them into a new world; to their ardour and inexperience, a freer and more joyous world. It seemed to them as if the liberalism of the nineteenth century were about to succeed in accomplishing in Russia what it had failed to do in western Europe. The liberation and absorption of the Jews was to take place by an administrative



ukase and the force of circumstances: no Jew had need to do anything but prepare himself intellectually and wait.

The young hopefuls were disillusioned. Alexander II himself repented of his wisdom just before his assassination, and his successor, with the assistance of the devout Pobiedonostzeff, arranged that the holy mediæval tradition regarding the treatment of the Jews should in no way be desecrated. The young Jewish hopefuls discovered, as so many of other races and times did, that the solution of a problem of community by self-attrition was not a working solution for the community. They found themselves, therefore, uprooted, loose, tramps in mind and body, with more energy than efficiency. This energy they threw into the vernacular and Hebrew press, which they used as the device to get the benefits of their experiences before the Jewish masses, hoping, and succeeding, by this means to recover or establish a ground for their existence. No people in the world is so completely sensitive to the printed word as the Jew, and the Haskalah became, almost overnight, a mass-movement. To an extraordinary degree it laughed supernaturalism, magic, and myth out of court. It popularized science and radical economics. It created a Yiddish and neo-Hebrew belles lettres. The realities of this renaissance ensue over a period of hardly two generations of the nineteenth century. Its achievement seems a miracle—until it is remembered that the Jews were without any other institutions either for expressing, conveying, or stabilizing opinion. They were literally and exclusively the people of the book—and the newspaper.

The interpenetration of science, higher criticism,

“Jewish science,” political and economic theory, religious speculation and belletristic fabrication with a realizing sense of the great Jewish tradition which was the stable mind of the Jewish masses led toward a recovery of the normal outlook upon the Jewish position and destiny. Haskalah imperceptibly took on the features of Jewish nationalism. Passive emancipation at the hands of the non-Jewish majority, which was the hope of secularists, gave way to plans and programmes of active emancipation of the Jewish people by the Jewish people themselves.

The earliest significant voice—which Hess had heard and to which he had responded—was that of Hirsch Kalischer, a rabbi of the orthodox church in Thon, Prussia. His whole work is witness of the interpenetration of modernism and tradition which the great conflict of the Haskalah resulted in. The Jewish people, Kalischer wrote<sup>1</sup>, needed to reinterpret their life and destiny. They had been taught to wait for the realization of the Messianic hope through a miracle, but the true basis of realization must be self-help. By means of a colonization society working in a modern way under modern conditions<sup>2</sup> the restoration of the Jewish people to the Promised Land and to freedom might be achieved. At the outset, Kalischer had more influence in the West than in the East. The creation of the Alliance Israélite Universelle was due to his inspiration and Hess’s own practical proposals echo his. But in the East the heady taste of secular freedom kept the young men assimilative and the old men resistantly set in scholasticism a generation longer.

<sup>1</sup>“Emmuah Jeaharah,” 1860.

<sup>2</sup>Derishat Zion, 1864.

It was the anti-Semitic reaction of the '80s which there brought them to realization of the social realities of the Jewish position. Its mark is Leon Pinsker's "Auto-emancipation." This book, by a man as cosmopolitan as Hess himself, makes an accurate and still valid analysis of the Jewish position. The world, it points out, has been dealing with Jews distributively, not collectively. Emancipation has been piecemeal, where it has occurred at all. The Jews have themselves been content with this condition. They have themselves denied their national reality, though it stared them in the face. In consequence, they have been treated as living individual members of a dead nation, whose entity involved them like a ghost, insubstantial, yet real enough to awaken fear and dislike. As individuals they are twice homeless—of uncertain and ambiguous status in the land of their sojourn and without any homeland to which they can refer or with regard to which they can change their status. Thus they are everywhere in the modern world legally and formally free and socially outcast. The only way to resolve this ambiguity is to create a homeland, a centre of corporate reference—anywhere. This can be done by the union of various Jewish alliances, the creation of a single directorate and of a fiscal agency that could raise money through the sale of lands and the necessary subscriptions.

How near to the actual feeling of the vital generation of Jewry Pinsker's analysis came may be gathered from its results. For the first time since Sabbattai, a concrete proposal bore practical fruits. A society was organized in Odessa, with Pinsker at its head. Branches sprang up wherever in a Jewish community thoughtful

men congregated. By 1890 the Hovevei Zion, as it was called, had chapters in Austria, Germany, England, Rumania, France, the United States. It had undertaken the adventure. Bodies of ignorant, untried, and tenderly nurtured young idealists had gone to Palestine to found colonies in swamps, to suffer decimation, to persist, and in the end to conquer: sufferers from Rumanian pogroms had gone; the victims of Russians; and those who were moved only by the love of Zion. To all the Odessa committee held out a helping hand, very often mistakenly and ignorantly, but always with certainty as to the ultimate purpose. Its work in Palestine was met and supplemented with the work of the Alliance Israélite, and of the great benevolent Edmond de Rothschild. Its mistakes were met and supplemented also. But underneath the intrigue, the error, the comedy, and the irony which the work in Palestine developed there was a living thing taking root in the soil and sending shoots in the air and growing free. Observers of the social process could say truly that the Jewish people was finding itself at last.

## CHAPTER VII

### AHAD HA'AM, HERZL, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZED ZIONISM

HOW completely and basically the Jewish people was finding itself may be gathered from the history of what is technically and formally Zionism itself. In the mind of Theodor Herzl, the initiator of the organized international movement, it took shape first of all as a reply to anti-Semitism, which from the '80s to the end of the nineteenth century infected Europe like a disease. Anti-Semitism, Herzl argued in his *Judenstaat*, is an ineradicable and growing social phenomenon. The world repudiates Jews who come to it as Jews purely, who have not rejected their nationality and committed national suicide. Such a suicide, even if it were desirable, is a terrible and tragic process of suffering, and impossible to accomplish. Its alternative is the liberation of the Jewish nationality as such, and this liberation must take the form of restoring the Jewish national home. The agency would be a world-wide society of Jews which should make preliminary political and economic investigations and create a Jewish company, with a capital of \$10,000,000 and headquarters in London, to carry out the enterprise of colonization by obtaining a charter from the Turk and operating under the same privileges as, say, the British East India Company.

Practical initiative did not, however, come from the author of the *Judenstaat*; it came from the Kadimah of Vienna, an organization of students, in theory and practice imbued with the spirit of insurgent nationalism that dominated central Europe. This organization pledged its support to Herzl in every effort to bring together his Society of Jews. From various communities in the heart of Jewry came memorials and appeals. Herzl went to England, where Zangwill introduced him to the Jewish community of the United Kingdom.

At last the great enterprise was launched and the first call for the Zionist Congress was sent out. Over it the Jewry of the world divided sharply—the prosperous minority of the West, represented chiefly by rabbis of the reformed sects, resented and denounced it. The great unprosperous majority of both the East and the West welcomed and acclaimed it as the first step in their divinely promised salvation. The old controversy between assimilation and freedom flamed up. The old arguments were repeated and the old rancours renewed, with, however, an unprecedented intensity deriving from the efficiency and vitality of the Zionist enterprise. The first Congress, held at Basle, Switzerland, in 1897, was an irrefutable demonstration of Jewish national solidarity: demonstration of the organic interdependence, of the diversity in unity which is nationality, of all extremes of Jewish life and thought. The platform it adopted: “The aim of Zionism is to create in Palestine for the Jewish people a publicly recognized homeland under legal guarantees,” became a foundation and a centre absorbing and coördinating all factions of Jewry to the com-

mon purpose it expressed. It brought together orthodox and freethinkers, capitalists and socialists, the East and the West; it gave their unconscious and blind solidarity a conscious and envisioning ground. It rationalized the Jewish being.

This rationalization is perhaps the most interesting aspect of an enterprise richer in handicaps and other-worldly survivals, particularly in sentiment, than in practical endeavour and achievement. It took the form of a conflict and reconciliation of what might be called the colonial temper of the western Zionists and nationalist temper of the eastern ones. The first Congress was naturally dominated by the great Jews of the West—in effect children of the tradition of Europe—by Herzl, Nordau, Zangwill, and their kind. To them Zionism was the solution of a question primarily economic and political. Its achievement was to be remedial rather than creative, and its value one of relief rather than of construction. But to the children of the Haskalah whose voice was the voice of the living Jewish nationality in eastern Europe, Zionism had of necessity to be far more than a relief and a remedy. In their reflection and aspiration it was to be the enfranchisement of the creative energies of the Jewish people, the conservation and reconsecration of the Hebraic spirit to the service of mankind in the Hebrew land. For them Zionism was primarily the condition of a spiritual and cultural recovery; economic and political changes were tools, not ends in themselves, and tools which they did not understand and could not care for.

The most powerful but also the most obscurantist (because he insisted that the desired effect must also

be used as its own cause—he urged the priority of a merely “cultural centre”) voice of this conviction was Asher Ginsberg. No Jew of modern times has had so profound an influence upon the Jewish people because no Jew has so adequately effected in his own thinking and outlook that fusion of contemporaneity with tradition which is the constant ideal of the Jewish as of every other nationalist. In many ways an autodidact, Ginsberg, whose pen name is Ahad Ha'am, had, like most young Jews of his class and generation, studied a little in Germany, a little in Switzerland. He had absorbed both from the writings of Smolenskin and the intellectual temper of the world of his youth the spirit and the method of the Hegelians of the left, and his use of these has served satisfactorily to reconcile the antagonisms of the factions of the nation. Each nationality, Ginsberg holds, is characterized by a spirit, an essence, a central spontaneity, which expresses itself in all the diverse forms of the national life: economic, social, political, religious, literary, and so on. The opposites of this expression are invariably fused in a common resultant, a synthesis, which alone is the adequate expression of the spirit. Thus the otherworldliness of the Essenes and the worldliness of the Sadducees are reconciled in the moralism of the Pharisees, who are therefore the true representatives of the Jewish spirit of their time. And so through every phase of the history of the Jewish people, the present phase excepted. The contemporary Jew of the Ghetto is too restricted and rigid in his life and vision to be truly expressive of the Jewish spirit; the “emancipated” Jew is too uprooted and errant. The combination of stability and freedom which allows for true



emancipation is possible only by the recovery of a fixed centre of national culture where the Jew may be a Jew by inclusion and absorption rather than as in the Ghetto by exclusion and rejection. This centre is necessarily Palestine. Tradition, hope, and work make it so, and the academic settlement of Palestine, the establishment there of concrete embodiments of the Hebraic spirit in cultural institutions is the only true method of saving a living Hebraism for the service of mankind.

This teaching made of Ahad Ha'am a protagonist and leader in the movement of Hovevei Zion. Herzlian Zionism took him by surprise and his relation to it has been that of a critical onlooker. The bulk of the Russian Zionists, that is, the bulk of the Zionists, were of his following. They opposed "practical" and "cultural" enterprises to "political" and diplomatic ones, the winning of the spirit to the saving of the body. Their victory was far-reaching, for they modified the temper and spirit of Herzl also—partly by combat, partly by contagion. By combat, through the steady and relentless party opposition, culminating in the scene at the Congress of 1903, where, in spite of the bitter need of relief from the terrible persecutions of the period, they made overwhelming sacrifice by rejecting the British offer of Uganda. By contagion, through the slow modification of Herzl's purposes from remedialism to construction, because of contact with the spirit and aspiration of the Jewish people as it lived and laboured. This is to be observed in all his publications from 1897 on, but particularly in "Altneuland." In that book the writer's preoccupation is no longer to escape from persecution. The writer's preoccupation is the

structure and organization of a just state. His experience had set his Zionism in a more comprehensive, a truer vision, a fuller conception of its roots and implicated fruits. But Herzl saw what Ahad Ha'am did not; what, indeed, he was incapable of seeing—that a free and living culture is not the source but the outcome of an organized and stable life; that consequently the alternative to political action such as Herzl always stood for was not “colonization” or “cultural activity” but one more Ghetto, this time in Palestine, added to the others already existing; that this new Ghetto might be a Hebrew-speaking Ghetto and a very learned Ghetto, but, that without self-government and economic competency, it never could be more than a Ghetto.<sup>1</sup> Hence, in Herzl's view “cultural” activity might—indeed, should—accompany “political” action, but could never be a substitute for it. Herzl's statesmanship aimed inexorably at a Jewish state in Palestine. And this state, conceived at last in terms of social justice, was his foremost concern when he died.

The activities which had preoccupied him and his following from the first Congress in 1897 to the day of his death, fall, broadly speaking, into three modes: the organization of Jewry, the development of the fiscal agencies of the organization, and political and diplomatic operations.

The first of these endeavours was carried on in the broadest of democratic terms. The Zionist Organization was conceived of, and composed, internationally.

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<sup>1</sup>The complete absurdity of Ahad Ha'amism is evidenced by the Arabized character of the so-called successful plantations like Petah Tikvah and Rishon-le-Zion which are Arab villages with Jewish lords of the manor.

The first Congress, of necessity, was made up of delegates representing the Jews of all the world who were interested, without regard either to number, age, basis of representation, or any of the other matters that are fundamental to representative government. The organization which was subsequently formulated made the Congress central. This was thenceforward to be composed of delegates, not less than twenty-four years old, who received their mandates from the members of the Zionist Organization. These, to become members, needed to be at least eighteen years old, and to pay the *Shekel*, or poll-tax, of twenty-five cents. They were joined together in autonomous national societies or federations, like the English Zionist Federation or the Federation of American Zionists. Any four hundred of the members could elect a delegate to the Congress. The Congress determined the policies and actions of the organization. At first it met yearly, then biennially. Its alternate was the Central Committee, composed of elected representatives of each national organization in proportion to its numbers, and designed to sit, when the Congress was not in session, with the Inner Actions Committee. The Congress elected the twenty-five members of the Actions (Executive) Committee and designated the five to seven individuals on it who were to compose the Inner Actions Committee. This latter was the administrative agency, the ministry, of the organization and was in continuous session. During Herzl's lifetime its interests were largely the creation of the means by which to carry out the programme adopted at the first Congress.

This programme having declared the aim of Zionism to be the establishment for the Jewish people of a

publicly recognized and legally secured home in Palestine, proceeded to specify the means of attaining this aim as follows:

1. To promote through effective agencies the settlement in Palestine of Jewish agriculturists, artisans, and tradesmen.

2. To organize and unify the whole Jewish people by means of local and general institutions suitable for the purpose and conforming with the laws of the respective states.

3. To strengthen and augment Jewish self-consciousness in the individual and in the community.

4. To take the proper preliminary steps toward securing the concurrence of the powers insofar as their assent may be necessary for the attainment of the Zionist goal.

In the beginning all the emphasis was laid upon the second and fourth proposals. Emphasis on the second led to the creation, as a part of the development of the organization, of the fiscal agencies of the Movement. These are the Jewish Colonial Trust and the Jewish National Fund. The former was the actuality of the "Jewish Company" sketched in the *Judenstaat*. Its creation was not merely essential as a pre-requisite to the work of colonization in Palestine; it was essential to the establishment of a sound and safe basis of credit there, without which new agricultural or industrial communities could not develop. So, by vote of Congress, the Jewish Colonial Trust was incorporated, as an English Joint Stock Company. The year of incorporation was 1899. Its projected capital, \$10,000,000, was to be provided by the sale of 2,000,000 shares of stock of the value of \$5 each, and its shareholders,

over one hundred thousand in number, are as widespread geographically as is the Jewish people; but they have paid in only about four hundred thousand dollars of the ten million. The first hundred of the shares are called Founders' Shares; they carry more voting power than all the others, but pay no dividends and are held by trustees who are responsible to the Congress. In them is vested the directing power of the Trust.

The trustees are also—with the freedom of their action limited in this connection by a “controlling committee” (identical with the Inner Actions Committee)—in control of the Jewish National Fund. (The two agencies of Zionist fiscal action are thus under a unified control and administered according to a single policy.) This Fund was established in 1901. Its purpose is to acquire land in Palestine as the inalienable possession of the Jewish people. Its moneys come entirely as free-will offerings from Jews of all lands. The use is decided by the trustees, who compose under the laws of Great Britain (which chartered the Fund) an association issuing no stock. Under the charter the Fund may only purchase land and other immovable property in Palestine and adjacent territory for the purpose of settling Jews thereon. It can under no circumstance “divest itself of the paramount ownership of any of the soil . . . which it may from time to time acquire.” Designed at its inception to accumulate until it had a capital of \$1,000,000, this fund has, nevertheless, since the Sixth Congress, 1903, undertaken a good many purchases and other enterprises in Palestine. This was due to a compromise decision made after a bitter

quarrel, between the "political" and the "practical" parties of the Congress, and a part of the compromise was the agreement that one fourth of the capital of the Fund must remain an inviolable reserve, against the time when the political situation might demand its use.

The political situation was in many ways Herzl's foremost preoccupation. His quarrel with Hovevei Zion derived from their blindness to its centrality and to the importance of political effort. His foundation of *Die Welt* was at bottom motivated by it, and so long as he lived operations in Palestine by the Zionist Organization were sharply kept within bounds. He visited one European chancellery after another, making friends for his cause, establishing precedent and priority for the Zionist Organization as the representative and spokesman of the Jewish people. He interviewed the Kaiser and the Sultan, the premiers of Russia and of England. With England he established a connection which has become traditional for good-will, friendliness, and coöperation.

His opponents, deriving from the politically inexperienced Ghettos of Russia, could neither understand this activity nor tolerate it. Their devotion to Zion was uttermost. They refused to endure anything that seemed like a surrender or compromise of the prime purpose of the recovery of Palestine. Consequently, the issue between them and Herzl came to a crisis in 1903, at the Sixth Congress. The background of this Congress was the period of anti-Semitic terrorism, of pogrom and massacre, initiated by the Tsarist government to divert public attention from the administrative rottenness which had been responsible for the Russian defeats in the Russo-Japanese War.

The towns of Kishineff and Gomel had been devastated, many Jewish communities laid waste. Herzl, seeking relief and finding Palestine—largely because of the intransigent attitude of Jewish millionaires who were begged to and might easily have provided the £10,000,000 demanded by Abdul Hamid for a concession in Palestine—for the time being out of reach, negotiated with the British Government and secured the famous offer of Uganda. Over this offer the Congress split. The delegates from Russian Jewry bolted in a body. Their mandate was clear. They and their constituencies had been the sufferers; their need and their tragedy had prompted the search for a substitute for Palestine. But they would accept no substitute. Their ancestors had suffered for a thousand years; they, too, would suffer. They would suffer, they would endure. No matter what the cost, they could accept no way-station, no *nacht-asyl*; their hope and their destiny were in the land of their fathers and in nothing else. It was with difficulty that Herzl persuaded them to return to the Congress. The British offer was not refused outright; a commission was appointed to study the fitness of Uganda for colonization. But the report of the commission was a foregone conclusion. Indeed, to make assurance doubly sure the Russian Zionists held a conference at Kharkov which formulated a certain ultimatum to put before Herzl. That he satisfied the representatives of the Zionist masses may be gathered from the fact that the meeting of the Actions Committee in April, 1904, gave him a unanimous vote of confidence. Three months later, on July 3rd, he died of heart failure. He was only forty-four years old.

## CHAPTER VIII

### PARTIES AND PROGRAMMES AFTER HERZL'S DEATH

THE leader's death seemed at first a blow from which the Movement could not recover. There were enrolled in it no personalities with the same force and imagination, none with any sense of the political realities which had always to be held in the foreground of Zionist statesmanship. The more influential of the western Zionists, to whom Zionism was far more a programme of relief than a principle of creation, disappointed over the outcome of the Uganda affair, seceded from the movement, with Zangwill at their head. They formed the Jewish Territorial Organization (*Ito*) which for a while bade fair to rival the Zionist association in influence and prestige. But the *Ito* was a lost cause from the beginning. It counted precisely without that deep emotion and overruling vision of the masses which had led to the dramatic rejection of Uganda, and which was keeping Zionism alive in spite of its inadequate leadership, in spite of the fact that with Herzl dead the movement became for a time a movement without a policy and without a plan, in spite of the fact that it reverted almost instantaneously to the eleemosynary attitude and methods of the pre-Herzlian times. Not that the "great programme" was forgotten; there were simply lacking the initiative and the imagination to carry it on. David Wolfsohn,



Herzl's successor as chairman of the Inner Actions Committee, was devoted to Herzl and the Herzlian programme, but he lacked the essentials of leadership. By vocation he was a banker, with distinguished business acumen, infinite caution, and unflinching courage. He lacked, however, the qualities to advance the cause. The best he could do was to keep it from going too far backward, to surround its financial agencies with adequate safeguards, to hold the factions together and—to mark time. In the end, the faction which caused the defeat of the Uganda projects defeated him also, and he also died.

That faction was tied to ineffectuality by its tradition of "practical" work and by its ardour for "cultural development." The Inner Actions Committee chosen to express it was truly expressive of it—its dominant figures were journalists, lay preachers, and at best a professor of botany. Neither it nor the Congress which elected it was particularly concerned with and certainly not skilled in the problems and technique of organization, the principles of financing, or any of the essentials which should compose an effective engine of statesmanlike endeavour. Numerically, the organization went backward rather than forward—it lost adherents particularly in western Europe and America, and in eastern Europe it came to a standstill. Attention shifted from the "great programme" to the support of the existing Jewish settlements in Palestine and to the piecemeal construction of new enterprises—more especially of educational enterprises.

This was accompanied by another phenomenon with which it was causally bound up—the development and

stressing of party differences within the movement itself. Under the "great programme" these differences had been academic: they had been irrelevant to and did not in any way affect the unity of purpose and method which sought to secure Palestine once more as the homeland of the Jewish people. But with the initiation of specific undertakings these differences became important and are destined to play a progressively greater rôle both in the Zionist Movement and in Palestine itself.

The differences echo the general political divisions of European society, with such qualifications as the peculiarities of the Jewish people impose. Zionism thus has its Centre, Right, and Left, and the quarrels that usually obtain between them. "Centre" may be used to designate what has often been called the "general" Zionist group, the Zionists who are concerned primarily and exclusively with the recovery of the Jewish homeland and are content to have let the correlative and subsidiary problems of its social and political economy wait public promulgation until the time comes for confronting and solving them. The overwhelming majority of the Zionists are "general." They elect the administrative officers and sustain them against the opposition. That, on the whole, and perhaps unfortunately, has made very few encroachments upon the Centre.

In most respects in harmony with the Centre, but differing from it in essential emphasis, is the Right. Its official designation is "Mizrachi," and its interest is the conservation and enhancement of traditional Judaism. It sees in Zionism and in the Jewish homeland simply tools—indispensable tools,

but nevertheless, tools merely—for the attainment of this end. Indeed, it sees the whole complexus of Jewish life, its culture, social organization, educational system and economy as secondary to this sectarian interest. The Jews, its protagonists hold, are a people whose chief, whose exclusive attribute, is religion, and religion of the type practised and defended by the Mizrachists. For justification they point to the fact that this type of Judaism is the Judaism of the orthodox mass, that the greater part of the history of this mass is religious history. From the Mizrachi point of view the Jewish problem is the maintenance of Judaism in harmony with modern life and society. Says an official apologist, quoting from the declaration made by its representatives at Pressburg in 1904: "The Mizrachi is an organization of orthodox Jews, who adhere to the Basle programme and who strive to perpetuate and develop the national Jewish life in the spirit of Jewish tradition." The Mizrachi believe, he says elsewhere, "that Jewish Nationalism is an essential ingredient to the existence of the Jews in the present and the future, and that it has always been an inseparable factor in Judaism, and that the Jewish religion is not complete without it. It further declares that the land of Israel, Palestine, is the land of the Jewish future, and that unless it is obtained, Jews and Judaism are threatened with a grave danger. Finally, it asserts that those two can obtain the ideal state only when they have as a base Torah Israel, the true tradition of the people." Organized in 1903 by Rabbi Jacob Raines of Lida, to carry out these principles, the Mizrachists have devoted themselves to propaganda among the "orthodox mass" and to the development

and maintenance of traditionalist educational institutions in Palestine. In view of their proclaimed unanimity with the orthodox mass, they have made extraordinarily little progress among them. The party's most numerous and most notable recruits have come from those Jews, both east and west, who find a problem of conscience in reconciling orthodoxy with contemporaneity. The Mizrachi programme and point of view offer a solution. But they are a programme and point of view altogether without meaning to the "orthodox mass," which is at rest in its orthodoxy and feels no problem. Mizrachism plays the same rôle in Judaism as Modernism in Catholicism, and is, by every probability, destined to the same fate. Meanwhile, it goes through the usual party exercises of obstruction, disingenuous opposition, demand for excessive representation. In Palestine it opposes the secular schools and demands disproportionate support for its own and other orthodox ones.

The Left is very considerably more than the opposite of the Right. Although the implications of the Right's position should lead to a complete split in the social economy of life also—Mizrachi seeks the administration of the whole "law of Israel" and "ultimate theocracy"—there exists, in fact, a high degree of harmony and coöperation between Mizrachi and the "general" Zionist organization on all matters not relating to Mizrachi's particular (demanded) prerogatives in organization standing and in Palestinian work. But the Left is irreconcilable. Its position is exceedingly subtle, and for one not acquainted with the ethnic, religious, and cultural complications of central and eastern Europe, difficult to grasp. It is a position

in which the postulates of socialism are fused with axioms of nationality. Because of the status imposed upon the Jewish people by the accidents of history, the Poale Zion (the Left is usually so-called—there are other forms of it—Zeiri Zion, Poel Hazair, etc.) hold, the Jewish masses are more absolutely the victims of exploitation than any other in Europe. They are exploited not merely as proletarians; they are exploited also as Jews, and exploited by everybody, by their fellow workmen of other races and sects as well as by the capitalists. The counter to economic exploitation is socialism. The counter to ethnic disability is nationalism, Zionism. Hence the name “Workers of Zion,” and hence the organization of the workers into “class-conscious national units.” Such organization is imperative for the adequate solution of the problem of the Jewish masses. The capitalist Jew may and usually does lose his identity in his economic class, or at most, he retains his connection with the Jewish people by way of the Church and tries to establish the illusion that the Jews are a sect. For the Jewish masses such a moral suicide is impossible, and they would reject it as unworthy if it were possible. The cosmopolitanism of the rigid Marxian socialist, on the other hand, though much assumed and defended by many Jews—the lower East Side of New York is full of exclusively Yiddish-speaking “cosmopolitans”; they really compose a socialist Ghetto—shows itself wherever logically undertaken to be only a “form of assimilation that makes of the Jewish masses a pawn in the hands of ambitious bourgeois.” Consequently, the self-conscious Jewish workmen are not merely Socialists, they are also Nationalists. “With the Jewish masses,”

writes Mr. Fineman,<sup>1</sup> "nationalism means self-assertion, contempt for servile sufferance, a higher cultural development; and, above all, a determination to take one's fate in one's own hand. Cosmopolitanism or assimilation involves surrender of individuality and destruction of self-reliance and self-respect. A people that is humiliated and is made to feel that its own speech and culture are of negligible importance is one that can also be more easily exploited. No wonder then that with minority nationalities the wealthy bourgeoisie and the exploiting plutocrats are usually in favour of assimilation and, on the other hand, class-conscious workingmen more or less clearly recognize that problems of cultural autonomy and equality of national rights are of primary importance to the working class even in their economic struggle." The concern of the Poale Zionists, consequently, is not merely with the recovery of the homeland of the Jewish people; they are as integrally concerned with the economic and cultural character that this homeland is to have. Where the Mizrachi stress orthodox Judaism, they stress Socialism. But they differ from the Mizrachi in the character of this stressing. To the Mizrachi the security of orthodoxy is the paramount end, and the devices by which this is to be maintained are indifferent: any polity accomplishing the purpose is acceptable. To Poale Zionism the paramount end is the freedom and happiness of the Jewish worker as *Jewish* worker, and the polity whereby this is to be attained is implied by it. Hence Poale Zion has operated everywhere—in the international congresses, in the various national federations, in Palestine—as a genuine opposition,

<sup>1</sup>"Poale Zionism," H. Fineman, New York, 1918.

pressing always in the direction of economic democracy. However mistaken its economic theories may be held to be, its practice has thus far been exceedingly salutary. It has had the courage, also the foolhardiness of its position: it has neither bargained nor compromised. In the international socialist organization it has consequently become the acknowledged representative of the Jewish proletariat and it has secured from this organization and others the endorsement of the Jewish claim to Palestine; in the Zionist organization it has acted as a relentless critic of the policy of the majority, more often with heat than with wisdom, but always with unswerving loyalty to its dogmas. It is in Palestine, however, that its influence has been truly salutary. There it helped to create *Hashomer*, the force of mounted police for the protection of the colonies which has as much as anything else served to win the regard and respect of "Arabs" for Jews; it organized the Jewish workmen against exploitation by Jewish landowners; it defended the Jewish National Fund against abuse; it established a Palestine Labour Fund and Bureau; it organized coöperative societies for day labourers on the Swedish and Italian plans, and it is developing and maintaining various coöperative enterprises recognized to be far from Socialism, which are intended to safeguard the Jewish workman in Palestine from exploitation on the one side and pauperization on the other.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE PRE-ZIONIST JEWRY OF PALESTINE

THE Palestine to which the "general" Zionists and the factions turned their attention was anything but the ideal which the tradition had made of it. Such forests as it had possessed had been cut down; its rivers were torrents in winter and rocky aridities in summer; the waters that had been distributed by irrigation ditches were puddled in swamps, and, for drinking and cooking, collected in cisterns. All these had become breeding grounds of malaria. The indigenous peasant population, victims of successive waves of military conquerors, each of which had left a racial sediment in its wake, existed below the level of sustenance necessary for healthful living. It was wasted by dirt and disease (trachoma and malaria outstandingly), retarded by ignorance and superstition, and impoverished by taxes and the exactions of public officials. Its numbers were slowly decreasing; the equilibrium which its ancestry had succeeded immemorably long ago in establishing with its natural and political setting being inadequate for increase and hardly sufficient for self-maintenance. The non-indigenous population other than the Jews was made up of Christian sectaries whose existence had no regard, even when they were self-supporting, to the condition of the land and the plight of their neighbours; their



preoccupation was ultimately with heaven and salvation.

The same thing was true in even a greater degree of the Jews. There had always been Jews in Palestine; indeed, in all probability the indigenous population is to a great degree Jewish by blood, though no longer by nationality and consciousness. The conscious Jews came mostly from outside of Palestine and their primary interest in the land was in the merit they acquired by living in it, and the security that accrued to them by dying and being buried in it. To live in the Holy Land was, in their eyes and in the eyes of their European brethren, itself sanctification. And it is of the very nature of saintliness that it must not concern itself with the sordid things of this world, such as the provision of food, clothing, shelter, and assurance of the future; it lays up treasure in heaven and lives by charity on earth. The return it makes for what it receives it makes by way of blessings and of prayer, to guarantee prosperity for the living and security for the dead.

This, since the middle of the eighteenth century, was the special vocation of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. They were concentrated in terrible slums of the cities—Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias. They studied the Torah, they recited psalms, they wept and prayed at the wailing wall, they acted as official mourners and *Kaddish-sayers*, under stipend, for the pious dead and preoccupied living in lands beyond. Very many of them were old people who had themselves made pilgrimage to Palestine to die, but lived—on charity—and bred. For their children they organized the typical mediæval *chedarim* or schools and the Talmudical academies

called *Yeshibahs*. They married them off—on charity, and when they finally did die, they left them for inheritance their claim on the charitable distribution which had attained the status and value of a vested interest and proprietary right. The charity they lived on and still live on is technically known as *Halukah*. It is a fund collected from the Jewries of the whole world to maintain the pious and saintly, whose merit it is to live in Palestine. Its administration and distribution participates in the unsavoury character of all such funds, and its existence and consequences constituted from the beginning one of the most vexatious problems of the Jewish secular concern with Palestine.

This concern became direct and active early in the nineteenth century, with the ritual-murder accusation that was levelled against the Jews of Damascus. The accusation brought Sir Moses Montefiore to Palestine, and in 1854 he tried to colonize thirty-five Safed Jews in Galilee. A score of years later, as one result of the efforts of Hirsch Kalischer, the colonies of *Mosza* and *Petach Tikvah* were founded by the settlement in those places of Jews from Jerusalem. To these were added in 1882, *Rishon le Zion*, *Wadi-el-Hannin*, *Rosh Pinnah*, and *Zikron Yaakob*.

With the foundation of *Rishon le Zion* a new type of Jew enters Palestine and the land's rehabilitation truly begins. There were no indications of this whatsoever at the outset, nor for a generation to come. The founders of *Rishon* were young men, intellectuals, most of them tenderly nurtured, innocent of all knowledge of agriculture, with neither the physique nor the force to undergo the hardships of pioneering. They and their kindred had turned to Palestine in the passion-

ate disillusion over liberation in Russia. The government of that land, under the Tsar Liberator, had opened up the gates of intellectual and vocational opportunity to the Jews. The younger generation, flocking to the universities, adding itself to the intellectual ferment of all young Russia, became Russophile and "assimilationist," as it were, over night. Then, as unexpectedly as the gates had been opened, they were shut down. The great good Tsar was killed. His successors replaced his liberal *ukases* with the May Laws of 1882. Pogroms were initiated by the government throughout the Jewish pale, and as a consequence the great contemporary folk-migration of the Jews began. The bulk adventured to America, there to build up the important American Jewish community; a few, a very few, reverting to the old ancestral vision of the Promised Land and moved by their misfortunes to seek a radical solution of the problem of which their misfortune was so intimate and poignant an expression, adventured to Palestine. What distinguished them sharply and utterly from the older communities was the fact that their objective was secular and practical. They were not going to Palestine to die, they were going to Palestine to live. They were not going to lay up treasure in heaven, they were going to win a livelihood from the earth. In their consciousness Palestine had acquired a status different from that of the miraculous Messianic tradition and other-worldly hope of their predecessors. Their sentiment toward the land had a greater kinship with patriotism than with piety. The land was to them the land of their people's salvation, even as it was to the religionists, but the salvation was to be secular, through work, not through faith.

The naïve and unconsidered affirmation of their inexperience met with nullification, however, from two directions. At hand was the nudity and barrenness of the country, changed in the course of centuries of maltreatment from "a land of milk and honey" into a swamp-spotted, disease-breeding desert. With that went the rapacity of the landowners who sold them land in all sorts of impossible places, like the marsh in which *Rishon* was founded. Farther off, in the Jewries of the world, there was the debilitating effect of the tenderness toward any Jew who lived in the Promised Land. Even the most secular of the European Jewries could not overcome the glamour of the vision whose fascination increased with the distance; could not overcome the sense of eleemosynary responsibility for the pious who were accumulating merit by merely living in Palestine. So, when the inevitable happened, when the aspiring young colonies had consumed all their capital, when inexperience had starved them, when disease had weakened them, and death and flight had decimated them and those that remained turned at last to their brethren in Europe, the Europeans sprang to their assistance.

But the spirit of the assistance they rendered was essentially charitable.

They failed altogether to realize the principle of self-help and self-sufficiency. In the east a conference was organized at Kattowitz which later was transformed into the Odessa Committee. In the west there was the French Rothschild, moved to great largess by the tales of the sufferings and ardours of the colonists. The two vied with each other in errors of method and material wherewith the colonists were to be

relieved. Little by little the colonists became demoralized. The first ardour died out, and the urgency of the struggle to survive was relaxed. Under the interest and providence of the Rothschild<sup>1</sup> fortune the colonists felt that they were secure. They ceased to work with their own hands. They acquired the manners and methods of the Arab *effendi*. Their homes became Arab villages. If a crop failed or money otherwise was needed, it came to them in the guise of a perpetual loan; or the price of a commodity was artificially maintained—by means of the Rothschild millions—regardless of the market and the other conditions controlling production. Wine that could not be marketed was stored in cellars built for the purpose, but prices were maintained and the proceeds used in sustaining in the colonies cheap imitations of the style and manners of Paris.

Withal, the "administrators" who represented the Rothschild interest and were its stewards, were either indifferent to the development of the settlement or inimical to it. They made all the errors that possibly could be made. By their policy they added a colourful hatred to the colonists' colourful life. When, in 1891, Ahad Ha'am visited Palestine for the Odessa Committee, he found the new *Yishub* living on a charity, on a *Halukah* more subtly distributed, but as genuinely a *Halukah* as the sources of livelihood of the old *Yishub*. He found strained relationships between the Jewish settlement and the Turkish Government,

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<sup>1</sup>It is proper to add that without the interest of Baron Edmond de Rothschild, this aspect of the Palestinian adventure would have failed in its very inception. He has not only generously maintained it, but has been able to profit by experience so that to-day he and his son James de Rothschild are among the staunchest supporters of a realistic policy of colonization and settlement in Palestine.

strained because there had been competition and speculation in the purchase of lands so that the government had found it necessary to prohibit the immigration of and the sale of land to Russian Jews. He found that there were hardly any legalized Jewish holdings. He found the law of *baksheesh* regnant, and a complexity of devices, all involving more and more *baksheesh*, to hold together the Jewish colonist and the land. He demanded, therefore, that the approval of the Turkish Government should be secured for any action to be taken by the Odessa Committee and he urged particularly that no aid should be given the colonists in the form of cash advances.

His survey and his recommendations were disagreeable but tonic. They designated the beginnings of the moral, the economic, and practical rehabilitation in self-help and self-respect which had been the hope and the purpose of the pioneers. That they had fallen into the easy ways of a kept community was not altogether their fault. There were the ponderous inertia of tradition, the inexperience, and the incompetence; there was the infection of example from the older settlement of Halukah Jews, and of the established order of society in the land. Talking and studying were after all more habitual, more traditional to them than doing: and their inward drive was toward these, not toward agricultural or industrial competency. Lacking the external compulsion which would have forced them to achieve the latter, they spent themselves, in the security of the Rothschild providence, on the former. Like the old *Yishub*, they concerned themselves with the spirit, but it was a secular spirit and its substance was a rehabilitated Hebrew vernacular,

a Palestinian Hebrew Press, and a system of education in Hebrew.

Its process and prelude was a cultural revolution in Palestine, a revolution in which the defenders of tradition persecuted, denounced, and excommunicated. Its leader was a young liberal, Eliezer Ben Yehudah. Born in Russia in 1859, his mind was formed by both the forces of the optimistic *Haskalah* and of the pessimism which made all the young Russians that were his contemporaries into Nihilists. The upshot of his political frustration and his intellectual disillusion was, as it was for so many of his peers, the rediscovery of his place among his people, and a self-dedication to the regeneration of the one enduring specific symbol of his people's entity—the Hebrew tongue. He went from Russia to Paris, from Paris to Palestine. Facing death from tuberculosis and starvation, he lived in an underground hovel in Jerusalem, the objective of all the rancour that orthodoxy could concentrate upon him. In his hovel, the only speech he permitted to be used was Hebrew speech. He refused to speak any other language upon the public streets. By force of his example, and the advocacy of the cause in a Hebrew weekly of which he made himself editor, he acquired a following. His following also pledged themselves to use only Hebrew in their households. Their children grew up in a Hebrew-speaking setting. They were sent to kindergartens and schools—such as they were—specially provided, where Hebrew alone was the language of play and of work.

And the Hebraization of the children reacted again upon the parents. Slowly, life in the new Yishub

became Hebraic. A literature and a drama grew up, as it were over night. In the colonies, the traditional holidays became spontaneously occasions for games, festivals, and pageants, the latter recapitulating various phases of the biblical narratives. To regulate and to guide the vernacular and literary development of Hebrew there was organized in Jerusalem the *Va'ad Halashon*, with Ben Yehudah as its head. This *Va'ad* had the nature and functions of Richelieu's first Academy. It was the court of language. All new forms, spontaneous or manufactured, were brought to it for confirmation or rejection. It set itself the task and purpose of providing expressions needful to the daily as well as the literary life, and not to be found in the existing vocabulary. To accomplish its task it drew upon all sources—archæological and Talmudical material, the Bible, the Hebrew literature of the Middle Ages. Its results are being incorporated by Ben Yehudah with the outcome of his own private labours in his *Millon*, or Hebrew dictionary.

This spontaneous linguistic and cultural development of the new Yishub was by no means a smooth one. That the Hebraic movement was resisted by the older and spiritually mediæval settlement has already been noted. An attempt on the part of a section of this settlement, made in 1866, to establish a school (the Blumenthal School) where the management was competent and where the study of one European language was compulsory, met with excommunication on the part of the Ashkenazic section of that community. The first real and effective attempt from outside to bring something of the spirit of self-help and national self-respect to the Jewish com-



munities of Palestine was made by the Alliance Israélite Universelle under the leadership and personal initiative of the saintly Charles Netter. In 1870 he founded near Jaffa the *Mikveh Israel*—an agricultural school, on the most approved model of the time. His supervision lasted until his death, in 1882. With the passing of his personality and the change in temper of the directorate, a change that reflected the political changes in the Europe of the time, the effect and the policy of *Mikveh Israel* as well as of the other Alliance schools in the Orient were altered. Designed to convert the Halukah-receiving population into self-supporting and self-respecting agricultural labourers—and during the period of Netter's leadership, labourers with a vision of national restoration before them—its actual effect, like that of all the Alliance schools, was to make of the pupils amateur Frenchmen, agricultural administrators, book-made experts, or teachers eager to find, and eagerly seeking, life and vocation elsewhere than in Palestine. The policy of the Alliance was to cross and to frustrate, as nearly as it could, the spontaneous tendencies of the new settlement and to obstruct its influence upon the old. That it should fail was a foregone conclusion. All it accomplished was to lend prestige to those tendencies—to the use of European methods of education, of management, and to training for industry. It had its competitors in England and in Germany, who endowed schools with analogous purposes and with analogous futility. Colony after colony succeeded in establishing independently its own school and its Hebrew medium. Not easily and not without conflict. In 1888 Israel Belkind tried to found a national school at Jaffa,

but failed for lack of funds. In the agricultural colonies this lack was met by the Rothschild money, distributed by the Jewish Colonization Association (J. C. A.)

This association, which is trustee for the Baron Maurice de Hirsch Foundation, had been made trustee, in 1899, of the Rothschild assets and liabilities in the Jewish colonies of Palestine. Its charge was to bring order and self-dependence out of the confusion and pauperism that prevailed in the Rothschild colonies. Although it has been accused of absentee landlordism and bureaucracy, it certainly did attain to something which may be called success in comparison with the utter failure of Rothschild and the Odessa Committee and the independent pioneers. To some degree and after a fashion, it rehabilitated the economics and administration of the colonies. Refusing resolutely to interfere with the cultural interests of the Yishub, it devoted itself to recreating the economic independence which had been lost. It uprooted vineyards, cut down the output of wine, withdrew the Rothschild subsidy which had kept prices at a level of extraordinary inflation, and compelled the wine-growers to offer their wine in open market to *bona-fide* buyers. At the same time it arranged to see the colonists through their crises on more of a business and less of a philanthropic basis. This it did by a system of guaranteed loans with specific, though varying, terms, secured by mortgages, and replacing the unguaranteed loans that were really gifts. The necessities of the situation and the pressure of the J. C. A. forced the wine-growers of the six viticultural colonies into coöperative organization for both buying and selling. Within ten years they succeeded in making their affairs profitable enough

to begin to discharge their debts and to pay off their mortgages.

The method had been used by the Jewish Colonization Association in the Argentine and in the establishment of its own colonies in Galilee. There it set up farms, for the training of agriculturalists, each under the direction of an expert supervisor. Around these farms it built its colonies, consisting of allotments of land, houses, stock, and tools, to be leased to each workman whose training had made him eligible for an allotment. His terms were of the easiest: the payment of a rent, at first in kind, of about one fifth his gross produce; then, if both sides were willing and satisfied with each other, a contract under which the colonist was to pay off the cost of his farm and equipment (varying in price from \$2,200 to \$3,500) in about fifty-one years, at the rate of 2 per cent. per year. Essentially philanthropic though this is, it is an enormous improvement over the earlier pauperizing methods.

That the readjustments which the methods of the Jewish Colonization Association compelled should work hardship; that the colonists, already pauperized in spirit, did not like them and should complain bitterly, were foregone conclusions. It was not a foregone conclusion that the Association should succeed. For its success was dependent upon a radical change, a change equivalent to a religious conversion, in the psychology of the colonists. This change neither the Association nor any other force active in Palestine could have brought about. It derived, when like a rocket it flashed up, from a new and entirely extraneous influence, supplying a new and efficacious morale, a new dynamic and a new vision. The influence was Zionism.

## CHAPTER X

### ZIONISM IN PALESTINE AND THE NEAR-EASTERN QUESTION

THE reaction of Palestinian Jewry to Zionism and the Zionist principle could not, at the beginning, fail to conform to the wont and use of their daily lives. These, in their bearing on the economy and polity of Palestine, had the blindness of instinct or the illusion of religion. At no point were they illuminated by an organic principle that should govern the policies of the community and give conscious direction to its life. The orthodox, the Messianists, in Palestine responded to Zionism with the same pious repulsion as their fellow-pietists elsewhere; the pan-Turanians, of whom there were some, echoed the German and French assimilationists, and among the members of the new Yishub there was the same dubious assent as among the Hovevei Zionists who were their chief bread-givers.

Moreover, the first position and prior policy of the Zionist organization under Herzl's leadership were indifferent to their interests. The position was that no enterprises should be undertaken in Palestine except under the guarantee of a charter which would make possible autonomous control and organic national development. The policy was to create the instruments for such a development and to withhold their utilization until the political guarantee had been

secured. Under Herzl, the Zionist organization, consequently, devoted itself to building up its membership and institutions and to carrying on diplomatic and political negotiations with the chancelleries of Europe. The Russian Hovevei Zionists, who—with notable exceptions such as Ahad Ha'am—had joined the movement, opposed the position and the policy bitterly; offering as alternative the elaboration and continuance of their own programme, now transluminated by the Herzlian purpose as its goal. Between them and Herzl and his followers there was continual strife, and all the parties in Zion were defined, according to their adherence, as “practicals” or “politicals.”

From the point of view of the “politicals” the position of the Jewish colonists in Palestine was precarious in the extreme. Under Turkish law they had no right to the land they held; indeed, their holdings were either unrecorded, or recorded in the name of some Arab or Turk; they themselves were without legal claim on it. To retain it, and to maintain their status, they were under the compulsion of the frequent and extensive use of *baksheesh*, and at the mercy of the caprice of every official. Jews, furthermore, could enter Turkish territory, particularly Palestine, only under difficulties, and their stay was formally illegal. By the regulations of the Porte, made in 1888, Jews seeking to enter Palestine were required to secure a “red ticket” and once in, could stay only three months. The regulations were a dead letter from the moment of their promulgation, *baksheesh* and the general feeling of their insincerity helping to make them so. But they kept dubious the whole position of the Jewish settlement of Palestine and it was with an eye on them that Ahad

Ha'am made the recommendations of 1891. In 1900, when it began to be apparent that little would come of the negotiations between Herzl and Abdul Hamid, the Vali of Beirut was again instructed to enforce the regulations, apparently in the hope that such an action might force the hands of the rich Jews, regarding whose riches and desire for Palestine Abdul Hamid had mythical ideas. Had the instructions been obeyed, the whole Yishub would have been destroyed. Italy and the United States protested, however, that enforcement would mean discrimination against their nationals on the basis of religion, and the Turks refrained, reverting to the older practice. The event, of course, was a concrete illustration of the consideration that animated the "politicals," and there were some Palestinians who understood them, and sided with them.

In any case, that the Palestinians' hopes were stirred and their vision enlarged is indisputable. They were always represented at the congresses, and Herzl's visit to Palestine produced a marked and lasting intensification of their nationalist *morale*. The negotiations over El Arish and Uganda, which succeeded the negotiations with the Turk, served to intensify it still further, and it was suffused with something like anti-Zionist feeling during the sessions of the Sixth Zionist Congress when the British offer was being debated. The occasion was not the Congress itself, but another congress in Palestine, organized and presided over by Mendel Ussishkin. Sanguine in temperament and dictatorial in his contacts with other men, he had qualities that fitted him for leadership under the conditions of restricted public life in Russia, but which were entirely

unsuited to the open methods and public deliberations of parliamentary procedure. Although a member of the Zionist organization and conspicuous by his behaviour rather than by his ideas at the congresses, he was an intransigent Hovevei Zionist and he opposed Herzl and the "politicals" from the start. His methods were rather those of Tsarist Russia than of parliamentary England, and the congress that he created in Palestine was his first reply to the Uganda offer. It proposed an organization of the philanthropic agencies functioning in Palestine—of the Jewish Colonization Association, the Odessa Committee, the Alliance Israélite, the Ezra (a German society) and representatives of Baron Edmond de Rothschild, who, together with the Yishub through its chosen spokesmen, should collaborate "practically" to the end of colonizing Palestine with Jews. The enterprise failed, and in the meantime Herzl had died, and the Seventh Congress had with dignity and appreciation declined the British offer.

This action was a victory for the "practicalists." It closed a phase of Zionist activity. All subsequent action, economic, social, and cultural, centred about Palestine and the communities there. The first step was taken in the year of the Sixth Congress, when the Jewish Colonial Trust organized the Anglo-Palestine Company bank in Jaffa. Other branches appeared, in the course of time in Jerusalem, Beirut, Haifa, Safed, Tiberias, Hebron, Gaza, and Petah Tikwah. Their ultimate purpose, their economic liberalism, and their—in comparison of course only with what had obtained in the past—apparently businesslike methods created a new industrial and commercial standard for the Yishub,

a standard suffused with something of the high *morale* of the national idea.

The function of these banks was reënfined in 1911 by the institution of the Palestine Commission. In that year Wolfsohn, who had succeeded to the post and the policies of Herzl, went down to defeat. The "practicalists" became the government of the Zionist organization, with a policy that just barely kept them from going over the edge of Zionism to an absolute philanthropism. This was, in the imagination of its apologists, an extension of the general policy of Europe abroad, to the sphere of Jewish interests. It was "the policy of economic penetration." The Jewish claim to Palestine on merely historic grounds, argued Otto Warburg, a professor of botany in Berlin and the leader and promulgator of the new programme, was not worth much, nowadays. A valid modern title would have to rest on the economic dependence of Palestine upon Jewish investment, initiative, and resources. The Palestine Office or Bureau was created pursuant to this idea. It purported to function practically as a home ministry, collecting information, guiding and assisting would-be settlers, and directing and coördinating all sorts of activities. Certain moneys of the National Fund were, not without a struggle, made available for its activities. It guided and to some degree subsidized experiments—which were wasteful failure—in afforestation; in coöperative colonization, notably the costly and unsuccessful Merchaviah experiment according to the plans of Franz Oppenheimer. It undertook housing experiments, the care of the Yemenites, the encouragement of the art school, Bezalel, and its shops, of the Hebrew Gym-



nasium at Jaffa, of the Technical School at Haifa, and the Hebrew University, projected already before the war—all with the enormous wastage which is the price of inexperience or something more sinister.

The dominating interest, naturally, was "cultural work" in Palestine. Three at least of the members of the Inner Actions Committee were avowed disciples of Ahad Ha'am. All felt the pressure of the Zionist intellectuals toward cultural revival. The exceeding emphasis on the school system, then, was a part of the party programme, but it represented, as has already been noted, the natural institutional trend of the effective will of the Jewish people, this will having become accustomed to expressing itself in schools and literature, and having still much training to undergo before it may be able to realize itself in organically conceived national economic and political institutions. Toward that latter end also, however, first and tentative steps had been taken in the development of coöperative consumers and marketing associations among the older colonists, and the growth and functioning of the *va'adim*, or councils, with their occasional equal suffrage and commission form of administration. The chief instrument of the Zionist organization in helping toward all these developments was the Palestine Office, somehow directed by a sociological writer, Dr. Arthur Ruppin.

In sum: under the new Zionist policy, the impact of the Zionist idea on Palestine served to awaken and to direct the anarchic Jewry of the land into a community tending to acquire the characteristics of a national polity. Compared with even the inchoate Albanians, the spirit of this community was still

atomic and centrifugal, but beside its antecedents in Palestianian Jewry itself it was corporate and organic indeed. Any enmity, menacing vigorously enough from without, would fuse its disparate organizations into institutions of its society and its consciousness of nationality into the patriotism of nationhood.

The lacking inimical menace was supplied by the action of European rivalries on the Turkish Empire. These rivalries had kept alive the "Sick Man" of Europe, even through crises in his own existence. The conflicting ambitions of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans, the British anxiety over the Syrian road to India and the protection of the Suez Canal, the French investments in Syria, and the crystallization of the German programme of a Middle Europe, were cleverly used by Abdul Hamid one against the other to keep himself safe amid atrocities. The latter were as essential a part of his domestic policy as the former were of his foreign policy. For the Turkish Empire was a polyglot empire, and the Turks were a minority in their own dominion. Heirs of the imperial structure of Byzantium, they allowed its common life to run on of its own momentum—until it ran down—and trusted their sovereignty to the sanction of the military force of the Janissaries. But these themselves lost integrity in the course of time. Posts became hereditary, and discipline and ferocity were replaced by intrigue and *baksheesh*. The peoples that were dominated and exploited by these forces were designated as *millets*, that is, religious nationalities, having their own leaders, with powers and functions that were secular as well as religious. Thus the Christians of Turkey in Europe were con-

sidered all of the Greek millet, regardless of whether they were Bulgars or Serbs, or Croats, or Vlachs, or Greeks proper.

It would perhaps have been fortunate for Europe if this mode of unity had remained the dominant one, and the liberation of these nationalities from the Turkish yoke had been the common action of a group regarding itself one and indivisible. But the pressure of the continental rivals prohibited this, and the auto-genous interests of the linguistic and ethnographic societies were reënforced and were exploited by the continental powers. The slow expulsion of the Turk from Europe is a function not primarily of the single religious, but of the many awakening national consciousnesses of the various subject-peoples of the Porte. Greek and Serb and Croat and Bulgar and Ruman, by force or fraud or both, attained first to autonomy, then to independence, under the stimulation of linguistic and literary revival at home and diplomatic intrigue and military force abroad. It became apparent, finally, that Turkey-in-Europe was doomed.

It became apparent, to none so much so, as to the subjects of the Porte who called themselves Young Turks, and who hoped to save the empire from the dissolution within and the destruction without, which threatened it. The Committee of Union and Progress that led them was recruited from a variety of the races of the empire: Dönme Jews from Saloniki, Bulgars, Poles. Most of its members had lived in exile abroad. They had been students of European politics and European political theories. They had been particularly intrigued by the ideology of the French Revolution, and at the outset, it would seem,

they took this ideology literally, abstractly. Their one aspiration was to modernize Turkey, to democratize and vitalize her. This aspiration fitted the interests of certain financiers in Saloniki and of others, far more important, in Vienna, Buda-Pesth, Berlin, and very probably, Paris and London. With the means supplied, in return for pledges of concessions by these financiers, the Young Turks conspired to overthrow the government. In 1908 they did overthrow the government, but their revolution was the *coup d'état* of a minority, not a great national uprising. For the latter the necessary elements were lacking. The religious sanctity of the Sultan was too great; the populations were too diverse, too backward, too little interested in government.

At the outset there spread the general spirit of good feeling and hopefulness which accompanies vital changes everywhere. The Constitution proclaimed religious and political equality, universal suffrage was introduced, and a parliament convoked. The more progressive parts of the population were filled with hope. But it soon became apparent that the abstractionist principles of the eighteenth century on which the Constitution was built were inapplicable to the mediæval status and mentality of the population of the empire. The Albanians, and then the other nationalities began to make difficulties. The levelling effect of the rule of universal military service was resented by Jews, Druses, Arabs, and others who had been accustomed to relieve themselves of the obligations of this service by paying a head-tax. The attempt to introduce a uniform system of taxation met with similar resentment. Other troubles eventuated.

Just how they converted the Young Turkish abstractionist libertarianism into what the Germans call "realistic" pan-Turanianism it is difficult to say. The Austrian seizure, in 1908, of the Jugo-Slavic territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina had a great deal to do with it; so had the attainment of complete Bulgarian independence; so had the Italian adventure in Tripoli, and the Greek rebellion in Crete. All these enterprises served well and nobly to awaken the Young Turks to the political realities of the situation of their empire. They saw the Balkans slowly Europeanized, their own people more and more forced back into Asia. They saw themselves without any real friends in Europe—alienated from the British, the object of exploitatious envy of the French, the object of military menace by the Russians, Austrians, and the Balkan peoples. In this situation their religion was no refuge to them. It was a tool, and, Europeanized liberals as most of them were, it was a tool too unsuited to their temperaments and points of view for any but the crudest and most bungling uses. They looked to Europe for a way out, and they found it in the chauvinistic nationalism which, after the Franco-Prussian War, had become the European style. The model they took was naturally Prussia, and they added the trickeries of electoral regulations, of racial disablements, and the other devices of that highly organized oligarchy to the traditionally Turkish methods of government into which they found themselves spontaneously sinking back.

That step once taken, the others in the *imitatio Christianis* followed inevitably. As they had changed from religious tolerance and nationalist indifference

to religious indifference and nationalist chauvinism, so they changed from nationalist chauvinism to cultural imperialism. To the oppressive pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism of the Russians and the Prussians, there was added, thus, the no-more-unworthy pan-Turanianism of the Turks. They saw a vision! a vision of a mighty, united modern empire, stretching from the Bosphorus to Persia, from Sinai to the Black Sea. The language of this empire was to be Turkish, and its literature and cultivation were to be not less than the best. It was to be economically and politically as powerful as the most powerful, and culturally as vigorous as the most vigorous. That its attainment meant the spiritual if not the physical murder of the Greek, Armenian, Kurd, Druse, Arab, Jewish and other populations of the empire did not trouble the seers. These subject populations could Turkify if they were made to: did not the Germans and the Hungarians and the Austrians and the Russians compel their own subject-populations? The order for Ottomanization went out. Inhabitants of the land were willy-nilly to be turned into Turks, bag and baggage, Turks in language, in allegiance, in military and fiscal obligation. The necessity of doing this became, in the opinion of the Committee of Union and Progress, all the more urgent after the disastrous war with the Balkan League. A pan-Turanian propaganda, led by Tekin Alp, was carried on among the Turks; Syrians and Armenians were faced with the alternatives of Turkifying or being exterminated.

These policies suited the interests and received the encouragement of imperial Germany. From the time that the rulers of that unfortunate country decided

to adventure after "a place in the sun," the cultivation of friendly relations with Turkey became the foundation of that scheme of empire known since the beginning of the Great War as *Mittel Europa*. Turkey was to be the keystone of this arch of empire in the domain of business enterprise, the keystone of this arch of empire in the dreamt-of hegemony of Asia and Africa. The relations with the Young Turks were made closer and more intimate as the latter's relations with the other European powers grew colder and more strained: German teachers in Turkish schools, particularly in the technological schools, German reorganizers for Turkish business and Turkish finances; German officers and German reorganization for the Turkish army; German concessionaries for Turkish natural resources, such as coal mines at Rodosto and copper mines at Arghana Maden; German concessionaries for Turkish public utilities such as railroads, harbours, and irrigation undertakings; German religious, scholastic, philanthropic, and colonial enterprises all over the empire, in Palestine, noticeably. Above all, the German language everywhere, displacing Greek or Arabic or Armenian or Hebrew, and rivalling Turkish. Thus in the empire of the Ottomans razor was cutting razor. Turkification and Germanization were going on at the same time and prefacing a complicated future indeed for both the masters and the subjects of the processes.

Palestinian Jewry was the first of the non-Turkish peoples of the empire to feel their effects. The nature and purposes of the Jewish settlement in Palestine became the subject of malicious animadversion in the German-language press in Constantinople. The Zionist movement and its plans became an item in the

Franco-German rivalries. The prominence of Jews of German citizenship in the movement added to the dislike with which the assimilatory directorate of the Alliance Israélite Universelle regarded it, and led to provocative exchanges with members of the Committee of Union and Progress in Palestine. Discussion upon it took place in the Turkish Parliament. It emerged that Zionism was being described as the spear-head of an international conspiracy of financiers against the integrity of the Turkish Empire; that it was a device to secure the hegemony of the empire's peoples; and so on. A pan-Arabian movement postulated upon anti-Jewish propaganda, and with an evident French background made its appearance. All this was to be added to the pan-Turanianism of the Ottoman Jews themselves. These symptoms of the French bid against the Germans for Turkish good-will served only to unify the Jewry of Palestine and to intensify their consciousness of nationality. Practical measures taken by the Turkish government—the sudden renewal of the enforcement of the rules requiring Jews who entered Palestine to obtain the “red ticket” which permitted them to stay there three months, the attempt to penalize all Jews inhabiting Palestine into Ottoman citizenship, and finally the abolition of the capitulations with the consequent subjection of foreign settlers to the dominion of Turkish law—these singly and together generated an emotion which crystallized into national solidarity. | But the irresistible agent of nationalization was the assault upon the one symbol of Jewish solidarity which has been perennial and has survived all the disintegrating forces which have worked upon Jewish life. This symbol is the Hebrew language. With



what pains and how heroically it had been made the speech of the children of the land and the language of the schools, has been recorded. The most conspicuous and cherished symbol of nationality among the other suppressed peoples of Europe and Asia, how much more precious was their language to the Jews, whose sole and only symbol it was, where the others had at least in addition the occupation of their lands by their own national masses, and the continuity and stability of their national customs and traditions. Among the Jews of the Diaspora Hebrew was the *lingua franca*, the Esperanto overruling their babel; in Palestine it was the cement that suffused and unified their diversities of origination, speech, sect, and custom. All the agencies at work among Palestinian Jews felt this—English, German, even the French. The schools they supported and the teachers they sent out made use of Hebrew as the medium of instruction. Suddenly, and in a very conspicuous case, the *Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden*, which had been the German section of the Alliance Israélite Universelle and had split off from it, appeared as the protagonist of German. This was in 1913. The Hilfsverein had for some years previously been conducting and supporting schools in Palestine, and in all of them the language of instruction had initially been Hebrew. The disturbance into which the linguistic *cause célèbre* threw the Jewish world brought to light the fact that German was being insinuated to displace Hebrew in the schools with which the Hilfsverein had any relations. The revealing occasion appeared itself to be a last step in a scheme of Germanification that fitted too well with the known programme of German imperialism. This occasion

was the determination of the language of instruction for the projected Polytechnic Institute at Haifa. The bulk of the funds for the organization of the Institute had come from the Wissotzkis, Hovevei Zionists of Moscow, and from a number of American philanthropists interested in Palestine. The very small remainder had been contributed by the Hilfsverein itself, while the National Fund had contributed the land. A question by Dr. Schmarja Levin regarding the attitude of the organization toward the language to be used in the schools and the Polytechnic forced the German members of the board at last to go explicitly on record in favour of Germanization. The Zionists thereon—Ahad Ha'am, Doctor Levin, and Doctor Tschlenow—necessarily resigned. The Zionist Organization immediately drew the Americans into the controversy, and an appearance was created of Germanism *contra mundum*. For they, although only a very few were Zionists, agreed with the Palestinians. The Hilfsverein, holding title to the plant, remained in possession of it.<sup>1</sup>

But it was an empty shell they remained in possession of. The event had thrown the Jewry of Palestine into a turmoil. The Teachers' Union protested, and their members employed in the Hilfsverein schools were locked out by its officials. Thereupon the pupils struck and with them the remaining teachers. There were meetings, parades, speeches. The whole Yishub was aroused. Money was raised to help the impecunious pupils and to support the striking and locked-out

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<sup>1</sup>It has since sold it to the World Zionist Organization for the amount actually put in by the German directors. It was paid for by the late Jacob H. Schiff who had contributed liberally toward its foundation.

teachers. An integrated national school system of a sort was worked out somehow, and the Zionist Organization pledged itself to meet the budget of the system. The men and women who made the system are members of the *Agudath Hamorim* or Teachers' Association. There is no unrelated or independent school committee, no demoralizing external control of the teacher's opinion, subject-matter or method. The teachers themselves, united in this association, have created the standards—such as they are—for the village and city schools, have licensed teachers, have prepared the needful textbooks. The teaching fraternity in Jewish Palestine is, with all its handicaps and incompetency, what it is nowhere else in the world: a democratic, autonomous, responsible professional body, eager for the advancement and maintenance of professional standards and professional competency. Its success has been extraordinary, considering the poorness of the material, the shortness of the time, and the straitness of the circumstances, yet the thing to be expected, considering its autonomy and responsibility. Behind it was the awakened national *morale* of the Jewry of Palestine, aflame over the assault upon the spiritual integrity of their one truly national institution. In a certain sense the Palestinian language-struggle was the first pitched battle of the Great War. It was a true and essential confrontation of the ideals of imperialism and democracy, and in that confrontation democracy was completely victorious.

## CHAPTER XI

### ENTER AMERICAN JEWRY

WHAT the line of development for the Jewish communities in Palestine would have been if the war had not intervened is a fairly simple inference. Administrative foresight was not looking very far ahead nor very far around. The policy of "economic penetration," in the shape of more or less experimental colonies, private industries, and such small fry, would have been carried on, in a manner more or less desultory and by methods more or less lackadaisical. The policy of "cultural" development would have been carried on energetically and aggressively though not efficiently. The Eleventh Congress, which met in 1913, authorized the project of a national Hebrew University, and the multiplication of Hebrew periodicals—verse, fiction, criticism, scientific monographs and textbooks—was a foregone conclusion. But the war intervened. And the war, even if it turn out not to have been a momentous readjustment in the history of the world, was conspicuously the most momentous event in the history of the Zionist movement, and through that, in the history of the Jewish people.

Its first effect upon this history was to bring into the foreground of Jewish activity and aspiration the Jewish community in America.

The story of this community is a modern instance so

typical of responsiveness and social adaptability in an ethnic group that it of itself merits more than a glance. But the status and function of the Jews of America in the solution of the Jewish problem are of a character that make a review of their story indispensable.

The earliest Jewish settlers in the United States were of Spanish and Portuguese origin. They came from the West Indies. In religion they were of the Sephardic sect. They settled in cities like New York, Newport, and Charleston, their settlement dating back nearly 300 years. Small in number and prosperous in their commercial and other enterprises, they soon made a place for themselves in the greater colonial communities, in spite of religious differences and certain exclusions. Their contacts with non-Jews were social as well as commercial and before long extended to the intimate relationship of marriage and a common life. Of necessity a decreasing community, they made up in the progressive rigour of their synagogal discipline for the increasing lability of their members. They played their part in the enterprise of the Revolution, contributing their quota in both men and money, in money very significantly indeed.

The place they established as Americans they guarded jealously. When between '36 and '60 a new type of Jew began to enter the United States in large numbers, they drew a class line as rigid and as bitter as any drawn in America by the older settlers against newcomers. They acknowledged the unity of stock and religion between themselves and the immigrant Jews from Germany, but admitted no other sort of unity. The German Jews were good enough to act as their clerks, their servants, and their depen-

dents, but no more. The notion that they might become their rivals was inadmissible. The German Jews, however, soon began enormously to outnumber the original Spanish and Portuguese Jewish communities. Differences in origin and in economic status, reinforced by the coördinate sectarian differences, generated a community warfare, partly conscious, mostly unconscious, in which, as was inevitable, the numbers were decisive. To-day the American Sephardic communities of the United States are on the whole negligible, and those which have survived with anything like the power and distinction which invested them in the beginning have survived by virtue of the fact that instead of fighting out the class war to the bitter end, they admitted the German Jews to an equality with themselves and assimilated them instead of being assimilated by them. Such are the communities which survive in Philadelphia and in New York.

The admission meant that a generation of Jewish immigrants from Germany had under free conditions achieved the same kind of adaptation to the larger social environment as the original Sephardic Jews. It meant that they had become full-fledged Americans, men of influence, wealth, and power, leaders in the community. Their attaining of prosperity and of the full status of the American Jew was marked most distinctly by the Reform movement in the synagogue. This movement operated in the United States as elsewhere. It abolished the essential basis of communal life which most of all served to distinguish the Jew in association with the Jew as against the Jew in association with the Gentile. The way of living got changed from Jewish to non-Jewish. Pig-flesh and shell-fish

were admitted into the household, and intermarriage, while ecclesiastically discouraged, was, on the whole, not prohibited. Hebrew was almost completely eliminated from the synagogue ritual. The prayer and the liturgy gave way to the sermon, and the status of the rabbi changed from that of an arbitrator of all matters in the daily life to that of a teacher and conservator of religious dogma.

By the time the first large mass of east European Jews began to enter the United States, the Jews of German origin had acquired the same relation to the country as the Jews of Sephardic origin. They had become the *de facto* heads and elders of the Jewish community, the inevitable middle term between the newcomers and the American order of life. To the newcomers, nothing could have been more foreign than the American order of life. In the countries from which they came they had been living, it must be remembered, under mediæval conditions—without status before the law, without rights and without duties as citizens, and without any legal claim that they could compel the government to make good. “Mediæval” is the only word that could signalize their status. And under mediæval conditions the position of any Jewish community anywhere in the world had depended exclusively on the good-will of a single individual or of a small group of such individuals. These might at any time in God’s name let loose or restrain the populace, as they chose. Contact between the Jews and Gentile arbiters of their destiny could never be established directly. It had to be made through a third party, a go-between for whom the Jews had the special name of *Sh’tadlan*. The *Sh’tadlan* was some-

times a banker, sometimes a merchant of great wealth, sometimes a physician—any person who had achieved importance in the eyes of the Gentile oppressor, and who could win his ear. Such a person could sometimes forestall a pogrom or an *auto-da-fe* by climbing back stairs and bribing safety and consideration. It was natural and inevitable that such a person should become the literal “boss” of the Jewish community, and should direct its policy and dictate its conduct within and without. His rôle was, in fact, to be the saviour of the community, actual or potential; to be its only effective reassuring link with the world outside—and hence, its master.

Now the relation of any immigrant group to the civilization of a new country whose institutions and language are different from anything that its members ever knew is not unlike that of the mediæval Jew or of the contemporary east European Jew toward the larger community of which he is a part. The immigrant of any stock is in extreme need of a mediator between himself and his environment, a mediator who shall bridge the differences and establish some sort of communion that may ease and simplify the mere business of living. This was particularly true of the Jew, for the Jew was regarded alien in a double sense: he was regarded alien because he came from another country with quite different institutions and ideals, and he was regarded alien because he was denied a share even in the institutions and ideals of that other country. To him government was necessarily identical with oppression, the policeman with bribery, the civil officer with petty tyranny. He was met in America by his fellow-Jew of German origin. This fellow-Jew served as a miraculously ready God-sent *Sh'tadlan*.



The necessities of adaptation to the new conditions required a go-between and on the whole, the Jews were more fortunate than the immigrants of other stocks in that they found this go-between ready made, of their own blood and religion. On the other hand, the existence of the go-between meant the reinforcement and continuation of the mediæval tradition. The attitude of the German Jew toward the east European Jew became spontaneously the attitude of the mediæval and east European *Sh'tadlan* toward the Jewish community. American Jews of German origin assumed, as was natural, complete responsibility for their Eastern brethren. They became their spokesmen, they defined their politics for them, they looked after their physical and intellectual needs, they "Americanized" them, and they despised them cordially.

The first step was to insure against their ever becoming public burdens. To do this the German Jew organized and elaborated systematic benevolent agencies which have been models of "scientific charity" and have had a large influence in giving direction to the progress of charitable organization in the United States. In the second place, they gave them employment. When the Eastern Jews began to enter the United States in large numbers, certain industries, most particularly the needle trades, were almost exclusively in the hands of the German Jews; the Eastern Jews were employed in sweat shops and kept by the evil devices of unregenerate employers on starvation wages, to be saved from starvation by the charity of these same employers.

As for the possibility of any other relationship, social or cultural, between the two types of Jewish

communities, this was not even admitted. From the point of view of the German Jew, the Russian Jew was good enough to be exploited in the shops, at the polls, to be spoken for in public and rather scorned and disliked in private. It used to be impossible, for example, for a Russian Jew to gain admission into a German-Jewish fraternal order like the *B'nai Brith*. It used to be impossible for a Russian Jew to acquire membership in a German Jewish synagogue or a social club. The sectarian difference between reform and orthodox Judaism was even greater and marked a greater social gulf than the sectarian differences between the original Sephardim and Ashkenazim, these being the two prevailing brands of orthodoxy. All this, nevertheless, the first generation of Eastern Jews seem to have accepted as natural, as inevitable, as proper, and with gratitude.

But a generation of living in America, even such an America as was New York City, meant inevitably the "Americanization" of the east European Jew. The mere pressure of American political institutions gave this Jew a new sense of his relation to the Government. He found himself free and civically responsible. He found himself participating in the business of the Government. He found himself called upon to determine with his ballot who shall govern him and what the policy of government shall be, not only of his city and his state, but of his nation also. However blindly the masses found themselves in their citizenship, its effect on their attitude toward government has been marked in the extraordinary independence of what is called the Jewish vote. In the field of business, trade, and manufacture, the natural initiative of the east European Jew soon changed him from an employee

into a rival of his German co-religionist. His restiveness under injustice made him the initiator of the Trade Union movement in his particular field, and brought to his employer the first realization of the possibility that the Russian Jew might be a competitor and an opponent as well as a servant. A far-reaching economic rivalry developed which lasted over a generation, until finally one industry at least is now as comprehensively Russian Jewish as it had been formerly German Jewish, and the enterprise of the Russian Jew has spread into a great many other regions. In fact, the signal growth of New York City—where every fourth person is said to be a Jew—begins with the first great immigration of Russian Jews in the year 1882.

A generation of American life brought prosperity and independence to the newcomers. With the coming of independence and prosperity, the caste war became intensified. The later comers began to go more and more on their own. To meet the exclusion from the earlier fraternal orders, they organized new fraternal orders like the Brith Abraham and the Brith Shalom. They organized their own "orthodox" charities, and their wealth gave them a place on the charity boards of the earlier American Jews. Their wealth, furthermore, stimulated their social ambitions and they began to pass from orthodox to reform synagogues, ceasing thereby to be "Russian" and becoming "German" Jews. The difference to-day between orthodox and reform Judaism, apart from dietetic and a few other habits of life, is in large part a difference in nothing so much as in economic status. The dogmas of the two Churches are in what theologians would call essential matters the same, but the Orthodox Church is

with few exceptions the church of the poor, and the Reform Church is the church of the rich and the well-to-do.

This encroachment of the newer community met with a deepening if reflexive resistance on the part of the older community. As the economic and other differences grew less, the social differences received greater emphasis. The "German" Jews found themselves after a while in the same position with reference to the "Russian" Jews as the Sephardim had been with reference to them. The encroachment of the "Russians" upon the privileges of the "Germans" meant two things: on the one side, a combination of interests; and on the other, a sharper drawing of social and other lines. The combination of interests sprang from one fact among others that young "Russian" lads flocked in large numbers into the professions and became eligible husbands for young "German" girls. The second basis turned on the weight of economic similarity itself. Capitalists are compelled by the interests of capital to coöperate, and the "Germanization" of the prosperous "Russian" was an effect of his economic prosperity. It meant that a section of the original east European Jewish group was slowly getting detached and infiltrating the community of earlier settlers. It meant, furthermore, that the numerical strength of the "Russian" Jews would soon compel a reversal of the process and that the assimilation of the "German" Jew to the "Russian" Jew, like the assimilation of the Sephardim to the "German" Jew, was a foregone conclusion.

Whether this process was consciously realized or understood by the protagonists of the two classes is doubt-

ful. What was noticeable in the years between 1900 and 1914 was an increasing osmosis of these classes, and an attempted tightening of the lines on the part of the earlier, more "assimilated" class in direct proportion to the osmotic pressure.

In the meantime, a permanent proletarian mass came to self-consciousness under the influence of two forces. One was the spread of the labour movement which in the Ghetto had a Socialist theory of life and labour to envisage it, a theory propagated by many of the most intellectual of the immigrant classes and articulated in a notorious, powerful Yiddish newspaper. The other was the Zionist movement.

The movement had been marked, on the whole, with an international outlook and economic vision analogous to that of the Socialist movement. It had shown itself, however, far more sensitive to the facts of life. Conceiving society as a collection of group individualities, each of which is entitled to the free and equal fulfilment of its life and the attainment of its happiness, it argued its cause in terms of a vision of society as a great family of nationalities carrying on the enterprises of civilization coöperatively, each contributing to the others according to its nature and power. It asked particularly for the Jewish people, a majority of whom are oppressed and outlawed, the opportunity which all other people have for themselves. And it asked this opportunity in Palestine, the original homeland of the people, fixed through the usage of religion and the immemorial idealism of the race as the goal of Jewish endeavour and suffering throughout history. Zionism was calculated to make a closer appeal to the masses of the Jews in America because

it invoked instincts, memories, attitudes, which were hereditary and had been passed on through the generations. Its appeal, in a word, was *internal* while the appeal of Socialism was external. The individual of no nationality, particularly not the individual of the Jewish nationality, conceives himself as necessarily and inevitably a member of an economic class. It is precisely for this reason that the Jews in America have turned out to be at one and the same time such conspicuous protagonists of the Socialist movement although they seem to have understood its protestant better than its constructive spirit, and such thoroughly Americanized trade-unionists, undertakers, captains of industry, and financiers.

Socialism and Zionism, added to the new self-consciousness as citizens which the immigrant generation had acquired, gave the Jewish masses a point of departure and a programme. For many years neither the point of departure nor the programme was conscious. They were there, but as potentialities, and the daily life of labourer and shopkeeper went on undisturbed. The Socialist continued the Yiddish formulation of his internationalist Marxian dogma. The Zionist continued the Yiddish and Hebrew formulation of his nationalist doctrine. Both were of the Ghetto—in temper, manner, and adequacy. Both were old-worldly. The protagonists of both were men and women of European background and European training; the followers of both were mainly of the first generation of immigrants from the older world. Both were more or less irrelevant to the problems and expanses of American life. They went on, only tangent to that, or at best wordy compensa-

tions for its restrictions, ridicules, and strangeness. They functioned in the life of the Ghetto communities of America like tunes sung at the machine, or in hospital when the patient's discomfort is so great that he whistles to keep up his courage.

Because of rapid changes caused by industry in the structure of American economic life, Socialism emerged first from irrelevancy and foreignness, from the Ghetto of speech and intellectual preoccupation, and its devotees found themselves at last organized and defined upon the arena of American political and social life, as American Socialists of Yiddish speech, denying and repudiating their Jewish connection and its implication in behalf of the fellowship of labour the world over, but particularly in America. They often had great sport abusing the Zionists, and the Zionists had great sport abusing them.

The latter emerged from their irrelevancy only with the coming of the war in 1914. Until that time, the American Zionist Organization numbered a handful. Its members were journalists, intellectuals, shopkeepers, and more or less skilled workmen. Their spirit and outlook and methods were of the tradition of the European Ghettoes from which they had come. Their centre was the lower east side of New York. Their relations with Jews of American nativity, training, and vision were of the slightest. Their organization had been headed by such a Jew, Richard Gottheil, a professor of Semitics at Columbia University. Such a Jew was its founder and has served them as the first secretary of their federation—Stephen Wise, now the foremost rabbi of the Reformed sect; foremost both for the distinction of his pulpit and his rôle in public

life. A few such Jews were enrolled in the membership—mostly university men, teachers or students, moved to affiliation by an ancestral sympathy or by a greater knowledge of the nature of nationality, its relation to the Jews, to internationalism, and to the problem in Europe than was the concern or the fortune of most of the American population.

These intellectuals were almost exclusively of the same extraction as the rank and file of the Zionists. The "German" Jews, the "American" Jews, i. e., the well-to-do Jews, were not to be counted among them. As in Europe, Zionism was an object of suspicion and attack on the part of these classes. Their spokesmen, preëminently the rabbis of the Reformed sect, assaulted the movement in America with even more vigour and vindictiveness than did their confrères in Europe, with indeed an added intensity of resentment, because of its secularism. Reformed Judaism in America being most sleek and prosperous, made a great deal more than its analogue in Europe of "the mission of Israel," insisted a great deal more upon the notion that the great Jehovah designed his chosen people to be scattered among the nations, a "priest people" charged with the task of manifesting "pure ethical monotheism" to the Gentile neighbour. The wealthier and the more secularized the congregation, the louder was its rabbi in his insistence on its religious spirituality, its universalism, and its mission, and the bitterer was he in his denunciation of Zionism. Controversy took about the same course in America as it did in Europe, with the difference that the men on the Zionist side who engaged in it, being farther from the problem-in-crisis than their European fellows, formulated the positions involved.



with an eye to the general psychological and social situation in Europe. This tended to do violence to the feeling common among Jews of all classes regarding the uniqueness and peculiarity of themselves and their problem. It tended to assimilate the Jewish question into the general complexus of the nationalistic and libertarian strivings of nineteenth-century Europe and caused some disturbance among the Zionists themselves. The American Zionist view tended, in a word, to crystallize in a formulation of the Jewish position less partisan, more scientific, more historical and sociological than formulations made at the seat of the Jewish problem-in-crisis in central Europe, and the American Zionist tended toward an attitude less ardent, more contemplative, and more businesslike than that of the European. There was natural resentment against this attitude on the part of the Europeans. They accused their American comrades of being not "really" Zionists, of being superficial, ignorant, uncaring. They made fun of the Americans' insight, joked about their Zionist competency, and treated them like the proverbial rich parvenu. "You provide the money," was the tenor of their attitude, "we will provide the rest." On the other hand, the American formulation of the Zionist position won in America the respectful attention and in the course of time the sympathy and then the adherence of one after another of the more distinguished Americans both of Jewish and non-Jewish extraction.

Among these was Louis Dembitz Brandeis, now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. By birth a Kentuckian, by education a European, by training and vocation a lawyer, and by

personal habit an ascetic, his history was even more uncomplicated by Jewish connections than Herzl's. They simply did not enter into his own problems, and what he had seen of Jews in the practice of his profession had not induced him to seek out such connections. There was, however, in his inheritance a strain of mysticism, mediæval in articulateness and intensity. In his uncle, Louis Dembitz, of Louisville, Kentucky, for whom he had been named, this showed itself as a scrupulous observance of the *Shulchan Aruch* and a visionary Zionism of the Messianic type. In Brandeis it took form as a passion for democracy and social justice which rendered him the protagonist of one fight after another against exploiters of the public, and earned him the cognomen, "the people's lawyer." Indeed, it was largely as a tribune of the people that he functioned in the years before his acceptance of the judgeship, fighting often alone and single-handed against sinister corporate and political interests of enormous power, influence, and unscrupulousness, who to beat him hesitated at no stratagem, even the libelling of his character and the murdering of his professional reputation. The completeness of their defeat and his victory is a matter of record, but the struggle could not have failed to leave its mark upon him. To the prophet-like truculency of his temperament and the passionate humanitarianism of his outlook there accrued a rigidity which at times gave his really distinguished powers of analysis and judgment a twist of advocacy, and the charge often levelled against him by his enemies that he was incapable of easily giving due weight to the claims or justice of the opposition is not without its basis in the record. His powers showed themselves to

be logical rather than persuasive, and his extraordinary influence is due far more to the force of his intellect and his uncompromising honesty than to his understanding of men's hearts. He is no politician. His leadership and power rest on an uncanny perception of the concrete implications of events rendered potent by a consuming passion for righteousness. It is this at bottom that led him to Zionism. In Brandeis, for the first time in the history of this movement anywhere, a truly national figure, a man of affairs as well as of vision, enrolled himself definitely in the Zionist Organization. This occurred in 1910 or 1911. Nothing formal or public was made of his adhesion, and its manifestations were mainly contributions to the treasury and sympathetic understanding.

His call to leadership came with the war. On August 1, 1914, the headquarters of the International Zionist Organization was in Berlin, that city being the home of many of its officers and within easy reach of many others. After August 3, 1914, the International Zionist Organization practically ceased to have a headquarters. Its officers and members became officially and in effect enemies, no longer able to meet for counsel or action, and to the anxious watchers of that anxious period no longer likely to meet. The Jewish national interest seemed about to be lost by default.

Under the circumstances the officers of the American Federation of Zionists, at the instigation of Dr. Schmarja Lewin, took the initiative. They called, and on August 30, 1914, held in New York, an extraordinary conference of Zionists from all over the country. This conference, which sat for two days, created the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs, with Louis D. Brandeis as

chairman and Stephen S. Wise as vice-chairman and eventually Jacob de Haas, who had been an intimate of Herzl's, as secretary. Associated with them were men like the distinguished humanitarian and philanthropist, Nathan Straus, the jurists Felix Frankfurter and Julian W. Mack, the financier, Eugene Meyer, and many others not formerly connected with Zionism.

Immediately a new spirit began to manifest itself not only in the organization, but in American Jewry at large. The election of Brandeis to the leadership turned the Zionist movement in America from an incident of Ghetto aspiration into a force to be counted with in Jewish communal life. It challenged prestige and prerogative in established interests in the American Jewish community. It disputed authority, it gave point and direction to the communal unrest of American Jewry of east and central European origin and background. The old issues were raised afresh and re-debated in the new setting created by the great civil war in Europe in which the Jewish people of eastern Europe were at once made the victims of both the belligerents. Laymen as well as rabbis addressed themselves to the fray, and "universal Judaism" and "the mission of Israel" were fulminated against Zionism from a hundred pulpits.

In the course of the controversy, which was an incident to far more practical issues, Brandeis took occasion to state in unmistakable terms his understanding of the view of the American Zionists regarding the Jewish problem and its solution. He demonstrated more forcefully than it had ever been demonstrated before the futility of trying to evade the problem by definition. "Councils of rabbis," he wrote, "and

others have undertaken at times to prescribe by definition that only those shall be deemed Jews who professedly adhere to the orthodox or Reformed faith. But in the connection in which we are considering the term, it is not in the power of any single body of Jews—or indeed of all Jews collectively—to establish the effective definition. The meaning of the word Jewish in the term Jewish Problem must be accepted as coextensive with the disabilities which it is our problem to remove. It is the non-Jews who create the disabilities and in so doing give definition to the term Jew. These disabilities extend substantially to all of Jewish blood. They do not end with a renunciation of faith, however sincere. They do not end with the elimination, however complete, of external Jewish mannerisms. The disabilities do not end ordinarily until the Jewish blood has been so thoroughly diluted by repeated intermarriages as to result in practically obliterating the Jew.” That also persons of Jewish blood recognize this situation as a constant factor in their setting and react to it thus is shown furthermore in the behaviour of even the most de-Judaized Jew. It is a behaviour that acknowledges the claim of the group, and willy-nilly takes an interest in its fortunes. The Jewish problem, consequently, is the problem first of securing for the members of this group, distributively and collectively, “the same rights and opportunities enjoyed by non-Jews,” and, second, of securing to the world “the full contribution which Jews can make if unhampered by artificial limitations.”

Liberalism, through which, at the beginning of the last century, it was hoped both these ends should be realized, had failed. Anti-Semitism remained, “univer-

sal and endemic," and the Jewish Problem, with all the diversities between the conditions that determine its manifestation, remains one and the same. The failure of liberalism is coincident with the oppression of nationality: "enlightened countries grant to the individual equality before the law; but they fail to recognize the equality of whole peoples or nationalities. We seek to protect as individuals those constituting a minority, but we fail to realize that protection cannot be complete unless group equality also is recognized." The Zionist movement is dedicated to the consummation of this recognition for the Jews. It is a movement essentially "to give the Jew more, not less, freedom; it aims to enable the Jews to exercise the same right now exercised by practically every people in the world—to live at their option either in the land of their fathers or in some other country; a right which Irish, Greek, Bulgarian, Servian, or Belgian may now exercise as fully as Germans or English." The struggle for this right, involving as it must and does the recovery of group self-respect and the revitalization of the tradition and idealism of the fathers, is the chief, perhaps the only bulwark against the demoralization which Jews have, since the French Revolution, been undergoing in America and Europe both, and which yields an excuse to the anti-Semite. "The sole bulwark against demoralization is to develop in each new generation of Jews in America the sense of *noblesse oblige*, a sense which can be best developed by actively participating in some way in furthering the ideals of the Jewish renaissance; and this can be done effectively only through furthering the Zionist movement."

Zionism, thus, is in Brandeis's view, the salvation

of the Jew who elects to build his life elsewhere than in Zion, no less than of the Jew who chooses the destiny of a Judæan. And not merely this. Zionism is demanded as well in the interest of all mankind. The satisfaction of these interests is possible only through organization. "Organize," Brandeis urged, "in the first place so that the world may have proof of the extent and intensity of our desire for liberty. Organize in the second place so that our resources may become known and be made available. But in mobilizing our forces it will not be for war. The whole world longs for the solution of the Jewish Problem. We have but to lead the way, and we may be sure of ample coöperation from non-Jews. In order to lead the way we need not arms, but men; men with those qualities for which Jews should be peculiarly fitted by reason of their religion and life, men of courage, of high intelligence, of faith and public spirit, of indomitable will and ready self-sacrifice; men who will both think and do; who will devote high abilities to shaping our course and overcoming the many obstacles which must from time to time arise. Organization, thorough and complete, can alone develop such men and the necessary support."

"Organize, organize, organize, until every Jew in America must stand up and be counted—counted with us—or prove himself wittingly or unwittingly of the few who are against their own people."

The new leader's statement of this position and this programme was made early in 1915. It was soon condensed into the slogan: "Men, Money, Discipline," that furnished the objectives of the vitalized fellowship of American Zionists. All three of these were critically wanted at the outset. Time has not lessened the need.

There was, of course, nothing new in the call to organization. It had been made many times before, and innumerable projects had been advanced to accomplish it. The novelty in this call was the fact that it was effective. It was effective because, at last, circumstances and the man adequate to their control were at hand together. The European war had created a crisis not only in the affairs of the Zionists but in the affairs of all the Jews of the European continent. There had been crises before, but there had never been before the conjunction of the crisis with the leader whose courage, whose faith in democracy, and whose organizing power could mobilize and bring into useful action the will of Jewry to meet the crisis. The lack of such a leader in 1905-06 had created a situation which rendered the solution of the problem of effective organization particularly difficult. It was in 1906 that American Jews became acutely aware of the need for united endeavour on their part, in behalf of the Russian Jews. The occasion was the Russian pogroms of 1905-06. These pogroms rendered the chronic Jewish problem once more critical in the minds of all American Jews. The need of their brethren on the other side called for coöperative action and the action was naturally initiated by the traditional leaders of the Jewish community. They created relief agencies and called for contributions. The response of the community was enormous, and when the need had passed, the relief agencies organized *ad hoc* found themselves with a large sum of money on their hands.

The situation which had brought the contribution of that money had called the attention of the leaders to the precarious character of the position of the Jews in



eastern Europe and to the need of a permanent agency of relief and protection which should meet such crises forehanded when they arose. That they would again arise was recognized on all sides. The agency thereupon formed was the American Jewish Committee. It was formed, after some discussion of the *pros* and *cons* of a possible democratic organization, in terms purely oligarchical, with a view only to the probable prestige and power of its controlling members rather than to their representative character. Democratic organization was regarded as impracticable, and it was felt that the intentions of the Committee rather than the seat of its authority was the thing that mattered. This feeling seemed, at the time, of necessity justifiable. The gentlemen on the American Jewish Committee, men like the late Jacob H. Schiff, Mr. Louis Marshall, Judge Mayer Sulzberger, had been for many years the natural, apparently the inevitable, spokesmen for the whole Jewish citizenry of the United States. They were renowned for good works, for generosity, and a genuine concern for the welfare and Americanization of their fellow Jews. The committee which they organized was acclaimed. Its leadership was accepted without question, and its service as the *Sh'tadlan* between the unripened immigrant communities and the nation as a whole regarded as natural and generous. This service, designated in a charter of incorporation, was multifold and varied, not always wise—as in the case of its agitation during the Taft Administration for the denunciation of the Russian treaty—but always motivated by humanitarian ideals of citizenship and brotherhood.

In the meantime, however, the self-consciousness of

the Jewish masses was becoming intensified. The impact of American institutions and conditions showed itself in new arrangements and groupings of the Jews, in a new intellectual and social vigour which is attested by the periodical literature of the interval. The whole change may be called indifferently Americanization or secularization. So far as the internal affairs of the Jewish community were concerned, it showed itself in a growing resentment against the tutelage of the traditional *Sh'tadlanic* leadership. Again and again it was expressed in bitter criticism of the American Jewish Committee and in proposals for some form of "representative" community government.

With the European war these proposals were turned into demands, insistent, passionate, poignant. As slowly the news of the atrocities perpetrated on the non-combatant Jewish masses during 1914-15 by the Tsarist armies and by their Polish fellow-subjects even more than by the Teutonic enemy, filtered through the censorship, a tremendous wave of feeling swept the Jewry of America. This feeling called for more than merely financial relief. The passion which fathers and mothers, wives and children, brothers and sisters, were undergoing at the hands of those who should have been their protectors could not be remedied merely by money. The community cried for something which should be done collectively, and which would make a recurrence of such conditions impossible. This blind feeling and inarticulate cry crystallized into a philosophy of group-solidarity and group-responsibility in the conception of a democratically constituted congress of American Jews. It was a chief item in the emergency programme adopted by

the Extraordinary Zionist Conference of August 30, 1914. It was the foremost concern of a group of various influential associations in the east European Jewish community in the United States. As the journals of the period show, it was a notion that met with universal approval among the masses of Jews. It was a notion that precipitated and enchanneled the feeling, relieved the accumulated uneasiness, clarified the mind, and gave some assurance to the faith of the people. It was a notion that precisely for this reason unsettled the old leaders and filled them with uneasiness and resentment.

In New York a group of men, mostly journalists very close to the pulse of the emotion and thought of the masses, waited on the executives of the American Jewish Committee and appealed to them to take the initiative, as was proper and good, in calling a congress. In the attitude of the American Jewish Committee toward this request, there became apparent the profound fission and the caste war in the community. The members of the Committee distrusted the rank and file. They were afraid of the publicity. They were afraid of having their "Americanism" impugned. One of them who had publicly denounced a Russian loan, stated that the Congress must not be held because some poor, anonymous devil of a radical might say something about the Tsarist Government which would then have a very bad effect upon the fate of the Jews in Russia. Others brought analogous objections. The class as a whole, as may be gathered from the texts of periodicals like the *American Hebrew* and the various weeklies edited by rabbis of the Reform sect, show distrust of democracy, fear of frankness, a consciousness

of moral and social insecurity; show themselves living under the dread of anti-Semitism. They insisted that whatever could be done, could be done quietly, by wire pulling, by use of the influence of individuals, by the back-stairs method of the *Sh'tadlan* of the Middle Ages and of the Russian Ghetto.

The issue was joined with recriminations on both sides. The Zionist programme, the Zionists having been with the radical leaders in the Congress movement, became an item of contention. It was argued that the Zionists were trying to create the Congress for their own purposes. It was retorted that there was a pro-German bias in the American Jewish Committee. All sorts of things were argued. But the one thing which was really fundamental in the quarrel over the Congress was the fact that it was a struggle between Americanism and mediævalism, between a democratized Jewry and a traditional Jewish oligarchy. This struggle, old as the Jewish community, had finally been precipitated in the Congress issue and was being fought out to the end. One great Jewish organization after another—fraternal order, synagogue, cultural society, and so on—declared adherence to the Congress movement. Nothing was so conspicuous as the fact that it was a self-conscious mass movement, with democratic postulates and programme.

Complications developed, however, in connection with what was technically known—only technically—as the “labour” group. The character of the Jewish workingmen has been such that the Jewish labour class and the Jewish labour organization tended to be of a very unstable composition. There is hardly a union which retains a moiety of the same membership

seven years running. The only part of any union or other form of association of workmen that tends to be permanent is the paid administrative organization, that is, the group of "labour leaders." This fact adds to the existing economic classes a new class having a curious and a distinct set of interests as between the labourers as such and the capitalists as such. This is the class of the labour leader—not the actual heads of unions—but the journalistic theorists who are professional labourites and who manage the affairs of the non-industrial, beneficial associations of workmen. Although these workmen's groups had given their officials a mandate to participate in the movement of the organization of a democratic congress, the leaders, considering their own biases and interests, interpreted the mandate to suit themselves, and dickered with the American Jewish Committee. The result was a split alignment within the labour groups and dissension whose tendency is toward complete division.

Apart from that, the Congress movement swept the country. There was established a Congress Organization Committee, of which Mr. Justice Brandeis was made the honorary head. Plans for organization were set in motion. The Organization Committee made every effort to come to some agreement with the American Jewish Committee and its allied groups, most of them under its control. When it seemed that popular sentiment was overwhelmingly in favour of the Congress movement, the American Jewish Committee conceded the democratic plans, and that constitutes the fundamental victory for modernism in Jewish communal life in America. But the concession of principle and its application in action are two differ-

ent things. The Congress Committee, in spite of prolonged negotiations, found that it could come to no adjustment with the American Jewish Committee. Finally, it gave up trying, and called a conference of all the great Jewish organizations of the country in Philadelphia on March 26, 1916. The delegates to that conference represented from a million and a half to two million Jewish souls, from all classes of society. They sat for two days and formulated a programme which received the endorsement and approval of many officials of the Government of the United States, notably the Secretary of War.

The Philadelphia programme involved consideration not only of the issues brought into the foreground by the war, but of the perennial problems of which the Jewish question is constituted. It aimed to provide for a permanent organization of American Jewry on a democratic basis, for a consideration of the questions and problems of migration, and so on. The character of the Conference and its programme were hailed with enthusiastic approval all over the country. The commissions and committees the programme called for were appointed and set to work. Particularly interesting were the problems of the committees on Representation and Elections and on Permanency of Organization. But before these committees and the others had time to get under way, the effects of the Conference made themselves felt in the opposite camp, and resulted in their calling a conference which was to talk over the question of the Congress anew. That conference, which was called in July, 1916, was composed chiefly of the members of the American Jewish Committee and its allied organizations and of the

Conference of Reform Rabbis. That conference also, though not without much division and bitterness, endorsed the Congress movement and opened negotiations with the new Congress Organization Committee established by the Philadelphia Conference, to find some *modus vivendi*. The first compromise involved the surrender of the democratic principle, and by referendum was rejected. Finally, a second compromise was attained and submitted by the Congress Organization Committee to referendum. The result of the referendum was acceptance of the compromise. The compromise was then formulated as the call to the Congress, viz.:

By virtue of the authority vested in us, as the Executive Committee for an American Jewish Congress, the Jews of America are earnestly requested to select representatives to an American Jewish Congress which shall meet exclusively for the purpose of defining methods whereby, in coöperation with the Jews of the world, full rights may be secured for the Jews of all lands and all laws discriminating against them may be abrogated. It being understood that the phrase "full rights" is deemed to include:

1. Civil, religious, and political rights, and in addition thereto

2. Wherever the various peoples of any land are or may be recognized as having rights as such, the conferring upon the Jewish people of the land affected, of like rights, if desired by them, as determined by the Congress.

3. The securing and protection of Jewish rights to Palestine.

4. The question of the economic reconstruction of the Jewish communities in the war zone.

No resolution shall be introduced, considered, or acted upon at the Congress which shall in any way support

or tend to commit the Congress as a body, or any of its delegates or any of the communities or organizations which shall be represented therein, to the adoption, recognition, or endorsement of any general theory or philosophy of Jewish life, or any theoretical principle of a racial, political, economic, or religious character, or which shall involve the perpetuation of such Congress.

The calling and holding of the Congress shall in no manner affect the autonomy of any existing American Jewish organization, but in so far as the Executive Committee selected by such a Congress shall take action for the securing of Jewish rights as defined in the Call for such Congress, the activities of such Executive Committee shall, during the period of its existence, be regarded as having precedence over those of any other organizations which shall participate in such Congress.

The call exhibits more explicitly than anything else could the fear and animus of the old régime and the completeness of the victory of the new settlement. It shows how the Congress struggle was not merely a struggle between modernism—or Americanism—and mediævalism, but just as essentially a struggle between assimilationist individualism and self-respecting nationalism. For all practical purposes the latter was at the time completely victorious. The theories and philosophies and principles which were to be excluded from discussion were the unquestioned basis of action. They were this because action was not possible on any other basis.

The agreement was reached on October 2, 1916. In the interim plans for representation and election had been worked out and these being confirmed by the new executive committee which the agreement necessitated, the elections were held. Three hundred



delegates were chosen by the popular vote of both men and women and one hundred more by the various Jewish organizations of national scope. With the elections, the rank and file of American Jewry passed into a new communal status. It is a status which has still to be made effective and which in all probability cannot be made effective without a great deal more extensive and far-reaching struggle between the strata of the Jewish population—a struggle that can be fought out in the last resort only on domestic issues. Meanwhile, a precedent of free and responsible common action for the rank and file of American Jewry—and through them for all Jewries—has been established. They have publicly debated Jewish issues as such. They have expressed their will at the polls regarding these issues. They have chosen their representatives to carry out their will. The assembling of these representatives as the American Jewish Congress was at first set for not later than May 1, 1917. But in April, 1917, the United States of America entered the war, and from that time on various circumstances intervened to postpone the holding of the Congress until December 15, 1918.

## CHAPTER XII

### ZIONIST ENDEAVOUR AND THE POLITICS OF THE GREAT WAR

**BETWEEN** October 2, 1916, and December 15, 1918, the complexion of events had so changed as to require a fundamental alteration in the problems and attitude of the Congress. The Jews had become the supreme victims of the war. No people on the battlelines, except possibly the Armenians, suffered as the Jews had suffered. The war on the eastern front was being fought within the Jewish pale of settlement. The treachery and incompetency of the Russian bureaucracy; the malice, intrigue, and disloyalty of the Poles; the brutality of the Germans were alike cloaked by means of charges and assaults against the Jews. More than 10 per cent. of the entire Jewish population of Europe was on the battlefield and more than 90 per cent. of these were engaged in the armies of the Allies. But in eastern Europe it was their ironic fate that the battlefield should be nothing else than the Pale and that Jewish soldiers should battle for the Allies amid the familiar scenes of their own homes, should be required to burn and raze their own communities, should be compelled to stand by while fathers, sons, or brothers were executed on trumped-up charges and wives and sisters and mothers were raped and maimed and killed. Thousands went mad; other

thousands committed suicide or were shot for insubordination. Their homes and families, meanwhile, were broken up; great masses of Jews were on various pretexts uprooted, evacuated; their economic foundations were shattered and their lives were thrown under the dominion of fear.

And the Jewries of western Europe were helpless to aid them. Aid was possible only from the Jews of America, during the first two years of the war the only neutral country with influence and resources great enough even to begin to meet the demands of Europe growing desolated. Amid the great work of relief done by the Americans, the work of the American Jewish Relief Committee holds a distinguished place. Begun in 1914, it reached in the course of two years, under the impact of the signal generosity of Julius Rosenwald and the organizing power of Jacob Billikopf, unheard-of proportions in scope and organization and still seemed the work of trying to fill a bottomless sack. The Jewish disaster had gone too deep to be amenable to merely relief measures. It had gone too deep to benefit even from the impulsion of the revitalized hopes, the resurgent ideals and promises of the Russian Revolution. To certain Jews, conspicuously rabbis of the Reformed sect, that revolution, during its Kerensky phase, seemed a God-sent excuse to enable them to evade the responsibilities of the time and the bitter draught that the Jewish Congress was to them. With the creation of the new Russia, they declared, the Jewish need terminated. The problems both of relief and justice were automatically solved. Of course, they knew better. It was impossible, the facts being what they were, not to know better—

but the occasion was too convenient to forego. Events more than invalidated the declarations and shamed the declarants—at the time, the Revolution served only to add another excuse for obstructing the organization of the Jews of America. The subsequent developments in Europe wiped excuses out altogether. They aggravated the anxiety and the horror of the Jewish position—particularly in Poland and the Ukraine. They imposed an urgency which, when the Congress did meet, was acknowledged in the details of the programme it set itself and the terms of its instruction to its delegates to the Peace Conference.

With regard to the Zionist Organization and the Zionist position the changes were even more radical.

The programme of organization formulated by the leadership was one that had to be carried out against almost insuperable obstacles. No people in the world is so disorganized as are the Jews—wherever they find themselves. So in America also. Over and above the economic groupings and oppositions which underlay the conflict over the Congress, there were literally hundreds of others, minutely diversified, insidious, elusive. The common nationality of the Jews is crossed and broken by groupings based—to mention just a few—on sectarian, domiciliary, linguistic, social, and cultural differences. Each difference tends to be expressed in an association. Each association, once created, functions as a self-preserving social unity with the attractions, repulsions, and crises characteristic of the behaviour of such unities. Their impelling force might in the beginning be nothing more than the anxiety of some petty villager, hungry for the sense

of security which contact with the people of the same local memories, habits, and background would give. But organized, they became nuclei of accretion for other interests and functions, with a vested right in existence, bound inevitably to obstruct the consolidation of the always potential larger groups or the efficient discharge of their functions. For larger groups and their functions are farther from home; they are without the compulsion of the visible and tangible elements of locality and the memories of the experience of such elements. They are, by contrast, thin and abstract.

Both the Congress movement and the Zionist movement were limited and hampered by these local associations. They claimed a prior allegiance which could be overcome only through education and functional displacement. Thus, the Federation of American Zionists was made up, at the outside, of "societies" whose members came together for any number of other reasons besides the Zionist, and there was no correlation between the strength of the societies and the strength of the Federation. Grounded as they were, the societies functioned necessarily as organs of exclusion rather than as organs of absorption, so that at its strongest the Federation of American Zionists never counted more than 20,000 members. To increase in numbers it was necessary to change the principle of association, to render the allegiance to the general Zionist Organization basic and to the local society derivative. It required a change from the federative to the individual form of organization. Such a change could obviously not be brought about at once, nor could it be brought about except through the pressure of an external force which should be strong

enough to loosen if not to shatter established habits of association and thinking, and compel the formation of new patterns.

The external force was present and active in the form of the war emergency to meet which was the function of the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs, called briefly the Provisional Committee. Created to act until the Inner Actions Committee could resume its duties, the latter found it inevitable, when it did emerge, to confirm the powers which circumstance had compelled the Provisional Committee to assume and to exercise. These involved the support of the Zionist institutions in Palestine, the maintenance and development of the organization in English-speaking countries, and participation in the diplomatic and political activities which the new problems and conditions necessitated.

To carry on this work, funds were needed, and as there was neither time nor opportunity to provide a new fund-raising machinery, the existing Zionist organization, such as it was, had to be used for the purpose. This use could not fail to change the centre of attention of the membership from local to general Zionist interests, nor to modify the form of their organizations. At the same time the Provisional Committee began to figure as a practical and efficacious servant of the individual Jew through the creation of the Transfer Department, which undertook without charge to transmit moneys to individuals in any part of the world where the Zionist organization could reach. This it did so efficiently that the Bureau of Disbursements of the State Department officially recommended the Provisional Committee to Jews and Gentiles alike

as distributing agent. All the while, the Congress agitation was going on, under Zionist leadership.

These circumstances, taken together, reënforced by the tradition of feeling and aspiration toward Zion, tended slowly to effect the necessary change in habit and thinking. The change showed itself first by the formal adhesion of increasing numbers of individuals to the Zionist movement at large. Chief among these was Judge Julian W. Mack, of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, a jurist of note, a leading member of the American Jewish Committee, and a very distinguished figure in American civic life and Jewish philanthropy; he became in the course of time president of the Zionist Organization of America. The change showed itself, secondly, in the formal adoption of the Basle Platform and the vote to pay the *shekel*, of one great fraternal organization after another. Coincidentally, the forms and methods of office procedure, which had had all the looseness and inefficacy of a Talmudical college, were organized and put on what is usually called a "business basis"—"business basis" being an ironic American euphemism for efficiency. Propagandists, American, European, Palestinian, were sent about the country to expound the movement, to show its relation to the Jewish question, and to secure men and money. By the time of the Pittsburgh Convention, June, 1918, the change in habit and thinking had become adequate enough to risk a formal change in organization. The constituent societies of the Federation of American Zionists, the women's society known as Hadassah, the Federation itself, and the Provisional Committee were dissolved, or rather, reorganized. In their place was put the Zionist Organization of America. All

Zionists were made directly and individually members of the national organization and this was divided into territorial districts from which they elected their delegates to the annual convention. This convention in turn was to be elected the National Executive Committee which was to be the administrative agent of the Organization between conventions. The movement is now toward the direct election of the National Executive Committee by the districts.

The same convention at which this organization was effected showed how far from the starting-point the programme of organization had led. The less than 5,000 enrolled Zionists of 1914 had become 150,000 in 1918, with the unenrolled shekel payers well over 200,000. The timid budget of about \$15,000 of 1914 had become \$3,000,000 in 1918. The petition it submitted in behalf of its programme contained 529,000 Jewish signatures. The negligible aggregation of Ghetto shop-keepers and intelligentsia of dreamers and theorists had become as large and potent an organization of Jews as existed anywhere in the world. The anonymous, powerless Jewish society of 1914 had in 1918 become the most influential in America, recognized by governments as the spokesman for the Jewish people and consulted on all matters touching them.

The most important, though intentionally least conspicuous cause in this change was the leadership which could inspire so great a personal allegiance and devotion on the part of a collection of people hard to parallel for diversified idiosyncrasy and individualism as to overcome them, and to create an unprecedented unity and intensity of action among them. But the compulsion and opportunity of circumstances were hardly less influential. The institutions and communities



of Palestine had to be preserved, and to preserve them required not merely the organization of Jewry and the collection of moneys, but negotiations with governments and consultations with diplomats. The success or failure of these was ineluctably a function of the aims and fortunes of the Great War.

Now the aims of the war involved a duality—more correctly a duplicity—created by its fortunes. The disregard of international decencies and obligations involved in the Austrian assault on Serbia and the German invasion of Belgium, and the atrocities there committed, supplied ground for public and ethical justifications of war which became the organizing ideals of the peoples of the allied countries, and the ruling themes in the propaganda of their governments at home and abroad. These justifications and ideals were formulated as the “principle of nationality” or “self-determination,” “to make the world safe for democracy,” “to establish lasting peace.” Brought forward among the belligerents of the alliance to stabilize and maintain the morale of their peoples and forces, they were seized on by the subject peoples of every land, but particularly by those of central Europe, among whom they had been vital and momentous for generations, and were made the basis for the presentation of their claims for liberation and independence. In addition they were used indifferently by either belligerent to embarrass the other. But in the United States they were taken at their face value and they won the sympathy and then the allegiance of both the people and the government of the greatest neutral country. Consequently, when Germany forced this country to enter the war they acquired at once and at

last the status of primary and overruling objectives of the combat, to which the Allies could not but consent.

Nevertheless, behind these ideals and justifications lay a complex of desires and interests altogether unrelated to them, in fact, their exact opposites, much deeper rooted, older, and more potent than they. These desires and interests had determined the behaviour, organization, and armament of European countries for well-nigh half a century. They had created the condition of competitive militarization, commercial rivalry, and emotional tension which Mr. Brailsford has aptly called the war of steel and gold. They had induced in international relations a state of affairs which was nothing more or less than a condition of international anarchy. The usual name for this condition is economic imperialism. Its core has been the rivalry of land-power and water-power over the control of the eastern Mediterranean. The policy of Britain with respect to the Turkish Empire, the diplomacy of the French, the wars of the Russians, the operations of the Germans, all had had the same end—the control or possession of the eastern Mediterranean and the roads and highways of Asia Minor.

The reason should be obvious. Asia Minor, including Palestine, is at the juncture of the three continents of the Eastern Hemisphere. The Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus on which is situated its greatest city, Constantinople, are the only all-the-year-round outlet to the sea for Russian commerce. Russia consequently has always striven to dismember Turkey and to gain possession of Constantinople. The rationalization of this striving is called pan-Slavism. But in this Russia has always been frustrated by Great

Britain. For to Great Britain the survival of Turkey used to be an insurance of the freedom of Egypt and India from attack by land, and of the maintenance of her monopoly of transportation by water between Europe and western Asia. To the French the integrity of the Turkish Empire was necessary because of the investments of the French in Turkey, particularly in Syrian railroads. Probably more than three fifths of the Turkish loan is underwritten by French rentiers, and a large proportion of the rest is in the hands of British interests. Now the trade monopoly of the English, the investments of the French, the desire for Constantinople of the Russians were all threatened by the creation of the understanding between Germany and Turkey, which, as we have seen, was the cornerstone of the proposed German structure of *Mittel-Europa*. On the basis of this understanding Germans received in Syria and Mesopotamia concessions which included coal mines, copper mines, and railroads. Particularly they included the Bagdad Railroad, with a projected terminal on the Persian Gulf. The completion of such a road connecting Bagdad with Berlin would have created for the products and manufactures of *Mittel-Europa* an all-land route to Asia. It would have given Germany a very distinct trade advantage over Britain. It would also have put into effect a very serious military threat against India. So Britain prevented the completion of the Bagdad Railroad by an understanding with the Shereef of the Koweit which gave her control of the possible terminals. But this was not enough. The German threat remained. And remained a threat not only against the interests of Britain but of Russia and France as well.

The three rivals over Turkey thus found themselves confronted with a common enemy within Turkey, whose existence required them to come to some common agreement with regard to the disposition of their various interests in the empire. Turkish participation in the war on the side of the Central Powers supplied the opportunity and the duplicity of the government of the Tsar with regard to the continuance of Russian participation in the war supplied the occasion. It was hoped that the Russian bureaucracy might be bribed to keep up their end. So accordingly, in 1916, with the fortunes of battle going against the Allies, Sir Mark Sykes, who had been sent to study conditions in Asia Minor, and had expert knowledge about that part of the world, was ordered to Russia in company with M. Georges Picot to see if an arrangement could not be made. One was made. It had the form of a secret understanding by which Great Britain undertook to abandon her traditional policy with regard to the Turkish Empire. The empire was to be dismembered. Russia was to receive Constantinople and her outlet to open water. France was to receive Syria and that part of northern Palestine which includes the Litani, the headwaters of the Jordan, and a portion of Galilee. Great Britain was to receive certain ports on the Syrian coast, namely Haifa and Acre with the implicated part of Palestine, the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, the control of the Persian Gulf, and of the Red Sea. What remained of Palestine was to go under international control. These arrangements would accomplish the same ends that the survival of Turkey would accomplish—the control of the ways to India and the monopoly of trade routes.

It would improve the latter, inasmuch as it would make possible the creation of short overland routes between the Syrian ports and the markets of Asia Minor. It would offset the disadvantage of the freedom of the Suez Canal.

Such was the intent of the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty of May, 1916, to be validated by concerted attacks through the summer of that year on the eastern, the western, the Balkan, and Italian fronts. The attacks, however, gained only ground, not victory, and the sordid Rumanian Government, lured by the promise and hope of being in at the death and participating in the division of the spoils, entered the war on the side of the Allies only to be overrun by the Central Powers and crushed. Russia became less than ever a force to be counted on. The people of the allied countries showed distinct signs of exhaustion and war-weariness. A period of depression ensued, in which feeling took form in reformulations of war aims, in attempts at stating conditions of peace, in negotiations, secret and overt, toward peace, under the dominion of a mood known as "defeatism." This mood could not and did not, however, influence in any essential way the habits of imperialism. Russian disintegration had gone too far to render her government effectually responsive to the lure of Constantinople. The living force of the country had passed beyond its control. Its economic life had come under the direction of the Union of Zemstvos; its political life was moving rapidly toward revolution. With the defection of Russia in view, the French and the English governments were compelled to seek other alliances, were prompted to promise anything. They worked on the Greeks

and on the Arabs. They planned at last an eastern campaign.

The work on the Arabs had long been held in view. The Arabs of Syria had always been friendly to Great Britain. Already during the first months of the war a Nationalist Committee, composed of representatives from Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, had been formed at Damascus. This committee formulated a programme of self-government and coöperation which it transmitted secretly to the Shereef Husein at Mecca. If he acquiesced in it he was to negotiate with Great Britain for help in its realization, in return for military support against the Turks. He did acquiesce, and did begin negotiations with the High Commissioner in the newly proclaimed protectorate of Egypt. But by the time partial agreement—sufficient to justify action—had been reached, the Committee in Damascus had been discovered and crushed by the Turks. Syria and Mesopotamia were unable to act. Only Arabia could do anything. The bargain that was made with Husein, through that remarkable young archeologist, Col. T. E. Lawrence, made with the approval of France, required him to proclaim his independence and to enter the war on the side of the Allies. In return, the Syrian and Arabian dominion of the Turk was to be divided into three Arabian principalities: one, consisting of Syria and Palestine, under the rule of the Emir Feisal, eldest son of the King of the Hedjaz; another, embracing Mesopotamia and the trade routes to India, under the government of the second son, Zeid; and the last, stretching from the Hedjaz to the eastern shore of the Red Sea, under the rule of a third son, Abdulla. France and Britain, of course, were, withal,

to safeguard their own especial interest—the British interests being notably the control of Irak, of the provinces of Bagdad, and Basra.

This secret treaty, made after an understanding with the French, rendered ambiguous the Sykes-Picot Treaty. As negotiated by Sir Henry McMahon, from Egypt, it had the desired effect of bringing the Arabs into action as reinforcements of the British operating in Palestine. It necessitated training them and subsidizing them. It left open, as a source of future difficulties, the unsettled points, particularly the control of the littoral of Syria and Cilicia lying west of Homs, Aleppo, Hama, and Damascus. Its immediate point was to get additional man-power, and this point was secured. But the man-power made little difference. America's entry into the war in April, 1917, brought hope, but not hope of a speedy decision. The strain due to submarine and zeppelin attacks, trench warfare, undernourishment, and casualty lists had produced a depression which in diplomatic circles sought relief in ever-new alliances and combinations, motivated by old imperialistic conceptions of vital interests. The very last of such alliances which might, at one and the same time, remain in harmony with the publicly announced ideals of the war, keep secure the interests of France and Britain in the Near East, and weaken the Central Powers, was with the Jews. Thus it came about that finally the national aspirations of the Jewish people and the Zionist Organization received official attention as factors in the international situation.

The considerations which led to this attention were manifold. Jews were an influential part of the popula-

tion of the United States. Jews played an important rôle in the affairs of the Russian Empire—both in the finances and economic activities of the established order and in the opposition. Their sufferings and persecutions were known and their Zionist hopes were known. It was expected that a pro-Jewish declaration might help hold Russia together, or if a revolution occurred, keep her at least on the battleline. In central Europe Jews constituted a minority nationality, with the same wishes and outlook as other minority nationalities. It was expected that a pro-Jewish declaration would add another to the groups of effective disaffection in the Central Empires. Probably, also, a factor was desired in Asia Minor to offset the force of the Arabs, should the time ever come when pledges and understandings had to be made good. It was urged that a Jewish Palestine would be the strongest support of British influence in the East and a great addition to the security of the Suez Canal; that in view of its racial linkage with the commercial settlements of Jews in Bagdad, Persia, India, the Straits, Hong Kong, Shanghai, it would be the chief gate for the economic penetration of the greater part of Asia and a most powerful support in the East for the British merchant and the British manufacturer.

But this was only half the story. The imperialism of the officials in this case was reënforced, within the general atmosphere of the Christian tradition regarding the restoration of the Jews, by the piety of one group of Englishmen, by the democratic liberalism of another, and the literality with which the masses of all the allied peoples but particularly of Britain were tak-



ing the public formulations of the objectives of the war.

Already in 1914, a professor of chemistry in Manchester University, Chaim Weizmann, had of his own initiative begun to put the Jewish position and the Jewish aspiration before Englishmen of influence and power. A man of great personal charm, swift wit, and keen social perceptions, he received a hearing which became all the more attentive and considerate after he had performed for the country a very important professional service—he had contributed toward the creation of T N T. But it was a hearing purely personal and unconnected with the actual politics of the international situation. His work, reënforced by the coming to London in November, 1914, of Sokolow and Tschlenow, members of the Inner Actions Committee, had purely the effect of preparing the soil, of providing conditions for favourable action, should the occasion by some miracle arise. In this he secured the agreement and collaboration of Messrs. C. P. Scott and Herbert Sidebotham of the *Manchester Guardian*, who organized the British Palestine Committee, and later, of Sir Herbert Samuel and the Rothschilds. Members of religious groups such as the Second Adventists, who saw in the war the apocalyptic Armageddon and regarded the restoration of Palestine to the Jews the final preliminary to the Second Advent, were naturally sympathetic to the Zionist plea, and active in its endorsement. Moreover, British religious tradition and foreign policy generally were weighted in the direction of favourable attention to Jewish rights. And Jewish claims gained additional prestige and picturesqueness through the agitation of Vladimir Jabotinsky and Pincus Ruthenberg for the

creation of a Jewish legion to fight with the Allies in France and in Palestine. The sole fruit which this agitation bore at the time—it was frowned upon by the Zionist leaders and repudiated by the Organization as impolitic—was the organization of the Zion Mule Corps, made up of Djemal Pasha's expulsees and a few European Zionists, and led by Colonel Patterson. The corps distinguished itself at Gallipoli.<sup>1</sup>

The work of education and propaganda in England thus met with comparatively favourable conditions from the outset. Its great asset, however, was the known fact that the President of the United States had come to believe in the Zionist programme as the solution of the Jewish question and had promised his best efforts in helping to carry it out. It counted heavily in Mr. Balfour's consultations with Justice Brandeis during the former's mission to the United States.

When, therefore, in the depressed early months of 1917, Sir Mark Sykes, acting on behalf of the allied governments, particularly of Britain and France, opened official negotiations with Mr. Sokolow acting for the International Zionist Organization, conditions were ripe. The negotiations condensed the psychological nebulae produced by the conferences, discussions, and propaganda into a programme of definite action. Regarding the terms in which this programme should be formulated there had been endless discussion between the leaders of the movement everywhere and the diplomats of the Allies. They varied from the delimitation of a Jewish state to merely opportunity for immigration and settlement. The formulation

<sup>1</sup>Cf. Colonel Patterson's book: "With the Zionists at Gallipoli."

had to be made, so far as the Jews were concerned, in view of the Jewish position in the politics of Europe and of the Basle programme. It was a statement so far as the Allies were concerned that had to be made in view of the complexities of economic, sectarian, and political interests in England, in France, in Italy, and in Asia Minor. Sir Mark came, in the course of the negotiations, to believe in Zionism and to work for it with a fervour which has since marked more than one disinterested liberal among his fellow countrymen. His knowledge, labour, and influence came to be at the constant disposal of the Zionists. He grew to regret the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, and after the statement was publicly made warned the Zionists that it would be necessary to keep the Government reminded of it.

The journeys of Mr. Sokolow to France, to Italy, to the Vatican; the statements made by Weizmann and Sokolow in May, 1917, to the Conference of the English Zionist Federation, precipitated a condition in England analogous to that in the United States. On May 24 the London *Times* published a letter signed by officers of the Conjoint Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association. The letter recapitulated the philosophy of the "assimilationists": the Jews were not a nationality in *Galuth*, but a sect dispersed by divine providence for salvational purposes; the Zionists were irreligious enemies of these purposes; their success would hopelessly compromise the Jewish struggle for equal rights in countries where these had not yet been attained, and would work injustice to the Arabs in Palestine, where the Jews, in the opinion of the Committee, after all had no especial

rights; withal they were not opposed to the establishment of relief settlements in Palestine. Immediately, the *Times* was bombarded with replies from all sorts of people, of all degrees of conspicuity and anonymity. In its editorial review of the controversy it hit upon the governing anxiety in the psychology of this group of Englishmen of the Mosaic persuasion. Don't be afraid, it told them; "only an imaginative nervousness suggests that the realization of territorial Zionism, in some form, would cause Christendom to round on the Jews and say, 'Now you have a land of your own, go to it!'" But this exposure of the complex to the light of day did not dissolve it. Some eighteen distinguished Englishmen of the Mosaic persuasion associated themselves with Messrs. David Alexander and Claude Montefiore, the signatories to the statement in behalf of the Conjoint Committee. Then the fat was in the fire indeed. One after another the congregations supposed to be represented by the Board of Deputies dissociated themselves from the action of the president, Mr. Alexander, and censured its officers. The Conjoint Committee was reorganized and subjected to democratic control. Although Zionism was declared to lie outside its province, practically all the constituent communities in the United Kingdom adopted resolutions in favour of Zionism. The English press was practically unanimous in the same endorsement. So was the press of the United States. So—it appeared in the course of the next year—were the members of the War Congress of this country, so was the American Union for Labour and Democracy, speaking for the organized workingmen of the country; so was the British Labour Party. So was the liberal-radical government

of Russia. Opposition came conspicuously from "assimilationist" or sectarian Jews of a psychology similar to that of the members of the British Conjoint Committee. Outstanding among these were rabbis of the Reformed sect in America.

The collective force of the opposition was too weak to have the remotest chance of success. For once justice, internationalism, and imperialistic interests were in harmony. Sir Mark Sykes, aware of the conditions in his government's contracts regarding the Near East, and anxious to resolve them, conceived of an Arab-Armenian-Jewish confederation of the Near East, founded in mutual good-will and creating together there through industry and righteousness a new civilization of culture and progress which should be a potent part of the commonwealth of nations he conceived the British Empire might come to be. The roots of the conception were the needs of imperialism, of course, but what roots are not, of anything that lives and grows and bears fruit, in carnality and earthiness? On November 2, 1917, after nine months of conference, negotiation, consultation, cabling, and visitation; after numberless writings and rewritings, in which representatives of the governments of France, Great Britain, Italy, as well as the Zionists of America, England, and Russia participated, and of which the government of the United States was kept fully informed and with which it was known to be in full sympathy, Mr. Arthur James Balfour, then secretary of state for foreign affairs, sent his famous letter to Lord Rothschild and the Zionist Organization, which has since been known as the Balfour Declaration. Both with respect to the form of this letter and the decision to issue it the

Government of the United States exercised a determining influence. Mr. Balfour wrote:

I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet.

*His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.*

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Organization.

The immediate effects of the declaration were what had been anticipated. Greeted with general approval by the press and the public opinion of the allied countries, it became a rallying point for the devotion and the energies of the Jews of the world. It brought new recruits to Zionism and encouraged recent ones like the late Mr. Jacob H. Schiff. It reacted immediately upon the morale of Russia and the Central Empires, to what extent may be gathered from Baron von dem Bussche's commentary on the statement elicited from Talaat Pasha in Vienna. All that Talaat could well do was to call attention to the historic friendliness of the Turkish Government toward the Jews, to its customary welcome to economic and industrial development of Palestine, and its necessary opposition to "Zionists who have political ambitions for Palestine." The German under-secretary commented significantly: "As regards the aspirations in Palestine of Jewry, particu-

larly, Zionism, we welcome the recent statement of the Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, expressing the Turkish Government's intention, . . . to promote flourishing settlements within the limits of the capacity of the country, local self-government corresponding with the country's laws, and free development of their civilization." Talaat had said nothing of the sort. The statement was a warning to the Turks and a promise to the Jews, as parallel as was possible to the Balfour Declaration.

But it was of no avail. The Declaration accelerated the fission going on in the Central Empires between the subject nationalities and their overlords; in Germany the Zionists took an attitude which was tantamount to defiance of their rulers. To the affairs and programme of the Jews the Declaration gave a new turn which no argument could deviate and no machinations hold back. Almost synchronous with it was the long-expected British invasion of Palestine, the conquest of Jerusalem, and the liberation of Judea. And succeeding it, in due order, came the public official confirmations of the French, the Italian, and the other allied governments, not excluding the Chinese and Siamese, while the politic Papacy was quick to announce its approval. Among the Zionists the Ruthenberg-Jabotinsky military programme was immediately renewed and with the coöperation of British recruiting officers, made as effective as circumstances would permit. A Jewish battalion "recruited chiefly in England, Palestine, and America," did participate in liberating the Homeland, and was mentioned in the dispatches. In America, the organization devoted itself to the constructive work of assembling and or-

ganizing and dispatching a Medical Unit to see to the health of the Homeland, and to the immediate accumulation of a great fund to begin its restoration. Among non-Zionists the Declaration became the occasion of statements by various groups—depreciation and denunciation by rabbis of the Reformed sect, and by laymen also troubled with “imaginative nervousness” regarding the security of their status and fortune in America; “profound appreciation” by the American Jewish Committee, while Mr. Louis Marshall declared, in refusing to join a group about to organize to combat Zionism, that he would “regard public antagonism to Zionism . . . as an act of treachery to the welfare of Judaism.”

In Russia its effects were cut off from development by the success of the communist revolution and the establishment of the Soviet Republic with all the disaster that to some degree it created and that mostly was imposed upon it. The dismemberment of the Russian Empire effected through the treaty at Brest-Litovsk dismembered also the world's greatest Jewish community and threw the Jewish people of central Europe under the dominion of fear and in jeopardy of extermination. It brought Zion as the hope of their salvation as intensely to their consciousness as in days of Sabbattai Zevi, with the living difference that followed from the secularism of the Balfour Declaration and of the new international attitude toward the Jews. It made them more conscious than ever of the defensive and insurance value of explicit acknowledgment in public law of their rights as groups, as national minorities with a historic and present function in the organization of such states as Poland,



Rumania, the Ukraine, and the rest of lesser ones which the treaty of Brest-Litovsk promised to let loose, and the loosing of which the final victory of the Allies consummated, adding to them the component parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Its consequence in Palestine was the enlistment of all able-bodied young Palestinian Jews in Allenby's army. The population, although suffering comparatively little through the war, had nevertheless been disorganized and rendered destitute by the policy of Djemal Pasha, who practised evacuations, levies in money and goods, and cut down plantations, and drove off live stock and fodder. Its health had never been properly looked after. A concerted attempt was made to work out a programme of relief in the administration of which all the sectaries including the Sephardim joined, taking a solemn and formal pledge to do all they could "in the work of our National Restoration," and the British military authorities did what they could in the areas they liberated. But the moneys needed were immense and the problems unnecessarily complicated so that it was felt that a representative and responsible body of Zionists should assume the task of rehabilitation of the Jewish communities of Palestine. Thus the Zionist Commission was conceived and provided for. It went to Palestine in March, just before the last desperate German drive. It went as an international body, whose members represented the Zionists and Jews of England, France, Russia, Italy and, indirectly, the United States. And it went under the sanction and authority of the British Government. Officially, it was designed to serve as a body of advisors to the military administration which

the Hague conventions prescribe for occupied enemy territory "on all matters relating to Jews, or which may affect the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in accordance with the declaration of his Majesty's government." Under this commission it was practically empowered to do anything it could within the law to rehabilitate Jewish Palestine of pre-war times, and to create the Jewish Palestine of the future. Its chairman was Dr. Ch. Weizmann; its liaison officer, Major Ormsby-Gore. The most dramatic and spectacular thing it did, through Weizmann—a thing characteristic and symbolic also—was to lay the cornerstone of the Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus. The episode itself, baldly taken, was hardly more than a rather ridiculous gesture, a grandiloquent flourish; taken in its historic context and implications it was the epitome of the Jewish bias for the word and the book, a warning of irrelevance and impracticality quite as much as a promise of sweetness and light. But what makes it truly important is the fact that the President of the United States consented to make it the occasion of a public reaffirmation of the attitude of the Government of the United States toward Zionism. Mr. Wilson wrote:

I have watched with deep and sincere interest the reconstructive work which the Weizmann Commission has done in Palestine at the instance of the British Government, and I welcome an opportunity to express the satisfaction I have felt in the progress of the Zionist Movement in the United States and in the Allied countries since the Declaration by Mr. Balfour on behalf of the British Government of Great Britain's approval of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and his promise that

the British Government would use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object, with the understanding that nothing would be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish people in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in other countries. I think that all Americans will be deeply moved by the report that even in this time of stress the Weizmann Commission has been able to lay the foundation of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem with the promise that it bears of spiritual rebirth.

A month later the victory of Allenby came to reënforce the victories which Foch had begun to win. Within another month, the Central Powers asked for and received an armistice conditioned on the terms of peace formulated by the President of the United States in his statement of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent statements, particularly that of September 27, 1918. This last statement was the envisagement of an organization of peace which should "express the common will of mankind." The war, the President asserted, had been a people's war. The peace must be a people's peace. It must be a peace which should render "impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed; and not only impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose interests are dealt with." But, most of all, the conference should establish lasting peace. And lasting peace could be secured only in the form of a league of nations. Agitation for such a league had begun early in the Great War. Societies dedicated to its establishment had superseded the old peace societies in all the countries of the alliance and in most neutral countries, with membership recruited from

among the most distinguished and influential in all walks of life. In the course of time government departments had been charged with the consideration of its possibilities, and the preparation of a constitution for it. It was made clear that the President of the United States was much preoccupied with its form and implications, and in this same final pronouncement before the armistice he described it as the cornerstone of any peace that could be lasting, that could guarantee the rights and safeguard the security of national minorities or could maintain justice between competing nations.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE JEWISH CAUSE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

SUCH was the situation, when at last, two years after the election of its members, the American Jewish Congress was finally convened in Philadelphia. The atmosphere in which it met and the emotional tone which its delegates brought were not of the healthiest. Repeated demands had been made that the Congress should be convened within the two years' interval, and the various reasons—from political crises to official requests of officers of the government—given by the executive committee for not doing so had not been regarded as satisfactory. There were many who believed that the American Jewish Committee were trying to void their agreement and had chosen their own special representatives—events proved the latter belief correct—to go to the Peace Conference. Others accused the Zionists of trying to delay the holding of the Congress lest it embarrass their own special interests, so fortunately advanced. Still others feared for the security of the democratic movement, which must inevitably disintegrate through heedlessness and inaction. All these special concerns faded, however, before the urgency of the times. The Peace Conference was imminent, was, in fact, unofficially in session. The need and disaster of the Jews in Po-

land, in the Ukraine, in Rumania, in the Balkans, in Morocco, and in Persia were overwhelming. The Balfour Declaration was only a promissory note, which required to be formally validated by the Peace Conference.

The Congress sat for four days, and each day the factional difficulties receded farther and farther before the felt need for unity in counsel and in action. They showed themselves at the outset, in contest over the chairmanship, to which, finally, the president of the Zionist Organization of America, Judge Mack, was elected by a vote of over four to one. They showed themselves by a demonstration of the Mizrachists against the spokesman for the radicals, Doctor Zhidlovsky, and that culminated in the vote, moved by the Mizrachists themselves, to permit Zhidlovsky to proceed. They showed themselves in the attempts to get the Congress to vote its own perpetuation and these were overwhelmingly defeated. The men and women of the Congress exhibited a good deal of impatience toward all these matters. They were anxious to get to the business in hand. That was the preparation of memoranda, and of resolutions to be based on the memoranda regarding the problems and wishes of the Jews of the world in the establishment and safeguarding of their rights and liberties. It was speedily found that the problem was organic, and that the numerous committees assigned to the consideration of Poland, Rumania, Russia, Ukraina, Finland, Lithuania, Galicia, and so on, would have to confer as a unit. The upshot of the conferences was the formulation of a "bill of rights" which was to be made the basis for the establishment of the Jewish position in each of the

countries where it was in jeopardy or doubt. It reads as follows:

THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Resolved that the American Jewish Congress respectfully requests the Peace Conference to insert in the Treaty of Peace as conditions precedent to the creation of the new or enlarged States which it is proposed to call into being, that express provision be made a part of the Constitution of such States before they shall be finally recognized as States by the signatories of the Treaty as follows:

1. All inhabitants of the Territory of . . . including such persons together with their families, who subsequent to August 1, 1914, fled, removed, or were expelled therefrom and who shall within ten years from the adoption of this provision return thereto, shall for all purposes be citizens thereof, provided, however, that such as have heretofore been subjects of other States, who desire to retain their allegiance to such States or assume allegiance to their successor States, to the exclusion of . . . citizenship may do so by formal declaration to be made within a specified period.

2. For a period of ten years from the adoption of this provision, no law shall be enacted restricting any former inhabitant of a State which included the territory of . . . from taking up his residence in . . . and thereby acquiring citizenship therein.

3. All citizens of . . . without distinction as to race, nationality, or creed shall enjoy equal civil, political, religious, and national rights, and no laws shall be enacted or enforced which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of, or impose upon any persons any discrimination, disability, or restrictions whatsoever on account of race, nationality, or religion, or deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.

4. The principle of minority representation shall be provided for by the law.

5. Members of the various national as well as religious

bodies of . . . shall be accorded autonomous management of their own communal institutions whether they be religious, educational, charitable, or otherwise.

6. No law shall be enacted restricting the use of any language, and all existing laws declaring such prohibition are repealed, nor shall any language test be established.

7. Those who observe any other than the first day of the week as their Sabbath shall not be prohibited from pursuing their secular affairs on any day other than that which they observe; nor shall they be required to perform any acts on their Sabbath or Holy Days which they shall regard as a desecration thereof.

To present and urge this bill before the Peace Conference a committee of seven was chosen, among them Judge Mack and Messrs. Marshall and Wise. They were further instructed by a resolution unanimously adopted "to coöperate with the representatives of other Jewish organizations and specifically with the World Zionist Organization, to the end that the Peace Conference may recognize the aspirations and historic claims of the Jewish people with regard to Palestine, and declare that in accordance with the British Government's declaration of November 2, 1917, endorsed by the Allied Governments and the President of the United States, there shall be established such political administrative, and economic conditions in Palestine as will assure under the trusteeship of Great Britain acting on behalf of such League of Nations as may be formed, the development of Palestine into a Jewish Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which shall prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."



Although it was expected that the Commission would proceed immediately to Paris, all its members were not assembled there until March 22. Various causes had contributed to this delay. Mr. Wilson's expressed preference to meet the delegation or its spokesmen on American soil kept a number at home; the need of personal coöperation with the Zionists in London took others to England. The delay was not without value. When the Commission finally was assembled in Paris it brought with it from the President of the United States assurances of his unchanging sympathy with "the incontestable principle of the right of the Jewish people everywhere to equality of status," and of a reaffirmation of his approval of the Balfour Declaration and his conviction "that the allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our Government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundation of a Jewish Commonwealth."

The two declarations, added to the fact that the Commission was the freely and publicly chosen spokesman of the most prosperous and most powerful Jewish community in the world, secured for the Commission a status among the representatives of Jewry in Paris which was all the more needful if its task were to be adequately performed.

The first of these tasks was to establish some degree of unanimity and coöperation among these representatives themselves. From the time of their assembling they had been gathered in varied and opposing groups, broadly reducible to two. One, later constituting the Committee of Jewish Delegations to the Peace Conference, had been democratically established and was representative of the rank and file of the Jewries of the

world. The other, representing the Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association of Great Britain and the Alliance Israélite Universelle of France, stood not so much for a class as for a certain philosophy of Jewish life and destiny—already commented on—which had been formulated as an apologia for the persistence of certain groups of Jews as Jews.

The Committee of Jewish Delegations was the outcome of the attempt made by the Copenhagen Office of the world Zionist Organization soon after the armistice to call a conference in Switzerland of the representatives of the Jewish National Councils—created through the contagion of the Congress Movement in America—in Russia, Poland, Ukraina, East Galicia, West Galicia, German Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Bukowina together with other organizations of national scope. The outlook and interests of its constituent groups derived not merely from the concrete and often extravagant nationalist philosophy with which they were imbued, but from the poignant immediacy of experience and suffering and sentiment of the unhappy communities whom they represented.

Both groups were too near their special problems to attain a proper perspective of thought and emotion with regard to them, to think them in any but disproportioned terms. Both suffered from an “imaginative nervousness”—the Englishmen and Frenchmen of the Mosaic persuasion from the pathoformic fear of endangering their dearly won and dearly maintained status; the Jews of central Europe from the similar fear of never attaining to any freedom and security at all.

Under the stressful conditions of the Peace Conference at Paris an enchannelment of emotions of so great a polarity into a pattern of common and united action was impossible. Nevertheless, the Commission from America promptly charged itself with this task. To the advantage of its prestige it added the advantage of its point of view. Its outlook on the Jewish problem was the echo and homologue of the general American outlook on the world-problem: an outlook resting upon an active and even intense sympathy and idealism cooled and reduced to measure and objectivity by the detachment of distance and the healthy, secure life of the Jewish communities of America. It possessed like the American delegation to the Peace Conference an almost perfect equipment for the work of conciliation. Unlike the American delegation, it was able to use its equipment. That it did not succeed was not its fault: force alone, not persuasion, could, under the circumstances, have succeeded. But it laid a foundation. It held, under the devoted leadership of Mr. Louis Marshall, conference after conference in the attempt at reducing the various committees into a single one, or failing that, of preventing public warfare and securing public coöperation. On the surface it seemed as if the Commission might gain its ends, particularly with the representatives of the Conjoint Committee, upon whom the general English outlook naturally had considerable influence. A Conference Committee was created and charged with the task of formulating a joint memorial on the Jewish position and the rights of the Jews. But after many consultations, the "imaginative nervousness," mostly of the French Mosaists, prevented union. Having conceded the *thing* in-

volved in "national rights," they balked at the phrase that touched off the emotional and associative reactions which had been initiated by the generation that Napoleon's Sanhedrin of 1807 had spoken for, and the reactions created an imponderable but impassable barrier to agreement. All that the English-French group could be persuaded to assent to was to refrain from taking hostile measures against any representations regarding "national rights" which the Committee of Jewish Delegations might make. Even this grudging and oral agreement they could not—so great was their anxiety—successfully keep.

Meanwhile, the Committee of Jewish Delegations, at its headquarters in the Zionist offices, had organized, with the head of the American Commission, Judge Julian W. Mack as its first chairman, and when he was compelled to return to the United States, with Mr. Louis Marshall as his successor, and Mr. Leo Motzkin, former head of the Copenhagen Office, as its permanent secretary. The Delegations held continuous sessions. Their problem was so to phrase their memorial to the Peace Conference as to secure the substance of justice to the Jews, individually and collectively, without at the same time adding to the burden of misunderstanding, ill-will, and enmity which had been the people's traditional lot. From the start it was agreed that the basis of any memorandum should be the Jewish Bill of Rights adopted by the American Jewish Congress. But concerning the details and formulæ there was a difference of opinion among the American commissioners also. However, the facts and specifications of the representatives of the Jewries of central Europe and Russia were

coercive: they made clear to both the most clerical and most legalistic of the Americans that for the Jews of the new states of Europe civil equality without national rights was a delusion and a myth. On May 10, 1919, a memorial was unanimously adopted by the Committee and later deposited with the secretary of the Peace Conference. The phrase "national rights" remained a stumbling-block, nevertheless. Adopted in principle by the Peace Conference, the treaty with Poland designates the concept "national rights" by the circumlocution "rights of minorities differing from the majority in race, language, or religion." Otherwise, the treaty follows the principles laid down in the Bill of Rights of the American Jewish Congress and the memorial of the Committee of Jewish Delegations. These were provided for also in the treaties with Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, Austria, and Greece. Poland and Czecho-Slovakia have ratified the treaties—the Rumanian Parliament has still to act, and the other treaties are in varying stages of suspension or, if adopted, of sabotage, amid the chaos that followed the Treaty of Versailles.

All the treaties establish essentially the same things, not for Jews alone, but for all national minorities.

*First.* That the several obligations are recognized as fundamental laws.

*Second.* That all inhabitants of the country involved are assured full and complete protection of life, liberty, and property without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race, or religion.

*Third.* That all habitual residents of the lands of a new state are admitted into the citizenship of that state

and are secured in their rights to adopt another citizenship if they choose to do so, and it be open to them to do so.

*Fourth.* That all members of national minorities are to be equal before the law, to be secured in their rights of admission to public employments, functions, or honours; in the practice of professions, crafts, or industry; in the freedom to use any language for the purposes of private intercourse, commerce, religion, publication, and assembly, and, within reasonable limits, in the use of a minority language before the courts.

*Fifth.* That racial, religious, or linguistic minorities must have equal treatment and security in law and in fact; that they are free to establish, manage, and control, at their own expense, charitable, religious, social, and educational institutions; that they shall be free to use their own language therein, and to practise their religion.

*Sixth.* That while the State may make obligatory the teaching of the State language, it must supply adequate facilities also for instruction in the language of the minority, and must allocate to towns or districts where appreciable proportions of such a minority reside an equitable share of the monies provided through state, municipal, or other budgets for the purpose of cult, charity, or education.

*Seventh.* That the Jewish minorities may, subject to general control of the State, provide, through the action of their local communities, committees which shall receive, distribute, and administer the monies so set aside, for the purpose designated.

*Eighth.* That the Jewish minority shall h

right to observe their Sabbath; that they shall not be required to attend court or perform other legal business on that day; that the State shall not order or permit to be ordered local or general elections, or registration for election or other purposes on that day.<sup>1</sup>

*Ninth.* That the State recognizes and acknowledges the obligations regarding members of racial, linguistic, or religious minorities as obligations of international concern guaranteed by the League of Nations; that the State recognizes and acknowledges the right and duty of any member of the Council of the League to bring to the Council's attention any infraction of these obligations, and that the Council is to take action upon each infraction. That the State agrees that differences of opinion between the State and any other member of the League on these matters shall be held to be a dispute of international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and that the questions of law or fact involved in it shall upon the demand of either party be referred to the permanent Court of International Justice, whose decision shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant. . . .

So the age-old problem of the rights of national minorities was met, and met for all minorities, by the one that had suffered longest and most terribly through its disinherited status. The ninth of the provisions here summarized constitutes the public and formal acknowledgment of the fact of nationality and the incorporation of its principle into the law of nations. Amid so much that was evil and retro-

<sup>1</sup>The *Seventh* and *Eighth* points are explicit only in the Polish treaty.

gressive in the action at Versailles this one thing, for which America, official and unofficial, deserves the lion's share of the credit, stands out as to some degree uttering and fulfilling the hope and the vision with which the free and the humane men of the world had looked to the Peace Conference.

Yet it does not in reality stick out from the picture. It is a conclusion, not a beginning. The same nineteenth-century spirit and outlook which underlay the rest of the work at Versailles underlies this also. It consummates in law, and thus lays the foundation for that change of habit in which will consist the consummation in fact, of a process of group-rearrangements whose collective tendency we have observed as "the principle of nationality." It is worth while repeating that by and large the effect of the recognition and application of the principle must be to remove it from the field of political contention and to permit the freer coming into the focus of attention of those other problems of grouping which were born with the industrialization of the western world.

How rapid or how slow this change is likely to be depends entirely on the organization of the minorities and their power to make their rights so effective as to be no longer subject to contention. To-day the law is still a scrap of paper, a promissory note, with the League of Nations, its guarantor, barely showing a head out of limbo and the minorities too disabled to make themselves felt.

When, however, the law was being thought out and urged, hopes were high, and upon its adoption in principle and form for incorporation into all treaties, gratulation was not unnaturally extensive, particularly among the Jews. One half of their problem had been



solved, so far as debate, legislation, and the pledged honour of diplomats could be regarded a solution. There remained the other half—the incorporation of the Balfour Declaration into public law. The mandate from the American Jewish congress was explicit and the will of the Jewries of central Europe was no less known and resolute. The Committee of Jewish Delegations again acted unanimously. On July 10, 1919, its members unanimously adopted a resolution to present to the Peace Conference a memorial regarding Jewish claims to Palestine. The presentation did not, however, take place until long after the Zionist Organization and the Jewish population of Palestine, acting jointly, had filed their own independent memorial, and the spokesmen of the Zionists—Messrs. Weizmann, Sokolow, Ussishkin, and André Spiré—had been heard by the Council of Ten. Sylvain Levi, on behalf of the Alliance Israélite, appeared in opposition.

Had this opposition been the only opposition the end of the matter would have been simple. But the disposal of Palestine was conditioned upon secret treaties, agreements, and counter-agreements. There were implicated in it interests of native landlords and foreign concessionaries, of foreign missionaries and native money-lenders. There was, besides, the swelling wave of nationalism, to no small degree artificially fostered by these interests and maintaining a propaganda from Cairo to Delhi. There was the anti-Zionism of high British military officials, who regarded the creation of a Jewish Palestine as impracticable and dangerous, and the resentful opposition of the Secretary of State for India, an Englishman of more or less Mosaic persuasion. Palestine, the military men told

the members of the Zionist Administrative Commission, could be held only by the bayonet, and no government, particularly not the British Government, would undertake to hold it so for the Jews. The briefs, memorials, conferences, innumerable and anxious, had at one and the same time to seek delicate adjustment to every new phase of the situation and yet not surrender a tittle of the Jewish position. Consultation followed consultation, draft followed draft, as rumour shifted and report veered. Finally a memorial was submitted. It was postulated upon Article 22 in the Covenant of the League of Nations regarding mandatories. The text of Article 22 is as follows:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the wellbeing and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be intrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and that tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative ad-

vice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League.

There are territories, such as southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific Isles, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory state, and other circumstances, can best be administered under the laws of the mandatory state as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate the mandatory state shall render to the League an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory state shall, if not previously agreed upon by the high contracting parties in each case, be explicitly defined by the Executive Council in a special act or charter.

A permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the mandatory powers and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the terms of all mandates.

Pursuant to the terms of this article, the Zionist memorial declared for Great Britain as Mandatory.

It outlined the historic claims of the Jewish people to Palestine, designated proposed boundaries, described the existing and *de facto* stake of the Jews in the land, their economic, social, and cultural services to it, and asked for the joint and formal validation of the Balfour Declaration by the members of the Peace Conference, their governments having already severally declared their adherence to it. And so on. At the hearing, the Zionist representatives elaborated and detailed their contentions. They made much of the Jewish urge toward Palestine, of the bearing of the Balfour Declaration on the Jewish tragedy in central Europe, of the rapidity and efficacy of the Jewish migration to Palestine, if proper conditions and safeguards are established.

The designation of these conditions and safeguards were, meanwhile and afterward, being worked out by an interallied Zionist conference in London, in consultation with friendly Britons. Of this, also, numerous versions were made. What was definitive in all of them was the recognition of the essentially economic character, once the political guarantees had been established, of the problem of Jewish settlement. This recognition was due preëminently to the American Zionists: they had perceived immediately after the Balfour Declaration the necessity of being prepared with a definite economic policy, had studied out what, generally, the situation would demand, and had formulated a declaration which was unanimously adopted by the National Convention held in Pittsburgh in July, 1918. This declaration was subsequently known as the Pittsburgh Programme. So far as possible, the Zionists sought to make the terms of this programme part of the terms of the mandate.

If accepted, these terms would render it the obligation of the mandatory to establish Palestine as the Jewish National Home and to develop it into "an autonomous commonwealth dedicated to the advancement of social justice." The realization of this end would require measures to promote the immigration of Jews; to establish Hebrew as one of the official languages of the land; to charge appropriate Jewish agencies with the creation and management of a system of education; to promote and perfect local and municipal self-government; to provide for the public ownership and development of land, natural resources, and public works and utilities; to foster the coöperative organization of all agricultural, industrial, commercial, and financial undertakings, and to do all this in progressive collaboration with appropriate Jewish agencies. Furthermore, guarantees of liberty of conscience and of civil and political rights would be extended to all the inhabitants of the land, regardless of race, faith, or sex; the holy places would be protected, and all members of the League of Nations or their nationals would be assured of equality of economic opportunity. And when, in the fulness of time and the judgment of the Mandatory, the inhabitants of Palestine should be capable of self-government, the Mandatory would enable them by means of a "democratic franchise without regard to race, faith, or sex, to establish a representative and responsible government in such form as the people of Palestine may devise."

The firmness and directness of the formulation and utterance of the Zionist aspirations before the Peace Conference and the Zionist policies in the terms of the mandate by no means represented the Zionists'

mood. Behind their serene and bold public front there were at work uncertainties, anxieties, fears. Immediately after the appearance of the Zionist delegation before the Council of Ten the Emir Feisal—who was then in Paris to demand the admission of his country into the councils of the Allies, among whom it counted itself one—issued a statement resting directly upon the arrangement—verbal, it is true—between the Egyptian High Commissioner and his father. The statement was in direct contradiction of the Balfour Declaration; in direct antithesis to Feisal's statements in private to Doctor Weizmann. The truth was that this wise and on the whole straightforward statesman was bewildered by the confusion of counsel and contradiction of pledges, by the antagonisms of advisors and the whole devious trend of diplomacy: he sought—in view of his relations to Syria he was compelled to seek—a straight and clean way out. Fortunately he was convinced, through the efforts of Mr. Felix Frankfurter, the lucid and competent chairman of the American Zionist delegation—that Palestine was not involved in the political manoeuvring and counter-manoeuvering over the independence and security of the Arab state. He expressed this conviction in a letter addressed to Frankfurter, in which he deplored the misleading of the Arab peasantry and stressed the traditional kinship and coöperation of Jews and Arabs, their common hardships, the sympathy of the Arabs with Zionism, and the hope for coöperation between the two peoples. He wrote:

Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate

and proper. We will do our best insofar as we are concerned to help them through. We will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.

These statements simply reaffirmed the sentiments he had somewhat earlier expressed at a public dinner in London. There he declared that "no true Arab can be suspicious or afraid of Jewish nationalism," and that the Arabs would be unworthy of freedom if they did not say to the Jews, "welcome back home," and "coöperate with them to the limit of the ability of the Arab state." But Feisal, though the spokesman, was not the ruler of the Arabs, not even the leader of all of them. Effendis and money-lenders meant him to be a tool rather than a guide; and his anti-Zionist expressions had been compelled by pressure in Paris and the news of unrest in Syria—unrest that, with the postponement of the Turkish Treaty and the multiplication of rumours, propoganda, and conspiracies which more and more disquieted Jews and Arabs alike, reached the point in April, 1919, of threatened anti-Jewish and anti-Allied outbreaks all over the Arabian and Mohammedan world. This added to the anxieties of the Zionists. And the event that the word of this unrest particularly impressed the experts of the American delegation charged with the definition of the settlement of the Near East did not help to lessen it. Nor did the way in which spying-out commissions were planned and their personnel was changed again and again. The commission that finally did go was by no means favourably disposed, but very sensitive to missionary interests. The upshot of its investigations was a recommendation still unpublished and contrary to the best judgment of the American

experts on the subject at the Peace Conference. This recommendation was not in favour of Jewish Palestine.

So the Peace Conference dragged on. By the time the Treaty of Versailles was signed, the terms of a Jewish Palestine had been outlined on paper, verbal pledges had been given and taken, but nothing definitive had been accomplished. A Turkish treaty had been drafted but its terms were far from established, and the time of its presentation to the Turks seemed indefinitely remote. The Peace Conference disbanded with the bulk of its work still to do. The Zionists returned to their respective countries, fed on air, promise-crammed. The enthusiastic certainty of the war-time had been modified by the experience of the peace-making into anxious and watchful expectancy. It was apparent that if the powers were going to throw overboard any of the causes they had espoused under the lash of war needs the cause of the Jews would be the first to go. Nevertheless, the Zionists, particularly the American Zionists, proceeded with their work and plans as if the Jewish Homeland in Palestine were a foregone conclusion. They proceeded on the assumption that the war had vindicated for all times the rights of small nationalities and that covenants, particularly the open covenants openly arrived at, between great powers and such nationalities never again would, nor could, be scraps of paper. It was an imaginative and courageous assumption, a fine and bold act of faith. There was perhaps also an element of despair in it. And it is difficult to say whether, in this instance of the process of group contacts and interaction, the faith, as is so often the case in matters social and psychological, did not create its own verification.



## CHAPTER XIV

### FROM VERSAILLES TO SAN REMO—THE BASIC CONFLICT

**THAT** the treaties signed at Versailles brought not peace, but more war; that they intensified the unrest, misery, and disintegration of all the countries of Europe which were affected by them; that they were in essence an act of dishonesty, a jockeying of solemn pledges to a beaten enemy—these have become commonplaces of liberal and humanist discussion of the terms of peace. The stupidity of these terms was, in liberal opinion, profounder than even their malevolence. By means of them, as Mr. Maynard Keynes has unanswerably shown and events have sufficiently proved, the governments of the allied and associated powers cut off their noses to spite their faces. It would be as easy as it is thankless to analyze the behaviour and to apportion the guilt of the statesmen responsible. No doubt the guilt is sure and the responsibility ineluctable: the character, temperament, knowledge, and wisdom of these men must be counted, no less than many other things, as efficient causes in the ultimate result, and must bear their share of the iniquity of the outcome.

But they were not the basic causes nor the important causes. Certainly, more intelligence and less self-deception on the part of Mr. Wilson, more honesty and less flexibility on the part of Mr. Lloyd George,

more knowledge and less vindictiveness on the part of M. Clemenceau, would have given the outcome a different turn and the consequent trend of events in Europe a more hopeful and cheerier direction. Certainly, had any operative factor in the peace-making been other than it was, the peace and its consequences would have been other. When that has been said, all has been said—and nothing. For the significant thing with regard to any discussion of the making of that peace is not the speculation of how it might have been different but the understanding of what were the forces which made it what it was. Of these forces the men who formulated the peace were but the last terms and expressions, the channels, the contact points; in themselves—like the straw that broke the camel's back—of no weight to speak of, but piled on top of all the rest cataclysmal.

Now the tendency which is above designated as “all the rest” constituted what has already been pointed to as a diminishing, not an expanding phase of social change. It is the tendency which in making for political democracy made also for financial imperialism. We have seen how the process of this democracy began with the philosophy of natural rights as compensation in idea for the inequalities of the dynastic state, and how in the history of European politics it took the form of the degradation of monarchical power and its displacement by popular power to be ultimately organized in the mode of parliamentarism on the basis of manhood suffrage. The philosophy of natural rights and its implicated political ideals could hardly have possessed the force and duration which are their properties if they had not rested in something more substantial

than the passion of resentment and the mechanism of emotional compensation. They were, as a matter of fact, expressive as well as compensatory, and what they expressed were the abilities and self-sufficiency of an ordinary family under an economy prevailingly agricultural. This is the central and coercive fact regarding the "democracy" for which the Great War was to make the world safe. Implanted in Europe and in America by the force of two revolutions—the one in the British colonies of North America and the one in France—it set the "sovereign nation" of farmer-citizens against the "sovereign king," government by consent against government by authority, representation of the masses of electors against direct control by the classes. The masses were mostly peasants—farmers and agricultural labourers; the classes were mostly landlords, and oftener than not, of alien race. What lay between them and kept generating their conflict and its cataclysms was the land. The vital need which the whole natural-right philosophy with its nationalist-democratic politics expressed and served was the need for land. The modern "democracy" which integrated and incarnated them came into existence as the popular political embodiment of an elementary economy of agriculture wherein the ostensible unit of political action was the freeholding agricultural worker, living with his family off his land through toil or through rent or both. In America there was any amount of free land to be had for the taking; in France, even as recently in Russia, the revolution became effective and irrevocable, with the expropriation of the feudal landlord and the redistribution of the land to the peasantry. In England and the rest of Europe, however, the recovery of the

land by the people was slower and more doubtful. Its culmination in the former country was interfered with by the war, and the war seems to have been set going on the continent, in order, among other purposes, to forestall its initiation there.

The social processes called democracy were, however, no sooner set up than they were crossed and crowded by new ideas and new processes deriving from a new economy. The new economy is the economy of industry. Under it the farmer or landowner does not live upon the soil he owns and draw his living direct from it. The working of the soil is merely subordinated to the operations of the mill or factory and may go on in areas very far removed from these—across continents, in foreign lands, in colonies, and so on. The soil produces only “raw material” which is transferred to the industrial plant where the mass of men and women, working at great machines, serve together to change it into the finished product. Mostly, these men and women neither own nor rent land; they neither own nor otherwise are secure in their dwelling-places; they neither own nor lease the tools and machinery which their skill alone can keep from being just so much junk. Compared with the agricultural worker they are nomads. Subject to unemployment, they move from place to place according to the exigencies of machine production. Compared with the agricultural worker, miserable though he may be, they lack both stability and freedom. Willy-nilly, no one of them is in himself anything as an economic unit. Each shares with all his fellows, in the most intimate way, the interest in the land from which comes the material he works on; the interest in the machine he works it with,

the interest in the men and women who are his fellow workers at the machine. For a shortage of raw material, a defect in the machine, a failure of any one worker in his part of the industrial process jeopardizes the livelihood of all. The automatic machine forces all who are productively related to it into an integral community wherein collective possession and free coöperative collaboration are inevitably indicated. They begin as the labour union and other modes of workman associations; it is not yet clear in what form they will culminate.

Thus, at the same time that the democracy which is the political aspect of the older agricultural economy was winning its slow and precarious way against feudalism and monarchism, the economy of industry was displacing and profoundly modifying the agricultural scheme. But while democracy was dislocating the feudal overlord politically through suffrage, it entrenched him economically through industry. For he alone—bar a small aggregation of bankers and merchants, who used to be largely his factors and agents, and who became his partners during the industrialization of society—was ever possessed of a surplus of capital large enough to use for making the automatic machine and putting it to work. The central fact of the domestic economy of the western world during the nineteenth century became thus the interplay of the governing ideas of political democracy with the situation created by the swift and uneven spread of the industrial economy. Through this interplay, population became urbanized; the serf became the citizen; the peasant, the proletarian; the landlord became the investor, and the factor, the banker and manager;

foreign lands ceased to be places to loot, as in the past, and became sources of raw material and markets for finished goods. Through this interplay political democracy became a direct and efficient cause of financial imperialism. Europe became and the whole world tended to become, a unified single economic mechanism, dominated by a separatist political ideology. Soon it grew apparent that the victories of democracy in politics brought with them no modification in the economic supremacy of privilege. Capitalism developed into merely the feudalism of industry: it replaced the overlord's direct control of politics by an indirect or invisible control. Reaction against it took form as the new system of ideas embodying the programme of life which is generally called socialism. This spread as a gospel while democracy was taking root as an institution.

The scope and extent of these curiously interlacing processes, usually called capitalism, was contingent on a variety of factors that kept coming together in ironic and often in grotesque combinations. Among these factors alone the inertia of habit and tradition stands out. Highly industrialized countries like England, where the use of machinery had overtaken and outdistanced democracy, seemed, prior to the war, in all basic essentials untouched by the doctrine; yet what happened during the war and since shows how deeply and imperceptibly the automatic machine had altered the habits and outlook of Englishmen, and with it their attitude toward their country's political organization. Almost exclusively agricultural states like Russia, whose political pattern was very nearly mediæval, underwent revolution predominantly under

the impulsion of a communistic socialism, to emerge, if reports of observers may be trusted, as France emerged from her revolution, secure in the change only through a redistribution of land such as would make inexorably for a political rather than a social democracy, and undergoing socialization, therefore, by means of autocratic force. Germany, next to England the most industrialized country in the world, and without exception the most purposively organized, develops a socialist party which functions politically as a democratic opposition to a powerful monarchy with feudal traditions, and which becomes, in the light of socialist ideology, reactionary once it gets established in power by a revolution brought on through external, not internal, causes. In the United States, a country half industrial, half agricultural, whose surpluses are still very considerable, Socialism as an ideology is irrelevant and tangential, even trade-union organization is elementary, the Socialist Party is the merest party of protest; yet revolutionary modifications of the political structure of the country take place (such as the growth of executive power, or the creation of commissions like the Interstate Commerce Commission), compelled by the reshaping pressure of the automatic machine on the habits of men's lives and the organization of their society.

And so on. Not a country in the world wherein dwell considerable numbers of men but its economy has undergone alteration in noticeable ways by the existence and increase of machinery. Nevertheless, such alterations have for the most part been unconscious, reflexive, forced, rather than conscious and voluntary, matters of automatic response rather than of planned control,

and the theory of life envisaging their purport and direction has functioned as protest rather than programme. It has not yet attained that successful incarnation without which nothing gets recognized as respectable. Its protagonists still lack the prestige of an "integral victory," just as the protagonists of political democracy lacked it at the beginning of the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the twentieth the latter have it, and their minds, therefore, apprehend righteousness as nothing else than the ideology of this democracy.

With such variations as differences of inheritance, setting, and experience of necessity impose, the men who possessed the supreme power in the making of the peace were subjected to the domination of the democratic ideology and to the conditions whereby it is respectable. When the Treaty of Vienna was signed and the Holy Alliance established as a union of "the ruling princes of Europe into a religious brotherhood pledged to guide themselves wholly by Christian principles," a similar situation obtained with respect to a less secular body of maxims which had also become respectable. Circumstances, particularly the swelling tide of political democracy, compelled the coupling of Christian principles with Machiavellian practices, just as after the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain democratic principles got coupled with star-chamber practices. The statesmen who promoted the practices declared them necessary to preserve the principles. Even when they knew better, they could not help themselves. They were frightened—frightened of Bolshevism. Old men all of them, past the prime of life, their minds had grown up and the pat-



tern of their political thinking had got fixed in the days "when the political democracy which was establishing itself still stood sufficiently firm upon the agricultural economy which is its foundation. Their lives had been spent in the contemplation and manipulation of the ideology and institutions of this democracy. To the new conditions created by the growth of industry under machine operation they deferred only as they were compelled to. The labour movement as distinguished from the political movement was to them an obstruction, not the basis of an ideal. They crushed it when they could and compromised with it when they had to. They did everything to it except understand it. For understanding it they had become too old. Their habits of attention and action—like those of their generation who made and ruled the war—had become fixed, and what they performed habitually and spontaneously was irrelevant to the new conditions which were displacing and rendering obsolescent the political forms wherewith they were preoccupied. So far as their relations to the real conditions of social growth were concerned, they were functioning in a vacuum. Prevailingly, it is this organization of mind that these old men carried over to the peace table: this that has governed their framing of the covenant of international polity and their ordination of a new international system. They framed the most that they were able to frame. They framed a mere reproduction of the pattern of the national polity of industrial states."<sup>1</sup> That they did this under the impulsion of many other motives as well—Wilson's fear of Bolshevism and blinding obsession with the League,

<sup>1</sup>Cf. Elisha Friedman: "America and the New Era," pp. 73-74.

Clemenceau's militarist imperialism,<sup>1</sup> Lloyd George's wish to seem to try to keep his election pledges, Orlando's to mitigate the opposition at home, the wish of the three Europeans to transfer to the erstwhile enemy the burden of meeting the costs of the war and the indebtedness of the peace—is incidental. The treaties imposed upon the Germans and the Austrians, the treaties delivered to the lesser and the newer states—such as Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia—all speak the language of democracy and impose the regulations of imperialism. They seek to ordain, in terms of exclusive national sovereignties, reciprocal, non-national, economic relationships. They are consequently implicated in an inevitable self-defeating duplexity which may indifferently be interpreted as the hypocrisy and insincerity of the members of the Council of Four, as Mr. Maynard Keynes thinks, or as the dilemma inherent in the conflict between the ideology of the peace and its effective conditions. One of two things must, in the course of the next few years, inevitably happen: Either Europe will revert to the agricultural economy consistent with the ideology of its dominating covenant, in the process of the reversion undergoing decimation and moral and intellectual retrogression through the horrors of starvation and the terrors of revolution, or the process of conscious economic integration which the war compelled<sup>2</sup> will be under-

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<sup>1</sup>Even Mr. Wilson recognized this. "Through the sessions of the Conference in Paris," he wrote to Senator Hitchcock, March 8, 1920, "it was evident that a militaristic party, under the most influential leadership, was seeking to gain ascendancy in the councils of France. They were defeated there but are in control now."

<sup>2</sup>*Cf.* H. M. Kallen, "The League of Nations Today and Tomorrow."

taken again, on an all-inclusive European, ultimately a world-wide, scale. From the conference at Versailles to the conference at San Remo the former alternative dominated. Since San Remo there have been indications, in the altered attitude toward Germany and in the activities of the League of Nations looking toward an international economic conference, of a movement in the direction of the latter alternative.

## CHAPTER XV

### FROM VERSAILLES TO SAN REMO—THE CONFLICT IN RUSSIA AND AMERICA

THE outstanding index of the compulsion of events toward sanity has been the changing attitude toward Russia. Such industrialization as had been effected in Russia prior to the revolution had been effected sporadically, in isolated spots, and mostly through foreign capital and management. The bulk of it was concentrated on her western frontier, in those areas which have since become parts of Poland and the other new states. The economy of Russia is still prevalingly agricultural. Prior to the war she was the source of food and raw materials to her industrialized neighbours. Industry modified her economy mostly in terms of transport; not only her traffic with other communities, but the development and exploitation of her extraordinarily rich and varied natural resources depended on that. Transport was an outstanding concern of the Tsarist government; it remains the outstanding concern of the Soviet Republic. Even without adequate transport an isolated Russia could, for many years, be economically self-sufficient: her level of organization would be comparatively low and simple and under the stress of the revolutionary ideology, would tend to realize the ideals of democracy of the eighteenth century. The Allied blockade against her hence

succeeded only in killing hundreds of thousands of innocent non-combatants in cities by keeping from them the tools and materials with which they were used to make articles of exchange with the country and by withholding necessary medicines; otherwise it served simply as a tonic to Soviet morale. The Soviet government could have survived under it longer than those of the other European countries; as Signor Nitti admitted, they needed foodstuffs and raw materials far more than Russia needed locomotives. But their policy was based on considerations very different from the economic. It was based first of all on the hope and wish to recover for the financial imperialists the pre-revolutionary investments and concessions and their rich profits; and, secondly, on a moral panic manifested in symbols of the democratic ideology. This panic was in Europe the panic of the investing and privileged classes; only in America did it infect—under the influence of malefic propaganda, it is true—the majority of the people. In Europe, the sentiment of the majority of the people opposed it—particularly the sentiment of organized labour—and finally took practical expression in the refusal to transport ammunitions for use against the Soviet armies. The excess of this ammunition over the needs of the Great War was itself a controlling factor in the prolongation of the war of the Allied governments upon Russia. The adventures of Kolchak, Denikine, Judenitch, Wrangel, and Pilsudki would not have been so lightly undertaken without it.

That they were undertaken at all, moreover, was a symptom of confusion and uncertainty, rather than of well-planned and executed policy on the part of the

Entente. The social personality known as the Russian Soviet Republic had become a baffling, obscure, and impudent thing, a very *enfant terrible* of politics. In its foreign relations its government exhibited a candour and realism, a shameless frankness of statement very embarrassing to the tradition and practice of unflinching mendacity normal to Allied diplomacy. It had assumed the championship of the rights of man; it repudiated annexations and indemnities; it practised open diplomacy, it preached and sought peace; it professed and practised the doctrine of self-determination. It warred by propaganda even more than by arms; seeking alliance with subject peoples in the east, appealing to peoples against governments in the west. And its practices squared with its professions, as an examination of its treaties with the Baltic States will show.

How much of the war propaganda was due to doctrinal fanaticism and how much to the exigencies of its position cannot be seriously estimated. Its position held and holds inherent contradictions which must be resolved if Russia is to survive as a communist republic. These contradictions were implicated in the irrelevance of the Socialist ideology to the prevailing agricultural economy. The practical necessities of administration had compelled very extensive accommodations of doctrine to the circumstances, habits, social traditions, and personal trends of the peasant masses. The security of the government rested primarily upon the fact that it was the guarantee that the redistribution of the land was final; secondarily upon the pressure from external enemies. Domestic policy, directed by these two facts, developed as the auto-

cratic régime of a party. Liberty was the least of its concerns, equality the greatest; effort was applied to reducing to a minimum the economic differences between the citizens of the Soviet Republic; all other differences were ignored, and those in conflict with the equalitarian programme were repressed. Thus anti-Semitism has been practically rooted out in Soviet Russia, and barring the provocative action of fanatical Jewish "internationalists," Jews have been able to go their own way as Jews in no less peace and security than other Russians of the non-proletarian classes.

At the same time education was organized to establish both in adults and in children—in children particularly—as firm a faith in the Socialist ideology as had ever obtained in the Christian. The new generation has been the overruling object of constructive regard in Soviet domestic policy.

But faith without works is a danger and a dream. The hope for a genuine communism for the generation to come, Lenine recognized, lies not in the mere alteration of the ideas of the Russian people; it lies far more fundamentally in the establishment of the institutional conditions which control and direct ideas and generate and confirm the habits whereby institutions keep going. The industrialization of Russia is essential to the success of communism in Russia; it must be ready for the new generation which grows up. This, accordingly, had to become the constructive aim of Russian foreign policy. To accomplish this aim it is indispensable that the economic relations between Russia and the industrial states shall be restored as soon as possible. Lenine, perhaps more than any other statesman in Europe,

realizes the organic character of modern industrial civilization: he accepts boldly and frankly the inevitability of industrialization and he is eager, as his sardonic statements show, to initiate as swiftly as possible the exchange of "socialistic wheat for capitalistic locomotives," which is the first step. He is ready to make extensive concessions for the sake of the swift expansion of machine industry in Russia. Hence military oppression and militant propaganda in the east are accompanied with offers of all sorts of concessions and agreements in the west. There is every indication that the former are carried on to enable the Soviet Republic to add to the weight of the latter as items of exchange in return for recognition and trade.

Now the commerce which would come to Russia as a result of an adjustment with the Allies would mitigate in a considerable degree a certain monopoly of the same now enjoyed in Europe by the United States. Whether the attitude of the American Government toward Soviet Russia has not largely been influenced by this fact would be a matter of curious speculation. The irony of the whole international situation lies in the major rôle which perhaps the most disinterested and powerful, the most naïve and idealistic as well as the wealthiest state in the world has played in the making of it. Such democratic and abstractly philanthropic trends as were apparent in the negotiations beginning with the armistice were more immediately the outcome of the attitude of the government of the United States. The eighteenth-century humanitarianism, the anti-monarchism, the republicanism, the deference to majorities, and the pacifism which are characteristic of the democratic ideology were, in



fact, the operative sentiment of American public opinion with regard to the peace. The cordial attitude toward the first phases of the revolution in Russia, the dissolution of the central empires and the establishment of the aggregation of more or less democratic republics in their stead, the guarantees of the rights of national minorities, the pacific and philanthropic items of the covenant of the League of Nations, all expressed the positive traditional sentiment of the American people. But they looked backward rather than forward, and because they looked backward they enabled the American senate to play politics with the treaty without fear of public opinion, and they worked as disintegrating and anarchic rather than saving influences upon the organization of Europe.

The American retrospection was inherent and inevitable. It was a symptom of the strain created by the existence of a growing industrial economy under a fundamental law resting on agricultural foundations. The community had, since 1900, been drifting, without any definite conscious direction, a confusion and a tumult. No real political issues divided it into real parties, no economic classes had gained stability and tradition enough to give body to a class alignment. The only unfailing force in the remodeling of the national life was the much-used, but in its social effects altogether unstudied, automatic machine. National political thought looked, as a result, backward, to the lucid and articulate past, to the Constitution and the Fathers. It was motivated by memory rather than the present urgencies to which memory had become irrelevant. Unrest grew, in spite of prosperity, often because of it—and the end is

not yet. The country grew sick of a neurasthenia from which the various "progressive" movements were interesting and inefficacious efforts at relief. The war did bring a degree of relief—unhappily temporary. It could do so not because it required meeting a common enemy, but because it compelled political thought and administrative organization to pay conscientious attention to new and constant factors in the national life which had caused the conflicts of habit and feeling wherein consisted the national nervousness. From the time these factors came out into the open a tendency toward a rearrangement of the lines of force of the national life has been manifest. War production with its accompanying financial inflation has strengthened this tendency. The artificially created war psychology has strengthened it. The transference since the armistice of the war animus from the Germans to the Russians, and the manifestations of Mr. Palmer's Okhrana and the "red hysteria" were symptoms of it. For the rest, the public mind lost sight of Europe altogether. League of Nations or no League of Nations, the habitual American ideology had been realized through the war: America had grown tired of foreign entanglements; public attention turned inward to the issues of industrial conflict, high prices, and such, consideration of which, as a matter of fact, the war had interrupted. The only regard for matters alien which did survive survived in the form of persecuting animosity toward anybody or anything strange and different, usually called at the time "Bolshevik." An Americanization craze, whose typical symptom is the concept "100% American," exfoliated out of the red hysteria and Palmerism. The Constitution was

treated as a fetish and Socialism as a devil. And the while the President was lying helpless on his bed with a clot on his brain, and the members of his bureaucracy either marked time, like the Department of the Interior or held high jinks, like the Department of Justice.

Oblivious of Europe though America was, so far as the country's pertinent feeling and efficacious attention were concerned, Europe was kept present to the American mind in two ways. First (and most significantly because of the political importance of their votes) by the poignant personal interest of great groups of American citizens of central and east European extraction in the fate of their friends and relatives on that unhappy continent. This interest coalesced with the traditional humanitarianism of the American mind and imparted to the philanthropy of various American private relief organizations a certain political import. This import was, however, more sentimental than practical. It bore directly upon the second way in which Europe was kept before the American public—namely, upon the romantic interest of the ethnic groups in the political forms of the new sovereign states and enfranchised nationalities of central Europe. This interest was reënforced by diplomatic emissaries, propagandists, emigrés, and agents and military heroes of Allied governments, particularly of France. They constructed for the admiration of the American public a pure image of the new democracies, their political forms somehow flattering imitations of the American, bravely struggling to hold their own and to “protect civilization from the menace of Bolshevism”; impoverished, starved, of course, and in dire need of

generous assistance, but assistance to be given as money loans to governments, not as the economic rehabilitation of peoples. The realities of the controlling economic correlations were nowhere and at no time in the picture. The starvation and misery of the populations were in no way connected with them, nor was there any realization of the mutual implications of political reconciliation and generosity with economic rehabilitation. Mr. Hoover, on the record, might have brought these realities into the picture, but got befooled and diverted by the politics of the coming presidential campaign.

## CHAPTER XVI

### FROM VERSAILLES TO SAN REMO—THE CONFLICT IN POLAND, THE UKRAINE, HUNGARY, AND RUMANIA

**MISLEADING** as were the pictures offered to America of all the new states, the picture of Poland was most particularly so. The reason is not far to seek. Poland had been designed to become the fulcrum of the new hegemony of the continent by which harassed and almost bankrupt French imperialism hoped to evade taxation at home, to collect its debts abroad, and at the same time to insure itself against possible German rivalry and actual and well-deserved Russian animosity. That Poland was chosen and not the much more competent Czecho-Slovakia is due to precisely the reasons which render Poland an ineffectual means to such an end. It is due to the difference in the intelligence of the leadership, the difference between Masaryk and Dmowski or Pilsudski. Poland, like Russia, had been until late in the nineteenth century without a middle class of its own ethnic stock. From the beginning until practically the 1890's Poland was a state composed of feudal landlords, Catholic clergy, and peasant villeins. The landlords constituted an upper class of petty autocrats who lived mostly on their estates and devoted their days to hunting, fighting, intrigue, debauchery, and Jew-baiting. The economic work of the state was performed by the peasants. Its administration,

manufactures, and commerce were delegated to these same baited Jews and to German immigrant bourgeois. These constituted what it needed of a middle class. They were, for obvious reasons, a middle class without the rights and powers of the middle class of other European states. They were able to offer no effective restriction or opposition to the profligate perversities of the *Shlakhta* and the government which it constituted. Powers<sup>1</sup> says:

Historic Poland was a signal failure. No government in Europe during the last thousand years has a record for more marked incompetency. Under the leadership of truly great sovereigns, the provincialism and local selfishness of the people proved obdurate to every appeal, even in the face of the most unmistakable national dangers. If ever a nation perished because it was unfit to live, that nation was Poland.

The partition which, on the whole, brought a measure of relief to the Polish masses created a grievance for the classes, and outside of Galicia, which had gone to Catholic Austria, for the clergy. On the grievances of these two estates Polish nationalism was built. It would have been impotent but for the oppressive measures of Prussification and Russification of the other two participants in the partition. Because of those, the religious loyalties and the rudimentary cultural development of the Polish people received acceleration and intensification; the upper class, living either on its estates or in exile, but living always in idleness or adventure, became the protagonists of an idealized nationalist fantasy and the teachers and leaders of rebellion.

<sup>1</sup> "The Great Peace," p. 290.

Meanwhile, the Jews continued to function as the Polish middle class. When the edge of the wave of industrialization reached as far as eastern Europe they were conspicuously the first to succumb to it. Together with Germans and Russians from the trading centres of Russia they created in Poland what was a great part of the industrial development of the Russian Empire. A town-dwelling people from the outset, they became the foundation of the proletarian industrial population of Poland, and constitute a very large part of it. The things they produced were sold in Russia, and the outstanding fact about industrial Poland has been its economic interdependence with Russia. The influences which generated a socialist attitude toward life in intellectual Russia generated the same attitude among the Poles, with this difference—that in Russia it was atheistic, universalist, and revolutionary, in Poland it was Catholic, nationalist, and rebellious. It took form among the proletarianized Poles as the Polish Socialist Party, among the Jews as the General Association (Bund) of Jewish Workingmen. The Romanist-nationalist character of the former was reflected in the somewhat milder nationalistic outlook of the latter. Both were opposed by the National Democratic Party, whose interests and leadership were entirely those of the baronial *Shlakhta* and the land-owning peasantry. The differences between the two Polish parties separated them less than their common anti-Semitism united them. The more intellectual among them demanded of the Jews complete Polonization while, at the same time, they denounced the Russians for a similar demand for the Russification of the Poles. For the quarter of a century preceding

the war the Jews were used politically as pawns and stalking-horses of the religious nationalism of the Poles and the cultural imperialism of the Russians. When, under the influence of industrialization, the landed aristocracy began to become an investing class and traces of a Polish middle class became apparent, the Polonizing movement took the form of an economic boycott, which aiming at the "polonization of commerce" drove the Jews still more definitely into industry. The initiator of the policy was an anti-Semitic candidate for the Duma who had been defeated by the Jewish vote—Roman Dmowski, the head of the National Democratic Party, and later head of the Polish National Committee in Paris.

When the war came this party adopted a philo-Russian and pro-Ally policy; under this policy its anti-Semitism took the form of pro-German accusations against the Jews. The Polish Party, headed by Pilsudski, adopted an attitude of militant pro-Germanism, with the view of using opportunity as it might arise for the advantage of Polish independence. The German occupation of Poland soon provided such an opportunity. The government that was then established, the constitution that was adopted, and such protection that the Germans gave was a protection to the powers of that party. Anti-Semitism during the period took the form of pro-Russian accusations against the Jews. When, finally, the Germans were turned out, and it became apparent that the Dmowski-Paderewski-Grabski combination had outguessed the Pilsudski-Kuchzarewski crowd, there was some uncertainty as to whether any sort of peace could be patched up between the parties. The baronial-



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clericalist National Democratic Committee had the ear and the good-will of the Allies, particularly of France; the Polish Socialist Party and Pilsudski had the sympathy of the Polish townsmen and tenant peasantry. The government which was finally created was a compromise: Pilsudski received the presidency and Dmowski, Paderewski, and company received the power. The new rulers of Poland thus are all men of the ancient régime, whose habits of mind are imperialistic and codes of behaviour feudal. Among them was an individual who as an official of the Austrian Empire had as much to do as any one with precipitating the Great War.

Poland, independent once more, was restored into the hands of the class which had lost her her freedom. It was this class which unwillingly signed the Treaty of Versailles. It had learned nothing and had forgotten nothing. Its ideal is mediæval Poland. It still lives on warfare, Jew-baiting, and vainglory. Incompetent to put its house in order, to face the realities of a genuine reconstruction, its imperialistic aggression aroused the bitter enmity of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and then proceeded to draw the usual red herring across its track by charging the Jews with Bolshevism, by permitting—if not inciting—and condoning pogroms, and by lying about them under investigation. From the reports brought back both by Mr. Henry Morgenthau and Sir Stuart Samuel the inference is inescapable that the Polish Government, in the interests of the class which it represents, is sabotaging the treaty upon which Polish independence is conditioned. It is sabotaging the treaty knowingly and with impunity, for the League of Nations is aborted,

and the hands of the Great Powers are bound. Meanwhile, although grudging economic reforms were grudgingly enacted, they were not enforced; starvation and disease were as extensive among the masses as was luxury among the classes; discontent became so intense as to require a more adventurous and less-habitual safety-valve than Jew-baiting. The obvious one was the traditional high moral business of defending the marches of civilization—now against Soviet Russia, as once against the Turks. So there was launched a brazen and merry war of unmitigated aggression in the interests of the land-barons who had holdings beyond the boundaries of ethnographic Poland. Its spirit is an inflated nationalism which misery and disaster must inevitably explode. Its sinews are the military and financial charity of France and England and the United States. Its victim is the one country upon whose markets the rehabilitation of Poland and her development as an industrial state most of all depends. The will of Poland to fight Russia depends on the survival of *Shlakhta* control; the strength of Poland to fight Russia depends upon either French suzerainty or commerce with Russia; and commerce with Soviet Russia is bound to mitigate if not to abolish *Shlakhta* rule and to render war between Poland and Russia progressively more difficult. French imperialism has played very stupidly in eastern Europe. It has played stupidly because it has ignored, wilfully, the conditions upon which strength depends in an industrialized world.

The extraordinary blindness of the imperialistic policy for central Europe has been even more conspicuous in the fate of Little Russia or Ukrainia. This

unhappy land was conceived of, together with Poland, as a principal instrument in the establishment of the Gallic hegemony of the continent. Victim, until the successful Chmelnitzki uprising, of the traditional practices of the Polish overlordship, it united, as insurance against the repetition of the terrible Polish exploitation, with Great Russia, in 1654. Only eastern Galicia, with its six million Ruthenians, remained in Polish hands, and passed at the partition under the dominion of the Austrian crown. Bitterly inimical to the Poles by tradition, although closer to them than to the Russo-Ruthenians in religion (they are Uniate Roman Catholics) the Ruthenians of Galicia, with the encouragement of the Austrian Government, retained and developed their linguistic and cultural traditions and their nationalist aspirations. During the war they became the agents and centre of German anti-Russian propaganda in Ukraina, and of Russian anti-German propaganda in Galicia. They acquiesced in the German project of a united and autonomous Ukraina under Austrian hegemony. This project was to some degree carried out. An independent Ukraina, protected by German arms, was in fact established under the Hetman Skoropadski, and the recognition of this independence was exacted in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Treaty of Versailles having abrogated the arrangements of Brest-Litovsk, the Ruthenians of Galicia, instead of being joined with their own people of the Ukraine, fell again under the dominion of the Poles, unsecured by anything except the inefficacious provisions regarding the security and freedom of national minorities. In Ukraina proper Skoropadski was displaced by Petliura. And then the shattering of that unhappy land began.

A wide alluvial plain, watered by three great rivers, Ukraina is one of the granaries of Europe. Like the larger part of Poland it is flat land, without natural barriers. The population is mostly a peasantry, who at various times have been members or victims of the Cossack bands. The cities—Kiev, Kishinev, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, Odessa—all have a very large Jewish population. Prior to the war, there were in all about 3,000,000 Jews in this very considerable and important portion of the old Russian Empire. There, also, they composed economically the commercial and industrial class. Politically, they were, after Versailles, subjected to the traditional use of pawns in the political game that was being played out in the Ukraine.

The motives in the game were the anti-Bolshevism of the Allies, the mediæval imperialism of the Poles, and the nationalism of the Ukrainian National Council. This nationalism expressed itself in the government of Petliura—the so-called Directorate—and took force in an army made up largely of demobilized peasants and *khlops*. The anti-Bolshevism of the Allies had for its instrument the reactionary government and volunteer army of Denikine. This person and his pretensions were hated by the Ukrainian *khlops* even more than the Poles. Hence, when in January, 1919, Petliura's forces were defeated by the armies of the Soviet Republic, the Ukrainian population was disposed to welcome the Soviet régime in spite of the hardships of an imposed communism. Petliura's troops, meanwhile, broke up into bands, each under a Hetman, and proceeded—not without an understanding with what had escaped of the Petliura government into Galicia—to ravage the unarmed Jewish populations

in the cities and villages. The justification offered was the claim that the Jews were Bolsheviks and that they were responsible for the defeat of the Petliura forces at the hands of the Soviet Republic. A proclamation of the Hetman Simchenko called for "death for the old because they brought up Bolsheviks; death to the women for having brought them into the world; death to the children so that they may not grow up into Bolsheviks!"

To the Jews, the Ukraine of 1920 reduplicated the Ukraine of 1648. By July of that year there had been 2,000 pogroms; 259,000 Jews had been killed, 250,000 more had died of causes related to the pogroms; innumerable capital levies had been made, houses and streets destroyed and towns raided. The Jews had been reduced to a condition of terror and disintegration without parallel even in their own history. In this reduction, the policy and army of Denikine had a rôle no less murderously distinguished. Nor did the Poles fail to live up to the standards set by their religious traditions and secular practices. With a claim to East Galicia of the most mythical sort, they established themselves in Lemberg by force, precipitating immediately their old conflict with the Ruthenians (who insisted on their solidarity with the Ukraine), organizing and encouraging pogroms. When Petliura, desperate, invited the alliance of the Poles in return for the recognition of their claims to East Galicia, the Ruthenians repudiated him for Denikine. But they found Denikine intolerable, and in the end returned to Petliura, who meanwhile, calling upon the hetmans of the various bands to rejoin him, marched with Pilsudski into Kiev. The ultimate victory of the

Soviet Republic is a foregone conclusion. The reincorporation of *Ukrainia*, or an intimate economic union between the Soviet Republic and an autonomous *Ukrainia*, is a foregone conclusion. By the vigour of its military discipline, by its adequate police and sanitary measures, by the security it assures to life, and within the limits of its rigid equalitarian programme, to property, the Republic has made itself the least disagreeable of the political alternatives to all sections of the population of the Ukraine.

But the most ironic consequences of the peace and its administration are to be seen in Hungary. Invaded after the conclusion of the armistice of November 4, 1918, by Serbian, Czecho-Slovak, and Rumanian armies, only five of her sixty-three counties were free of enemy occupation. This occupation rendered impossible elections for a constituent assembly, and cut off the great city of Buda-Pesth, her population more than doubled by refugees, from medicine, fuels, raw materials, and food. Protests to Paris were of no avail. The Karolyi government, postulated upon the Wilsonian policy, found itself unable to withstand the attacks of monarchists and counter-revolutionaries on the one hand and communists on the other. Hungary, like Poland, with which it has great religious and moral kinship, had in the course of the preceding generation been undergoing industrialization. With industrialization had come an intellectual revival in which the centre of Hungarian attention shifted from a rather narrow and turbid clericalist nationalism to a Europeanism like that of the more European and western peoples.

The leaders in this "Western" movement had been, numerous and conspicuously, "Hungarians of Jewish

blood," who constitute a very large portion of the middle and intellectual class of the land. With the Jewish communities of Hungary from which they sprang they had nothing whatsoever to do. Assimilated and passionate Magyars, they figured as conspicuously in the industrial and political movements that were the correlates of the literary, as they did in the literary. Under the Hapsburgs, the journals they edited, and the groups and parties they led and instructed, developed into centres of liberal and radical opposition. When, because of the stress of the failure of the Karolyi government to meet the situation created by the bad faith of the Supreme Council and its agents, the movement toward Communism began, it began naturally in connection with these journals and organizations. Neither political nor military action was able to quash the movement. Deportation of Bolshevik agitators—ordered by the French—did not reduce it; nor did imprisonment reduce it. Demobilized soldiers without jobs, workmen unemployed because the Allied blockade cut off raw materials and fuel, agricultural labourers driven to town by the enemy occupation flocked to the Soviet standards. Even the attempt at calling elections—in spite of the difficulty created by the occupation—and passing agrarian reforms failed to stem the tide. The communist revolution in Hungary was the result of a general mass-movement and expressive of the will of the Hungarian people.

The government this revolution established was a dictatorship not purely communist—it was a coalition between the communists and the social democrats. It avoided, as well as it could, the errors of the Russian Soviet Republic. It tried to upset as little as possible

the going economy of the country. Of course, it expropriated those who lived on rent, profits, and interest, and sought to put them to work. But it kept in its own employ the managements of the industries and of the great estates; it recognized and rewarded individual superiorities in capacity and responsibility; and it planned to couple with the gradual democratization of agriculture and industry the Taylor system and piece work. It gave the same passionate attention to the education of the masses as the Russian Government, and it honoured and rewarded the teachers by assigning them the highest salaries allowable under the constitution, salaries equal to those of the members of the government themselves.

Its most difficult stumbling-block was the same as in Russia—the peasants and the peasant psychology. Mainly tenantry or agricultural workers on great estates, entirely under the dominion of an illiterate and intriguing Roman Catholic clergy, suffused with anti-Semitism, these peasants were eager to possess the land, but were not eager to communize its management and control. The government of Bela Kun tried to deal with them as tactfully as possible. It refrained from “socializing” the small farmers. It worked the large estates in the old way but with a new morale. It looked to education and the lapse of time to effect the desired modifications in the mentality of this mass of the population too great to be coerced and too slow-witted to be convinced. General Smuts, sent from Paris to survey the situation, reported himself “well-impressed.”

The fact was, that the government of Bela Kun was making an experiment, within the limits of reasonable



control, in easing the adjustment and interpenetration of industrial with agricultural economy. It was making this experiment under insuperable difficulties—without fuel or raw materials in the factories and with insufficient food in the cities. The success or failure of this experiment under its own weight and strength would have been a distinct service to mankind, and every facility ought to have been supplied it to work itself out in peace. But the Supreme Council was as terrified by “Bolshevism” as, a century before, the Holy Alliance had been terrified by “democracy.” When the communist arms were victorious over Czecho-Slovakia and had overrun two thirds of Slovakia it offered Bela Kun a definitive peace provided he would surrender all the fruits of his victory and withdraw his troops. But when he did what it wished and withdrew his troops, it repudiated the offer as a “clerical error.” Turning then in despair against the other invader—the Rumanian who also was occupying Hungary in violation of the armistice—with a force half his size, Kun suffered a calamitous defeat and the Rumanians marched into Buda-Pesth. Paris then offered the Social Democrats of the Kun government to lift the blockade if Kun would resign. To save his fellow-countrymen Kun did resign and a moderate socialist government replaced his. But the whole action was nullified by the unspeakable Rumanians. They organized a terror against the “communists,” in a month killing 6,000 intellectuals and Jews. They looted the country with a thoroughness beside which the Germans in Belgium—even in the earliest days—are as innocent as new-born babes. They propagated anti-Semitism and carried out po-

groms. They encouraged counter-revolutionaries, who brought the Archduke Joseph into power.

This was more than even the Supreme Council—certainly than Mr. Wilson, whose anti-monarchism at least is adamant—could tolerate. Joseph was driven out and a new government, or a succession of them, was installed. The counter-revolution, with Horthy for its figurehead, placed itself forcefully in the saddle. The constitutional reforms created by the Karolyi government and the communists were abolished. A narrow franchise was established and the monarchical principle reaffirmed. Freemasonry, for reasons best known to the clericals, was suppressed. The White Terror was amplified into a pogrom. The party “Awakened Magyars” was organized. Officers of the late imperial army, persons with titles, feudal landlords, distinguished Catholics, were gathered into terrorist bands, who murdered, raped, and stole and committed unspeakable outrages upon workmen, Socialists and Jews, particularly Jews. The press was subjected to a rigid censorship. Martial law was declared. The peasantry were reduced to a state infinitely more miserable than under the autocratic Communist régime, and far worse than under the Hapsburgs. The workmen and their organizations were proscribed. Unparalleled anti-Jewish laws were enacted. An arrangement was made with the Entente, perhaps with France alone, by which Hungary is to maintain a large army against the Bolsheviks. The details of the witches’ Sabbath which the counter-revolution instituted and maintained in Hungary may be read in the separate reports of the commissions of inquiry sent by the International Federation of

**Trades Unions and the British Labour Party. The findings of both led to the reimposition of the blockade upon Hungary until the White Terror should cease and freedom and security be restored. This blockade was an entirely new thing in the history of civilization. It was not a blockade by governments but by the organized workers of the world. It was common international action postulated upon the economy of industry and the consciousness of solidarity, power, and interdependence which the experience of the war has bred among the trade-unionists of Europe. It is these who, having discovered how, have become the effective champions of a Europe safe for democracy.**

**The philosophy and ideal which underlie the tyrannous terror of Hungary are those of the class which more than any other had served to precipitate the Great War. It has simply transferred its animus from the Slavs and Rumanians, whom the peace has removed from its power, to the Jews. It exhibits a mediæval zest in the obscenities it commits upon them. For it has the mediæval mind. It is the class of clericals and landlords, in no important way differing from the similar class in Poland. It hates not communism alone. It is inimical to mere democracy. It desires the feudal respect for authority, the peonized peasant and exploited workman. It wants the extermination of the Jews. It wants to establish in Hungary a "Christian national system" by which it means a system wherein its own privileges will be forever secure. Its identification of anti-Semitism with anti-Bolshevism is no accident. In Hungary also the Jew is being put to the traditional use of scapegoat.**

**The rôle of the Rumanians in the creation and main-**

tenance of this situation is one of the blackest spots in the black history of the rulers of that land. It is a rôle dictated by the need to divert public attention from the sabotaged fulfilment of promised economic reforms, and to find an outlet for the anger caused among the unspeakable land-barons and bureaucracy by the minority clauses in the peace treaty. Rumania, more than any other Balkan country, has been a landlord's paradise. The exploitation of the peasant has been unutterably thorough, in fact, mediæval, and the development of a political opposition has been a function of the bitter need of the peasants. Prior to Rumanian participation in the Great War, this need was on the point of compelling agrarian reform. The instability of the country was then so great that even a revision of the anti-Jewish laws was pledged, and this was bound up with the enfranchisement of the peasant. The Rumanian bargain with the Entente, by which Rumania entered the war in return for the promise of an "ethnic Rumania" at the expense of Austria-Hungary and Russia, was not popular with the people. The disastrous campaign of the Rumanian armies was due not only to deficient generalship and Russian bureaucratic treachery but to defective morale. In the peace of Bucharest the Germans took advantage of this situation to bind the Rumanian upper classes to themselves in terms of benefits. The rights of the Jews which the treaty purported to conserve were conserved in the spirit and practice of the Rumanian constitution and the Rumanian land-barons. The treaty and the German occupation offered a complete alibi for the failure to execute the promised reforms; a dangerous failure,

in view of the close connection between defeat and revolution. This connection the government of Rumania understood. It was afraid to demobilize. Its swift invasion and looting of Hungary, its violation of the terms of the armistice, its hide-and-peek policy with the Peace Conference were designed to neutralize the psychological consequences of defeat with at least the simulation of victory—even over an outnumbered, disarmed, and beaten foe. Its anti-Semitism in Hungary was part and parcel of the same policy by which it tried to escape accepting the minority-rights treaty, and after accepting it, sought to delay and sabotage its enactment by postponing the election of a new parliament to ratify it, among the other familiar devices of diplomatic sabotage.

In Rumania, as in other states, the cause of the Jews and the cause of the masses of the people are identical, the status of the former is a direct index of the freedom and culture of the latter. Now, with the accession of Bessarabia and Transylvania the Rumanian Government acquired dominion over more than 500,000 additional Jews. The total number of Jews within the Rumanian borders and entitled to citizenship becomes well-nigh a million. Should the traditional Rumanian rule be applied to them, they would be automatically outlawed. For the government of Rumania, in order to evade the application of articles 43 and 44 of the Treaty of Berlin by which, in 1878, Rumania became an independent kingdom, formulated into law what under the Christian dispensation had been the social position of the Jews in Europe since their disfranchisement in the fourth century by the Emperor Constantius. It designated the Jews as "aliens without foreign

protection"—that is, as aliens "in the eyes of the law . . . even without the protection of alienage, since allegiance on their part to any other government is not recognized. They were literally looked upon as men without a country,"<sup>1</sup> without opportunity, without hope, without redress.

Only the most explicit guarantees could save minorities in a land of so black and so ingenious a mediævalism. These guarantees were given, not voluntarily. That the ruling classes will continue to sabotage them is a foregone conclusion. They face a repetition, on a larger scale, of the revolution of 1907. Their habits of mind are such that inevitably they will evade the task of eradicating the causes of social unrest, which alone can solve the problem; they will merely seek to divert attention by spreading sentiments and organizing action against the Jews.

Poland, the Ukraine, Hungary, Rumania—these lands are all lands of primarily an agrarian economy, with no middle class to speak of, backward, illiterate, ruled by land-barons and exploited by priests; the most advanced of them is only at the beginnings of its democracy—even in the eighteenth-century sense of that term. A free government dedicated to the protection and development of the Rousseauist-Jeffersonian "inalienable rights," of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" would, with the best good-will, still have to take into consideration habits of thought and feeling, the inertias of tradition and their modification by the inescapable economic pressure and psychological influence of the automatic machine upon its people.

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<sup>1</sup>Memorial to President Wilson by representatives of the American Jewish Congress, March, 1919.

It would have to depend upon rigorous preventive justice, education, and industrialization to create new habits and to establish a new ideology which in course of time should save the people and prevent Europe from going shipwreck. That they might be destined to success may be gathered from the experience of Czecho-Slovakia and of the short-lived Magyar Commune. Now the governments of Poland and Rumania and Hungary are governments of and for a class, not a people, and the Ukraine has been the battlefield of opposed interests and ideologies without regard to its people. Given the actualities of the situation, hence, their organized anti-Semitism and their fathering of Bolshevism upon the Jews were deducible phenomena. Not so easily deducible is the appearance of the same phenomena, in forms somewhat less virulent, also in industrialized countries like Germany and German Austria. Their scope and extent varied with the increase of hunger, insecurity, and disease, and the correlative reactionary reversions to more primitive states of mind which accompany these. In these countries, too, there has been manifest the witch-hunting tendency to attribute the countries' ills to the Jews. Moreover, anti-Semitic sentiment and propaganda appeared in France and even in England and America. Wherever members of the old régime in Russia, in Germany, or elsewhere in central Europe found or retained a footing they generated or brought with them and sought to spread this social poison surviving from the Middle Ages.

A comic opera item in the activities of this conspiracy was the revival and extensive use of the so-called "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." These protocols

are the last chapter in a typical book by a reputed typical paranoid Russian mystic, one Nilus, in which Nilus traces a divine comedy of approved mediæval type in terms of his own mystical experiences, and those of his friends and his time, supported by documents manufactured *ad hoc*. An Orthodox and a Russian, he makes the Jews the devil of the comedy, ascribing to them a conspiracy to rule the world. The sources of his fantasy may well be a book by one Goedsche, a convicted forger, called "Goeta, Warschau and Dueppel," extensively used by Junker anti-Semites in Germany and similarly worked in Russian form by the Tsarist government during the troubles of 1905-1906. Its present use in the English-speaking world is associated with a person calling himself Frazier Curtis, operating from London, and one Henry Ford, a very rich maker of cheap automobiles who gave the nonsense extensive circulation through his paper, the *Dearborn Independent*, published at Dearborn, near Detroit, U. S. A. It was first published in the *Morning Post*, of London. Regarding it, Mr. Lucien Wolf writes in the *Manchester Guardian*:

The prodigious essay on "The Cause of World Unrest" which the *Morning Post* has lately published in seventeen articles and some sixty columns of printed matter is a document on which the student of political thought in England will dwell sadly. Over a century ago, in world circumstances of startling similarity and almost from the same party standpoint, Burke gave us, in his "Causes of the Present Discontents," his "Reflections," and his "Regicide Peace," a large and stately piece of political philosophy. To-day the leading organ of Conservative opinion in this country can only expound a sort of political demonology, borrowed partly from the obscurantists of Bourbon Clericalism and



partly from the fanatics of Hohenzollern Anti-Semitism. It would be merciful to pass by this strange effort in silence, but unfortunately there is reason to believe that with all its grotesqueness, it is calculated to work a good deal of mischief. Credulous and vicious people are still abundant, and they are not confined to the crowd. Mr. Winston Churchill has darkly hinted that he reads the signs of the times much in the same way as the *Morning Post*, and a curious story is current that the translation of the Russian forgery on which the theory of that journal mainly rests was actually made in the Intelligence Department of the War Office. Then there are Mr. Chesterton and Mr. Belloc and quite a conventicle of smaller fry who have been vainly preaching the same apocalypse for years. The *Morning Post* may bring them recruits, and that assuredly is not desirable.

The theory of the *Morning Post* may be briefly stated. Its fundamental contention is that all political unrest is artificial. It is a product of the Hidden Hand which is now revealed to us as a "Formidable Sect" encompassing the world. This sect has been at its present work for at least a hundred and fifty years. The French Revolution was contrived by it, as well as all the subordinate revolutions down to our own time. Trade Unionism, Socialism, Syndicalism, Bolshevism, Sinn Fein, Indian Nationalism, and their analogues in every part of the globe are outward and visible signs of its sinister activity. That there are social grievances and even evils at the root of this unrest is not denied, but they are as artificial as the unrest itself. They have all been deliberately brought about by the Hidden Hand in order to stir up revolt against the Throne and Altar. The way in which it is done is a little complicated. Behind the restless and seditious movements which we all know there is a secret revolutionary organization in the shape of Freemasonry. But this is only intermediate, for Freemasonry itself, through some obscure transaction between the Templars and the Old Man of the Mountain, was created by the "Formidable Sect," and is wholly, though perhaps unconsciously, under its control.

Now what is this "Formidable Sect"? It is no other than the Jews. Those ancient enemies of the human race are alleged to be far more daring and dynamic in evil-doing than is generally supposed. Throughout their world-wide Dispersion they have secretly preserved their old political organization, and they have used it—and are still using it—with deadly persistency to overturn the established Christian order of things and to found in its place a universal Jewish dominion under the sceptre of a Sovereign of the House of David. The Jews are, in short, the "cause of the world unrest."

There is nothing new in this theory except the claim of its authors to have produced documentary proof of its final development—that is, of its Jewish aspect. It was invented over a century ago, as it has been resurrected to-day, to explain the unfamiliar international character of the prevailing unrest. The clergy and the nobility of the *ancien régime* were as little capable as the *Morning Post* to-day of understanding the natural causes of this phenomenon. And yet they were by no means obscure. The French Revolution, as Burke pointed out, was not a mere uprising against local oppression, but a "revolution of doctrine and theoretic dogma" which was bound to find echoes beyond the French frontiers. In this respect it resembled the Reformation, and also that other "armed doctrine" which we know as Bolshevism. Nevertheless, it puzzled the Bourbon apologists, and, confusing cause and effect, they became convinced that they were in the presence of an international conspiracy. The theory was first propounded by a Superior of the Seminary of Eudists at Caen in 1790, but it was afterward vastly developed by the Abbé Barruel in his "Memoires sur le Jacobinisme," by Robinson of Edinburgh in his "Proofs of a Conspiracy," and by the Chevalier de Malet in his "Recherches Historiques." Their conclusion was that there was a triple conspiracy of Philosophers, Freemasons, and Illuminati who form an actual sect aiming deliberately and methodically at the overthrow of the established religions and Governments throughout Europe. The theory had a short shrift, though the industry

of its authors did much to throw light on the organization and activities of the secret societies. So far as the Freemasons and Illuminati were concerned it was easily demolished by the Earl of Moira, who, at a meeting of the Grand Lodge of England in 1800, showed convincingly that it was a mare's nest. As for the Philosophers, no one ever took the charge against them seriously. For half a century scarcely anything more was heard of this aspect of the "Formidable Sect," though meanwhile the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 had taken place. The nonsuit of Barruel was *chose jugée*.

It was revived in the sixties under the influence of the religious passions kindled by the war for Italian unity. The struggle for Jewish emancipation had triumphed all over western Europe, and the new citizens thus enfranchised had everywhere cast in their lot with the Liberal parties. This was swiftly and angrily noted by the Ultramontane polemicists, and the old bogey of a "Formidable Sect" began to haunt them in a new and enlarged form. In the new conspiracy there was no longer any talk of Philosophers and Illuminati. Their place was taken by Jews and Protestants. The "Formidable Sect" thus became a triple alliance of Freemasons, Jews, and Protestants which was said to be directed by the "Grand Master Palmerston" and supported by the whole British people, not only as Protestants but as descendants of the Lost Tribes of Israel and the subjects of a dynasty claiming descent from the House of David. The chief protagonist of this stupendous hallucination was M. Gougenot des Mousseaux, who in 1869 embodied it in a volume entitled "*Le Juif, le Judaïsme, et la Judaisation des Peuples Chrétiens.*" From his own admissions, however, it appears that he was largely indebted to German Catholic inspiration. Once again the theory failed to find support, and Gougenot's book, like the books of Barruel and Robinson, became relegated to the literature of forgotten crazes.

Later on, however, attempts to revive it were made by M. de Saint-André, the Abbé Chabauty, M. Drumont, M. Martin, and M. Copin-Ablancelli, in the full flood of Anti-

Semitic agitation which had been imported into France from Germany. The only notable addition made to the theory by these writers was the hypothesis of a secret Jewish government, transported from Jerusalem into the Diaspora, which, throughout the ages, has never ceased to command the allegiance of international Jewry and to conspire against the established order of Christian Society. Since 1909 the agitation has become retransferred to the headquarters of Clerical Anti-Semitism in Vienna and Munich, and the most recent works on the subject with which the *Morning Post* appears to have mainly worked, although for obvious reasons it does not acknowledge them—are Wichtl's "Weltfreimaurerei, Weltrevolution, Weltrepublik," Meister's "Judas Schuldbuch," and Rosenberg's "Die Spur des Judens im Wandel der Zeiten," all published in 1919. All this literature, while expounding exactly the same theory as that of the *Morning Post*, is as violently anti-English as it is anti-Masonic and anti-Jewish.

This, then, is the discredited raw material of the theory hashed up as a serious contribution to the grave political preoccupations of British statesmanship at this moment. It will be noted, however, that in the forms so far referred to it is confessedly a theory, resting at the best on evidence of a highly circumstantial character. The novelty in its latest presentation is that an effort is made to bolster it up with what is claimed to be direct evidence. This takes the form of a document entitled "The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion," which was published in an anonymous pamphlet a few months ago by Messrs. Eyre and Spottiswoode. These protocols are alleged to be the minutes of certain meetings of the Secret Directory of the Jewish people held in Paris toward the end of the last century, and they record avowals by the Elders, of the very conspiracy set forth hypothetically by M. M. Gougenot des Mousseaux and Copin-Albancelli. "In this book," says the *Morning Post* triumphantly, "for the first time we find an open declaration of the terrible conspiracy of the 'Formidable Sect.'"

Unhappily for those who rely on it this document is a

clumsy forgery which has already been used for the most disreputable purposes. It has been known to the Jewish community for some years. The first draft of it was fabricated in 1868 by an official in the Prussian Post Office named Hermann Goedsche, who was dismissed from the service on account of more vulgar forgeries. It was long a stock broadsheet of the German Anti-Semites. In 1905 it was used in Russia by the secret police for pogrom propaganda, and it was afterward embodied in a politico-apocalyptic book on Antichrist by a disciple of Father John of Cronstadt, one Serge Nilus, who sought to show that the old "Formidable Sect" of Gougenot des Mousseaux, consisting of Jews and Freemasons under the direction of England, was the real Antichrist. This book was used to persuade the credulous Tsar to conclude a secret treaty with the German Emperor aimed at England and the Entente. In 1918 and 1919 doctored typewritten copies of the protocols, with the anti-English passages carefully deleted, were secretly circulated by emissaries of Koltchak's and Denikine's intelligence service among Cabinet Ministers and other officials of the Allied and Associated Powers, with the object of showing that Bolshevism was an exclusively Jewish creation and that the whole Russian people were innocent of it. It was then that, thanks to the American Department of Justice, the Jewish community were made aware of their existence. They had already done considerable mischief, as may be seen by the propaganda leaflets distributed by the aeroplane service of the British armies at Archangel and Murmansk and certain oracular utterances of Mr. Winston Churchill in a Sunday newspaper.

Last year the idea occurred to certain enterprising people who had been concerned in these manœuvres, and who were justly affrighted by the impending collapse of Denikine, that money might be made out of the protocols. Accordingly, certain of the Jewish Delegations in Paris were approached with an intimation that these precious documents were about to be published, and the kindly offer was made to spare Israel this damning disclosure for the trifling sum of £10,000.

The upshot of the matter is that the "Formidable Sect" is a German Anti-Semitic and Anglophobe myth constructed out of garbled history and synthesized by impudent forgery. How and for what purpose it has been foisted on the innocence of the *Morning Post* have yet to be explained.

Mr. Wolf's review, it will be observed, gives indications of the existence of something like a gigantic international conspiracy against the Jews designed everywhere to link them with the contemporary devil of respectable society—Bolshevism. Even in Palestine, the Bishop of Jerusalem, a most respectable man, and a pillar of the Church of England, objected to Zionism because of this imputed linkage.

That the linkage is more often than not malicious and mythopoetic does not alter the fact that it is made—and that it is believed. Nor is this fact much modified by the observation that the attribution is invariably made by parties of reaction, clericalism, and privilege and that the champions of the Jews are the contemporary champions of the rights of man—the workmen's organizations like the British Labour Party, the men of letters, the liberals, the scientists. We are here face to face with a characteristic phase of Christian psychology. It is a phenomenon which is part and parcel of the recrudescence of atavistic traits in European society, a recrudescence brought on by the general disintegration of the normal spirit of man which the over-centralization of the war and the anarchy of the peace have caused. Central Europe, forced back to practically a primitive mediæval economy by the terms of the peace, has reverted automatically to the primitive mediæval mentality. Once again the Jew, assigned to that status by the

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mediæval theory of life, is made the scapegoat of the ills of the people. Kolchak or Denikine, Kapp or Dmowski, Stephan Friedrich or Bratianu, Maxse or Drumont, Henry Ford or the *Morning Post*, their psychology is alike. Through them and their followers, the Jews become the ultimate burnt-offerings to the delusions of the peace which was made to save democracy, to insure the rights of minorities, and to establish international comity.

## CHAPTER XVII

### FROM VERSAILLES TO SAN REMO—PALESTINE AND THE NEAR-EASTERN PROBLEM

THE reaction of the Jews themselves to the situation, though not simple, was not confused. Although in some respects the bitter epigram of Zangwill's

Hear, O Israel, Jehovah, the Lord thy God, is one,  
But we, Jehovah His people, are dual, and so undone.

has become truer than ever, in others, it has been considerably weakened by circumstances. Under the impact of the central European catastrophe the principle of "sauve qui peut" came naturally and automatically into operation. The Jews have their *émigrés*, no less than the Russians, the Ruthenians, the Austrians, with the *émigré* mentality and aspirations. They have their Socialists and Bolsheviks with the inquisitorial fanaticism of a new religion powerful at last, and they have their established behaviour-patterns of custom, habit, and tradition. The inner life of the Jewish peoples of central and eastern Europe was determined by the confrontation of these psychological forces, with the victory inevitably for the deeper-lying and more primitive trends of mentality. The objective of these trends is secular, but the emotions usually called religious had an overruling influence in rendering it authoritative. Circumstances, more-



over, endowed it with a material purposiveness which in other periods of persecution it had never possessed. It is, of course, Zion, the traditional substance of salvation.

Between the protagonists of the Zionist idea and programme and the abstract and doctrinaire humanitarianism of the Jewish internationalists of the Bolshevik or other Socialist sects there was fought out concomitantly with the tragedies of the Ukraine, Hungary, and Poland, a battle for the leadership of the Jewish community and the control of the Jewish institutions. In the Ukraine and Russia the Socialist sectaries accused the Zionists of being tools of British imperialism, of providing army corps to combat the people's rights in Egypt and Syria and India. During the German occupation in the Ukraine they called them "infamous friends of England." When the Soviet government reconquered the Ukraine they accused them of reaction and counter-revolution. They denounced Hebrew as the bulwark of Jewish clericalism and they did their best to obtain complete control of the communal institutions and the Jewish National Assembly. Disastrously defeated by the Zionists in the elections of 1918, they withdrew from the Assembly, and devoted themselves, under the Bolshevik dominion—which, instructed by them that they represented the Jewish masses, had given them place and power—to persecuting the Zionist organization and breaking up the Jewish communities. They even succeeded, through the intervention of the Ukrainian communist Diamanstein, who was visiting Moscow, in persuading the central government, which had always tried to deal justly with the racial minorities in its dominions,

to undertake the complete repression of the Zionists. This was prevented by a protest meeting in Moscow. Attended incognito by Soviet commissaries, it influenced them to take steps correcting the mistake.

Of course, the feeling of the Jewish masses in Russia and the Ukraine against the Jewish communists could not fail to become intensely bitter. In the Zionist programme and the Zionist organization they had found the fusion of their past and present hopes of salvation. It gave them a foundation for self-respect and a programme for creative action. The Balfour Declaration, which had come to them as a promise of relief, had developed with the growing tragedy of the time into a gospel of religious hope. More than a million of what remained of the three million disinherited Jews of Russia and the Ukraine were, because of their sufferings, in the state of mind where madness and religious inspiration cannot be distinguished. In Russia great undertakings were planned for Palestine and large sums—in rubles—subscribed. Enormous migrations were projected. Odessa and Sebastopol were overrun with committees trying to arrange migration or restrain migration. Workmen's groups were organized in thousands. Young men and old sailed in fishing smacks or wandered on foot—to find themselves stranded in Constantinople and other wayside cities. Poland, Hungary, Rumania—by and large—were in this respect echoes of Russia and the Ukraine. All classes of the Jewish population exhibited the same dominant trend. Even in Germany—where the "Germans of the Mosaic confession" who had before the war controlled the Jewish communities found themselves facing a general

democratic movement for nation-wide community organization analogous to that in the eastward lands—the unity of sentiment on Zionism stood out in contrast to the division on domestic problems.

This was still more true in the western lands. There were many conflicts within the Jewish communities, accentuated by the war—in America over the permanence of the American Jewish Congress; in England over the responsibility of the *Sh'tadlanic* heads of the Jewish population there. But excepting negligible cases of “imaginative nervousness” or doctrinal repressions, the unity of sentiment regarding the Jewish Homeland was extraordinary. The Board of Deputies in Great Britain had already in March, 1918, endorsed the Balfour Declaration and the planned terms of the Mandate. During the ensuing year it also established with the Committee of Jewish Delegations informally closer and closer relationships that only waited an annual meeting to be made formal. Alone the Anglo-Jewish Association and the Alliance Israélite Universelle still stood out against the union, their theological internationalism serving the same practical purpose as the economic internationalism of the Jewish communists of obstructing united Jewish action to save two thirds of the Jewish population of the world being done to death.

The Committee of Jewish Delegations carried on as best it could. It pressed matters left pending by the adjournment of the Paris Conference. It studied and reported on conditions that developed in central Europe. It protested to the public opinion of the world and interpellated and memorialized governments. Its constituencies in America and in western

Europe took similar action with regard to their own governments. And the governments promised investigation and correction—which, no doubt, in the course of diplomatic time and according to diplomatic agreements may be effected. But all the while from central Europe the bitter cry of the Jews went up. And they suffered and endured only through the hope of the New Zion.

Yet as the months crept on, they began to fear, as we have already noted, that the saving vision, which had been the essence of the morale of Jewry through all the long centuries of its outlawry, was about to be destroyed at its base. Not only the leaders, the whole Jewish people became shaken by a bitter great disquiet. Rumours spread among them in all the lands where they dwelt, that the Balfour Declaration had been only a diplomatic gesture, and having served its purpose, would be abandoned, like other used-up war materials.

Specifically the reasons were as follows:

War propaganda, reënforcing the nationalism of the upper classes of Egypt, of Syria, and other of the Asiatic tributaries of the Turk, fused with war oppression and administrative stupidities in Egypt and India, to bring into existence something like a political sentiment among the altogether unpolitical and economically primitive masses of those countries. This sentiment constituted a social explosive which almost anything in the way of an error of judgment or a failure in tact might touch off. Arabia and Irak, which had been under the Turk an insulating vacuum between the two centres, became, under the contagion of Syrian nationalism and British propaganda, a fairly sensitive

conducting surface. In consequence the Arab world, with its very contrasting social classes and levels of culture, was on the point of attaining a unity of feeling—secular, this time—which it had not been possessed by since the days of the great Arab Khalifs. The ideational channels of this feeling and of the programme of action to which it was to supply the force ran in one direction to the imperialistic extremes of pan-Arabism, in other, to the nationalist harmonics of the Wilsonian programme and the Balfour Declaration. The latter had in a very short time after its promulgation become a sort of gospel of reconstruction among the masses of the Allies. Article XII of the Fourteen Points stated:

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and absolutely unmolested opportunity for autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

Until discussions actually began in Paris this paragraph represented to the minds of all but the most extremist of Syrian and Arab leaders the realistic limits of what they might hope to attain. They were ready to acquiesce in it. To the rather primitive peoples—the Armenians may, perhaps, be excepted—whose self-chosen representatives they were, even these conditions were of remote and somewhat speculative importance. But as it began to be more and more apparent that the official American and popular liberal European terms

of settlement were being entirely disregarded by the Peace Conference, that the settlement had become the usual diplomat's game of grab, and that the presentation of the Turkish treaty was destined to indefinite delay, Turks and Arabs began a play for their own hands.

For the Turks the play was desperate. They had been refused all consideration by the Council of Four in terms as unmistakable as they were stinging. Their state, even such as it had been, was completely ruined, and their pre-war pan-Turanianism was bankrupt. There remained a nationalist eastward propaganda among the more or less Turanian stocks from Anatolia to the Carpathians, and a religious general propaganda among the Moslem faithful. Pan-Turanianism and pan-Moslemism were preached at one and the same time. The nationalist leader, Mustapha Kamil Pasha, produced a reconciling formula for these essentially irreconcilable doctrines. "I preach," he declared, "Islam as a race." At the same time he made use of Islam to foment and increase the unrest in Moslem India, Egypt, and Syria. By the Moslems of India, whose nationalist preoccupations would be well served by such an occasion, the Turkish peace and the integrity of the Turkish Empire was converted into a religious question of the Khalifate. In Egypt and Syria the conception of the unity of the Moslem world was made the basis of a bitter anti-European propaganda.

This was possible because the Arabic world was itself insecure in status and confused in counsel. To the contagion which it was undergoing at the hands of the Turks were added the effects of the vacillating policy of the English and the logical imperialism of the French.

Between these two countries a duel went on of which the purpose was, so far as the French were concerned, to squeeze the maximum of advantage out of the Sykes-Picot Treaty; so far as the English were concerned to assuage the excitement in Egypt and in India, to keep their words to the Arabs and the Jews, and to make sure of the possession of the Mesopotamian oil fields and the gates to India. Many British officials, particularly the political and ethnographic experts, felt that this could be accomplished only with great difficulty, and that the Jews were the essential part of any plan not merely of conciliation but of development of the Far East. So, as we have seen, Sir Mark Sykes believed, dwelling on the concept of a confederation of Jews, Arabs, and Armenians in a great league of Syria and Asia Minor. In the opinion of Col. T. E. Lawrence, who had been the chief British agent in Arabia and Feisal's right hand in all the activities of the Hedjaz from the first contact to the conference in Paris, Zionism was "the only practical means of setting the new Semitic near east in order in our own days." He urged that the Jews become Palestinians as quickly as possible and bring into play in the life of Asia Minor that aspect of their temperament which, because of their long European discipline, is complementary to that of the Arab. Major Ormsby-Gore, the first liaison officer between the Zionist Administrative Commission and the military government in Palestine, now a member of Parliament, urged the necessity of Jewish initiative in the revival of Arabic culture as a foremost device in relieving the long strain due to political disturbances in the Arabian world. General Smuts held a similar opinion.

The military, on the other hand, felt that all the British purposes could not be accomplished at the same time and that for the good of the empire one or another of them would have to be dropped. They were for dropping the pledge to the Jews. Under that pledge, the strategic problem in Asia Minor and in Egypt became complicated. Palestine became a sort of buffer state between the nationalism of Egypt and the nationalism of Arabia that, from the military point of view, could not be successfully held. A much easier and simpler thing to hold would be a united Asia Minor, a Pan-Arabia, with no ethnic or religious problems superadded to those already existing. Military experience had already proved this. While all Asia Minor was under Allenby, there had been no exceptional police difficulties or any other type of trouble. The administration of Syria and Transjordan by the French and Arab officials had gone on smoothly and easily enough. But then Paris demanded and London ordered, in fulfilment of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, the withdrawal of the British troops to the boundaries set by the treaty. The withdrawal was executed—under the protest of both Allenby and Bols, and border troubles immediately began.

Thinking thus in strategic and imperialistic terms, and animated perhaps by the vision of a continuous British protectorate, from the Mediterranean to India, the military administration, backed by the mission, took advantage of the rules imposed by the League conventions regarding the government of enemy territory to sabotage the British mission and to establish their own programme. Anti-Semitism among



high officials had not a little to do with the matter; ignorance, stupidity, and incompetence among their subordinates not a little. That they were not officially made aware of the Balfour Declaration helped. That, as Colonel Lawrence pointed out to Doctor Weizmann, Episcopal dioceses with missionary interests organized anti-Jewish propaganda, helped. And the almost parallel stupidity, ignorance, and incompetence of the Palestinian Jews, and their unparalleled disunion, their sectarian, nationalate, linguistic, and other quarrels, helped. The Occupied Enemy Territory Administration was crowded with ex-Turkish officials and Syrian Christians who were used and who made spontaneous use of their positions in political intrigue and opposition to Zionism. Military officers known to be anti-Jewish were appointed to what would become permanent posts. The use of Hebrew on official documents was sabotaged. Palestine became the gathering place for Egyptian and Syrian agitators and the propaganda field of a subsidized press. The Arab landlord and the Arab money-lender were automatically adopting the tactics of the Polish and Hungarian and Rumanian upper classes in the attempt to retain their privileged stranglehold upon the peasantry. Meanwhile, officers of administration were making promises of amendment and correction which were never carried out, while in Europe, Curzon, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was solemnly reaffirming the Balfour Declaration.

The position of the Zionist Administrative Commission under these circumstances may be imagined. Its personnel was constantly changing, and in its permanent membership there was no one of character,

competency, and distinction great enough to command the respect of the military administration. In the course of little more than a year it gathered into its offices a body of Palestinian experts-by-book and others who were no better than the officials of the administration. It tried hard to introduce—particularly at the beginning, when Americans were unofficially in the Commission—system and efficiency into the affairs of the Palestinian communities, but it was neither skilled nor wise enough to find a device that might overcome the babel of minute sectarian, geographical, linguistic, economic, social, and political groupings from which the Jewish population of Palestine suffers, and into which it had again disintegrated with the relaxation of the unity of the war. The Commission was required to meet problems of relief, education, health, and political organization, but its departments were organized according to a pedantic scheme rather than according to the realities it was called upon to face. Such realities were the Arabs with whom it should have sought a rapprochement, the rising cost of living and the increasing emigration of Jews from Palestine. But for this it possessed neither the inward equipment nor the outward prestige. It needed capacity, men, and money, and the last was pitifully inadequate even for such powers and abilities as it possessed. Palestinian Jewry at the same time were deeply engrossed in the very pleasing business of getting all they could out of the situation, or in speculating profoundly and arguing loudly regarding political forms and economic programmes, while the concrete task of work and self-maintenance from day to day were left to the agencies of relief or went by default.

Even the American Zionist Medical Unit—in its relation to its setting a paragon of disciplined efficiency—was infused with the quarrelsome contagion. It also found itself undergoing, in addition to the opposition of the old-fashioned Palestinian physicians and the jurisdictional disputes with the Commission, internal dissensions. Its work, indeed, was the most hopeful, and a function of its entire independence from the Commission. It created what is in practice a national health service, with hospitals both fixed and mobile, and medical help for all the inhabitants of the land, without distinction of race or creed. Another hopeful indication was the creation of the Pro-Jerusalem Society, made up of Jews and Arabs, with the purpose of cleaning up, preserving, and beautifying old Jerusalem and building a decent new Jerusalem. Still another was the agitation over the franchise for women precipitated by the orthodox rabbis, whose opinion of women and their rights corresponded with the orthodox opinion of all sects at all times. This quarrel—which through the courageous action of the Commission delayed the election of “the constituent assembly” of Palestinian Jewry until it was settled—was finally settled in favour of the women.<sup>1</sup> Something got done also to improve the educational system and the condition of the teachers. The problem of maintenance was faced, if not met. Consumers’ coöperatives were first encouraged and then mishandled. *Kwuzoth* or coöperative workmen’s colonies were outfitted. Irrigation and water-power surveys were planned, and

<sup>1</sup>The “Constituent Assembly” was chosen on the basis of a secret, direct ballot and proportional representation. The workmen’s organizations and the Sephardic communities made the best runs, the others being too broken by schisms and dissensions or being boycotted by the electors.

within the straitened financial limits undertaken—the engineer in charge being Pincus Ruthenberg, one of the few really forceful personalities who had reached Palestine.

But confusion and inefficiency within and political obstruction and anxiety without were on the whole too great handicaps. Mr. Justice Brandeis's visit to Palestine in the summer of 1919 relieved the situation a little. Through his influence one of the chief *saboteurs* of the Balfour Declaration was removed, and a politically much wiser and administratively more competent man was sent in his place. One man, however, working in transit could do little to break the bureaucratic web of intrigue that had somehow gotten stretched from the meanest Arab money-lender in Nablus to the highest English administrative officer in Cairo. The crisis in the duel of empire developed with the approach of the time for the promulgation of the Turkish treaty of peace. Signs were not lacking that a coup was being prepared not without analogies to the South African coup which was aborted by the Jameson raid. The Arab Club at Damascus—the heir of the nationalist group of the Great War—was encouraged to make bolder and bolder demands. It was anti-French—as are the vast majority of Syrians—and its titular head was Feisal. Its resources came from the Arab administration and this functioned on subsidies from the British and French governments. In cases of error, the more cautious, substantial, and propertied Nationalist Party served to neutralize the attitude of the firebrands, but in an emergency it would not fail to act with the Arab Club. The demands of this club took the form of the resurrection on an imperial

scale of the proposals made in the early days of the war by the Arab National Committee which had been betrayed to the Turks and by them crushed. There was to be an imperial Arab state, under British protection, coextensive with Asia Minor. This state should be a *fait accompli* that the unsuspecting politicians in Downing Street and the negotiators in San Remo should, willy-nilly, have to face and acknowledge. So, in March, 1920, a Syrian Congress coming together any which way proclaimed Feisal king of Syria and Palestine and his brother Abdullah king of Mesopotamia. At the same time the Egyptian legislative assembly met and proclaimed the independence of Egypt and the Sudan. The understandings Feisal declared he had with Doctor Weizmann, his written statements and public proclamations of endorsement of and coöperation with Zionism, the pledge made by the British Government through the Balfour Declaration, these were to be redeemed by giving Feisal a mandate for Palestine and guaranteeing Jewish rights therein by means of a minority treaty of the type the Jews had themselves promulgated for themselves and the other minorities of central and eastern Europe.

How this brilliant and sardonic conception would have fared among the politicians had the European entanglements of the Entente and the political complications in India not been in the way, may be speculated upon. The Moslems of India were demanding an integral Turkey for the sake—so they said—of the Khalifate. They repudiated the Emir at Mecca and all his works. The Tripolitan Arabs protested Feisal, and the Lebanon Committee—these represented the French connection—demanded that he evacuate

Syria. The French—who seem in addition to have mobilized the Catholic interest (which acquired a sudden anxiety about the Holy Places and reversed itself on Zionism) and to have encouraged the Arab nationalists outside of their piece of Syria—demanded the letter and the spirit of the Sykes-Picot Treaty.

In Arabia and in Palestine the crowning of Feisal was accompanied by propaganda both spoken and printed. The number of foreign agitators in Palestine multiplied. The city populations, especially that of Jerusalem, were particularly inflamed. Tension increased. The British authorities were warned by members of the Zionist Commission and by others that there was danger of bloodshed. They ordered the population to give up its arms but they enforced the order against the Jews and not against the Arabs. They were asked to bring in soldiers to do the policing, and they refused that. One anti-Zionist demonstration succeeded another. Appeals to the Arabs by the *Va'ad Hazmani*—a sort of provisional council of the Jewish community—for peace and coöperation failed of attention even. Under the circumstances Vladimir Jabotinsky and Pincus Ruthenberg proceeded, in violation of the governor's prohibition, to organize a defense brigade. The organization was not complete or effective enough to prevent the culminating riot and bloodshed during the Passover of 1920. It had been preceded by a demand—on the threat of a massacre of the Jews—that the Administration suppress the Zionist Commission, expel the leaders, and dissolve the Jewish battalion. The rumour spread that the local administration had conceded this demand, but that General Allenby had vetoed it. A couple

of days later came the riot, with all the casualties on the side of the unarmed Jews. It lasted three days and was accompanied with cheers for Feisal and the exhibition of his portrait. On the third day the administration brought in the soldiers and restored order easily enough. Later, Jabotinsky and members of the Defense Company were arrested for breaking the rules against carrying arms, and other similar high crimes and misdemeanours, and Jabotinsky was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, the same sentence as was passed upon two Arabs convicted of rape. The news came on Saturday while most of the Jews were at prayer in the synagogue. Some indication of the total effect of the situation upon their morale may be found in the fact that, led by the rabbis, the masses signed then and there a petition to the governor claiming equal guilt with Jabotinsky for the defense organization and demanding equal punishment. Jews, it will be remembered, are prohibited by their religion from writing on the Sabbath.

Among the country people the outrages brought similar protests. To Sir Herbert Samuel, who had been sent ostensibly as economic and financial adviser to the military administration, twelve Sheikhs of Druses and Maronites protested the pogrom. Later, eighty-two villages, describing themselves as 70 per cent. of the Palestinian population and 90 per cent. of the peasant landholders, denounced the anti-Zionist demonstration and declared their hope for a great Jewish settlement under British mandate which would liberate them from the oppression of the Effendi and the money-lender.

In England and in the United States the mixture of news and rumours all of which seemed to point to an

attempt at nullifying the Balfour Declaration made a very painful impression. Its effect upon the Jews has already been indicated, but its effect upon the non-Jewish citizens of England particularly, is most significant. One paper after another, from the *Times* to the smallest provincial journal, demanded that the word given the Jewish people should not be broken. Questions were asked Parliament, again and again, on all the elements in the situation. There was formed a parliamentary committee to watch over Palestine affairs, with Lord Robert Cecil as chairman and Major Ormsby-Gore as secretary. Petitions were circulated and signed by members of the House of Lords, the Commons, the journalists, writers, labour leaders, churchmen, societies, demanding the validation of the Balfour Declaration and a British mandate for Palestine. These petitions were sent to the Peace Conference which at last was meeting at San Remo.

The workmen of Great Britain sent then the following resolution addressed to Mr. Lloyd George:

At meetings held in London this week the Parliamentary Labour Party, the Executive Committee of the Labour Party, and the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress have adopted resolutions reminding the British Government of the Declaration made on November 2nd, 1917, that the Government would endeavour to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, a declaration that was in harmony with the declared war aims of the British Labour Movement, and which was cordially welcomed by all sections of the British people, and was reaffirmed by Earl Curzon on November 2nd, 1919. The National Labour organizations indicated now urge upon his Majesty's Government the necessity of redeeming this pledge by the acceptance of a mandate under the League



of Nations for the administration of Palestine with a view to its being reconstituted the National Home of the Jewish people. The National Committees desire to associate themselves with the many similar representations being made to the Government urging the settlement of this question with the utmost despatch, both in the interests of Palestine itself as well as in the interests of the Jewish people.

J. R. CLYNES (Acting Chairman  
Parliamentary Labour Party).

H. S. LINDSAY (Secretary).

W. H. HUTCHINSON (Chairman  
Labour Party Executive).

ARTHUR HENDERSON (Secretary  
Labour Party Executive).

J. H. THOMAS (Chairman Trades  
Union Congress).

C. W. BOWERMAN (Secretary  
Trades Union Congress).

The Jews of the world choked the wires with messages. Even the League of British Jews and the Conjoint Foreign Committee took steps to help insure the redeeming of the pledge to the Jewish people. From the President and from other members of his administration in America came explicit cables regarding the position of America on the terms of the Turkish treaty. Against the great wave of public sentiment the imperialists could not hope to prevail. Feisal was told, when, after repeated invitations he had stated his case, that the project—not his own—for an integral independent Syria and Palestine was inadmissible. The French took their mandate over Syria, and England accepted that over Palestine and took that over Mesopotamia. Constantinople was left to the Turk. On April 25, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allied Peace Conference decided to incorporate the Balfour

Declaration into the Turkish treaty. A little more than a month later, Sir Herbert Samuel, distinguished British public servant, devout Jew, Zionist, official philosophic exponent of British liberalism<sup>1</sup> was appointed High Commissioner for Palestine.

But the action was not a clean action for the treaty was written in terms of the tripartite agreement between England, France, and Italy. That meant that there was extended into the future at least the nefarious consequences of the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty. And that meant essential injustice to both the Jewish homeland and to Feisal. Morally it involved in many respects a violation of the pledges made to both. Nevertheless, the principal pledges were kept.

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<sup>1</sup>*Cf.* Herbert Samuel: "Liberalism: Its Principles and Proposals." London, 1903.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### SAN REMO: THE END OF AN EPOCH

THE Treaty of San Remo begins to redeem what the Balfour Declaration pledged. It restores the Jewish people to an equal status with the other peoples of the world. It designs to give them back by public covenant the corporate citizenship under the law of nations which imperial edict took from them in Rome in the 339th year of the Christian era. It is a momentous covenant, momentous for the Jews, momentous for the world. It marks, in more ways than one, the ending of an epoch in the history of mankind in Christian Europe. This is an epoch whose character was determined by the closing of the schools and the surrender of education to the control of the fathers of the church. What it meant for the happiness and freedom of mankind, how it shut in the mind and degraded the body and divided the spirit has already been suggested;<sup>1</sup> it may be read in any history of Europe dealing with the evolution of free institutions and the liberation of the masses of men from their oppressors.<sup>2</sup> The critical step in this liberation was the reviving of the freedom of thought. From this everything

<sup>1</sup>*Cf. Supra pp. 21-25.*

<sup>2</sup>*Cf. Lecky: "The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe"; White: "History of the Warfare of Science with Theology"; Gibbon: "The Decline and Fall of Rome"; Taylor: "The Medieval Mind"; Schapiro: "European and Contemporary History"; Bury: "The History of the Freedom of Thought."*

else followed—the shattering of the walls of the world through the slow and painful establishment of the heliocentric astronomical system in the commonsense of mankind; the development of commerce; the physical enlargement of the stage of human enterprise and imaginative adventure by the voyages of Columbus; the overthrow of the tyranny over conscience by the Reformation; the very, very slow recession of obedience to authority and the credulity of religion before the independence and experimentalism of science; the secularization of industry and politics until religious imperialism gives way to religious nationalism, and religious nationalism slowly disintegrates under the contacts with science, and with the art and industry which are the children of science, so that, in theory at least, Church and State become completely separated, and the right of citizenship is finally disentangled altogether from the accident of membership in a particular religious confession.

Indeed, under the impact of thought set free, Christianity itself changes its character. It becomes less and less a rigid system of unchanging dogmas sustained by force as the opinion of mankind in Europe. It becomes more and more a sentiment of humane piety, a loyalty to the sources and the fellowships of our being, seeking salvation in works rather than in faith, and aiming at justice rather than charity. The international image of this sentiment is the Christ of “higher criticism,” cleared by the application of scientific and historical method from the mummified encasements of the churches and their theologies, and stepping out of the historian’s reconstruction of the gospels under a new glory, in what is in very

truth a second advent—an old symbol renovated by the new time, crying abroad “the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man.” The lands where this Christ has appeared and been acknowledged are lands where the Church itself has become secularized and “true” religion has become identified with social service.<sup>1</sup> They are lands also in which both political democracy and industrial economy have made extensive gains, in which the workingmen are self-conscious, organized, and socially active; in which literacy is high and clericalism negligible. They are *modern* lands, in the best sense of that term, and they are lands in which the Jew is at least formally and legally secure and free. For the freedom and security of the Jew, it cannot be too often reiterated, has always been in Christian Europe, the barometer of the civilization, the culture, the prosperity, the democracy of the countries of his sojourn. It has always been a function of the freedom of thought. It has always been associated with the causes of all the oppressed or enslaved portions of the populations of Europe. Lecky writes:

The persecution of the Jewish race dates from the very earliest period in which Christianity obtained the direction of the civil power; and although it varied greatly in its character and its intensity, it can scarcely be said to have definitely ceased till the French revolution. Alexander II, and three or four other Popes, made noble efforts to arrest it; and more than once interfered with great courage, as well as great humanity, to censure the massacres; but the priests were usually unwearied in inciting the passions of the people, and hatred of the Jew was for many centuries a faithful

<sup>1</sup> Cf. F. G. Peabody: “Jesus Christ and the Social Question.” Harry F. Ward: “The Social Creed of the Churches”; “Social Evangelism”; “The New Social Order”; and many others.

index of the piety of the Christians. Massacred by the thousands during the enthusiasm of the Crusades and the War of the Shepherds, the Jews found every ecclesiastical revival, and the accession of every sovereign of more than usual devotion, occasions for fresh legislative restrictions. Theodosious, St. Lewis, and Isabella the Catholic—who were probably the three most devout sovereigns before the Reformation—the Council of the Lateran, which led the religious revival of the thirteenth century, Paul IV who led that of the sixteenth century, and above all the religious orders were among their most ardent persecutors. Everything was done to separate them from their fellowmen, to mark them out as objects of undying hatred, and to stifle all compassion for their sufferings. They were compelled to wear a peculiar dress and to live in a separate quarter. A Christian might not enter into any partnership with them; he might not eat with them; he might not use the same bath; he might not employ them as physicians, he might not even purchase their drugs. Intermarriage with them was deemed a horrible pollution, and in the time of St. Lewis any Christian who had chosen a Jewess for his mistress was burnt alive. Even in their executions they were separated from other criminals, and till the fourteenth century, they were hung between two dogs, and with the head downward. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, all they possessed, being derived from the practice of usury, might be justly confiscated, and if they were ever permitted to pursue that practice unmolested, it was only because they were already so hopelessly damned that no crime could aggravate their condition.

Certainly the heroism of the defenders of every other creed fades into insignificance before this martyr people, who for thirteen centuries confronted all the evils that the fiercest fanaticism could devise, enduring obloquy and spoliation and the violation of the dearest ties, and the infliction of the most hideous sufferings, rather than abandon their faith. For these were no ascetic monks, dead to all the hopes and passions of life, but were men who appreciated intensely the worldly advantages they relinquished, and whose affections had become all the more lively on account

of the narrow circle in which they were confined. Enthusiasm and the strange phenomena of ecstasy, which have exercised so large an influence in the history of persecution, which have nerved so many martyrs with superhuman courage, and have deadened or destroyed the anguish of so many fearful tortures, were here almost unknown. Persecution came to the Jewish nation in its most horrible forms, yet surrounded by every circumstance of petty annoyance that could destroy its grandeur, and it continued for centuries their abiding portion.<sup>1</sup>

It continued, and as we have seen, it still continues. But now, because the principle of the rights of national minorities has been incorporated into the law of nations, because of the Balfour Declaration and the Treaty of San Remo, it should not, if science maintains its momentum of growth and industry its pace of expansion, fail to end. These principles and treaties are conclusions, not beginnings. They are signs and portents of a profound alteration in the mind and commonsense of the western world. Their effective realization is still remote, difficult, full of travail, but the significant thing is that they could be formulated and uttered at all. Their very being as law enables and initiates their culmination as fact. They renaturalize the Jew as Jew in the world from which he has been kept outlaw for sixteen hundred years. They abolish the ambiguity of the Jewish position. They destroy at a stroke the compulsion upon the individual Jew to commit moral suicide in order to attain civil freedom or social equality. The Treaty of San Remo liberates both the Jew who wishes to assimilate his entity to such non-Jewish nationalities as he selects and as will

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<sup>1</sup>"The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe," II. ch. 6.

receive him, and the Jew who wishes to identify himself wholly and completely with his own people. It liberates the former because it supplies him with a fixed and unmistakable centre of reference with regard to which he may at last say, beyond cavil or question, "I am part and parcel of that," or "I am not part and parcel of that"; it gives him an equal status with the Frenchman or Englishman or Belgian or Servian or Italian in this respect. If these, or the members of any other European nationality, constitute no problem like the Jewish problem, it is because they have never been outlawed by a theological system in which they were an integral item from the fellowship of mankind, and particularly because these peoples actually inhabit as majorities politically definite areas universally acknowledged to be their homelands. The establishment by public law of the ancient home of the Jewish people as their actual centre of life and labour cannot fail to work the same effect upon the Jewish position. Enabling the assimilator freely at last to assimilate, it at the same time enables the Jew who wishes to realize all the potentialities of his life as a Jew, to find himself in an integrated, organic, free Jewish society, where he may fulfil himself Jewishly without let or hindrance, where he may be completely a Jew without being penalized for his preference, where being a Jew shall no longer be identical with possessing the perverse and psychopathic traits of a persecuted people.

That these ends can be attained only in Palestine, the whole character of the great tradition of Europe and of the Jewish national aspiration as a part of that tradition goes to show. However, let Mr. Balfour



himself speak on this matter; in the course of his introduction<sup>1</sup> to Sokolow's "History of Zionism" he writes:

. . . Why it may be asked, is local sentiment to be more considered in the case of the Jew than (say) in that of the Christian or the Buddhist? All historic religions rouse feelings which cluster round the places made memorable by the words and deeds, the lives and deaths of those who brought them into being.

Doubtless these feelings should always be treated with respect; but no one suggests that the regions where these venerable sites are to be found should, of set purpose and with much anxious contrivance, be colonized by the spiritual descendants of those who originally made them famous. If the centuries have brought no change of ownership or occupancy we are well content. But if it be otherwise, we make no effort to reverse the course of history. None suggest that we should plant Buddhist colonies in India, the ancient home of Buddhism, or renew in favour of Christendom the crusading adventures of our mediæval ancestors. Yet, if this be wisdom when we are dealing with Buddhism and Christianity, why, it may be asked, is it not also wisdom when we are dealing with Judaism and the Jews?

The answer is, that the cases are not parallel. The position of the Jews is unique. For them race, religion, and country are inter-related as in the case of no other race, no other religion, and no other country on earth. In no other case are the believers in one of the greatest religions of the world to be found (speaking broadly) only among the members of a single small people; in the case of no other religion is its past development so intimately bound up with the long political history of a petty territory wedged in between states more powerful far than it could ever be; in the case of no other religion are its aspirations and hopes expressed in language and imagery so utterly dependent for their meaning on the conviction that only from this one land, only through this one history, only by this one people, is full religious

<sup>1</sup>Reprinted in pamphlet form by the Zionist Organization of America.

knowledge to spread through all the world. By a strange and most unhappy fate it is this people of all others which, retaining to the full its racial self-consciousness, has been severed from its home, has wandered into all lands, and has nowhere been able to create for itself an organized social commonwealth. Only Zionism—so at least Zionists believe—can provide some mitigation of this great tragedy of the Jewish people.

Doubtless there are difficulties, doubtless there are objections—great difficulties, very real objections. And it is, I suspect, among the Jews themselves that these are most acutely felt. Yet no one can reasonably doubt that if, as I believe, Zionism can be developed into a working scheme, the benefit it would bring to the Jewish people, especially perhaps to that section of it which most deserves our pity, would be great and lasting. It is not merely that large numbers of them would thus find a refuge from religious and social persecution; but that they would bear corporate responsibilities and enjoy corporate opportunities of a kind which, from the nature of the case, they can never possess as citizens of any non-Jewish state. It is charged against them by their critics that they now employ their great gifts to exploit for personal ends a civilization which they have not created in communities they do little to maintain. The accusation thus formulated is manifestly false. But it is no doubt true that in large parts of Europe their loyalty to the state in which they dwell is (to put it mildly) feeble compared with their loyalty to their religion and their race. How, indeed, could it be otherwise? In none of the regions of which I speak have they been given the advantage of equal citizenship; in some they have been given no right of citizenship at all. Great suffering is the inevitable result; but not suffering alone. Other evils follow which aggravate the original mischief. Constant oppression, with occasional outbursts of violent persecution, are apt either to crush their victims, or to develop in them self-protecting qualities which do not always assume an attractive shape. The Jews have never been crushed. Neither cruelty nor contempt, neither unequal laws nor illegal oppression, have

ever broken their spirit, or shattered their unconquerable hopes. But it may well be true that, where they have been compelled to live among their neighbours as if these were their enemies, they have often obtained and sometimes deserved the reputation of being undesirable citizens. Nor is this surprising. If you oblige many men to be money-lenders, some will assuredly be usurers. If you treat an important section of the community as outcasts they will hardly shine as patriots. Thus does intolerance blindly labour to create the justification for its own excesses.

It seems evident that, for these and other reasons, Zionism will mitigate the lot and elevate the status of no negligible fraction of the Jewish race. Those who go to Palestine will not be like those who migrate to London or New York. They will not be animated merely by the desire to lead in happier surroundings the kind of life they formerly led in eastern Europe. They will go in order to join a civil community which completely harmonizes with their historical and religious sentiments; a community bound to the land it inhabits by something deeper even than custom: a community whose members will suffer from no unequal laws under which they are forced to live. To them the material gain should be great; but surely the spiritual gain will be greater still.

But these, it will be said, are not the only Jews whose welfare we have to consider. Granting, if only for argument's sake, that Zionism will on them confer a benefit, will it not inflict an injury upon others who, though Jews by descent, and often by religion, desire wholly to identify themselves with the life of the country wherein they have made their home? Among these are to be found some of the most gifted members of the race. Their ranks contain (at least, so I think) more than their proportionate share of the world's supply of men distinguished in science and philosophy, literature and art and medicine, politics and law. (Of finance and business I need say nothing.)

Now there is no doubt that many of this class look with a certain measure of suspicion and even dislike upon the Zionist movement. They fear that it will adversely affect

their position in the country of their adoption. The great majority of them have no desire to settle in Palestine. Even supposing a Zionist community were established, they would not join it. But they seem to think (if I understand them rightly) that so soon as such a community came into being men of Jewish blood, still more men of Jewish religion, would be regarded by unkindly critics as out of place elsewhere. The ancient home having been restored to them they would be expected to reside there.

I cannot share these fears. I do not deny that, in some countries where legal equality is not firmly established, Jews may still be regarded with a certain measure of prejudice. But this prejudice, where it exists, is not due to Zionism, nor will Zionism embitter it. The tendency should surely be the other way. Everything which assimilates the national and international status of the Jews to that of other races ought to mitigate what remains of ancient antipathies; and evidently this assimilation would be promoted by giving them that which all other nations possess: a local habitation and a national home.

Mr. Balfour, although a statesman, is an understanding man. His eye, in this instance, at least, is upon those essential trends in society which determine the success or failure of the expedients of politicians and the devices of diplomacy. He recognized the extraordinary rôle of Palestine in the Jewish psyche; he observes the effects on that psyche of outlawry and persecution, and he is explicit in his recognition that the solution of the difficulty inherent in the Jewish position must lie in that equalization of status for both the group and the individual which is the essence of democracy. Equality of status does not mean, it must be remembered, identity of character or function. It means, if anything, freedom for the development and operation of differences of character and

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function in which progress consists. The assimilation of "the national and international status of the Jews to that of other races" cannot fail not only "to mitigate what remains of ancient antipathies," it cannot fail to reënforce also and to invigorate that new tendency of the European mind whereby a European statesman of conservative principles can be so oblivious of an ancient tradition as to utter the sentiment for equalization as a principle and lay it down as a programme.

## CHAPTER XIX

### “VITA NUOVA?”

BY THE Treaty of San Remo the Jews are faced with a problem unprecedented in the history of their Diaspora. The treaty is a legal formula, a promissory note, whose ultimate validation depends far more upon those to whom it is given than those by whom it is given. Speed and range are essential to the success of the validation, and both hang upon the adequacy of the reorientation of the Jewish position which the implications of the treaty require. There is no help toward this reorientation in a study of the past; nor has there been any preparation for it in the present. The situation demanding it has ripened so swiftly and under conditions of so much doubt and anxiety that if the confusion of counsel prevailing among the Jews is any indication, its coming has taken them by surprise. Within six of the most trying years in the history of the western world, six of the most bitterly tragic years in the history of the Jews, a tradition of consolatory aspiration has been precipitated into a condition of compelling fact. By public law and international guarantees of hope of Zion, which was an age-old sentiment and a compensatory fantasy, has been turned into the hope of Zion which is the hard, barren, sordid geographical and ethnographic reality of Palestine, with its needs of economic rehabilitation

and cultural development, its political complications and religious cross-currents, its problems of public health and social justice. Although in recent years much has been written, written voluminously and with a supremely knowing air, particularly by the experts-by-book in whom Jewish Palestine abounds, on the problems of the construction of the Jewish homeland, what has been written remains in the realm of the pleasant—and irrelevant—speculation that has been characteristic of the productions in this field from the beginning of the Hovevei Zion activity in Palestine.<sup>1</sup> Nor do the only less official activities of the bureaus of the World Zionist Organization and of its advisory bodies appear to have been more pertinent.<sup>2</sup> The fact is that the validation of the Balfour Declaration by public law finds the Jews—both the masses of the people and the organized Zionists—unprepared; the continental communities stripped and broken and despairful; the Americans exhausted by the political and financial efforts compelled by the war; the British too confused by the political entanglements and too retarded by the weight of tradition, which counts much more heavily among the Jews of England than of America. Here at last is the salutation which has been the sustaining hope of the heart of Jewry through the bitter ages, challenging them to new life. Yet the manner in which they respond to it leaves room to doubt

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<sup>1</sup>Oettinger: “Colonization in Palestine”; Ruppin: “Der Aufbau des Landes Israel”; Oppenheimer: “Merchavia”; Poale Zion Commission: “Report on the Work in Palestine.”

<sup>2</sup>Only the surveys and the proposals of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration, to which the Zionists were not permitted access, had any regard for the realities of the Palestinian economy—such regard as is possible to the capitalistically minded. Such Zionist proposals as have been printed somehow keep reminding one of the schemes of Col. Sellars.

whether the attainment of this new life shall not become a process painful, lingering, and—disillusioning.

The reason is that the decision of San Remo effects what is practically a magical change, what is tantamount to a metaphysical transvaluation in the character and significance of Palestine for the Jewish people. And how quickly and completely they adjust themselves to this transvaluation must needs be a large item in the settlement of their fate. Some inference regarding the psychology of this adjustment may be drawn from the astounding parade which took place, on May 25, 1920, on Fifth Avenue, in New York City. The marchers in this parade came from all the strata of Jewish society in America—millionaire merchants, rabbis, great bourgeois and little bourgeois, workingmen, veterans of the Great War, legionaries returned from Palestine, children, women. They intoned psalms and they sang songs. And there was that in their voices and that in their glances as they marched and sang, they the freest and most secularized of the Jews of the world, which brought to mind what one had read of religious demonstrations in the Middle Ages, what one had seen of great evangelical revival meetings in one's own time. The phenomenon was a religious phenomenon, a release and outpouring of hidden streams of feeling, and bearing the ideology of an immemorial past.

To these also, in the moment of crisis—even joyful crisis—Palestine, which had been changed from an ideal centre of other-worldly emotion into a locus of practical endeavour, became religious again. The crisis simply



brought a reversion of mind to that basic other-worldly tendency whose mitigation has been the chief function and best effect of secular Zionism. If the mood of the parading crowds on Fifth Avenue has a meaning, the meaning is that for the Diaspora at least there is the danger that Zion will remain what it always has been—a compensatory ideal. Those who do not live in Palestine have ever been too ready to give as a somehow religious duty, and those who do live in Palestine have been ever too ready to take as a somehow religious right, what, is after all, nothing more or less than charity.<sup>1</sup> The Zionist organization, in a very great degree in spite of itself, has been an eleemosynary institution, and the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, only in very sporadic instances in spite of themselves, have been objects of philanthropy. The emotional survivals which manifest themselves by the readiness of Jewry outside the land to give become with the application of the Treaty of San Remo a thing sinister: the continuance of the eleemosynary activities acquires an ominous import. Their discontinuance, or rather, their alteration into a programme relevant to the new status of Palestine, requires a change of heart which conditions on the European continent to a large degree preclude, and of which at the present writing<sup>2</sup> there is no sign in England or in America. Nowhere except among the handful of American leaders does there appear to be any adequate realization that Palestine is not any longer a symbolic vision of an other-worldly future of salvation from death and the fear of death; that Palestine is at last a present solid and

<sup>1</sup> *Vid. supra*, Chapters IX and X.

<sup>2</sup> July, 1921.

coercive fact, whose saving power can be brought into operation only by swift and extensive readjustments of temper and attitude; readjustments, moreover, not merely to Palestine, *an und für sich*, as Hegel used to say, but to the specific and concrete and living Palestine which is a node in a network of complicated relationships that stretch from England to India and around the world, involving the whole economic process of modern civilization, with its political and ethnographical and religious relationships.

This Palestine, the Palestine that has been the object of racial rivalries and the subject of imperialist exploitation, the Palestine of the Arab fellahin and the Jewish *Halukah*-takers, the Palestine that Allenby conquered and that the Treaty of San Remo allocated, this and no other it is that the Jews are to build their national home upon. And this Palestine is a challenge—no easy one—to the competency, the realism, and the moral enthusiasm of the Jews of the entire world. The meeting of this challenge—the success of which alone can establish that normalization of the Jewish position in which all Jews have a stake—will be watched by a world far from unanimous in its friendliness. Our survey of the mind of Europe, past and present, regarding the Jews shows that the climax has been reached. The alternative to success in Palestine and coördinately, normalization in the Diaspora, is destruction—violently as in central Europe, or through progressively swifter assimilation as in the United States. But the old ambiguity of the Jewish position is doomed.

The situation created by the San Remo decision thus demands from the Jews a new attitude and new func-

tions. In the course of time, the situation would no doubt evoke the attitude appropriate to itself; but time is here, as in military operations, an essential in determining failure or success. The new attitude must be created as foresight and establish itself as habit, instead of merely establishing itself as habit; it must be a plan before it is a process. The new functions require new organs, and these again cannot be waited for to grow; they must be created *ad hoc*. Hence, in its present form, the Zionist organization is irrelevant to the realities of the Zionist position. Secular though the movement it expresses may be, it rests, nevertheless, upon a fund of unconscious feelings and trends which are introverted, compensatory, and defensive rather than objective and adjustive. As a consequence, its fiscal institutions, for example, have not been conspicuous for economic insight or even intelligent administration. Both the Jewish Colonial Trust with its subsidiaries and the Jewish National Fund are in need of fundamental reorganization—in method, function, and personnel. Their assets must be made liquid, their bookkeeping modern, and their policies regardful of the realities of a Palestine to be settled by self-supporting and not supported Jews.

The other institutions of the movement, again, its Congress and its executive agencies, have been too much postulated upon propaganda and philanthropy. Inevitably so, no doubt, since the Jews have so long been a disfranchised and landless people, and the only peculiar institutions they have been able to develop in the course of their long life in Europe have been those of their religion, their charity, and their literary culture. But whatever the reason, Zionism has been over too great a

period dominated by cultural conceptions to the exclusion of more fundamental economic and political ones,<sup>1</sup> and its leadership had, prior to the war, been drawn too exclusively from journalists, orators, lay preachers, schoolmasters, and such, all excellent for purposes of propaganda and instruction, helpless, as events showed again and again, particularly during the years of the war, to meet fundamental situations in fundamental terms. What the war created as an occasion, the peace converts into constant necessity. The international Zionist organization needs a complete recasting of its form and technique if it is effectively to carry out its new functions. It needs a complete overhauling of its personnel. In this, it is face to face with its acid test. Its leadership is face to face with its acid test. For such an overhauling and reconstruction require a decision between public duty and personal position which those who are acquainted with the temperament of the orator and writer and such know is neither easy nor a foregone conclusion. A propaganda organization whose object invariably touches off fundamental emotions and whose realization is remote easily becomes an end in itself at the expense of its object—political parties are perennial examples—the instrument displaces the end, the camel drives the master from the tent. A rehabilitation of the essential relationships may then become extremely difficult or even impossible. This is a danger of which the Zionists may well beware.

The purpose of Zionism is now the effective establishment of the Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. Logically, if this purpose can be best accomplished

<sup>1</sup>Cf. *supra*, Chapters VII and VIII.

through keeping the Zionist organization intact, then it should be kept intact. If it can be best accomplished by entirely making over the Zionist organization, then it should be made over, and if it can be best accomplished by abolishing the Zionist organization, then it should be abolished. Of course no such logical consideration of alternatives is likely to take place; the same trend by which a child clings for years to a rag-doll, in spite of many better-made and more satisfactory playthings, makes men cling to antiquated tools and survival-types of organization, particularly if their vanities and sense of personal worth and achievement cohere in them: livelihoods need in this connection not be mentioned, for there are none or few. In the case of the Zionists, thus, the problem is critical.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Since the above was written news comes from London bearing out the analysis. At the Annual Conference of 1920, Mr. Justice Brandeis proposed a fundamental reconstruction that would actually have subordinated the organization to its purposes and that would have created for it organs adequate to the new functions which the situation requires. The proposal failed of acceptance, largely through the type of motive discussed above. The subsequent activities of the officers of the international organization seem to have been determined thereby to the point of a complete break with the realistic American leaders who demanded that administrative integrity should replace sentimental looseness, and the economic needs of Palestine should take precedence over the organization politics of Zionism. This demand was apparently granted. The business of the new Inner Actions Committee which was chosen at the London Conference was to be reorganization and retrenchment in both London and Jerusalem, and construction in Palestine. A Reorganization Commission, with full power, was appointed to undertake the work in Palestine. But its activities were nullified before they were begun, and two members of the Commission, Messrs Simon and DeLieme, who were also members of Inner Actions Committee, were forced into resignation. The immediate cause of their resignation was a secret agreement made by Doctor Weismann with M. Jabotinaky by which M. Jabotinaky, who had failed of election to the Inner Actions Committee at the London Conference, was to be added to it, with the understanding that the conditions on which he assumed membership would be met. These conditions were that the controls which the World Zionist Organization exercised over the Keren Hayesod would be abolished. The Keren Hayesod, or Foundation Fund, was the new fiscal agency which had, by a

It is the more critical because, without its solution, there cannot be accomplished, within a reasonable time, that change in the Jewish habit of mind regarding Palestine upon which the successful establishment of the Jewish homeland is postulated. Both the feeling and action of the people need to be redirected so as to work in relevant and not defensive or compensatory ways toward the upbuilding of the restored Jewish homeland. Such a redirection cannot be accomplished

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vague resolution, been ordered by the London Conference. Its control was like that of the other financial institutions of the Zionist Movement, kept in the hands of the World Zionist Organization by giving it fifty-one per cent. of the voting power, which was exercised for it by a governor appointed for that purpose by the Inner Actions Committee. It was this control that was abolished. Under the charter which was subsequently drawn for it, the Keren Hayesod becomes a corporation with unlimited powers, of such a sort that it may displace both the Zionist Congress and its executive agencies. The American leaders were opposed to this. They had found reason to mistrust the integrity and the competency of some of the administrative officers in both London and Palestine. These, they had discovered, had been constantly exceeding the budget, had diverted trust-funds to meet current expenses; had, without authority or right, made use of non-Zionist monies for Zionist purposes, and violated the integrity and broken the statutes of the Jewish National Fund.

-- The explanations offered by Doctor Weismann for himself and his colleagues were those of emergency and necessity. They rationalized these explanations in terms of what they called a "philosophy" of the Zionist position—namely, that Palestine and the Jewish National Home are not identical, and that it is the business of the Zionists to make the two identical. Differences of opinion and policy between the representatives of the national Jewish interest in Palestine and the British colonial interest were not only possible, they were inevitable. Jewish activities in Palestine must be such as would be sure to attain the Jewish objective. Although those of the mandatory would often be in harmony with them, quite as often they would not be. Hence the need for the Keren Hayesod, hence the justification of budgetary looseness and the other irregularities. Hence the need for a strong centralized Zionist organization, for terms in the Diaspora, for Diaspora Nationalism, and all the complications of a propaganda-organization.

To which the American reply indicates that the American leaders agree with the "philosophy," but do not see how the conclusions of Dr. Weismann and his colleagues can be drawn from the premises it supplies. With respect to the Keren Hayesod, to budgetary and other irregularities, they drew the exactly opposite conclusions. (See the Annual Report of Zionist Organization of America, for the period November 1, 1920, to May 31, 1921, particularly, Exhibit 3.) The differences did not lie in "philosophy." They lay in the fact that the Americans were thinking in terms of the economic actualities

through propaganda merely. Whatever success accrued to the propagandist movement, prior to the Great War, was itself something in the nature of an unearned increment upon the existing funds of feeling and the instituted will of the Jewish masses regarding Palestine. The corrective and salvational character of the feeling has already been indicated; it keeps Palestine still so much a gratifying fantasy in the consciousness of the masses that they resent any realistic

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of Palestine and the Diaspora, and the Europeans were thinking in terms of the political complications within the Zionist Organization. Consequently, Doctor Weizmann and his colleagues resented the resolution adopted by the Convention of the Zionist Organization of America at Buffalo, on November 28, 1921, which separated donation from investment funds, and otherwise sought to keep Zionist activity in Palestine on solid ground. In answer to his letter embodying his objections, Judge Mack was directed by the National Executive Committee to formulate a reply which should embody “a detailed statement on the position of the American Organization.” This reply took the form of a memorandum (Exhibit 3 of the Report mentioned above) which was submitted to Doctor Weizmann on his arrival in the United States in April accompanied by Messrs. Ussishkin and Mossinsohn, from Palestine, and conducting Albert Einstein.

Negotiations began which revealed at once a deep fissure between the American leaders on the one side and the Europeans on the other. In the National Executive Committee itself a minority, the customary opposition, had voted against the memorandum and had dissociated itself from its representations. This minority took sides with Weizmann and his colleagues. As time went on, the fissure widened and deepened. The Yiddish press, with the exception of one paper, was solid against the American leaders. The minority conducted a powerful propaganda against them. The accusation, made by Weizmann even before the London Conference, that they contemplated a Zionist “Monroe Doctrine,” and taken up by the American opposition after the Conference as a rallying cry, was shouted from the housetops. They were accused of secession from the World Zionist Organization, they were accused of rebellion against the duly-constituted authority of Weizmann and his Keren Hayesod. They were particularly accused of being disregardful of the respect due to distinguished guests. It was said that they were not Jews, that they did not understand the heart of the Jewish people; that they were autocrats, out of touch with the democracy.

That they were out of touch, and very completely out of touch, soon became obvious. The facts they pointed to, the records they published, were denounced by the press and the minority as exaggerations or mitigated as “emergencies.” Their explanation that far from seceding, it was they who were protecting the integrity of the World Zionist Organization from usurpation fell on deaf ears. Their plea that they were seeking to protect the honour of the World Zionist Organization by securing standards of trustee-

account of its own character or that of its Jewish inhabitants. To overcome this, how much careful teaching will they not need that a happy Palestine to-morrow implies complete disillusion about Palestine's to-day. They will require a new ideology, a new philosophy of Zion, established as habit in thought and in action, through a new objective, new institutions, and a new technique. There should be no fear that

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ship and the customary safeguards for trust funds was ignored. That the officers of administration in Palestine "did not put the money in their own pockets" but used it for Zionist purposes was regarded as sufficient vindication of their honesty and their efficiency. "Our Weismann," "Our Ussishkin," Zionists for so long, the press and the orators declared, could do no wrong; these accusations grew out of the secessionism of the autocratic newcomers in the movement, like Mack and Brandeis. In a word, American Jewry was in the grip of a wave of emotion, a religion-like frenzy with Weismann and the Keren Hayesod as its objects of worship, which made it as impervious to the realities of the case as any country community under the influence of the evangelical revivalist. Pledges of all sorts and sizes were made to the Keren Hayesod which Weismann formally opened by proclamation on April 17, 1921. Reception committees were organized and passionate meetings held. The delegates to the Convention which the majority of the Executive Committee decided to call for a determination of the issue, were overwhelmingly instructed against Judge Mack and his administration. Upon the rejection of his report, by a vote of 129 to 75—acceptance would have been tantamount to a vote of confidence—he and more than two thirds of the Executive Committee resigned, declaring at the same time that they could not hold any office in the Zionist Organization so long as it was opposed to the principles for which they stood. Simultaneously, a letter was read from M. Justice Brandeis endorsing the stand taken by Judge Mack and his associates, and resigning as Honorary President of the Zionist Organization of America. He has also tendered his resignation as Honorary President of the World Zionist Organization.

Thus, in the United States, in Europe and in Palestine, the responsibility for the future, so far as it is in the hands of the Zionist Organization, falls squarely and unequivocally upon the pre-war propagandist group. The American leadership—for although rejected by a majority they will be responded to as a leadership because of their distinction of character, their position in public life, their moral authority, and their unparalleled services to the cause—are now liberated from the restrictions set upon their work for Palestine by the past and politics of the Zionist Organization. They can go at the task of upbuilding Jewish Palestine as a living economy without internal hindrance. At the conference they held with their followers in Cleveland after the rejection of Judge Mack's report, they determined to do so. Time alone can show whether they are capable of the success in which must lie their vindication.



such a philosophy need or can be a break with the old. It will differ from the old because inevitably it must rest upon a different set of determining conditions and must consist of the development and rounding-out of the implications of these conditions; but within this development the old cannot fail to be absorbed and transmuted.

These determining conditions are organically inter-related. They differ from those which grounded the Basle Programme in that they are positive rather than negative. The conditions that led Herzl to his great enterprise still, as we have seen, obtain and are likely to obtain, for generations to come. But now they are essentially at the periphery of the Jews' problem, not at its centre. With the San Remo decision the Basle Programme has been realized. And with the realization of the Basle programme the centre of the Jews' problem has shifted from the Diaspora to Palestine. Americans have expressed the change in the formula that the Basle Programme must be replaced by the Pittsburgh Programme. What they mean is that the nature of the free Jewish commonwealth, which in the fullness of time is to grow up and function in Palestine, has become the norm-giving objective in the affairs of the Jewish people.

The conditions which set the formal limits and imply the constitutional pattern of this commonwealth are, broadly speaking, of three orders—political, ethnographic, and economic. Of these the first is the most immediate, closest to the apparent and given motives of men; the second is the most instinctive, but manifest rather in terms of æsthetic and religion, in terms of cultural nationality; the last is the most coercive,

determining the form of the community, its tempo, and its power.

To consider them in their order:

## I

The political complex in which Palestine is an item exhibits the same duplexity which has already been observed in the Treaty of Versailles, its consequents and derivatives. The elements of this duplexity are an imperialistic drive in foreign policy coupled with what is practically a class-war in domestic affairs. The more sharply defined the latter is, the more uncertain and vacillating is the former. Thus, the strength of the Labour Party in Great Britain can be measured by the changes in the Government's policy toward Egypt, toward India, toward Mesopotamia, toward Russia. The changes in all these items are in the direction indicated by the ideology of the Fourteen Points—national self-government, democracy, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. In France, on the other hand, which has a prevalingly agricultural economy, organized labour is weak, and the imperialism of the French has become the effective successor of the imperialism of the Germans. The weakness may be measured by the treatment accorded by the French to the Syrians, to Feisal; by their intrigues in central Europe with Poland and Hungary against Russia, and in America with political opponents of the government against President Wilson's conception of peace terms and the League of Nations.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>*Cf.* the press reports of conferences between Senator Lodge and French officials regarding peace terms during the winter and summer of 1919 and the announcement of a set of terms by Senator Lodge remarkably like those

Now the governments of both France and Great Britain are pledged to the realization of the Balfour Declaration in fact. Both have underwritten it in the Treaty of San Remo.

But here the similarity ends. For the French this underwriting is an item incidental to the game of imperialism, to be adhered to or repudiated as advantage and opportunity require. The underwriting is an action of the French Government to which the French people are indifferent or slightly hostile, but in which they have no direct emotional or practical concern. For the English, on the other hand, the underwriting has a background of extensive and thorough-going public discussion. It is an action representing—bar certain vested missionary and ecclesiastical interests and professional anti-Semites—the united will of all the people. Not the government alone, the Opposition also, stands behind the Balfour Declaration. It was the pressure of the Labour Party, quite as much as the pledges of the government, that made that declaration a part of the law of nations at San Remo. It was the pressure of the Labour Party most of all that overcame the opposition of the militarists and made Great Britain directly responsible for the fulfilment of the terms of the declaration by demanding the acceptance of the mandate for Palestine under those terms. The Labour Party, from the time that it first took a stand on the objects of the war<sup>1</sup> to the present day, has been staunchly and actively sympathetic to the Zionist endeavour. Its first step in support

of the French agent, Chéradame. Later, the announcement made by the Republican candidate for President, Senator, now President Harding, of a conference with a French emissary regarding the League of Nations.

<sup>1</sup>*Cf.* Statement on War Aims.

was taken not without hesitation. Its last was taken in full confidence. It was taken in full confidence because it saw in the rebuilding of a Jewish homeland in Palestine an opportunity not only to right a historic wrong, but to try out within the limits of conscious and technical control an important experiment in creative democracy; because it regarded the Pittsburgh Programme of the American Zionists as a pledge that conditions permitting this experiment would be<sup>1</sup> conscientiously attempted. It knew that the terms of this programme were written into the draft form of the mandate presented by the Zionists to the British Government for consideration. And whether the terms are accepted by the British Foreign Office depends largely, again, on the pressure that the public opinion of Great Britain may bring to bear. For, although the mandate is issued, its terms are not yet established, and whether the San Remo decision may become a decision in fact as well as in law, whether a Jewish commonwealth shall ultimately grow up in Palestine, in what manner, and what kind of commonwealth, depends to a very large degree upon the terms of the mandate. These terms are in Great Britain a domestic issue with imperialistic implications. They may become, they should be, if the Foreign Office should prefer the programme of the militarists to the endeavour of the Zionists, an item in the struggle between owners and workers which has marked the recent domestic history of Great Britain.

But they are implied, perhaps even more fundamentally, in the duel of empire. For the economy of Palestine, the number of people it can support, its

<sup>1</sup>Cf. *The London Daily Herald*, March 25, 1920.

cultural status and social organization must depend very largely upon the degree of industrialization it can attain. Industrialization depends on power, and in Palestine at the present stage of technical control of power, power on any scale can be nothing except water-power, and water-power is a matter of boundaries, particularly of the northern boundaries. The whole future of Palestine is in the hands of the state which controls the Litani, the Yarmuk, and the headwaters of the Jordan. And just now that state is imperialistic France to whose rulers Palestine is a mere pawn in their imperialistic game. The French Government has, according to occasion, taken conflicting attitudes regarding Palestine. It is committed to the Balfour Declaration and its consequences. It has also made counter commitments to the Lebanon and to the scattered handful of pro-French pan-Syrians. It is, however, in no degree much concerned with either. Its dispute with Britain over the northern boundary of Palestine is an item less pertinent to its Syrian than to its European policy. It is demanding the letter of the secret and repudiated Sykes-Picot Treaty and the full measure of the tripartite agreement that it may in return for conceding the letter receive a substantial concession regarding Russia or Germany or central Europe. It may well be content to wreck Jewish Palestine if it can thereby gain some advantage for the international finance whose headquarters is in France. That, in the tentative agreements regarding the northern boundary<sup>1</sup> it has not done so, is to its

<sup>1</sup>The agreement concedes to the Zionists the use of the waters of the upper Jordan and the Yarmuk under an arrangement to be worked out by French and Zionist technicians. The Zionists desire the inclusion of the Valley of the Yarmuk and the headwaters of the Jordan under the British mandate.

credit, but is to be associated with the reparations conferences.

Now, however the boundary disputes will be determined, the practical question for the Jews is clearly the question, not of present advantage with the powers that be but of harmony in the long run with the trend of life in Great Britain which will dominate domestic activities and establish ideals. That this trend is toward industrial democracy need not be argued: it is predestined, and only the destruction of industrial society can liberate it from its destiny. A vicious boundary is much less troublesome, in an experiment like Jewish Palestine, than an antipathetic public opinion in the country whose public opinion is the sole effective sustaining force of the experiment. The minds of the present active officials of the international Zion'st organization do not, however, reveal any adequacy to think in terms of the long run here indicated. By background, training, aptitude, and outlook they express at best the liberalism and sentimentality of the mid-Victorian ideals that are the mental furniture of the American progressive. They exhibit an obvious taste for diplomacy, and a distinct distaste, particularly in England, for political and economic realism. If they are without the fanatical intransigence of the Zeiri Zionists and the Poale Zionists of the continent, they lack also the saving cynicism whose absence makes diplomacy a losing game. They are at once too sincere for diplomatic guile, and too wordly-wise for revolutionary force. In a word, they are sentimentalists, and they are sentimentalists in a position requiring the clearest and coldest realization of specific

living trends—in England first and then in Asia Minor.

II

For the difficulty that attaches to the political situation in England attaches in like manner to the whole social situation in Asia Minor. The sentimentalism of the Jews—manifested in its most vicious form in the conduct of the business of the Palestine Commission by Menahem Ussishkin (a conduct which repelled the English and angered the Arabs)—prevents the clear realization of the conditions that must determine ethnographic adjustment not only between the Jews and the other Palestinians, but between the Jews and the other non-Turkish peoples of Asia Minor. Of these the Arabic-speaking peoples constitute the great majority. Tradition—truly or falsely, does not matter—declares a blood relationship to exist between them and the Jews. History, far more explicit and verifiable, records a cultural coöperation between them, lasting through the Golden Age of Arab civilization. The exigencies of imperialism have imposed upon both a common political interest in the preservation of their corporate integrities. Feisal, when the French displayed their conception of the mandatory principle (under which the mandates are to be issued with the consent of the people concerned), by driving him out of Damascus and imposing by force their overlordship on his kingdom, declared that his people must appeal for the coöperation of the Zionists. Similarly, the Jews are not unlikely to find that the terms of the mandate which the imperialistic and military clique will allow are such as will facilitate the complete shift of the base of defense of the Suez Canal

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from Egypt to Palestine and the security of the Arab hinterland, but are not such as will facilitate the swift and adequate development of Palestine as a Jewish homeland.<sup>1</sup> They will then need even more absolutely than now the sympathy, the good-will, and the coöperation of their Arab neighbours. The cultivation of good relations with the Arabs becomes thus the foremost desideratum of a realistic Jewish policy.

Such a cultivation can, at the outset, be political only in one respect. That respect is, however, fundamental to the effective foundation of a new international order. It is in respect of the mandatory principle laid down in the covenant of the League of Nations and underwritten by very nearly all the civilized states in the world. Whether this principle shall

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<sup>1</sup>A draft Mandate for Palestine has since this writing been laid before the Council of the League of Nations. So far as the Jews are concerned, it does nothing more than repeat and amplify the indeterminate formula of the Balfour declaration: to the mandatory, on the other hand, it assigns "all the powers inherent in the government of a sovereign state," including those of using the man-power, facilities, and resources of the land for military purposes, and completely controlling foreign affairs. It commits the mandatory to the development of Palestine as the "Jewish national home" whatever this may mean, and designates the Zionist Organization as the "Jewish Agency" to help it in this task, so long as this agency's "organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the mandatory appropriate." It permits the Palestine Administration to aid in the immigration of Jews to Palestine and their admission to citizenship there. It requires the administration to introduce "a land system appropriate to the needs of the country" and allows it "full power to provide" for public ownership and control of national resources, "public works, services, and utilities, and permits it to arrange with the Jewish agency" to develop or establish these on condition that profits shall be reasonable and excess profits shall be used for the benefit of the land. And it recognizes Hebrew as an official language. Its whole effect, so far as it concerns the Jews, is permissive far more than directive. Everything regarding them comes ultimately to depend upon the good-will of the Administration, not upon the compulsions of fundamental law. The inferences from this situation are obvious. The Arab riots in Jaffa on May 7, 1921, are a commentary on it; the latest exposition, in practically identical terms, by both Samuel and Churchill, of the meaning of the Balfour Declaration, limiting its scope, are a commentary on it. Both Jews and Arabs must beware; Jews, particularly.



be a hypocritical cloak for imperialistic exploitation or shall be carried out in good faith depends to-day exclusively upon the Jews and the Arabs. In the vindication of the mandatory principle they have absolutely a common cause before the bar of international justice.

They have in it absolutely a common enterprise toward the establishment of international peace. For the mandatory principle contains in itself the essential repudiation of imperialism and all its works. In the degree in which its provisions are successfully enforced, the financial exploitation of weaker peoples and the military collisions therein implicated become impossible. But the enforcement of the mandatory principle is hardly likely to arise out of the respect for it by the governments at present holding mandates. It will be compelled only by the peoples who are the subjects of the mandates, and of these peoples alone the Jews and Arabs have the competency to exact the attention and secure the support of the enlightened public opinion of the world. There is thus in the international position created for the Jews by the Treaty of San Remo and in the Arab connection something that the religious-minded would no doubt call predestination—the predestination of making real in some sense the prophecy of Isaiah that the law shall go forth from Jerusalem and the word of the Lord from Zion to the effect that men shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks, that nation shall not lift up the sword against nation nor learn war any more.

Such a culmination, obtained so far as may be through the enforcement of the mandatory principle, is no doubt a matter first of the effective confirmation

of the principle and then of the slow accumulation of precedents and the establishment of habits which would foreclose such default by mandatory powers as cannot in the nature of things fail to be attempted. Meanwhile, the validation of this common cause of Arab and Jew must rest upon a unity far more competent than merely common action under the covenant of the League of Nations. It requires a unity established through a meeting of minds, an interchange of intellectual culture, a coöperation in the public enterprises necessary to the smooth going and the progressive enrichment of the daily life of the two peoples. The Jews cannot too soon create in their University a Department of Arabic Life and Letters. They cannot too soon open all their schools, from the highest to the lowest, to the Arabs at home and abroad, and invite reciprocity. As Feisal has repeatedly pointed out, cultural communion must be coupled with economic coöperation, and the building up of Palestine must be accompanied by the development of Syria and Mesopotamia. The need is particularly great to raise the standard of living of the Palestinian fellah. Already the mere existence of the Jewish colonies, poor as they are, has done much for his wages and his health—this is one of the reasons for the animus of the effendi and the money-lender against Zionism. But there is still much to do. The fellah must be completely freed from the exploitation of the landlord and the usurer, and must receive the maximum opportunity for education in the Jewish schools and for the absorption of Jewish standards of life, labour, and thought. That this must be accomplished not by coercion but by contagion is, of course, obvious.

The fellah of Palestine is a case of the arrested development and enforced degradation typical of the whole Arabic-speaking and Mohammedan world. The cultural level on which he has found stability is barbarous. His rise above it is restricted by the accumulations of immemorial precepts, prescriptions, and taboos which even in the Bible appear in already vestigial form. From these he will need to be moved by attraction, not impulsion. With the Jewish avenues toward culture and occidentalism open, with no constraints from without, and particularly with the example of Jewish success and prosperity before his eyes, he will, in the course of time, of his own motion seek a status wherein he will help to elevate, as he now degrades, the standards and conditions of life of his European Jewish neighbour.

The ultimate outcome of such a process is, willy-nilly, likely to be, within Palestine, the assimilation to one another of Jew and Arab, and on the European level of life and culture; outside of Palestine, the realization of that confederation of the peoples of Asia Minor which Sir Mark Sykes dreamed of, and to which his unfortunate arrangement with Picot is to-day the most serious obstacle.

### III

If the political situation has its ethnographic implications and the ethnographic relations carry their political responsibilities, involving a condition and requiring a will to make effective the prophetic vision of international peace; so also the economic situation, which underlies both the others, has its implications. These involve a condition requiring a will to make

effective the prophetic vision of national righteousness.

The struggle to establish this righteousness seems to be the outstanding fact of the internal history of the ancient Jewish state. One of the most interesting things about the literature of that state is the absence of political writings. In other ancient states—the Athenian, for example—political form seems to be a paramount concern. With Plato and Aristotle, the political organization of the state is the outstanding preoccupation and their successors are legion. Ancient Hebrew literature seems to ignore altogether political forms. It seems to take them for granted, and the changes in Hebrew government seem to be changes necessitated by foreign, not by domestic, problems. The subject matter of the Prophets, of the two books of law, Leviticus and Deuteronomy, is the *economy* of the state.

The history of this economy can be summed up very briefly. When the Jews slowly conquered Canaan, the unit of military action was the tribe, and the land that was conquered became the property of the tribe as a whole. When it was distributed, the tribe received it first. Thus, Joshua distributes so much land to this tribe, so much to that tribe, and so on. The land went first into the possession of the tribal community. Then the community distributed it to the clans and families, and from these it could not be alienated except as subject to the right of preëmption by the next of kin. Transfer to persons outside the clan was not permitted. Nor, as is told in Numbers, could land be transferred from one tribe to another. At the outset, then, the land was divided among the families and each cultivated its own vine and fig-tree.

A process of subversion which seems to be universal

and endemic and as persistent as what is called natural law—it may be observed to-day in Texas even as then in Palestine or Greece—deprived the peasant freeholder first of his land, then perhaps of his children, his wife, and, finally, his freedom. In the next stage the community is, broadly speaking, a community of landowners on the one side and serfs and slaves who till the land of the landowners on the other. All the prophets, from Amos to Isaiah, are engaged in denouncing both the process and the condition. They are engaged in denouncing the whole system of inequalities that it developed, and their reforms are reforms which look primarily toward eliminating it and preventing its recurrence in the future. Deuteronomy is the first step taken toward this end, Leviticus the second. Between Deuteronomy and Leviticus came the Babylonian exile, and it is not improbable that the exiles' observation of land tenure and slavery in Babylon, no less than of religious ritual, had its influence on the drastic reconstruction formulated in the Levitical code. The heart of this code is the conception that the land belongs to the community as a whole and the ordination of an economy based on this conception. Under this economy land may be leased but not sold. The lease may be determined by the value not of the land, but of the crops prior to the year of jubilee. And if the original holder wishes to reclaim his land, he may do so, refunding the price. In the forty-ninth year land must be returned to him whether or no. Houses must be treated like land.

Similarly with respect to the tools of the labourer, his clothing, food, and so forth. Both Deuteronomy and Leviticus prohibit taking them as pledges. So

also with interest: it may not be taken from citizens, although it may from aliens.

The attempt is obviously to safeguard the lives and liberties of men against the menace involved in private ownership or control of natural resources, of the tools and instruments of their trades, and in financial exploitation. This is to-day familiar doctrine, and it is all that is substantial in the "righteousness" which the prophets imposed as the conditions of private and public security.

Deuteronomy and Leviticus reveal the pattern of the problem which the prophets anciently faced and the solutions which the prophets found. They have apparently set the standard for all time. Hardly any of the proposals of contemporary Utopians and thinkers, no matter how radical or how temporizingly statesmanlike, do more than envisage the same essential confrontations, and propound, in varying degrees, the same essential solutions. Modernly, however, the anatomy of the situation has been complicated by the addition of the automatic machine. The machine has added to the problem new factors and to its solution new elements. The difference between the tasks of Nehemiah and Samuel may turn on nothing else beside.

Now the effect of the automatic machine on the problem of livelihood in Palestine is to render impossible there economic self-sufficiency and a merely agricultural economy. Even the mass of the fellah, whose margin of sustenance is barely above the starvation point, have felt the influence of the machine and have become dependent on outside for necessities such as clothing, and more often than not, for food. The

Jews, with a much higher standard of living, even among the poorest of them, have so far not succeeded in establishing themselves in a merely agricultural—and so primitively agricultural!—Palestine. If Palestine is to become a Jewish commonwealth, hence, its agriculture will have to be industrialized at least to the degree in which it is industrialized in the United States, and in addition it will need to develop an industrial economy—particularly, perhaps, in terms of textiles—that can quickly absorb, employ, and support a large Jewish immigration.

But wherever industry has come, there have come radical modifications in the structure of society and a clash of interests—not, as we shall see, necessary—usually called the class war. New social formations have come into existence—banks, trusts, labour unions, regulative commissions, and so on. The country has been put at the mercy of the city and the farmer of the miller, the commission merchant and the banker. Thus, in the United States the clash between industrial worker and owner, taking form as the “labour” problem, is paralleled by the clash between producer and distributor, taking form in the “problem” of the Non-Partisan League. Similar situations are to be found everywhere. It is clear that nothing but advantage could accrue to Jewish Palestine if these situations could be averted from the outset. For the problem of constructing the Jewish commonwealth is already very complex and difficult. The mass of the new settlers will come from central and eastern Europe. That means that they will not be either emotionally or physically the stuff that pioneers are ordinarily made of: the Poles and Ukrainians and the

Hungarians and Rumanians have seen to that. Their organization, instruction, and activities will need to be such as will enable them to recover in the shortest possible time health, hope, and self-dependence, to evoke their initiative and to encourage them in the emulations of work; a morale will have to be created for them; and this in the presence and against the contagion of the lower economy and hope of the Arabs. To permit the complication of this problem by the addition of an unnecessary and dangerous "labour" problem would be the height of folly. Yet, since inertia, sentiment, and prejudice govern men more than either insight or hindsight one may not doubt that the height will be attained.

#### IV

Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to keep the development of Palestine on the plains of commonsense. This attempt is the Pittsburgh Programme. Its origin is to be sought in a series of discussions which began between some of the members of a small group of American Zionists calling themselves "Parushim," shortly after the publication of Mr. Balfour's letter to Lord Rothschild. The eight or nine men and women who participated in the discussion were of all shades of opinion and of all schools in economic thought. By common consent they determined to leave doctrine as nearly as possible to the doctrinaries and to face the problem of the economy of Palestine developing into a free Jewish commonwealth in terms of the conditions which such a development must meet and must overcome. The upshot was the agreement upon a set of principles which they bound themselves, each



in his own way, to teach and defend. These principles in a modified form were unanimously adopted by the convention of the Zionist Organization of America in July, 1918, under the title “Resolutions Bearing on Palestinian Policy,” and reaffirmed at subsequent conventions. The formulation of these resolutions was the work of one member of the group. The modifications were due to the criticisms of the best minds of the organization, including Mr. Brandeis. The resolutions declare:

In 1897 the first Zionist Congress at Basle defined the object of Zionism to be “the establishment of a publicly recognized and legally secured homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine.” The recent Declaration of Great Britain, France, Italy, and others of the allied democratic states have established this public recognition of the Jewish national home as an international fact.

Therefore we desire to affirm anew the principles which have guided the Zionist Movement since its inception, and which were the foundations laid down by our lawgivers and prophets for the ancient Jewish state, and were the inspiration of the living Jewish law embodied in the traditions of two thousand years of exile.

1st. Political and civil equality irrespective of race, sex, or faith, for all the inhabitants of the land.

2nd. To insure in the Jewish national home in Palestine equality of opportunity, we favour a policy which with due regard to existing rights shall tend to establish the ownership and control of the land and of all natural resources, and of all public utilities by the whole people.

3rd. All land, owned or controlled by the whole people, should be leased on such conditions as will insure the fullest opportunity for development and continuity of possession.

4th. The coöperative principle should be applied as far as feasible in the organization of all agricultural, industrial, commercial, and financial undertakings.

5th. The fiscal policy shall be framed so as to protect the people from the evils of land speculation and from every other form of financial oppression.

6th. The system of free public instruction which is to be established should embrace all grades and departments of education.

7th. The medium of public instruction shall be Hebrew, the national language of the Jewish people.

## V

The discussion of which these principles are a precipitate were inevitably wide-ranging, and inevitably entailed not merely a reversion to economic theories and programmes, but an analysis of political and cultural ideologies. As they went on and agreement came closer, they tended to take shape as an attitude of mind which involved a practical criticism and restatement of the postulates or preconceptions of current economic theories, whatever their schools. It was observed that these theories arose as attempts at justifying or correcting special economic situations, and that the theories were challenged, opposed, and finally displaced as the situations altered. There were reviewed and rejected as inapplicable, both generally to the whole region of economic life, and particularly to Palestine, the assumptions of the classical orthodox economists, of the Socialists, of the syndicalists, and of the anarchists. All these seemed to have arisen as responses to secondary rather than primary conditions, and to have undergone distortion in the degree that these primary conditions were lost sight of.

In Palestine, however, an undeveloped and backward land, the primary conditions were in no way overlaid.

For all practical purposes, no economy existed in Jewish Palestine, only a charity. An economy was to be created, and it was to be created by bringing together people of a certain character and vision, of certain habits of mind and work with a territory where even the soil would require special treatment before it could begin to support them. The attempt to envisage what they must get and what they must make led ultimately to an anatomy of the economic interests and functions of men, and this to certain premises which, commonplace as they seemed, struck many of that sophisticated company as the beginnings of a restatement of economic theory, having possibilities of much wider relevance than Palestine.

The point of departure for these premises was the observation that consumers and producers, even more than buyers and sellers, come at a certain level into inevitable conflict with each other. This conflict, so the argument ran, is more widespread and more fundamental than the Socialist's class war, inasmuch as the latter obtains only between different classes of producers in the same field of endeavour, while the former is coextensive with mankind and obtains in the heart of each and every human being. To the question why the conflict was thus universal, the answer was made that men are born consumers and only become producers. Had the world been one that was made for them, instead of one in which they happen and grow, men would have been consumers purely. The world being what it is, they have to make it over to prepare it for consumption. Thereby the whole complicated economy of industrial society comes to be in which the ultimate end of production—use, consumption

—gets displaced by the proximate end, marketing, profit; things get made, like the razors bought by the Vicar of Wakefield's son at the fair, not for use, but usury; not to serve but to sell. And even where use is held in view, the conflict is apparent. A baker wants to buy the flour and eggs and yeast and housing which he consumes as cheaply as possible and wants to sell his bread as dearly as possible. His customers, who may be the very people from whom he buys these things, want their bread as cheaply as possible, but tend to charge their own patrons all that the traffic will bear.

Nor is this the whole story, nor its most important phase. The butcher, the baker, the candlestick-maker each produces one thing only, but each consumes many things, very many things, that he does not produce and that he cannot produce; that, consequently, other people must produce for him. His interests as consumer have a much wider range and span than his interests as producer. His conflict with all other people as producer is due to the fact that his consumer's interest can be served only if he receives a return for what he produces adequate to yield him the satisfactions he craves. His returns on his production are a rough measure of the effective range of his consumption, and the completeness of his satisfactions.

Now there comes a point in consumption when the value begins to fall off. Consumption, no less than production, has its law of diminishing returns, confusedly treated by economists as "diminishing utility." In production, however, the law of diminishing returns applies only to profits. Where profits are not involved production may go on indefinitely; but consumption

stops where the point of gratification is passed. The principle of diminishing returns in consumption makes the rich man poor and turns the so-called law of supply and demand into a business man's myth. For the law confuses consuming power with purchasing power, and assumes that demand has been satisfied when people have stopped buying. But for the basic products of industrial society—food, clothing, shelter, protection against danger and disease—social demand, consuming power, is insatiable, and purchasing power limited. From the point of view of society, supply can be exhausted by consuming power, and can and often does exhaust purchasing power, as the economy of the war and the current economic crises clearly enough show.

With individuals the reverse may be the case. A dyspeptic millionaire may have endless purchasing power and yet be practically bankrupt in consuming power; the threshold at which his satisfaction stops may be very low, and the number and variety of his satisfactions may be very small. Indeed, the whole difference between a barbarian and a man of culture may be said to lie in these things. The production power and skill of each in his own sphere may be equal; that of the former may even exceed that of the latter. But the latter's capacity for consumption is enormously extended. The barbarian is able to consume only the merest necessities; the other requires not alone what the barbarian requires but a great many more things which are to him equally necessities. Civilization may be defined, in fact, as the multiplication of the necessities of life. A standard of living is high or low by just what it accepts and what

it rejects as necessary. And the standard of living is the preoccupation of consumption. Currently, it has been measured by two conditions—that of health, and that of morale. By the latter it was agreed to mean the diversity and coherence of consumption interests in a common purpose that may express the identity and continuity of a human group. Thus the country is being deserted and country life is a problem; towns are growing in number and complexity because they present the concentration of a greater diversity of satisfactions. The movement of population from country to city is a consumers' movement, not a producers'. City has more articulation, is more shot through with spiritual values, its morale is higher.

The reason is that the city is essentially a centre and organization of consumption. Consumption is the end or goal of life; production is either an instrument and servant of consumption or is identical with consumption. In the latter case the activities which men undertake are *free* activities, and their nature is that of art or science or play. They do not merely use material, they *use it up*. They are recreational in both senses of the word, and the associations of men who pursue them tend to be *free* associations with professional standards of workmanship and conduct. But the bulk of the productive activities in the economy of life are not free but bond, not recreational but exhausting. They constitute, and always must constitute, labour, not art. For, by and large, there is no liberative quality in them. They are things men do because they must, not because they want to.

And the things men do because they must are, on the whole, the things which in economic life diversify them;

the things men do because they want to are the things which unite them. Men are by nature in need of food, clothing, shelter, recreation, medicine; they are not by nature farmers or machinists or bakers or physicians or weavers or carpenters or printers. Their consuming interests are innate; their producing interests are acquired. As consumers men are, by and large, similar and equal. As producers they are, by and large, diversified and unequal.

In all societies which have attained a certain level of organization, the similarities become the basis of competition and conflict. Wanting the same things, when there are not enough to go round, as when consumers want bread and meat, or producers want patrons, seems to be the source of all wars, whether economic or political. Baker competes with baker, not with carpenter; shoemaker competes with shoemaker, not with butcher; and so on. Insofar as men are diverse, individual not merely in their vocations, but in their natures; they need one another, are interdependent and coöperative; insofar as they are similar, they tend to be competitors. That diversification of producers known as the division of labour together with the later organization of the diversified producers into guilds, trusts, trade-unions, and so on seems in the history of the industrial arts to have been conditioned upon the similarity of consumers; competition for custom was obviated by the differentiation of services. By means of this diversification and the subsequent integration of individuals of similar vocation into vocational groups, producers appear to have obtained an absolute advantage over the “ultimate” consumer, an advantage tremendously increased

through the development of the economy of industry.

The consumers' counter of this advantage has been consumers' coöperation. It is a form of organization and involves an ideology which appears later in the history of economic associations than producers' unions. It rests upon the natural and moral priority of consumption over production, and converts the consumers' similarity and equality from a competitive to a coöperative trend. It does so, moreover, under the Rochdale plan, without denying gratification to the competitive interest, since members of the system buy at cost, yet with a profit, really a saving, proportional to their purchases. Its development has been a movement from distribution by consumers for consumers to production by consumers for consumers. Never in its history has it failed to maintain the priority of consumption over production, and to extend the operation of this priority over greater and greater areas of social life.<sup>1</sup>

Producer's coöperatives, both in agriculture and in industry, do not take their point of departure from the common human interest of the consumer as such in conflict with the specialized interests of different crafts and trades and industries of producers. They take their point of departure from the class war among producers, and the difficulties that exist among them and that are involved in their theories are due to the biases caused by this origin. This makes them aim at the establishment of what is only a social means

<sup>1</sup>Cf. George Jacob Holyoake. "The History of Coöperation in England"; "The History of the Rochdale Pioneers"; L. Smith-Gordon and C. O'Brien: "Coöperation in Many Lands"; Albert Sonnischsen: "Consumer's Coöperation."



in the position of the social end—which is consumption—through the conversion of the tools and the materials of production in any craft or trade or industry into the property of all the members of the craft, or trade or industry. They hypostatize the instrument,<sup>1</sup> aiming thus at the same kind of control of the consuming public that the capitalist has, minus the class war which troubles the power of the capitalist.

To avoid the menace in such a control, to obviate the inevitable conflict between different coöperative producers' unions such as would obtain under syndicalism, and yet to make impossible the servile state which is the constant menace of socialism, the ownership of land, of the resources drawn from the land, of the tools and agencies of production, would obviously need to be vested in the consumers *as* consumers. In practice this would mean that all the inhabitants of a land would be voluntarily associated together, in a consumers' coöperative society, having a federal structure, and holding title to the land, the natural resources, and the machinery by which these are converted into consumable commodities and services and the various wants of men are satisfied. Such an organization would guarantee to all the inhabitants of the land that *usufruct* which ownership under the system of private, personal property in these things guarantees to only a few. The priority of consumption would thus be confirmed in organization and in law.

But if the pattern of economic control were limited to this feature, the essential abuses of the modern industrial system in which the class war has its ground would be neither avoided nor obviated. The producer

<sup>1</sup>Cf. H. M. Kallen: "William James and Henri Bergson," Chapter I.

in any industry would be a wage-earner and at the mercy of his employer—in effect, of the management of the industry. That he would, as a member of the National Consumers' Coöperative society, be to some degree owner as well as worker would make no practical difference, for his property right would be too small—as is the case with employees in English and other coöperatives—to modify his status of employee. If he is to get justice as a worker there must be assured to him exactly the type of freedom that the producer seeks by means of the Producers' Coöperative. It must, however, be assured to him not as against the consumer's interest but in reconciliation with it, in due acknowledgment of the priority of the consumer's end. This aim can be attained by the organization of producers according to their different trades, crafts, vocations, or professions—i. e., as agricultural labourers, carpenters, machinists, transport-workers, physicians, teachers, bankers, and so on. These organizations would, in matters of their several technologies, of the conditions of production, be self-governed and autonomous. They would be endowed with *ownership of use* in contrast to the *ownership of usufruct*, on the basis of their functions as producers. Every member of a producing coöperative would be an owner in the process of production, would be a member in a free coöperative company in which the less skilled would have a voice with the more skilled in the government of their industry as an organization of productive activities. The various associations producing commodities or services would then be federated into a single society, constituting a National Producers' Coöperative.

Thus, each citizen of the land would enter twice into

economic association with his fellows. Once, as consumer, with all his fellows; once as producer with the members only of his craft, industry, or profession. The duly-chosen administrative officers representing him as consumer together with the duly-chosen administrative officers representing him as producer would determine the economy of his country and adjust the conflict between his interests as consumer and as producer. These officers might be selected by two national assemblies chosen by the parties at interest—the consumers and the producers. They would guard the standard of living, which is the main concern of the consumer, and the conditions and methods of production which are the main concern of the producer. They would reconcile the members of the community with one another and with their own selves at just the point where their conflict is the most basic, the most enduring, and the most disastrous in its effects.

## VI

The similarity of this theory to that of the Guild Socialists comes at once to mind. Its difference, it was pointed out in course of the discussion among the Parushim, lies in the very important fact that it makes no reservations as to political government and weights the relative values of consuming and producing interests almost inversely. Guild Socialism is primarily interested in the organization of production; it acquiesces in the form of political association already existing. Preoccupied with the application of a mediæval system of producers' organization to modern industry, and regarding the problem with reference to the established institutions of the British community, its protagonists

could not have come, perhaps, to any other conclusion. Although they have ignored, in the formation of their theory, the rôle and significance of the consumers' coöperatives in England, it is still true that the politico-economic situation is there too complex, too full of secondary factors, too shot through with vested interests to make possible anything short of a violent transition from the existing pattern of British organization to such an one as has been outlined above. In Palestine again, among the Arabs, such a change would be quite as impossible. For the barbarous nature of the Arab economy in Palestine and the retarded character of the fellah institutional culture preclude it, desirable as it is. A long process of education and cultivation must intervene. At present neither the Arab mind nor Arab society, with its tribal organization, its nomadic groups, its cult of taboos and prescriptions, could without the greatest difficulty adjust itself to such a change, to say nothing of undertaking it.

The only people among whom it is possible, the argument went on, are the Jews. To them it is not only possible, it is inevitable. It is inevitable, regardless of the theoretic validity or invalidity of the plan. For in its adoption and application, in the minimum form of the Pittsburgh Programme, lies their only chance of the swift, effective conversion of Palestine into a Jewish homeland. The reason is, that no matter what part of the western world they come from, the standard of living of the Jews is very many times higher than that of the fellah. They could never survive, as wage earners, in competition with the so-much-cheaper Arab labour. They would be compelled either to emigrate or to starve. The upshot

would be that the greater part of agricultural Jewish Palestine would become a collection of manorial estates like Petach Tikwah, and the industrial Palestine to be created would be a Palestine of Jewish owners and Arab workers. The total Jewish development of Palestine would serve only to keep Jews out of Palestine.

To keep them in, they must, hence, at the same time, become both workers and owners. If the whole soil of Palestine were already in private hands, the situation would become one of extreme difficulty. To change it would cost immense sums of money and perhaps bloodshed. But both the conceptions of land-tenure that underlay Turkish law and the actual state of ownership in Palestine give the public as against the private right a certain preëminence in prestige and actual dominion. Only 15 per cent. of Transjordan, 20 of Galilee, and 50 per cent. of Judea are actually held by the fellah. In the sanjak of Jerusalem only some sixteen or seventeen thousand families of them make their living from agriculture, and on farms varying from eight to twelve acres in size. Of the balance of the land, a great proportion is in the hands of absentee landlords. Many of these acquired the mass of their holdings by means of fraudulent registrations under the law of Tabu formulated by the Porte in the early decades of the second half of the nineteenth century. This law created the same effects in Palestine as did the Enclosures in England. Public lands, commons, came into private hands. Workers suddenly found themselves transformed from owners to tenants, and innumerable fellah freeholders fell thereby first under the dominion of the Mohammedan landlord and then in the power of the Christian usurer.

The remainder of the land is public land, actually in the possession of the Government. Exclusive of the territories of El Arish and Transjordan, this land amounts to about 300,000 acres. It is *de facto* the possession of the whole people. So, in a somewhat lesser degree, are the existing Jewish holdings in Palestine. The land owned by the National Fund is that by fundamental law. The land on which the proprietary colonists are settled can in the majority of cases not be held to be either legally or by use their own. Much of it is under mortgage either to Baron Rothschild or the Jewish Colonization Association, and those who live by its exploitation are not really freeholders at all. They are the beneficiaries of a public trust, philanthropic in character if you will, but public, and capable of hypothecation without improper hardship to the beneficiaries. Thus land in Palestine immediately available for Jewish settlement is already national or semi-national.<sup>1</sup> But its very nature would compel its conversion, if it were private. For it is not like land in other parts of the world on which pioneers have settled and at once found a living. To make it habitable requires an initial investment which is like investment in the structure, instruments, and tools of an industrial plant. It must be "re-

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<sup>1</sup>News has recently come of the promulgation of a land transfer ordinance by the office of the High Commissioner. Under this ordinance all transactions other than leases of three years must be carried out through the land-registry, by the consent of the administration. Buyers or lessors must be residents of Palestine, the amount of their purchase is limited in area and price—about £3,000—and they must prove their intention immediately to undertake cultivation or development. It is to be observed that these provisions will prevent land speculation but will not encourage extensive or swift Jewish settlement. As, however, the High Commissioner is not bound to the law but can consent to land transactions without any restrictions if in his view they are for the public good, the prospects of Jewish settlement are scarcely altered by the law.

claimed” before it can be settled, and such a reclamation is beyond the powers of any one prospective settler. It is a charge upon the Jewry of the world, the returns on which it may take a generation to produce. A public charge of this kind cannot be carried except by a public administration, under public control.

With respect to public utilities and natural resources, the situation is somewhat different. Transport facilities, bar those built during the Great War by the British army for war purposes, are either privately owned or heavily mortgaged and bear, like all the public works in the recent Turkish Empire, an interest and maintenance charge out of all proportion to their earning powers. There are no other public utilities to speak of. They will have to be created. The fundamental one, on which all others will necessarily depend, is a hydro-electric service from the utilization of the water-power in the drop of the Jordan. This is the foremost, wellnigh the only one of the natural resources of the land. Both transport and industry must wait upon making available this power, and whether and how it is to be provided is contingent upon political questions of doubtful issue. These are the questions of the northern boundary and of the mandate. The latter is the more important, for by its economic terms will be established whether the decision at San Remo may actually be converted from a formula into a fact. If the Jews of the world do through the Zionist Organization in fact receive that priority in economic concessions on which alone the building of a Jewish Palestine can be hopefully postulated, they will have the opportunity to put into use the natural resources of Palestine and to develop the necessary public utilities

under conditions of a public trust. Their claims as against possible competitors are allowable only on this basis, and neither the status of public utilities elsewhere in the world, particularly in England, nor the character of the problem permit of any other.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, in the very nature of the case, the land and other natural resources and the public utilities of a Jewish Palestine must come under public control and be developed for public use. A new, large, and swift settlement of self-supporting Jews does not seem to be possible under any other conditions. That such a socialization would meet with resistance from the vested Jewish interests already established in Palestine is of course a foregone conclusion. But it is equally foregone that such resistance could be broken down either by force or persuasion. There is a precedent for persuasion having the weight of religious authority. This precedent is to be found in the Book of Nehemiah, which portrays a situation not unlike the present one. Nehemiah is the Jewish High Commissioner from Persia, devout, loyal, competent. He finds the countryside a desert and the city a desolation. He finds the "restored" Jewish community in the homeland surrounded by intriguing, inimical neighbours<sup>2</sup> and divided

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Footnote p. 292 *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Then there arose a great cry of the people and of their wives against their brethren the Jews. For there were that said, We, our sons and our daughters are many: let us get grain, that we may eat and live. Some also there were that said, We are mortgaging our fields, and our vineyards and our houses: let us get grain because of the dearth. There were also that said, We have borrowed money for the King's tribute upon our fields and vineyards. Yet now our flesh is as the flesh of our brethren, our children as their children: and lo, we bring into bondage our sons, and our daughters to be servants, and some of our daughters are brought into bondage already: neither is it in our power to help it, for other men have our fields and our vineyards.

And I was very angry when I heard their cry and these words. Then I consulted with myself and contended with the nobles and the rulers, and



into wealthy and exploiting land-owning and clerical classes on the one side, and oppressed, impoverished, and degraded masses on the other.<sup>1</sup> To guard against the neighbours all the workers are made to become soldiers as well. Against exploitation Nehemiah recalls the labour and sacrifices of the Diaspora and invokes the piety and loyalty of the classes. He succeeds. He also secures considerable contributions toward the rebuilding of the city from the “heads of fathers’ houses,” and finally he calls a public assembly, at which the Law is read by Ezra, translated to the people, and the keeping of it sworn, particularly of that portion of it dealing with land tenure and indebtedness.<sup>2</sup>

History, it may be inferred, still continues to repeat itself, though with a difference, a difference often so great as to turn repetition into mutation. In the case of the restoration of the Jewish homeland, the difference is very great, but it is not a mutation. The same essential conditions reappear: the same need of the masses, the same danger, the same spirit in the

said unto them: Ye exact usury, every one of his brother. And I held a great assembly against them. And I said unto them, We after our abilities have redeemed our brethren the Jews, that were sold unto the nations: and would ye even sell your brethren, and should they be sold unto us? Then held they their peace and found never a word. Also I said, The thing that ye do is not good: ought ye not to walk in the fear of God, because of the reproach of the nations our enemies? . . . I pray you let us leave off this usury. Restore, I pray you, to them, even this day, their fields, their vineyards, their oliveyards and their houses, also the hundredth part of the grain, the new wine, and the oil that ye exact from them. Then said they: We will restore them and will require nothing of them. . . . Then I called the priests and took an oath of them, that they would do according to this promise. . . . And the people did according to this promise. (Nehemiah v, 1-12.)

<sup>1</sup>As, on the record, the Arabs of to-day have been, and are likely to be, with alien help, for some time to come, unless their counsels are more surely guided than heretofore.

<sup>2</sup>Nehemiah, ix-x, 31.

economic proposals to obviate the danger and to serve the need. There are no men of considerable wealth and land-ownership among the Jews of Palestine. They are prevaillingly paupers, living on Halukah. Such as there are, however, might well be persuaded by the precedent recorded by Nehemiah, to convert their holdings into coöperative Jewish farms. The alternative is for them to make alliance with the Arab absentee landlords—in which case history would repeat itself, indeed—or to be crowded out automatically by the competition with the coöperative community.

## VII

The rudiments of this community already exist. But it must not be supposed that they originated *ex nihilo*, as the fulfilment of a Utopian ideal and the carrying out of a “revolutionary” programme. They arose automatically out of the total situation in which the life and labour of the people of Palestine were involved, and the crux of the problem of the economic organization of contemporary Palestinian Jewry is to be found in the question as to whether they are capable of correction and guidance to the point of functioning as agencies for the economic assimilation of great units of immigrant Jews.

Of these rudiments, the consumers’ coöperative is the more recent, and by far the more successful. It goes by the name of *Hamashbir*, literally, the grain-purveyor. Organized in 1914, shortly after the beginning of the Great War, by the five hundred or so Jewish labourers in Petah Tikwah who found themselves threatened with starvation under the profiteering which the war occasioned, it succeeded with its limited

means not merely to reduce the cost of living materially but to undertake the manufacture of jams and to give employment to a few of its members. When, in 1917, the Palestine Commission arrived, it made Hamashbir a loan to enable it to extend its operations. These were not conducted according to the Rochdale plan of selling at the market-price and distributing the difference between the market and the cost-price as a “profit” or dividend at the end of the year. Nor were purchases limited to the membership. The society sold at cost to everybody. So important were its services in the first year that its expansion was inevitable. In the three years following it was the purchaser of all the grain produced in the Jewish colonies, and established thus a relation between itself and the producers’ coöperatives. So far, what it did, it did for labourers only. In 1918, however, the approach of the British army and the retreat of the Turks led to a kiting of prices in the approved style, and the workers in the Bezalel shops, the teachers and the other “white-collar” proletarians, clamoured for provision through the agency of the society. The provision was promised and the country was scoured to add foodstuffs enough to meet their needs. But by the time this provision was secured, at exorbitant prices, the British had entered Palestine, bringing with them grains and other comestibles. Prices immediately fell. The “white-collar” people refused to buy the commodities that had been secured in their behalf. There was no way of holding them to their agreement, and thus the Coöperative Society found itself with the burden of—for it, a very large deficit—about £6,000 (sterling). This deficit has been called, by the directors

of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, a proof of the incompetency of the managers of the society and of the society's impracticality, and has been made the basis for refusing it further credit. As against this refusal credit has been extended to a new coöperative society, recently formed for these same "white-collar" classes, called *Hamazmin*—the importer. A class war between coöperatives has been initiated, not—it is impossible to believe—without malice.

The ill-will of the Anglo-Palestine company's officials has, however, affected the activities of *Hamashbir* very little. It received credit from the "groups" or Coöperative Producers' Societies, who sold it all their produce. It established a connection with the English Coöperative Wholesale, which also gave it credit. It has survived its crisis, and is again showing a profit that may enable it to meet its indebtedness.

Nevertheless, the strictures of the officials of the Anglo-Palestine Company are deserved, simply from the point of view of coöperative technique and the future of the society. It continues to sell to everybody—workers, "white-collarer," shop-keeper who may be buying to resell, Jewish "colonist" or Christian usurer. It undersells the ordinary shop-keeper, but it does not require the purchaser to be a member of the society. Of the seventy-five to one hundred thousand Jews in Palestine of whom five or six thousand are organized workmen, only about one thousand are shareholders. Being a shareholder gives no one any advantage over the rest of the population. This benefits simply at the expense of the shareholders and the profit-making competitors. It is being confirmed in its vicious habits of competitive purchase. To

function as an effective assimilating agent to consumer's coöperation Hamashbir must adopt the Rochdale plan. It must absorb Hamazmin. It must do everything in its power to make itself the *national* Coöperative Society, with every Jew in Palestine a member. It should at once place itself in the hands of the British Coöperative Wholesale Society for guidance and training toward this end. It should, if it is wisely managed, be able to secure money to lease or buy new lands on which it may settle its own members as coöperative producers' groups, supply them with tools, machinery, cattle, instruction, and other necessities, and produce, at least, most of the foodstuffs that its members consume. If it grows more powerful it should extend its operations to the arts, crafts, and industries, until as the National Consumers' Coöperative Society of Palestine it is the holder of all the land and of the natural resources and the owner of the tools and instruments of production in the land.

In the holdings of the National Fund, in the actual processes of financing Palestinian undertakings, the beginnings already exist. By squeezing the philanthropy out of them, by making their beneficiaries responsible for them through the obligation and necessity of supplying their own needs—i. e., by making their cost a charge against the Jews of Palestine organized as consumers, these beginnings can be developed into agencies of economic self-support and moral freedom for the inhabitants of the Jewish homeland.

For in relation to production also, the beginnings exist and are not unfavourable. Of the five or six thousand workers who make up the membership of the *Ahduth Avodah* or Labour Union of Jewish Palestine

more than half are agricultural labourers—composing the Agricultural Labourers' Union. Of these from one half to one third are settled upon public land in *Kvuzoth* or coöperative communities. It is these communities which in its dark hour sold their produce to Hamashbir on credit, sold it in spite of the higher rate they might have received from other purchasers and their great need of this higher price. Now these communities—there are about twenty-two of them—are far from self-supporting. They are composed almost exclusively of physically weak, agriculturally untrained men and women, European intellectuals all, who have undertaken pioneership out of love of Zion. They have been settled by the *Palästina Amt* or other agencies on such land as was available, without regard to either sanitary conditions or the essentials of housing and labour. They are unskilled, and no competent training, no foremanship has been supplied them. Once in a long time an expert-by-book would visit them and give them a lecture, but the development of manual skill and practical competency by example was not attempted, because there was nobody in officialdom able to attempt it.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, ignorant, untrained, regularly losing from 50 to 25 per cent. of their working time through malaria, they held on. They had obligated themselves to the Jewish National Fund, the Jewish Colonization Association, or the Ahuzoth (Land Acquisition Societies) for the cost of buildings, of equipment, and often of food.

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<sup>1</sup>The significance of this fact may be noted in the story of the sudden success of the bee industry in the Jewish colonies. Attempts made at various times prior to the appearance of a practical bee-keeper—Livahitz of the Mikveh Israel school—failed. The latter within a year taught the colonies to produce honey at a profit.

The obligations were to be paid out of their earnings, but, as they themselves sardonically declared, all that they earned—all that they could earn—was a deficit. The life organized for them and by them has been a compromise between an ideology and a condition. As they possessed neither the materials nor the technology to master the condition, they found escape in their ideology and in the free play it could get in the politics of Jewish life in Palestine. If their communities are not “culturally” Arabized as are the “colonial” settlements, they are economically Arabized, in that the standard of living has been degraded and the *technological morale*, wherever it developed, as in Merchavia, destroyed.

Nevertheless, they represent the basic type of agricultural organization on which alone the building of a Jewish Palestine can be successfully accomplished. Given competent foremanship, instruction aiming at manual skill, and practical agricultural judgment instead of theoretical botanical knowledge; given proper sanitation and modern tools, the urge which took these young people to Palestine and holds them there can be turned into a technological channel where now it runs in merely a political one. The point of departure for their coöperative organization can then become the problem involved in their work, and the free ordering of their lives can at last take its direction from this common base. As members of the Consumers' Coöperative, they will, in their producers' association, be working equally for themselves and their fellows. They will be responsible to their peers, not to their alien and superior benefactors. The whole basis of their incentives will be shifted, and will become more

pertinent to the inward interests and the actual course and condition of their daily lives.

The same thing is true in a lesser degree of the other crafts and industries represented in the *Ahduth Avodah*. There are two coöperative societies of printers and of carpenters, one of bakers, one of shoemakers, one of machinists. The iron workers, and of course the railroad workers, are not in a position to labour coöperatively, and of the bakers, the majority are "hands," not partners in the enterprise. Their membership in Hamashbir, the acquisition by Hamashbir of the private bakershops and printeries and carpenteries and machine shops and such, are easy steps, prerequisite to the reorganization of the practitioners of these crafts into self-governing producers' units, each embracing all the levels and stages of the industries and including an adequate system of apprenticeship and industrial education. The step toward the conversion of the railroads into a coöperative producers'-consumers' enterprise is a more complicated and difficult one. Imperialistic foreign investment is involved and the Jewish employees are in very small minority. The first move must be toward the representation of the workers in the existing management, and the focalization of their interest upon the problems of management.

For the rest, *Ahduth Avodah* itself constitutes the beginning of the national producers' organization. Its constituent units are the associations, unions, "groups" of the various craftsmen and workers at present composing the organized section of the labour or producers' interest of the Jewish homeland. But both in its form and in its objective *Ahduth Avodah* is



preoccupied not with self-government in industry, not with effecting coördination, economy, and competency in the business of production, but with the class war which is the interest of mere trades unionism, with the beneficiary institutions of such unionism—i. e., Ahduth Avodah maintains a sick fund, an employment bureau, a bureau of information, a kitchen, and a sanatorium (not, of course, at its own expense merely)—and most of all with the political manoeuvring which is so much a filling, like cards for the idle, of the otherwise empty lives in Palestine. The Union has been made to reflect the political and ideological differences of the Jewish Socialist parties in the Diaspora, and like all Jewish organizations has been inclined to lay more stress on ideology than on the problems of the daily life. Recently it has shown signs of waking up to the realities of the situation. If it become thoroughly awake, it will at once devote itself to the expansion of Hamashbir and the inclusion of all the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, whether otherwise coöperators or not, in workers' or producers' associations that shall then become members of the Ahduth Avodah. The teachers are already organized, and in terms of the American Zionist Medical Unit, the physicians and sanitarians are organized. They should be included in Ahduth Avodah. So should all other professions, crafts, industries that supply commodities or services for the inhabitants of the Jewish homeland. Their mutual relations should be thoroughly analyzed and defined, and a programme of common action looking ultimately toward a commonwealth based on primarily economic and functional relationships should be worked out and undertaken. The proximate end in

view should be to create a set of institutions that will be *ready* to replace the mandatory in full responsibility for the life of the commonwealth. Perhaps the central item in such a programme, if the implications of the present organization are acknowledged to their logical limit, is education.

### VIII

Now there exists a certain traditional eulogium regarding the Jewish interest in and aptitude for education. This eulogium is misleading, for the reason that successful education is never education in a vacuum. Teaching and learning are always the teaching and learning of some particular thing, at a given time and in a given place and under given circumstances. The significance and value of what is taught and what is learned are determined by its relevance to the life that it is supposed to liberate and to guide at the time and in the place and under the circumstances. The education on which the Jewish "love of learning" is postulated has been irrelevant, other-worldly, speculative, and verbal. It has had little regard for the realities of things, and much for typical compensations-in-idea for the unsatisfactoriness of those realities. It has been an education in fantasy and dream. This has been almost as true of the modern Yiddish and neo-Hebrew developments—*vide* Ahad Ha'amism—as of the older Talmudical ones. In Palestine it has been notorious. The whole so-called "modern" system of education there is education by book. The teachers are mostly untrained in pedagogical technique, neo-Hebraists who are teachers by virtue of their devotion to Hebrew rather than by virtue of their professional

competency. Associated into a union, they share with the community and the Zionists the responsibility for the organization and the effectiveness of instruction. The agency of this responsibility is the *Vaad Hachinuch*, composed of three representatives of each of the three parties at interest. But the Vaad has established no effective coördination and exercises no competent control. It has no system of records, no adequate supervision. Principals and teachers do much as they please, without regard to professional standards of effectiveness and improvement. Vocational education there is none whatsoever. Instruction is exclusively by book and by word. Its victims are taught Hebrew but not the conditions of labour and the practice of life according to the requirements of Palestine. They are taught in places which are sanitary abominations, and with materials almost barbarous in their inadequacy. Nevertheless, the cost of instruction, in the light of the returns on it, is extraordinarily high, and is paid for almost wholly by contributions from America. The Palestinian community shirks the responsibility: of the £100,000 or so spent in 1919 on education, Palestinians contributed only £8,000. Adult education, barring instruction in Hebrew secured at their own cost by voluntary classes, is practically non-existent.

Clearly, for a pioneer country like Palestine, where relevant knowledge is of the uttermost importance, these conditions are criminal. Public education will have to take as its point of departure the conditions and necessities of life in Palestine, not irrelevant cultural conceptions generated outside of Palestine. It will have to move from work to vision, in terms of

the actual economic enterprises undertaken and developed in Palestine and of the forms of free human organization these indicate or require. Thus—to take topics of instruction mostly absent from the Palestinian curriculum—geography must be taught as an actual outgrowth of the topography of the scene of the daily life, and not as a remote thing in a book; zoology must be made to derive from animal life on the farm; botany, similarly from the vegetable life, or from the problems of the carpenter's shop. Particularly must the so-called social sciences—economics, sociology, history, social psychology—spring directly from the actual processes of want and work as want is expressed and work is organized and undertaken at home, and as it is known to be undertaken abroad. Instruction, which is now the inculcation of doctrine, must become the creation of practice, and the derivation of doctrine from practice.<sup>1</sup> To accomplish this will require the importation, for the young, of a large number of teachers, preferably from the United States, who can teach the use of the hands as against those that teach the use of the tongue. It will require, for adults, the provision of competent foremen and of higher officers of management who will know how to make of every farm and factory a school that will reveal the interlinking of the specific operation on the spot with the present life, the past history, and the future destiny of men the world over. And this will need to be done as quickly as possible at a charge upon the economic unit involved, not upon the charity of the Diaspora.

Education, in a word, must become an integral part,

<sup>1</sup>*Cf.* Dewey: "Democracy and Education."

expressly provided for, of every enterprise undertaken in Palestine. The remaking of the mind of the present population, the reconstruction of the population to come, must not be left to the decision of events, to chance, or to circumstance. The growth of the commonwealth, no less than the growth of its children, must be consciously directed. Its institutions must be realizations of its ideals, not contradictions of them; its ideals must be expressions of its institutions, not compensations for them. Broadly speaking, hence, the educational system must be made coincident with the whole community. Not merely in the official schools, but in each enterprise of agriculture and of industry men and women must be taught the art of self-government and of specific technological responsibility through self-government.

For the young, moreover, who are at school, an opportunity for public service should be provided. It should be provided because what would otherwise be the cost of this service could be used in maintaining the compulsory school age up to the age of nineteen or twenty. It should be provided, also, because it is the surest guarantee of the survival of a democratic spirit and the maintenance of a democratic morale. Much of the misunderstanding between classes of society, not merely between rich and poor, but between carpenters and machinists, bricklayers and plumbers, farmers and industrialists, physicians and mechanics, is due to their failure imaginatively to realize each others' lives. This failure comes from the absence of common fundamental experience in the business of living. A man who has never actually spread dung in a wheat-field, cleared out an irrigation ditch, run a lathe, or

mended a road can never get the outlook of one whose life consists in doing just that and nothing more. There are, undoubtedly, in every population, a proportion of persons whose abilities extend to nothing more. And it is recognized that there are also a far greater proportion known as "the average man" who can live and work on a richer and more varied level, but who do not get the opportunity. It is agreed, moreover, that no educational system is competent which does not supply the maximum of opportunity, and what has been suggested should, if properly undertaken, accomplish just that. But it still remains inexorably a fact that every community rests upon certain basic activities—the so-called "dirty work" of civilized society—which are the foundations and occasions of the more specialized activities of the different crafts, trades, industries, and professions, whatever be their nature. In this "dirty work," hence, every citizen should have a share: in building roads, digging irrigation ditches, tending fields or orchards, running machines, and so on. The time for this work is during the school age—in the vacations of the period from the fourteenth to the twentieth year. After schooldays, whatever enterprise or profession is desirable or fit: during schooldays, participation in the indispensable basic activities of the community.

Education would thus be made to play its inevitable rôle to the advantage and not the obstruction of the development of the Jewish homeland. Take care of education, says Plato, and education will take care of everything else. Whatever the climate, the condition of the land, the nature and extent of the natural resources, the social traditions and individual character

of the people, whatever their present interests and future aspirations may be and imply, the one force which will count more than any other toward the alteration or perfection of these is education. In the end the success or failure of the New Zion will be attributable to the quality, extent, direction, and competency of its educational system.

IX

In the end. . . .

In the end, clearly. But not more so than in the beginning. The beginning is, however, modified by other considerations, most of which have been enumerated and studied. There remains one to consider in conclusion, which is of primary importance. This is the will and attitude of the sources of capital. For assuming even the best will on the part of the authorities and the Jews of Palestine toward the attainment of the type of community here indicated, the very great sums that the initial investment in such an enterprise will require make the whole matter ultimately dependent on the sources of capital. These sources will of necessity be found outside the Zionist organization, among the Jews—particularly the great and rich Jews—of the world. How they envisage their relation to Palestine, what they mean to do and to refrain from doing becomes the central fact of the Diaspora upon which the reorganization of the Zionist movement itself must turn. The indications are that their attitude is positive and responsible, conspicuously in England and in the United States. In England an Economic Council has been forming, under the leadership of Sir Alfred Mond and Major James de Roths-

child, and in the United States the Conference of American Rabbis have adopted resolutions declaring that however much they differ from the Zionists in theory, they are desirous to join hands with them in the upbuilding of Palestine. Where Zionism was felt as a challenge and a defiance, Palestine is felt as a task and a responsibility. There appears no sufficient reason to doubt that the non-Zionist Jews accept and will carry the task.

But how, and on what conditions? The usual incentives to investment are lacking in the case of Palestine. Even the interest on a government loan, should one be called for, would need to be somewhat below the market, if the Jews only were to take it, as an earnest of good faith. Many of the enterprises to be undertaken in Palestine will earn no income whatsoever in the beginning, and only a small one in the course of time. A sense of religious duty, of social responsibility, these far more than the desire for profit, may be said to have moved non-Zionists to offer service and aid. The same motive will move them to investment in the upbuilding of a Jewish Palestine. But also, and perhaps largely, the desire to mitigate the home problems that arise out of immigration will move them: Palestine is nearer to central Europe than America or Australia and the establishment of the immigrant there is far less costly. Interest in particular modes of development will move them. But not profits as profits. For an undertaking in Palestine initiated merely by the hope of gain can mean only what concessionary enterprises mean in any undeveloped country—the sweating of labour at starvation wages, the skimping of power and the waste of material,



the multiplication of charges. Such undertakings can only serve, as has already been observed, to drive the Jews from Palestine, not to implant them there. Investments in Palestinian enterprises will necessarily serve a public end far more than a private motive. Investors will need to be glad, if, in the course of time, their money comes back to them, and if it does not come back to them, but has actually served to make numbers of their tragic brethren from central Europe permanently at home in Palestine, they will not need to be without rejoicing.

Aiming at no profits in the sense in which investors in other fields aim at profits, they will not tolerate the risks which are undertaken in the hope of profit. They will wish their money to be used with all the economy, speed, and efficiency possible; i. e., they will wish the greatest possible number of Jews implanted and self-supporting upon Palestinian soil in the shortest possible time. They will resent the waste that comes through the reduplication of effort, through haste, through carelessness, through incoördination, through irresponsibility, incompetence, untrustworthiness, through any of the conditions that have hitherto prevailed under the East-European Zionist administration in Palestine. The very nature of their objective rules out as dangerous and undesirable the initiation of a collection of diverse projects, each going on its own. The primary want, hence, is for a coördinating central agency, which shall specify, analyze, and establish priorities in the economic needs in Palestine, and shall take the initiative in creating the industrial and financial instruments to serve their needs. It is an agency, that is, which would function like the American War Industries

Board during the Great War. Its organization, however, would need to be determined by the conditions out of which it arises and the interests it serves. It would have to be called together, obviously, by the Zionists, who alone are prepared to assume the already long-delayed initiative. They might designate the Economic Council or some other body to undertake to secure the financing of a company to develop, for example, hydro-electric operations involving water-power, water-supply, drainage, and irrigation, and a company to create the building industry, from quarrying to construction, in the form of a guild like those now in operation in Manchester and London. Each company, as it is formed, would automatically send a representative chosen by the investors to the coördinating agency. If, in addition, it is provided that the people of Palestine as *producers* and as *consumers* are also represented on this board, then the whole of Jewry would be adequately represented, and represented in their groupings as the parties at interest. The Zionists and the Jews in general would be represented by the agencies designated to take the initiative: the investors by their chosen representatives; the Jews of Palestine by election from Hamashbir and from Ahduth Avodah whose expansion to the point of embracing the total Jewish population of Palestine would be automatically secured by the assignment to them of this electoral responsibility. The coördinating agency thus standing for all Jewry would be a trustee for all Jewry in the development of Jewish Palestine. It might establish its trusteeship by holding Founders' Shares analogous to those of the Jewish Colonial Trust or by more effective or convenient

devices. Its charter should require it to devise and provide ways by which, in the fulness of time, the ownership of its enterprises shall pass to the Jews of Palestine organized as a National Consumers' Coöperative Association and the management of each pass to its working force organized as the Producers' Coöperative Society of the whole industry.

The steps which lead to this culmination involve a type of financial arrangement and industrial organization for which there is no merely "business" precedent. But neither is there a precedent for the problem these are designed to solve. The matter of importance is that there does exist among the Jews of the world the will to solve the problem, but not the realization of the inexorable terms and conditions of its solution. These, and the methods by which alone they may be met and mastered, have been indicated in the Pittsburgh Programme and the studies that underly it. The New Life of the Jewish people in the New Zion will either attain the forms designated or remain a compensatory ideal.

**THE END**



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